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Massachusetts Appellate Case Citations
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Division of Property
Cases
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Baccanti v. Morton: (2001)
Leading Massachusetts case on
the treatment of Stock Options
in Divorce.
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Belsky v. Belsky 9 Mass. App.
852 (1980)-Future inheritance
can be taken into account when
dividing assets in divorce.
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Bianco v. Bianco 371 Mass.
420 (1976) Early case interpreting
MGL
Ch. 208 section 34 relating to
division of assets.
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Dalessio v. Dalessio 409 Mass.
821(1991) Case involving division
of proceeds of personal injury
claims in divorce.
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Dewan v. Dewan 17 Mass. App.
Ct. 97(1983)—leading case on dividing
pensions.
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D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct.
488 (2004). The Huband’s interests
in certain trusts were property
excluded from the marital estate
subject to property division pursuant
to G.L.c. 208, § 34, and the Husband’s
income from the trusts were treated
as streams of income to establish
alimony and child support orders.
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Drapek v. Drapek: 399 Mass.
240 (1987). A spouse’s professional
degree is not considered a marital
asset subject to property division
under G.L. c. 208, § 34. However,
the spouse’s earning potential
is considered when ordering alimony
and property division.
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Early v. State Board of Retirement
420 Mass. 836. Public Employment,
Retirement. Retirement. Divorce
and Separation, Division of property.
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Hanify v. Hanify 403 Mass
184(1988) Pending lawsuits are
marital
assets and can be divided by a
divorce judgment.
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Kuban v. Kuban: 48 Mass.App.Ct.
387 (1999). The wife was not entitled
to contributions made to the husband's
retirement annuities, which were
made by the husband's employer
after the effective date of the
dissolutions of the parties' marriage.
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Moriarty v. Stone: 41 Mass.App.Ct.
151 (1996). The parties co-habited
for ten (10) years prior to their
marriage, and it was no error
by the judge to consider their
pre-marital contributions when
determining an equitable division
under G.L.c. 208, § 34.
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Putnam v. Putnam 5 Mass. App.
Ct. 10(1977) Division of assets
may not
be justified purely by bad conduct
by one of the parties. All factors
under 208 Section 34 must be considered.
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Rice v. Rice: 372 Mass. 398,
400 (1977). A party’s estate is
defined as “all property to which
he holds title, however, acquired.”
This allows a judge to assign
“to one spouse property of the
other whenever and however acquired.”
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Savides v. Savides: 400 Mass.
250 (1987). After a lengthy separation,
it was appropriate for the Court
to value the marital assets at
the date of separation because
the spouse made no further financial
contributions to the marriage.
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Williams v. Massa: (2000)
Leading Case on Inherited property.
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Child Custody Cases
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Ardizoni v. Raymond: 40 Mass.App.Ct.
734 (1996). The best interests
of the child is the guiding principle
when determining child custody
awards.
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Rosenthal v. Maney, 51 Mass.
App. Ct. 257 (2001). A parent
may remove a child out of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
if he/she has established a “good,
sincere, reason” or a “real advantage”
for moving.
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Bailey v. Bailey 27 Mass.
App. Ct. 502(1989) The trial court
has the power to decide which
parent gets the child dependency
exemptions for federal tax purposes.
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Child Support Cases
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Brooks v. Piela, 61 Mass.App.Ct.
731(2004). In a modification action
for child support the probate
judge did not abuse her discretion
by considering the non-custodial
parent’s enhanced income and the
disparity of the standard of living
in each household, where the judge
considered the children’s needs
and stipulated evidence that the
children’s ages and their increased
expenses justified an increase
in child support.
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Department of Revenue v. Roe,
29 Mass.App.Ct. 967 (1990) In
paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A.
c. 209C, § 9, courts have the
authority to order retroactive
child support for this period
from the birth of the child to
the entry of the order.
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Department of Revenue v. Doe,
31 Mass.App.Ct. 924 (1991) In
paternity cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A.
c. 209C, § 9, courts have the
authority to order retroactive
child support for this period
from the birth of the child to
the entry of the order.
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Department of Revenue v. G.W.A,
412 Mass. 435 (1992) In paternity
cases, pursuant to M.G.L.A. c.
209C, § 9, courts have the authority
to order retroactive child support
for this period from the birth
of the child to the entry of the
order.
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Donovan v. Donovan 15 Mass.
App. Ct 61(1982) Worker’s compensation
benefits can be assigned for payment
of alimony and child support.
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O’Meara v. Doherty, 53. Mass.App.Ct.
599 (2002). In paternity cases,
pursuant to M.G.L.A. c. 209C,
§ 9, courts have the authority
to order retroactive child support
for this period from the birth
of the child to the entry of the
order.
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Passemato v. Passemato: (1998)
Leading Case of Educational Trust
for College Expenses.
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Richardson v. Department of Revenue,
423 Mass. 378 (1996). A person
who voluntarily acknowledges his
paternity, and agrees to pay child
support is not entitled to recover
child support payments when it
was determined that he was not
the father nine (9) years later.
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Schuler v. Schuler: 382 Mass.
366 (1981). The husband filed
a Complaint for Modification to
reduce his support obligations
because he had a substantial reduction
in income. The Court refused to
reduce his support payments because
he failed to show “a material
change in circumstances” as he
still had the ability to pay his
current support obligations.
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Silvia v. Silvia 9 Mass. Appt.
Ct 339(1980)—The income or assets
of a second spouse can be considered
by the court in awarding child
support because the existence
of these assets or income effects
the ability of parents to use
their own resources to pay child
support.
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Visitation
Cases
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- Grandparent Visitation
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Blixt v. Blixt: 437 Mass.
649 (2002). In a Complaint for
Grandparent Visitation, the grandparent
must show that the “failure to
grant visitation will cause the
child significant harm by adversely
affecting the child’s health,
safety, or welfare. The requirement
of significant harm presupposes
proof of a showing of a significant
preexisting relationship between
the grandparent and the child.
In the absence of such a relationship,
the grandparent must prove that
visitation between the grandparent
and the child is nevertheless
necessary to protect the child
from significant harm.”
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Dearborn v. Deausault: 61
Mass.App.Ct. 234 (2004). A substantial,
meaningful and nurturing relationship
between a grandparent and grandchild
is not the kind of relationship
that failure to grant visitation
will cause the child significant
harm. If, however, the grandparent
can show through "expert
testimony or otherwise" that
visitation is necessary to protect
the children from significant
harm, the grandparent may present
such evidence to the court.
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Prenuptial
Agreement Cases
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Dematteo v. Dematteo: (2002)
Leading Massachusetts Case on
Prenuptial Agreements.
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Knox v. Remick: 371 Mass.
433 (1976). If a judge finds that
a parties' separation agreement
"was not a product of fraud
or coercion," fair and reasonable
at the time of entry of the judgment
nisi, and the parties agreed to
the finality of their agreement's
provision regarding spousal support,
then the separation agreement
should be specifically enforced
'absent countervailing equities.'
An example of ‘countervailing
equities’ may be that a spouse
is or will become a public charge
or where a party has not complied
with a provision of the separation
agreement.
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Austin v. Austin: Divorce
and Separation, Antenuptial agreement.
Complaint for divorce filed in
the Barnstable Division of the
Probate and Family Court Department
on May 31, 2001.
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College Education & Divorce
Cases
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Lang v. Koon, 61 Mass.App.Ct.
22 (2004). A judge erred by
ordering future college expenses
where there were no special
circumstances to justify the
order.
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McCarthy v. McCarthy: 36
Mass.App.Ct. 490 (1994). The
parties’ separation agreement
survived the judgment of divorce
and had independent legal significance,
and there was no provision regarding
college education. As such,
there was no significant change
in circumstances to justify
a modification of the parties’
agreement to order the husband
to pay for college educational
expenses.
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Purdy v. Colangelo, 61 Mass.App.Ct.
362 (2004). When a separation
agreement is silent as to college
education, a party may not seek
a judicial modification of the
agreement for college contribution
after the child graduates, unless
there are exceptional circumstances.
Alimony
Cases
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Cohan v. Feuer 442 Mass. 151,
(2004) The general rule is that
the payment of alimony terminates
when the obligor spouse dies or
the obligee remarries, “unless
either (1) the original decree
on agreement provides otherwise
or the parties legally amend their
agreement to provide otherwise,
or (2) in the case of the obligor’s
death, the court makes written
findings establishing that termination
of the award would work a substantial
injustice because of facts not
present in most cases.
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Cooper v. Cooper, 62 Mass.App.Ct.
130 (2004). A judge’s finding
did support its order to modify
alimony in excess of the terms
of the original divorce judgment.
Thus; its judgment was vacated
as to the alimony order that was
in excess of the original divorce
judgment, unless a judge found
that “the husband’s income was
of such magnitude as to be well
in excess of adjustments to income
reasonably anticipated by the
parties’ separation agreement
and that the agreement’s provisions
for support and property were
inadequate to maintain the wife
in the standard of living enjoyed
by the parties while married.”
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D.L. v. G.L., 61 Mass.App.Ct.
488 (2004). Based on the circumstances
in this case, it was an error
to limit the duration of the Wife’s
alimony award, as her future income
from employment was uncertain
and her expected inheritence was
too indefinite in time.
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Goldman v. Goldman 28 Mass
App. Ct. 603 (1990.) Court disapproved
a trial court order of eight years
of alimony in a 20 year marriage.
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Gottsegen v. Gottsegen 397
Mass. 617(1986.) Important case
on the issue of enforceability
of co-habitation clauses terminating
alimony.
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Grubert v. Grubert: 20 Mass.
App. Ct. 811, 819 (1985). When
awarding alimony to a spouse,
the “need” of a spouse is determined
by “the ‘station’ of the parties
--- by what is required to maintain
a standard of living comparable
to the one enjoyed during the
marriage.”
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Lynch v. Lynch 5 Mass. Appt.
Ct. 167(1977.) Marital conduct
cannot be the primary determinant
of the amount of alimony.
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Rosenberg v. Rosenberg 33
Mass. App. Ct. 903(1992) In high
asset case, involving a long term
marriage, the wife received $4,000,000
in cash and other assets equivalent
to approximately 30 percent of
a marital estate worth $22,000,000.
The court approved a judgment
awarding $2000 per week alimony
in addition to this property settlement.
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Sampson v. Sampson, 62 Mass.App.Ct.
366 (2004). The alimony award
was vacated and the issue of property
division was remanded for reconsideration
because the probate judge’s order
left the wife in “economically
strained circumstances while [the
husband was] guaranteed continued
enjoyment of the secure, comfortable
marital lifestyle.”
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Thomsen v. Thomsen 12 Mass.
Appt. Ct 1010 (1981)—Alimony award
which included cost of living
increase was permissible.
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Jurisdiction Cases
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- Residency Requiremments
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Caffyn v. Caffyn: (2004) Leading
case on residency requirement
for filing for divorce in Massachusetts.
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Alphabetical Index of Massachusetts
Appellate Cases
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