Executive Director,
National Coalition for Child Protection
Reform
CONTENTS
Overview
The Spreading Panic
Scenes From a Courthouse
The Inside Story
The Danger to Children
DCF Workers
Get Their Marching Orders
Overintervention Is The Problem
The View from the Frontlines Extended
Hostility
The Law Formerly Named for Kayla
The In-between Cases
Failing at Adoption
Privatization: As Irrelevant as Ever
Getting it Right in Pittsburgh The
Litany of Excuses
Conclusion
Notes
Appendix1: Eight Ways to do
Child Welfare Right
Appendix2: DCF Documents
Its own failure
ABOUT NCCPR
The National Coalition for Child Protection
Reform is a non-profit organization
whose members have encountered the
child protective system in their professional
capacities and work to make it better
serve America's most vulnerable children.
Board of Directors: President: Martin
Guggenheim, Director of Clinical and
Advocacy Programs, New York University
Law School. Vice President: Carolyn
Kubitschek, attorney specializing
in child welfare law, former Co-ordinator
of Family Law, Legal Services for
New York City. Treasurer: Joanne C.
Fray, attorney with extensive experience
with litigation involving the care
and protection of children and termination
of parental rights, Lexington, Mass.
Directors: Elizabeth Vorenberg, (Founding
President) former Assistant Commissioner
of Public Welfare, State of Massachusetts;
former Deputy Director, Massachusetts
Advocacy Center; former member, National
Board of Directors, American Civil
Liberties Union; Annette Ruth Appell,
Associate Professor, William S. Boyd
School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas; former member of the Clinical
Faculty, Children and Family Justice
Center, Northwestern University Law
School Legal Clinic, former Attorney
and Guardian ad Litem, office of the
Cook County, Ill. Public Guardian;
Marty Beyer, Ph.D., clinical psychologist
and consultant to numerous child welfare
reform efforts; Ira Burnim, Legal
Director, Judge Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law, Washington, DC;
former Legal Director, Children's
Defense Fund; former Staff Attorney,
Southern Poverty Law Center; Diane
Redleaf, former Supervisory Attorney,
Children's Rights Project, Legal Assistance
Foundation of Chicago; Prof. Dorothy
Roberts, Northwestern University School
of Law. Staff: Richard Wexler, Executive
Director. Author, Wounded Innocents:
The Real Victims of the War Against
Child Abuse. (Prometheus Books: 1990,
1995).
NCCPR's National Advocacy Activities
are funded by grants from the Annie
E. Casey Foundation and the Open Society
Institute, part of the Soros Foundations
Network.
NATIONAL COALITION FOR CHILD PROTECTION
REFORM
53 Skyhill Road (Suite 202)
Alexandria VA 22314
www.nccpr.org
Phone/Fax: (703) 212-2006
e-mail: NCCPR@AOL.COM
First Edition, February, 2001
THE LENGTHENING SHADOW
How Florida's continuing foster care
panic endangers children A report
from the National Coalition for Child
Protection Reform
Overview
Amber and Michael Grubb and their
children already were in mourning
last March 17.
A four-week-old infant had died of
sudden infant death syndrome. Sheriff's
detectives had been to the house,
investigated, and concluded there
had been no foul play. But by law,
they had to notify the Florida Department
of Children and Family Services.
The Lakeland Ledger told the story
of what happened next. Hours after
the detectives left, at 3 a.m., there
was a knock on the door. It was a
DCF caseworker. It didn't take long
for her to get to the point.
"Have you ever heard of the Kayla
McKean Child Protection Act?"
She asked.
There would be no investigation. The
detectives' findings were ignored.
The worker demanded that the Grubbs'
children, five-year-old Morgan and
19-month-old Julian, be awakened so
they could be seized on the spot.
If the children can't stay here, the
Grubbs said, could they at least stay
with a grandparent? The DCF worker
said no. How about aunts and uncles?
The DCF worker said no. Then the Grubbs
suggested a cousin who also happens
to be a licensed foster parent and
former child abuse investigator married
to a Sheriff's deputy. The DCF worker
said no to that, too. Only
tearing the children from the arms
of their parents in the middle of
the night and placing them with complete
strangers would truly be, as DCF and
similar agencies love to say, "erring
on the side of the child."
Eight hours later, a judge rubber-stamped
the removal - as judges almost always
do -- but agreed to move the children
to relatives. Only later, after a
preliminary autopsy report confirmed
the Sheriff's findings, were the children
finally allowed to go home.
DCF's handling of the case infuriated
the Sheriff's office. "When I
came into the office at 8 a.m. the
next morning and heard those kids
had been snatched at 3 in the morning
I hit the roof," said Polk County
Sheriff's Sergeant Larry Cavallaro.
"There was no need to traumatize
the family any more."
"What do I say when [my child]
asks me, 'Mom, why did they have to
take me away?'"
--Amber Grubb
The Grubb children actually were luckier
than many others caught up in Florida's
ongoing foster care panic. Their parents
are middle class, relatively prominent
in the community and could afford
a private lawyer. The children were
back home within a day.
But even one day was time enough to
do plenty of damage. Says Amber Grubb:
"What do I say when Morgan asks
me, 'Mom, why did they have to take
me away?'"[1]
And had the Grubbs been poor their
children might still be in foster
care. Just ask Keith McConnico.
At least once a month McConnico boards
a bus in New York City for a 1,285
mile 24-hour trip to Lakeland. That
would be hard enough for anyone. But
McConnico has cerebral palsy. He can't
walk without elbow crutches.
He makes the trips because that's
what it takes for him to be able to
see his two-year-old son, Steon. DCF
took the boy away nearly two years
ago. Keith McConnico was not accused
of abusing his son. He is not a drug
addict. Keith McConnico's only crime
is to be handicapped and need some
help to raise the boy. Rather than
provide the help, DCF took the boy.
Unable to get assistance from the
State of Florida to help him live
on his own, McConnico had to move
to New York to live with his mother.
She's willing to take in the boy as
well. And New York authorities have
approved the arrangement.
[A]s operated, the Florida foster
care system is the single biggest
abuser, neglecter and exploiter of
children in Florida."
--Attorney Karen Gievers
But even though a judge overruled
DCF in December 1999, father and son
still were not together as of last
November 29. DCF says these interstate
cases take time.
McConnico says, "They take away
kids and ask questions later."[2]
McConnico might not even have won
in court if not for the very disability
that cost him his child in the first
place. He won based not on any child
welfare statute, but because of the
federal Americans with Disabilities
Act.[3] For families that are simply
poor and homeless, there is not even
that option.
Indeed, some women are forced to choose
between living with an abusive husband
or boyfriend, or losing their children
to DCF. As The Ledger reported in
December:
"Fearful of losing their children
to state child abuse workers, many
women avoid the streets by staying
in abusive relationships, living with
friends or leaving children with relatives.
"There is some validity to the
fear of losing their children, said
Ruth Olinger of Lighthouse Ministries,
and it prevents many homeless women
from asking for help.
"'It's sad. They don't know what
else to do to feed their children
and protect them from the (foster
care) system.'"[4]
Morgan and Julian Grubb, Steon McConnico,
and all those children in all those
homeless families are among the casualties
of a foster care panic that continues
to destroy children in order to "save"
them.
One year ago, when the National Coalition
for Child Protection Reform released
its first report on the Florida Foster
Care Panic, Shadow on the Sunshine
State, we said there is probably no
place worse in America to be a foster
child than the State of Florida. It's
still true. Indeed, a class-action
lawsuit filed by Attorney Karen Gievers
alleges that the Florida foster care
system violates the U.S Constitution
prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.[5] The lawsuit alleges
that "as
operated, the Florida foster care
system is the single biggest abuser,
neglecter and exploiter of children
in Florida."[6] It is a system
that, the lawsuit says, turns children
into "virtual hostages."[7]
Years of neglect brought Florida to
this point. But the problems have
been vastly exacerbated by the misguided
policies of DCF Secretary Kathleen
Kearney and the statute formerly known
as the Kayla McKean Child Protection
Act.
There is more than one reason for
the Florida foster care crisis. But
the most important reason is this:
Florida takes too many children from
their parents. They are taken from
homes that are safe, or could be made
safe with the right kind of
services.
The problem is not ill will. DCF workers
are not jack-booted thugs who take
joy in destroying families. By and
large they are dedicated, hardworking
individuals doing an almost impossible
job for absurdly low pay. And, as
we noted last year, we have no reason
to question Kearney's motives. But
the road to foster care hell has been
paved with Kathleen
Kearney's good intentions.
As we also said last year, Kearney's
approach can be boiled down to a single
sentence: Take the child and run.
Kearney's justification for all the
pain inflicted by this approach is
that it will make children safer -
indeed, despite the mass of evidence
to the contrary, she repeated the
claim in her response to Shadow on
the Sunshine State.[8] But what we
said then is even more apparent now:
The problem with the approach taken
by Kearney and [State Sen. Anna Cowin,
who sponsored the Kayla McKean law]
is not that it hurts parents, though
of course it does. The problem with
their approach is that it hurts children.
· It hurts children when they are
subjected to emotionally devastating
interrogations and stripsearches .
· It hurts children when they are
taken from everything loving and familiar
and thrown in with strangers, never
knowing if they will see their mother
and father - and often brothers, sisters,
grandparents, friends, teachers, and
classmates --
ever again. Younger children often
assume they must have done something
terribly wrong, and now they are being
punished.
· It hurts children when the emotional
trauma is compounded by physical and
sexual abuse in foster care itself,
a widespread problem nationwide and
one which worsens during a foster
care panic.
· And it hurts children when workers
are so overwhelmed dealing with the
huge increases in their caseloads
that they have even less time to find
children in real danger, so more such
children are overlooked.
And that is exactly what happened.
Over and over again, we heard that
Kearney's policies and the Kayla McKean
law were necessary to save lives.
Let us take away huge numbers of children,
we were told, and fewer children will
die. But when DCF finally released
the data on child abuse fatalities
for the first full year of the foster
care panic, 1999, they were virtually
unchanged from 1998, before Kearney
took office. All the wrongful removal
of children, all the misery of children
torn from loving homes, all the abuse
of children in overcrowded, substandard
foster care - it was all for nothing.
All the wrongful removal of children,
all the misery of children torn from
loving homes, all the abuse of children
in overcrowded, substandard foster
care - it was all for nothing.
The Florida child welfare system operates
like a fire department that responds
to every false alarm by breaking down
the door, chopping holes in the walls,
overturning the furniture and flooding
the entire house. If anyone complains,
the fire chief says: "We were
just erring on the side of safety.
You never know when there might be
a real fire."
Meanwhile, across town there is a
real fire. But the building burns
to the ground, because everyone is
so busy at false alarms that there's
no one left to extinguish real flames.
The legislature learned at least a
little bit from its mistakes, modifying
some of the worst features of what
was formerly the Kayla McKean law.
But Kathleen Kearney still refuses
to face up to the consequences of
her actions. In responding to Shadow
of the Sunshine State, she hid behind
judges, arguing that their rubber-stamp
approval of removals - like the
removal in the Grubb case - justified
her agency's actions. And she hid
behind her predecessor, actually putting
forward data from his administration
is if it reflected her own regime.[9]
The Spreading Panic
In Shadow on the Sunshine State we
documented the foster care panic that
swept the state after Kearney took
office, ripping children from their
homes and overloading the foster care
system.
That panic continues - indeed it has
spread.
Exactly how much it has spread depends
on who you ask, and when you ask them.
According to a February 22, 2001 e-mail
sent to NCCPR by the DCF communications
office, at the end of fiscal year
1998, the last full fiscal year before
Kathleen Kearney took office, there
were 10,938 children in foster care
in Florida. Just before Kearney took
office in January, 1999, the figure
had risen to 12,680, probably because
of several highly-publicized
child abuse deaths during this period,
including the death of Kayla McKean.
By January, 2001 it was up to 14,191.
Overall, that's more than a 29 percent
increase in two-and-a-half years,
with an 11 percent increase since
Kearney took office.
All this at a time when, nationwide,
the social problems that lead to child
abuse, and child abuse itself are
declining, so the foster care population
should, in fact, be declining, as
well.
And these figures may well underestimate
the true scope of the increase.
Almost exactly one year before NCCPR
received these figures from the DCF
Communications Office, the very same
office answered the very same question
- with very different figures.
In an e-mail dated February 23, 2000,
the communications office claimed
there were only 8,467 foster children
at the end of Fiscal Year 1998, rising
to 10,431 a year later. (No figure
was available at that time for January,
1999).
A graph on the DCF website last year,
showed that by January 2000, the figure
already had risen to 13,862. The graph
does not appear to be on the site
at this time, but NCCPR has a hard
copy.
And news accounts put the current
figure at between 15,000[10] and 18,000.[11]
In other words, by these figures,
the increase since the end of FY '98
is not 29 percent. It's between 75
percent and 112 percent.
Adding credence to the 15,000 figure:
a DCF Senior Management Analyst says
the agency has projected that the
total number of children in non-relative
foster care will reach at least 15,993
by June 30, 2001.[12]
These data indicate that the Florida
foster care population will nearly
double in the three years ending June
30, 2001. Other estimates suggest
it may have more than doubled already.
And for almost the entire time, Kathleen
Kearney has been in charge. But even
that may be an underestimate. Last
June, for example, the DCF District
office for Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties
told the state it had 4,000 children
in foster care. Over the following
five months, it
discovered 1,000 more.
In some cases workers forgot to enter
the information in computers. In other
cases they listed a child as living
with birth parents when he was really
in foster care. In still other cases,
the worker listed one child and forgot
his siblings.
Said attorney Gievers: "If the
department doesn't know about the
kids, it not only boggles the mind,
it makes you say a prayer quickly
that the kids who have been 'misplaced'
are o.k."[13]
And all of these figures cover almost
exclusively non-relative placements.
As of January, 2000, according to
the website data referred to above,
there were another 15,327 children
in the care of relatives.
Furthermore, one-day "snapshot"
numbers don't account for all the
children who pass through the system
over the course of a year.
An indication of how many children
are missed by the snapshot can be
seen in figures compiled by the Center
for Florida's Children. They found
that statewide, in just the one year
following the death of Kayla McKean
in November, 1988, the number of children
removed from home and placed in "emergency
shelter" increased by 80 percent.[14]
What do these kinds of numbers mean
around the state?
· In Jacksonville, dozens of children
remained trapped in a psychiatric
center for weeks after they could
have been discharged - because there
was no place for them to go. An 11-year-old
boy, healthy enough to leave after
a week had to stay for more than two
additional months because there was
no treatment program available.[15]
· In Hillsborough county, one family
has 12 foster children, all age 5
and under. Another has 13 children,
most of them teenagers. And in another
home foster parents aged 73 and 67
care for seven children - none of
them more than two-years-old. Not
only does that exceed guidelines for
24-hour foster care, it's even over
the limit for a day care home.
The couple is loving and, many would
argue, heroic. But they acknowledge
that to a greater degree than they
would if they had a more manageable
number of children, they have to keep
the children strapped in to high chairs
and otherwise gently prevented from
moving around the house. And they
say there's usually no time to read
to the children.[16]
Worse, they are being set up for burnout,
or a tragic accident.
· Also in Hillsborough County, average
caseloads for DCF workers, which already
were unmanageable at 38, have increased
to 49,[17] and on at least 15 occasions
children were forced to sleep in a
DCF office.[18]
· In Palm Beach County, the backlog
of uncompleted investigations has
topped 1,000, and workers try to juggle
an average of 43 cases each.[19] Says
the executive director of the county's
Children's Services Council: "Until
we start slowing the tide of kids
entering foster care, the system is
never going to be salvageable."[20]
________________
Scenes From a Courthouse
Last year, attorney Michael Dolce,
Legislative Assistant to State Sen.
Walter "Skip" Campbell (D-Tamarac)
released a study of Florida's dependency
system.
The report begins with a series of
vignettes from two typical days in
a Florida court. All of the cases
below were witnessed by Dolce or people
he interviewed:
· "A child will go to bed curled
up in anguish because yet another
day went by, more than 30 now, in
which he has not seen his mother.
A court-approved case plan . dictates
that mom be at work during all of
the hours that supervised visitation
is offered. ."
· "A child will awake in foster
care, very excited, anxiously awaiting
the arrival of her mother. She has
counted the days. She may go to bed
tonight weeping. Her DCF caseworker
will never arrive to supervise visitation."
· "If she could understand, a
child would see her mother offered
a case plan for rehabilitative services
today, five months after the infant
was taken from her mother. By law,
these services should have been offered
no later than 60 days after the department
took the baby."
· "A child's mother will not
have met her attorney, even though
the attorney was appointed by the
court four months ago."
· "A child will awake in foster
care, having been taken from his parents
several months ago because of bruising.
Today, the DCF will admit in court
that they have 'no basis to prove
the source of the bruising.'"[21]
____________
The Inside Story
Some of the most damning data come
from a sample of case records from
nine of the state's districts, plus
Sarasota and Manatee Counties, conducted
by DCF itself, and obtained by NCCPR.
(All of the data we received are included
as appendix 2 to this report). The
sample was done as a kind of dress
rehearsal for an upcoming federal
audit. The DCF official who conducted
the sampling says she is confident
that the samples are representative.
Among the findings from the records
sampled:
· In District 10 (Broward County)
there was no record that children
were properly immunized in nearly
one third of cases.
· In District 11 (Miami-Dade and Monroe
Counties), only 23 percent of foster
children got their medical checkups
on time.
· In five districts, nearly half or
more of foster children were placed
in overcrowded foster homes. In District
14 (Hardee, Highlands, and Polk Counties),
86 percent of the children were in
overcrowded foster homes.
· In three districts, at least a quarter
of the foster children were moved
more than three times in just one
year.
· In several districts, between one-
quarter and one-third of the time
there wasn't even a complete "case
plan" in the file - meaning parents
could not even know what hoops they
had to jump through to get their children
back, and there was no way to know
if children were getting the services
ordered by the court. In no region
- including DCF's highly touted
model privatization initiative in
Sarasota -- did more than two-thirds
of parents take part in preparing
the plan.
And even where there is a "case
plan," it may not be worth the
paper it's printed on. Though the
plans are supposed to be custom-tailored
to the specific needs of families,
in fact they often are "cookie
cutter" documents filled with
what two DCF officials themselves
called "gobbledy guck"[22]
prescribing "services" the
parents don't need. Worse, there are
times when the plans may include services
parents can't get to because they
lack transportation - and the people
drawing up and approving the plans
know it. Or the plan may require both
that the parents work and that all
visits be supervised. But supervised
visits only are available during the
same hours the parents are required
to work.[23] Nevertheless, the parents
must jump through the hoops or lose
their children forever. · In many
districts, records indicated that
six-month judicial reviews of cases,
required under state law, occurred
less than half the time. · The record
wasn't much better for the 12-month
permanency hearings required under
the so-called Adoption and Safe Families
Act. Typically case records showed
such hearings occurring in only about
two-thirds of cases - and even then,
the "12 month" hearings
often weren't actually held within
12 months. In District 14, the hearings
apparently were held in fewer than
a quarter of cases. · Some of the
most shocking data concerned how often
DCF foster care counselors actually
saw the children on their caseloads.
They're supposed to meet with the
children at least once a month. But
in only two districts did that happen
more than 40 percent of the time.
In District 11, monthly meetings occurred
in only 23 percent of cases. In District
13 (Citrus, Hernando, Lake, Marion
and Sumpter Counties) it was 21 percent.
In District 12 (Flagler and Volusia
Counties) it was 20 percent and in
District 14, monthly meetings occurred
in only five percent of cases sampled.
For meetings with birth mothers in
cases where the stated goal was reunification,
the record was even worse. In two
districts, Manatee County and District
10, in not one sampled case did the
meetings take place monthly. The same
was true for meetings with fathers
in Districts 12 and 13. ·
Among the most important ways to cushion
the blow of foster care placement
is to keep siblings together. But
the sampled records indicate that
almost every district examined failed
dismally in this regard. No district
managed to keep siblings together
more than 60 percent of the time,
most managed it only about half the
time. And the worst record was in
Sarasota, where siblings were kept
together in only 14 percent of the
cases sampled.[24]
In contrast, in Pittsburgh and
surrounding Allegheny County, Pennsylvania,
which has rebuilt its system to emphasize
keeping families together, siblings
are kept together 82 percent of the
time (see "Getting it Right in
Pittsburgh, p.21).
The Danger to Children The
emotional abuse inflicted on these
children should, by now, be obvious.
But the foster care panic also continues
to endanger children's physical safety.
The Gievers lawsuit charges that the
Florida foster care system has "caused
these children to suffer harm which
is often more severe than that which
caused them to be removed from the
custody of their parents . and which
will leave them with long-lasting
physical and emotional wounds more
serious than any injuries caused by
their families."[25]
Or, as Bernard Perlmutter, director
of the Children and Youth Law Clinic
at the University of Miami put it:
"[The children] are worse off
in foster care than they ever would
be with their natural parents."[26]
Just days before the release of this
report, DCF claimed that, as of September
2000, "only" 1.9 percent
of children are abused in foster care,
down from 6.5 percent in the 1999-2000
fiscal year.
But attorney Gievers says data given
to her by DCF puts the figure at 9
percent.[27] And DCF's own review
of case records, dated August, 2000,
suggests the problem actually is far
worse. When it comes to abuse in foster
care there is an enormous incentive
for DCF to see no evil, hear no evil,
and speak no evil. Of the seven areas
providing figures, not one reported
abuse in fewer than seven percent
of the homes for which records were
reviewed.
The review found that even in Sarasota,
there was documented evidence of abuse
in foster care in 12 percent of the
cases. And in Miami-Dade and Monroe
Counties, there was evidence that
foster parents abused the children
entrusted to them in nearly one-third
of the records sampled. Furthermore,
in only 30 percent of these cases
is there evidence that DCF made "an
appropriate change in the placement"
after the abuse was discovered.[28]
This raises serious questions about
the reliability of the lower figures
DCF has been using. And even the case
record reviews don't even begin to
tell the story. DCF looked only for
abuse by foster parents. They didn't
even ask about foster children abusing
each other - a problem that is among
the least reported, and a problem
that increases when foster homes are
overcrowded. In Hillsborough County,
for example, The Tampa Tribune reports
that such cases have doubled.[29]
And even these figures greatly underestimate
the problem. For abuse in foster care
to make it into a case record it means
first that someone, often the foster
child himself, must come forward and
disclose the abuse - quite possibly
to the very worker who placed him
in that home in the first place. The
worker then must investigate her own
bad decision, and report her own failing
to her superiors. And, of course,
if abuse is substantiated, the children
should be moved out of the home, but
because the system is so overwhelmed
with needless placements, there often
is no place else for those children.
So when it comes to abuse in foster
care, there is an enormous incentive
for DCF to see no evil, hear no evil,
and speak no evil.
One year after settling a suit against
the system in Broward County, attorney
Howard Talenfeld said: "We're
still seeing very significant problems,
like child-on-child sexual abuse,
caretaker-on-child sexual assault,
scores of children who are still on
the street and the fact that permanency
is not being achieved for children
in care."[30] But don't be surprised
if Broward County soon announces that
the number of cases of child-on-child
sexual abuse has changed. Why? Because,
according to the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
"staff is currently redefining
what constitutes assault."[31]
Last
May, a Hillsborough County foster
mother, Marjorie Moss, was arrested
on 40 felony counts of child abuse
and neglect. Allegations include punching
children, locking them outside for
hours with no food or water, holding
their heads under hot water, and threatening
them with a gun. Her husband Charles
was charged with six counts of felony
child neglect. They vigorously deny
the charges.
The case file runs 227 pages and goes
back seven years. It is replete with
warnings to DCF. As is often the case,
good foster parents were among the
first to sound the alarm. Said one
such foster parent: "This isn't
something that fell through the cracks
because they didn't know."
But
a spokesman for the DCF district office
said the Moss' were not "necessarily
a bad foster family. Mrs. Moss was
actually involved in training other
foster parents."[32]
Why would DCF show so much tolerance
for alleged abuse in foster care?
Reacting to another such case, a guardian
ad litem in Palm Beach County said:
"They can't close the homes because
they have no place to put the children."[33]
Indeed, the Gievers lawsuit charges
that "defendants operate the
foster care system with a much greater
tolerance for child abuse committed
by their own foster parents, group
home parents, and institutional personnel
. than they show toward children neglected
or abused . by their own parents."[34]
But
even that is not the worst of it.
In Shadow on the Sunshine State, we
documented the impact of foster care
panics around the country. We showed
how in each case, agency chiefs and
politicians promised that massive
removal of children would save lives.
We documented how, instead, with the
system so overwhelmed with children
wrongfully taken from their parents,
workers had even less time to find
children in real danger and total
child abuse deaths actually
went up.
In one sense, Florida did better.
Child abuse deaths didn't go up. But
they didn't go down either. In 1998,
there were either 80 or 82 child abuse
fatalities, depending on which DCF
source you use.[35] In 1999, the number
was 81[36] - a figure well above the
average for the previous five years,
which was 75.4.[37]
As noted earlier, the Florida foster
care population may have nearly doubled
in two-and-a-half years. That did
incalculable damage to the psyches
of thousands of children. It did nothing
to make children safer.
The casualties continued to mount
in 2000. Among them, Joshua Saccone,
who died on August 13, two months
before his third birthday. DCF investigators
suspect that the boyfriend of Joshua's
mother threw him against a wall. The
boyfriend is
believed to have fled the country.
__________
DCF
Workers Get Their Marching Orders
In
a couple of places in this report,
we have had to
quote people anonymously because they
feared
retaliation for their candor. Why
might anyone be
afraid? A clue can be found in an
e-mail sent to DCF
employees and obtained by Tallahassee
Democrat
columnist Bill Cotterell. The topic
is what all DCF
employees must do if a legislator
or legislative
staffer dares make contact in hope
of getting an
honest answer. The e-mail reads in
part:
"The Secretary of Children and
Families
fully expects notification of any
meetings with
legislators and/or legislative staff
PRIOR to such a
meeting. You are to communicate this
to all staff .
and it is to be FULLY understood that
if anyone is
planning to attend a meeting with
legislators/legislative staff or receives
a call . MY
OFFICE IS TO BE NOTIFIED AT ONCE!"
Kearney
has assured legislators she wasn't
trying to stifle dissent."[38]
After his death, all the usual things
happened. There were front-page stories.
There was a
grand jury investigation. There was
a state
investigation. The investigations
found all the usual
problems. Workers who failed to follow
basic
procedures. Workers who failed to
communicate with
each other. Workers who missed the
obvious until it
was too late.[39]
The Grand Jury report found that workers
in District 9 (Palm Beach County)
appeared in court
late, unprepared or not at all, and
failed to return
phone calls. The grand jurors wrote
that "passing the
buck has become a way of life in District
9."
But was this because of incompetent
workers or an incompetent system?
The grand jury dismissed complaints
about
lack of resources as "crutches
to validate substandard
work, lack of motivation, and lack
of devotion to
children."[40]
But when a system is as grossly overwhelmed
as
Florida's is now, even the best workers
can make the
mistakes that were made in the Saccone
case.
Disciplinary
hearings revealed workers
trying to cope with twice the national
standard for a
manageable caseload. A lawyer for
one fired worker
charges that the worker was dismissed
"because this
child died and it looks politically
good."[41]
One of the paradoxes of a foster care
panic is that
the most dedicated worker can become
a scapegoat if
the workload is so overwhelming that
there is no time
to follow normal procedures. On the
other hand,
genuinely incompetent workers can
hide behind the
excuse that the huge caseloads make
it almost
impossible for anyone to do the job
well.
There's only one way to know if "lack
of resources" is
just an excuse: Provide the resources,
and see what
happens. But there never will be enough
resources as
long as the system is overwhelmed
with needless
placements.
Whatever the truth in this case, it's
always more expedient for DCF to blame
individual
workers. So as always, a few of them
were disciplined
in this case, in an effort to persuade
the public that
this would actually make a difference.
In fact, the
only difference it is likely to make
is to scare
workers in Palm Beach County into
making still more
wrongful removals of children from
safe homes.
"Prevention programs aren't popular
with DCF
officials, despite mountains of data
that document how
poorly children fare under the current
system. When
DCF starts creating and financing
programs that keep
children out of foster care, it will
need fewer foster
parents and have more resources to
spend on training
and helping those foster parents who
are needed."
--Ed
Horton
Former
DCF Regional Director
Certainly
that is likely to be the result
of the district's decision to fire
everyone remotely
connected with the case, and then
reinstate those
found innocent after investigation
and/or appeals
hearings. As the acting district administrator
at the
time put it "For safety reasons
we wanted to get
anybody out of the office who may
have touched this
case."[42]
The two real lessons of the Saccone
case
have been largely ignored.
First,
there's been a huge effort to sell
Floridians on the notion that turning
over
investigations to law enforcement
is a panacea. But
in the Saccone case, mistakes apparently
were made
both by investigators in Palm Beach
County, where
investigations are conducted by DCF,
and in Broward
County, where they now are conducted
by the Sheriff's
office.
"I don't dare say 'reunification'
in [Kearney's]
presence."
--A DCF official
And no wonder. When the job was
transferred, the impossible workloads
were transferred
as well. As of July, 2000, the Broward
County Sheriff
had a backlog of 3,300 uncompleted
investigations.[43]
Apparently, overwhelmed workers who
work for the
Sheriff behave like overwhelmed workers
who work for
DCF.
The second overlooked lesson concerns
the
placement that might have saved Joshua's
life. One of
the reports alleging that Joshua was
abused was filed
by his father, by all accounts a man
who loved Joshua
deeply and took very good care of
him when mother and
father were married and living together.
After that
report was substantiated, Joshua went
to live with his
father. All went well until the father
lost his job.
Unable to care for Joshua full time,
the father sent
him back to his mother, having been
promised, falsely,
that the boyfriend was out of the
picture.[44]
Had DCF operated under a philosophy
of
helping troubled families stay together,
Joshua's
father might have gotten the help
he needed to keep
Joshua - and he might have kept Joshua
alive.
Indeed, more than six months before
Joshua's death, a former DCF Regional
Director for
Palm Beach County, Ed Horton, called
for such a change
in approach. In the Palm Beach Post,
Horton wrote:
"Prevention programs aren't popular
with
DCF officials, despite mountains of
data that document
how poorly children fare under the
current system.
When DCF starts creating and financing
programs that
keep children out of foster care,
it will need fewer
foster parents and have more resources
to spend on
training and helping those foster
parents who are
needed."[45]
Eight months before he wrote those
words,
Horton was fired by Kathleen Kearney.
Overintervention Is The Problem
There is little dispute over the fact
that
Florida's foster care system is a
national disgrace,
and little dispute over the fact that
it does enormous
harm to children. But DCF remains
in denial when it
comes to the fundamental cause of
the problem:
Overintervention into the lives of
innocent families
and families where the problems could
be solved
without resort to tearing away the
children.
The only way to fix foster care is
to have
less of it. Only when DCF abandons
its
take-the-child-and-run mentality,
will there be
sufficient resources to make foster
care a safe,
humane short-term solution for the
children who really
are in danger in their own homes,
and really must be
removed from their parents.
The problem begins at the state's
child
abuse hotline. The hotline was swamped
with 180,000
calls in 2000, 59,000 more calls than
the year before.
That's partly because of the general
atmosphere of
hysteria caused by the policies and
pronouncements
coming from DCF. It's also a function
of what was
formerly the Kayla McKean law.
That law toughened penalties against
certain professionals known as "mandated
reporters,"
who fail to report even a suspicion
of maltreatment.
So now, terrified mandated reporters
are more likely
to send in reports even when they
don't really believe
there was maltreatment at all.
The law also says that reports from
doctors, teachers and other school
officials can't be
screened out by the hotline. Every
one of these
reports, no matter how absurd, must
be passed on to
the regions for a full-scale investigation.
And even where hotline workers have
discretion, they are afraid to use
it. As a result,
95 percent of all reports are passed
on for
investigation.
But according to a state-mandated
study of
the hotline, at least 35 percent of
those calls should
have been screened out. As a result,
the study
concludes, workers have less time
for each
investigation, increasing the likelihood
that serious
abuse will be missed.
"The hotline is supposed to be
a gate,"
the researcher who conducted the study
said. "They've
got the gate rusted, stuck open."
As a result, cases
pile up, creating a backlog of uncompleted
investigations.
"I equate that to the game of
playing
Russian roulette. It's just a matter
of time before
some child in the backlog pool is
really badly
injured."[46]
The conclusions are all the more
remarkable considering the source.
The researcher is
Richard Gelles of the University of
Pennsylvania, one
of the foremost national advocates
of taking away more
children from their parents. If even
Gelles thinks
that 35 percent of the hotline calls
should have been
rejected, the real figure probably
is far higher.
The same mentality that grips the
hotline,
grips the investigators.
And that mentality is imposed from
the
top. As one DCF official put it: "I
don't dare say
'reunification' in [Kearney's] presence."
_________________
The View from the Frontlines
After Shadow on the Sunshine State
was
published, the National Coalition
for Child Protection
Reform was contacted by many people
inside and outside
the Florida child welfare system.
One was a longtime
child abuse "protective investigator"
or P.I. This is
some of what the investigator said.
The investigator
asked to remain anonymous for fear
of
retaliation by DCF.
"There is no such thing as 'reasonable
efforts' [to keep children out of
foster care]. When
we write shelter petitions after detaining
a child [to
get a judge to approve the removal
of a child from the
home] we usually just put on the petition
that the
level of abuse was too severe or the
risk was deemed
too high to offer services. These
comments usually
are never questioned by judges or
defense lawyers for
some reason. It's very easy to remove
a kid, but it's
very difficult to close a case. .
We are rewarded for
removing kids, not for assisting family
preservation.
.
"If you remove a child you must
have a
shelter hearing within 24 hours. This
hearing is the
most crucial because this is where
most arguments are
raised, with the exception of the
trial. The
Department has a real advantage: The
P.I. has prepared
the report the night before or morning
before, and
many P.I.'s exaggerate the allegations
in order to get
[protective custody]. Then the defense
attorney
receives this shelter petition minutes
before the
hearing and is not adequately prepared
to represent
his client."
____________________
In Shadow on the Sunshine State, we
cited the
conclusions of Dr. Ivor Groves, one
of the nation's
leading authorities on child welfare,
and the
court-appointed monitor of the nation's
most
successful child welfare reform, in
Alabama, after he
studied the system in Broward County.
He offered his
expert opinion for plaintiffs who
sued over conditions
in Broward foster care.
Among his conclusions:
"Children are likely entering
care when family
preservation could be achieved if
more time was
available to work with the family
carefully to address
the issues that actually create a
safety risk to the
child.Children are staying in the
custody of the
department longer than necessary because
of lack of
options for permanent placement, lack
of sufficiently
intensive reunification efforts resulting
from high
caseloads and lack of enough options
for timely and
intensive in-home services."[47]
Groves is not alone. Guardians ad
litem, who in
Florida are volunteers, assigned to
try to determine
the best interests of children and
make
recommendations, tend to give DCF
the benefit of the
doubt when the agency takes away children.
But a
source in one Florida GAL program,
who asked to remain
anonymous for fear of DCF retaliation,
says that in
her region "children are [taken
away] for virtually
any reason. There is an attitude of
'let someone else
decide' (i.e. the court) and then
you won't be fired.
Of course that means a child's life
is disrupted, but
that seems to mean little or nothing
to the
department."
The GALs acknowledge that their views
are subjective,
as are those of DCF workers. But after
reviewing
their work on 475 cases, the conservative
estimate of
GALs in this region is that 20 percent
of the children
DCF wanted to take away did not need
to be removed
from their homes.[48]
And one of Kearney's own regional
directors has gone
even further. Shortly after the first
edition of
Shadow on the Sunshine State was published,
Phyllis
Scott, the regional director in Broward
County,
estimated that 35 percent of the children
in foster
care in that county could have remained
safely in
their own homes had the right services
been
available.[49]
Still another indication of the extent
of wrongful
removal comes from Florida's participation
in a
federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development
program to provide Section 8 rental
assistance
specifically for families where "lack
of adequate
housing is a primary cause of the
separation or
imminent separation of a child or
children from their
families."[50]
In 1999, the most recent year for
which data were
available, Brevard County, Hialeah,
Miami-Dade, Pasco
County and Tampa received a total
of $3,702,937 in aid
to provide 500 Section 8 vouchers
for such
families.[51] While it is to these
communities'
credit that they sought out this help,
either they
misled HUD in their grant applications,
or DCF does
indeed tear apart families when the
primary reason for
the separation is simply lack of adequate
housing.
Sometimes DCF goes out of its way
to set up extra
barriers. A grandmother testified
at a public meeting
that her grandchild was ready to return
home and the
parents were ready for the child.
But DCF said no,
until the parents could rent a three-bedroom
house.
And on top of that, DCF was requiring
the parents to
send the agency $200 a week to repay
"public benefits"
the family had received. As the grandmother
explained, as long as they had to
pay DCF $200 a
month, the parents could never afford
to rent a
three-bedroom house. What DCF was
doing amounts to a
legal form of holding children for
ransom.[52]
Extended Hostility
DCF's ingrained hostility to parents
extends to extended families. Grandparents
and other
relatives who step in to care for
children in order
keep them out of foster care with
strangers often are
met not with gratitude but with contempt.
Such relative caregivers are treated
as
second-class citizens from the moment
they step
forward. Though they can't qualify
for aid under
Florida's Relatives as Caregivers
program unless a
court formally judges the children
dependent and
awards custody to the relatives, and
though they must
undergo often intrusive, belittling
home studies, they
receive far less financial aid than
strangers would
get for becoming foster parents to
the same children.
And the aid may result in loss of
food stamps,
reducing its value still further for
the many
relatives who are poor - an issue
that doesn't arise
when children are placed with middle-class
strangers.
Last summer the Kinship Support Center
at Nova
Southeastern University Law School
issued a report on
a series of town meetings, where relatives
told of the
hardship they endured in order to
step in and care for
children.
Relatives told of DCF workers who
were
ignorant of the Relatives as Caregivers
program and
indifferent, or actually hostile,
to their plight.
They spoke of the bureaucratic maze
they had to
navigate to get even the meager benefits
available
under the program.
A grandmother said: "I cannot
buy clothing for [my
grandchild]. My refrigerator broke.
My washing
machine broke. I have nothing for
special lessons for
him. We never go to a movie or the
community center
to buy ice cream. . How do you raise
a child when you
have less than nothing?"
"One grandmother, raising four
grandchildren.testified that she had
a nervous
breakdown, had to stop work and go
on disability.
Another woman raising a special needs
nephew said the
child was such a problem in school
that she couldn't
hold a job. Another relative had to
close down her
paralegal business and her husband
had to take a
second job in order to care for her
four cousins in
addition to her own three children."
A grandmother said: "I cannot
buy clothing
for [my grandchild]. My refrigerator
broke. My
washing machine broke. I have nothing
for special
lessons for him. We never go to a
movie or the
community center to buy ice cream.
. How do you raise
a child when you have less than nothing?"
Said another grandmother: "I
had to go
begging after they brought me the
children."
The prejudice against extended families
is
contradicted by the evidence. The
most extensive
effort to track the success of relative
placements is
in Illinois. That state has found
less abuse in
placements with relatives than in
placements with
strangers.
When still another grandmother who
wanted custody of
her grandchild appeared in court only
to see the child
handed over to strangers, DCF told
her to just forget
that her granddaughter ever existed.[53]
The hostility from DCF is not all
that
surprising. It suggests a common,
though largely
unspoken, prejudice against extended
families: If
grandma raised the child who neglected
the grandchild,
it is believed, then there must be
something wrong
with grandma, and grandpa, and all
the other relatives
in the family.
In fact, in poor communities all over
America there are parents who have
waged a battle for
decades to save their children from
poverty, despair,
and the lure of the streets. They
have been forced to
call upon reservoirs of strength that
most of us can
only imagine. Is the mother who won
the battle with
three children and lost it with a
fourth to be
denigrated and discarded when she
comes forward to
take in that fourth child's children?
Judging by how
the agency treats relative caregivers,
the answer from
DCF apparently is yes.
The prejudice against extended families
is
contradicted by the evidence. The
most extensive
effort to track the success of relative
placements is
in Illinois. That state has found
less abuse in
placements with relatives than in
placements with
strangers.[54]
It is a prejudice that can have fatal
consequences.
Florida is not the only state mired
in a
foster care panic. The take-the-child-and-
run
approach has been dogma in Connecticut
for even longer
- since the death of a child "known
to the system" in
1995.
That state's child welfare agency,
also
called the Department of Children
and Families, placed
three-year-old Alex Boucher with an
aunt and uncle in
Maine. But Alex had serious medical
problems and when
the relatives became overwhelmed and
begged for help
to care for the boy, Connecticut DCF
refused. "They
fought me tooth and nail when I tried
to get services
for this kid," said the aunt.
"They didn't want to
pay for it."
Instead Connecticut workers went on
a mad rush to
place Alex for adoption with a New
Port Richey couple
that was not licensed to be foster
parents. The
agency bent or broke rules to make
the placement,
relying on a glowing report from a
private agency in
Florida.
Just five days after arriving in Florida,
Alex Boucher was dead. Police allege
that the father
who was on the fast track to adopt
Alex, Jim Curtis,
confessed to wrapping the little boy
in a blanket so
tightly that the child couldn't free
himself when he
choked on his own vomit.
Had Connecticut not been in such a
mad
rush to ignore relatives as a resource,
they might
have known better than to place Alex
with Jim Curtis.
As the Hartford Courant reported:
"Jim Curtis had a rather dubious
background that
included a recent eviction from an
apartment for
repeatedly fighting with other tenants
and a
first-degree misdemeanor charge for
allegedly
threatening a group of children under
the age of 18
with a gun on June 26.
"The glowing recommendation from
the
private Florida agency has turned
out to be less than
reliable, as well.
"Although a foster care recruiter
for the
Children's Home Society wrote to Connecticut
DCF
workers on Aug. 28 saying the Curtises
would make
"excellent adoptive parents for
this or any other
child placed in their home,'' others
who have met the
Curtises and visited their home are
baffled about the
recommendation.
"Jackie Pehote, a corporal with
the New
Port Richey police department and
the main
investigating officer in Alex's death,
says she
wouldn't 'let a dog live in that apartment.'"[55]
_______________
The Law Formerly Named for Kayla
In Shadow on the Sunshine State, we
said that "it
profanes the memory of Kayla McKean
to have her name
on a law that has hurt so many children."
Her name isn't on the law anymore.
It's no longer the
Kayla McKean Child Protection Act.
That's because
Kayla McKean's grandfather declined
to play the
assigned role for grieving relatives:
A knee-jerk
demand to "crack down on child
abuse." Instead, he
realized that the law onto which legislators
slapped
his daughter's name was doing more
harm than good. He
demanded that Kayla's name be removed,
and the
legislature complied.
Unfortunately, legislators didn't
do much more than
that.
The legislature did modify one of
the most onerous
provisions in the law. The law originally
required a
so-called "medical evaluation"
of the child for almost
every category of maltreatment. "Medical
evaluation"
is a euphemism for a stripsearch.
The stripsearches
were required not only in cases in
which a DCF worker,
after investigating, believed there
was genuine cause
to suspect physical or sexual abuse.
It also was
required for physical and even emotional
neglect.
And it didn't matter if the DCF worker
herself found
no evidence of maltreatment and believed
the
allegation to be patently false. The
stripsearch had
to be performed anyway. The child
did not even
necessarily get the comfort of having
this traumatic
examination performed by the family
doctor. In many
cases only members of specified "child
protection
teams" could conduct stripsearches.[56]
The law has now been modified. Stripsearches
no
longer are required in cases of physical
and emotional
neglect, a wider variety of practitioners
can perform
them and they are no longer automatically
required if
both a worker and her supervisor feel
the report was
unfounded.
However members of designated child
protection teams
still can override the exceptions
and demand
stripsearches.
The other key problem with the law
is the provision
barring the state's child abuse hotline
from screening
out reports from certain mandated
reporters. As
documented elsewhere in this report,
this has
contributed to overwhelming the system,
making it more
likely that real abuse will be overlooked.
This part of the law was not changed.[57]
But more important than any specific
provision of what
was once the Kayla McKean law was
the symbolic message
it sent: It reinforced the "take
the child and run"
ethos sweeping across the state.
No tinkering around the edges will
change that. To
truly undo the damage done by this
law a new message
must be sent, a message that recognizes
the failure of
the take-the-child-and-run approach.
The Legislature
should start over, using the lessons
learned from the
failure of this law, and the lessons
that can be
learned from the success of very different
approaches
elsewhere in the United States.
The In-between Cases
Just as not every parent who loses
a child to foster
care is brutally abusive or hopelessly
addicted, not
every parent is entirely innocent
either. Cases fall
on a broad continuum, with some parents
neither all
victim nor all villain.
Sometimes these cases involve drug
abuse.
As we explained in Shadow on the Sunshine
State, the
reason it is worthwhile to work with
families in these
cases is not for the sake of the parents,
but for the
sake of the children. And the evidence
for that comes
from a University of Florida study
of "crack babies."
In the study, one group was placed
in foster care,
another with birth mothers able to
care for them.
After six months, the babies were
tested using all the
usual measures of infant development:
rolling over,
sitting up, reaching out. Consistently,
the children
placed with their birth mothers did
better.[58] For
the foster children, the separation
from their mothers
was more toxic than the cocaine. It
is extremely
difficult to take a swing at "bad
mothers" without the
blow landing on their children. Therefore,
if we
really believe all the rhetoric about
the needs of the
children coming first, we must put
those needs before
anything - even our anger at their
parents.
But DCF has shown little interest
in
providing such help. Between July
1999 and March,
2000 there were 496 women on waiting
lists for drug
treatment in Hillsborough County alone.
Only two
programs in the county are geared
specifically to the
needs of women, and they can serve
only 95 women at a
time. One of those two programs wanted
to open a
facility where women and children
could stay together
during treatment. But they didn't
have the money.
The facility will house only the women.[59]
DCF continues to show little interest
in
prevention of any kind. In Governor
Bush's proposed
FY 2002 budget, the increase in funding
for child
welfare goes almost entirely into
hiring more
investigators and workers to monitor
families, and to
covering the increased cost of throwing
more children
into foster care.[60]
Even the one primary prevention program
DCF claims to
support, Healthy Families Florida,
gets a budget
increase of less than three percent,
apparently for
what is almost certainly a well-deserved
pay
raise.[61] The budget for Healthy
Families Florida
estimates that 23,454 families need
the service, but
only 6,926 will get it - 36 fewer
families than will
be helped in the current fiscal year.[62]
(In
contrast, the DCF central office public
relations
budget is slated to increase by more
than 20 percent,
to more than half a million dollars.)[63]
And all of the worthwhile prevention
initiatives that
DCF tried unsuccessfully to cut last
year, it's trying
to cut again this year. In fact this
year, DCF will
try to make $3.49 million in cuts
in such programs, up
from $1.7 million in cuts last year.[64]
The hit list again includes the Hibiscus
Children's
Center Crisis Nursery, which provides
not only respite
care but also concrete help for families
that might
otherwise lose their children to foster
care.
Also on the hit list again is state
funding for two
centers in Jacksonville that provide
a comfortable,
humane place for parents to visit
their children while
those children are in foster care.[65]
Staff at the Family Visitation Center
also help
arrange the transportation needed
to get everyone to
the visits, often a huge barrier for
parents too poor
to own cars. (Both this program and
the crisis nursery
are described in detail in Shadow
on the Sunshine
State.)
DCF's own internal data illustrate
the need for such a
facility. The examination of records
from Region 4,
which includes Jacksonville, found
that in 43 percent
of the cases in which the case plan
calls for visits
between mother and child, the visits
are not taking
place according to the plan. In 56
percent of cases
in which visits are supposed to occur
between child
and the father, they're not happening
according to the
plan.
And Jacksonville isn't the worst of
the districts
examined. Broward is. In Broward County
children are
not getting visits with their mothers
as called for in
case plans 72 percent of the time.
With fathers the
case plan isn't being followed 69
percent of the time.
And visits with brothers and sisters
are not
occurring as called for in case plans
75 percent of
the time.[66]
Yet once again, Kathleen Kearney wants
to cut $83,000
in state funding for a visitation
center - an amount
that is less than the proposed increase
in the DCF
public relations budget.
DCF's rationale for the cuts is that
the programs
originally were funded by the legislature,
without DCF
asking for them. And, in fact, to
the agency's credit,
DCF also is trying to cut $750,000
in funding for two
orphanage schemes.[67]
But there is nothing in the record
of the Department
of Children and Families to support
their apparent
belief that no idea can be any good
unless they ask
for the money.
There is one small bit of good news:
Using $2.9
million annually in federal funds,
Kearney has agreed
to expand the Community Partnership
for Child
Protection initiative - one of the
innovations cited
in Shadow on the Sunshine State, --
to 13
neighborhoods in eight counties.
But by and large, DCF still is putting
its money in
all the wrong places. That's why the
huge increases
in overall spending aren't producing
results.
It would be truly tragic if DCF's
bungling how it
spends money wrongly persuades the
legislature that
additional funding isn't needed.
As we said last year: Spend more,
but spend smarter.
Failing at Adoption
One irony of the Florida Foster Care
Panic
is that it hasn't just prevented DCF
from doing the
things Kathleen Kearney doesn't want
to do - like keep
families together. It's even interfered
with one of
Kearney's top priorities - adoption.
In 1999, the first year of the foster
care panic,
Florida was one of only eight states
which placed
fewer children in adoptive homes than
it had the year
before. In fact, Florida's record
was the second
worst in the country.[68] When needless
placements
overwhelm a system, it makes it harder
to do anything.
Privatization - As Irrelevant as Ever
In Shadow on the Sunshine State we
referred to privatization as "the
great irrelevancy,"
citing evidence that child welfare
systems all over
the country can perform well or badly
whether run by
government or by private agencies.
What is crucial is
not who is in charge but the financial
incentives that
govern privatization.
If private agencies are paid for each
day
they keep a child in foster care,
they will keep that
child in foster care as long as possible.
Indeed, the
Gievers lawsuit alleges that that's
exactly what
happens now. The suit charges that
the "overuse of
long term foster custody . rewards
contract providers
with payments for the foster children
who, contrary to
law, are not moved toward real permanency
and who
suffer harm while being held as virtual
hostages."[69]
"It's a private organization.
There's no law that
says you can't hire family and friends."
--Jerri Blair, lawyer for
Lake County Boys Ranch
On the other hand, if privatization
includes a provision to pay agencies
for permanence,
and penalize them for holding children
in foster care,
then those agencies will find safe,
permanent homes
for children more quickly. As Shadow
on the Sunshine
State documents, that's exactly what
has happened, for
example, in Illinois.
Nevertheless, DCF continues to insist
that
privatization per se will solve everything.
The
agency points to its model privatization
program, in
Sarasota County. But Sarasota is a
wealthy,
resource-rich county with proportionately
fewer
problems.
DCF apparently hopes that by constantly
pointing to Sarasota, which looks
relatively
successful only when compared to the
rest of the
state, everyone will forget about
the other pilot
project in privatization - the debacle
in Lake County.
There, the 32-year-old Lake County
Boys
Ranch was given control of all substitute
care
services. Months after the Boys Ranch
and DCF got
into a dispute over who was responsible
for the death
of Kayla McKean, Boys Ranch was indicted
on criminal
charges of Medicaid fraud.
The criminal case was dropped. The
prosecutor says that's because it
is now pointless to
proceed, since the charges themselves
led to a cutoff
of all state contracts, driving Boys
Ranch out of
business. A civil suit still is pending.
Court documents and sworn statements
charge that the
problems went beyond alleged Medicaid
fraud. The
president of the Ranch, Tom Manning,
allegedly hired
friends and relatives, allegedly falsified
a document
in an effort to raise his own retirement
annuity and
is accused of using ranch equipment
and staff for
personal work.
Manning vigorously denies all the
charges.
The Ranch's attorney, Jerri Blair,
says DCF waged a
vendetta against the organization
after the Ranch
refused to take the blame for Kayla
McKean's death.
But Blair's response to the nepotism
charge should cause concern as Florida
rushes headlong
into privatization. "It's a private
organization,"
Blair says. "There's no law that
says you can't hire
family and friends."[70]
If, in fact, Boys Ranch is guilty
- and,
in fairness, the agency has yet to
have a chance to
defend itself in court - then DCF
contracted with a
bunch of thieves. If, on the other
hand, Boys Ranch
is innocent, then DCF helped drive
the agency out of
business and plunged its own privatization
experiment
into chaos.
Either way, the turmoil in Lake County
doesn't bode well for privatization-
as-panacea.
Neither do recent developments in
Palm
Beach County. There, only one organization
came
forward to apply to be the "lead
agency" to handle
child welfare services in the county.
The agency
performed so poorly on DCF's rating
scale that it was
initially rejected. Then DCF changed
its mind and
said the agency was good enough after
all.
The Palm Beach County experience suggests
that either DCF doesn't know how to
evaluate the
agencies to whom it will entrust the
lives of the
state's most vulnerable children,
or it is willing to
entrust those lives to marginally
qualified or
unqualified agencies.[71]
Privatization per se is not dangerous.
But
it is extremely dangerous to believe
DCF when it says
Florida's children should just wait,
wait, wait until
the system is turned over to private
agencies, after
which everything will be fine. It
won't.
_____________________
Getting it Right in Pittsburgh
Shadow on the Sunshine State highlights
a
series of successful alternatives
to the
take-the-child-and-run approach championed
by Kathleen
Kearney. These approaches include
Intensive Family
Preservation Services programs and
the Alabama System
of Care, which has significantly cut
foster care
placements while making children safer.
These
innovations are summarized in Appendix
1 to this
report.
Still another example of successful
innovation can be found in Pittsburgh
and surrounding
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, an
area with a
population of 1.3 million.
In the mid-1990s, the child welfare
system in
Allegheny County was a pretty typical
failure.
Lackluster leadership had allowed
the system to drift,
and foster care placements were soaring.
Some very good reporting by the Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette helped force the resignation
of the
agency chief. Her replacement engineered
a remarkable
turnaround.
· Since May, 1997 the foster care
population has been
reduced by 20 percent.
· 82 percent of the time, when children
are placed in
foster care, siblings are kept together.
In Florida,
no district included in DCF's internal
case record
sample has been able to do better
than 60 percent, and
roughly 50 percent is more common.
Here's how they did it. Allegheny
County:
· Tripled the budget for politically
popular primary
prevention programs.
· More than doubled the budget for
politically
unpopular family preservation programs.
· Embraced the Annie E. Casey Foundation's
Family to
Family program, a program described
in Shadow on the
Sunshine State and in Appendix 1.
(The Casey
foundation also helps fund NCCPR).
But in some ways, the little things
are the most
revealing.
· There is now a housing counselor
in every regional
child welfare office in the county,
to reduce the
chances that children are taken because
their families
lack decent housing.
· There's a special transportation
program to get
parents to visits with their children
while the
children are in foster care - exactly
the kind of help
Kearney is again trying to cut in
Jacksonville.
Allegheny County hasn't neglected
adoption either.
Adoption is up significantly (as opposed
to Florida
where, as noted elsewhere in this
report, adoptions
actually declined in 1999). But a
report on the
county's accomplishments states that:
"from the
start, we recognized that the term
permanency had come
to suggest adoption when, in fact,
it encompasses a
continuum of services designed to
ensure safety and
stability for children, with adoption
as a final
option when others fail."[72]
Allegheny County is proving how much
can be done with
guts, imagination, and vision, qualities
sorely
lacking right now at the Florida Department
of
Children and Families.
The Litany of Excuses
Eight days after the publication of
Shadow
on the Sunshine State, Kearney issued
a response. The
response offered no source notes to
allow for
independent verification of her claims.
And, in fact,
it was inaccurate in many respects.
We note this here
because this update also is likely
to prompt a
response. We think the way Kearney
responded to the
first document bears on her credibility
in responding
to this one.
The Kearney claim: "For fiscal
year
1998-99, 93% of alleged child victims
remained home
during the investigation, another
3.2 percent were
placed with relatives."[emphasis
added].
The facts: Even if true, this represents
a
double dose of irrelevancy.
First, the term "during the investigation"
is not defined. If that means "during
the time it
takes the worker to conclude there
was maltreatment,"
then, obviously, a child shouldn't
be removed before
the worker even believes something
has happened. Even
if the term allows for investigation
beyond this
determination, the crucial issue is
the number of
children removed after the investigation
is concluded.
Even then, the raw number of such
children is far
less important than whether all of
those children
actually needed to be removed.
Second, and more important, the figures
are for the1998-99 fiscal year. What
was then known
as the Kayla McKean law, which played
a crucial role
in the Florida foster care panic,
did not even take
effect until that fiscal year was
over. And for half
this time period, Kathleen Kearney
was not even
running DCF. Thus, whatever the figures
mean, they
are largely a reflection of the performance
of
Kearney's predecessor, and of how
DCF operated before
the foster care panic.
The Kearney claim: "With the
vast
majority, 95 percent, there were findings
of
maltreatment once the investigation
was completed."
The Facts: It is unclear what Kearney
is
referring to here, but if she means
to allege that
abuse is found in 95 percent of all
cases
investigated, her claim is contradicted
by DCF's own
"situation reports." The
most recent such report
found that only 46.5 percent of investigations
resulted in a finding of either "verified"
or
"indicated" maltreatment,
almost exactly the same rate
as a year ago.[73]
Even this figure is almost certainly
too
high. It takes only a caseworker's
personal opinion
to brand a case "verified"
and data from a major
national study show that workers are
at least twice as
likely to wrongly substantiate maltreatment
as they
are to wrongly label a case unfounded.[74]
The Kearney claim: "The law prohibits
the
removal of children due to neglect
that is related
solely to a parent's lack of financial
means."
The Facts: Neglect actually is defined
in
two different sections of Florida
law. The clause
Kearney refers to appears in one section,[75]
but not
the other.[76]
More important, such clauses are routinely
ignored in Florida and in other states
where they
exist. That is quite easy to do.
In Shadow on the Sunshine State, we
offered the following hypothetical
example:
Imagine that you are an impoverished
single mother
with an eight-year-old daughter and
a four-year-old
son. The four-year-old is ill with
a fever and you
need to get him medicine. But you
have no car, it's
unusually cold, it's pouring rain,
and it will take at
least an hour to get to and from the
pharmacy. You
don't know most of your neighbors
and those you know
you have good reason not to trust.
What do you do?
Go without the medicine? That's "medical
neglect." DCF can take away your
children for medical
neglect. Dress the feverish four-year-old
in the one,
threadbare coat he's got and take
him out in the cold
and rain? That's "physical neglect."
DCF can take
away your children for physical neglect.
Leave the
eight-year-old to care for the four-year-old
and try
desperately to get back home as soon
as you can?
That's "lack of supervision."
DCF can take away your
children for lack of supervision.
In every one of these cases, DCF could
say
it wasn't taking away the children
because of poverty
alone, even though poverty would be
the real cause of
the removal.
The Kearney claim: "Neither the
Department
nor I can remove children from their
homes
independently or arbitrarily. When
a child is
removed, the case must go before a
judge who, within
24 hours, reviews the Department's
decision to shelter
the child."
The facts: These two sentences are
contradictory. The second sentence
is an admission
that DCF workers can take away children
on their own,
before a judge ever sees the case.
But again, there is a more important
point. Kearney's
comment, and her general description
of a system
filled with checks and balances, in
which families get
to defend themselves and judges decide
only after
weighing conflicting evidence, bears
no resemblance to
the facts on the ground.
The 24-hour hearing Kearney mentions
is largely a
rubber stamp exercise. On one side
is a lawyer for DCF
who is fairly familiar with the case
and does this
kind of work for a living. On the
other side is a
usually impoverished, often bewildered
parent. At
best, the parent may get a lawyer
at the hearing
itself, meaning the lawyer has no
real way to defend
his client. At worst, the lawyer may
not even be
appointed for another month, and then
it is likely to
be a lawyer with a huge caseload and
few resources.
As for the judges, they know that
if they listen to
the overwhelmed parent, send the child
back home and
then something goes wrong, their entire
career may be
in jeopardy. If, on the other hand,
they listen to the
old pro from DCF and keep the child
in foster care,
the child may suffer all sorts of
harm, but the judges
are safe. A team of national experts
who examined
family court in New York City found
that judges
actually admit they often remove children
even when
they think the child welfare agency
hasn't made its
case, in part because of "withering
media attention"
if they send a child home and something
goes
wrong.[77]
In the review in which Florida guardians
ad litem
estimate conservatively that 20 percent
of removal
attempts were unnecessary, judges
denied DCF attempts
to remove children less than seven
percent of the
time, and even that is an increase
over previous
years.
A GAL involved in the survey said
judges genuinely try
to do what's best for children, but
faced with little
more than DCF's side of the story,
they often feel
they have no choice.[78]
The deck remains stacked throughout
the
process. In a criminal proceeding,
the defendant must
be proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. But the
standard DCF must meet to take away
a child and put
him or her in foster care is no higher
than the
standard to determine which insurance
company pays for
a fender bender. This "preponderance
of the evidence"
standard is the lowest in American
jurisprudence.
At every stage, DCF has the real power.
So it is
worth repeating the comments of a
DCF Protective
Investigator who contacted NCCPR to
describe how the
deck is stacked against families:
"The department has a real advantage
[at the 24-hour
hearing]. The P.I. has prepared the
report the night
or morning before. . Then the defense
attorney
receives the shelter petition minutes
before the
hearing and is not adequately prepared
to represent
his client. This happens all the time."
And just to make sure they get custody
of
the children, the investigator says,
"many protective
investigators exaggerate the allegations."[79]
Finally, Kearney displays a surprising
contempt for
the notion of learning from past mistakes.
She
claims, erroneously, that much of
the material in
Shadow on the Sunshine State dates
back to 1991.
Material from 1991 and, in one case,
even
earlier, takes up about three pages
of the 37-page
report. It is in a section called
"Roots of the
Current Crisis." That section
is included to show,
among other things, that Kathleen
Kearney did not
create the problems at DCF - though
she certainly made
them worse.
It is also there because of our conviction
that "those who do not remember
the past are condemned
to relive it."
For example, it was in 1991 that a
survey of
caseworkers found that nearly two-thirds
listed among
barriers to doing their jobs "responding
to minor
neglect reports" and "having
to respond to obviously
unfounded cases." [80]
Rather than learn from the 1991 findings,
Kearney
allowed procedures at the state hotline
to become even
worse. Now, ten years later, another
report has made
essentially the same point.
Kearney closes her response to Shadow
on the Sunshine
State with a quote from the head of
the demonstration
privatization project in Sarasota
County, praising her
to the skies, and declaring that "we
ought to be
shouting from the mountain tops!"
Perhaps he hopes that if all the bureaucrats
and all
the "providers" shout loudly
enough, they can drown
out the cries of the children.
Conclusion
What's the harder job, running the
Florida
Department of Children and Families
or being a parent?
Any parent will tell you this is a
no-brainer. Running a huge state agency
is tough.
But, to steal a line from the Peace
Corps, being a
parent is "the toughest job you'll
ever love."
Kathleen Kearney likes to brag about
her
role in helping to write the so-called
Adoption and
Safe Families Act. Under this law,
with rare
exceptions, no matter how much hardship
a family has
had to endure, parents who lose children
to foster
care are expected to turn their entire
lives around in
12 months.
The rationale is that the children
can't
wait.
Kathleen Kearney now has had more
than 24
months to turn her agency around.
But every time the
failings of the agency are pointed
out, she insists
she needs more time.
No one expects the entire job to be
done in 24 months
- a good strong start would be enough.
But Kearney
has been moving full speed backwards.
It's not hard to imagine what Kearney,
formerly a judge nicknamed "the
terminator" would have
done had a parent come before her
with a similar
record.
One year ago, we concluded Shadow
on the Sunshine
State with these words:
There is no reason to believe that
Kathleen Kearney
has anything but the best of motives.
. But the issue
isn't motivation. The issue is results.
There are parents who do terrible
things to children
with the best of intentions. They
may beat children
mercilessly, for example, because
they think it's the
only way to get children to behave,
or get them stay
away from drugs or a dangerous group
of peers. When
parents do that to children - even
if they think it's
for the children's own good - those
parents must be
stopped. And when the State of Florida
does terrible
things to children, even when it's
in the name of
doing good - the state must be stopped
Kathleen Kearney now has had twice
as much time as she
would give to a parent. Maybe it's
time to consider
whether Kearney's right to run DCF
should be
terminated - because Florida's vulnerable
children
can't wait.
NOTES:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Billy Townsend, "Taken in
the Night," The Ledger,
September 10, 2000, p.D1
[2] Eric Pera, "Man With Cerebral
Palsy Waits to Be
With Son," The Ledger, November
29, 2000.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Eric Pera, "Address Unknown:
New Report Shows a 64
Percent Rise in Polk's Homeless,"
The Ledger, December
16, 2000, p.A1
[5] 31 Foster Children v. Jeb Bush
et. al., Case
#000-2116-CIV-King, U.S. District
Court, Southern
District of Florida, Complaint, p.37.
[6] Ibid, p.20.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Department of Children and Families
press release,
Judge Kearney Responds to Richard
Wexler's "Shadow on
the Sunshine State" Report, March
23, 2000.
[9] Ibid.
[10] E.g., Shana Gruskin, "Lawsuit
over foster care
gets July 16 trial date," Ft.
Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
October 18, 2000, p.4B.
[11] e.g. William Cooper, Jr. "Florida
hasn't reduced
foster-care time, suit says,"
Palm Beach Post, January
25, 2001, p.4A; Shana Gruskin, "Advocate
Boosts Foster
Care Suit," Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
January 24,
2001.
[12] Author's interview with John
Perry, Senior
Management Analyst, Department of
Children and
Families.
[13] Jacqueline Charles, "Foster
children lost in
files" Miami Herald, November
3, 2000.
[14] Press Release, Center for Florida's
Children,
Nov. 24, 1999
[15] Steve Patterson, "Troubled
kids left in center
too long," Florida Times-Union,
March 12, 2000, p.A1.
[16] Curtis Krueger, "So Many
Children," St.
Petersburg Times, March 8, 2000, p.1D.
[17] Elizabeth Bettendorf, "Report:
Child abuse climbs
10%," Tampa Tribune, October
25, 2000, p.1.
[18] Wayne Washington, "No longer
in state offices,
foster kids still in limbo,"
St. Petersburg Times,
October 21, 2000, p.1B.
[19] Shana Gruskin, "Child welfare
services face
struggle with shortage of child-abuse
investigators"
Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, November
23, 2000.
[20] William Cooper, Jr,. "Area
Judge Promotes Plan to
Fix Foster Care," Palm Beach
Post, October 18, 2000,
p.1B.
[21] Michael T. Dolce, Esq., A Better
Day for
Children: A Study of Florida's Dependency
System With
Legislative Recommendations. The study
is undated,
the observations took place in August,
2000.
[22] Dolce, note 20 supra, citing
his interview with
DCF Assistant General Counsel Peggy
Sanford and DCF
Chief of Child Protection Policy Mary
Allegretti.
[23] Dolce, note 20 supra.
[24] This information comes from a
series of charts
headed "Status of ASFA Reviews,"
prepared by DCF in
August, 2000, based on a sample of
cases in all
regions except Districts 1,3,5,7 and
9. The charts do
not include statewide averages. They
were obtained by
NCCPR from a source that prefers to
remain anonymous.
Data since have been gathered for
districts 1,3,5,7
and 9, but these data were not available
to NCCPR.
The methodology and purpose of the
survey was
confirmed by Margaret Taylor, Financial
Administrator,
Department of Children and Families.
[25] 31 Foster Children. Note 5, Supra,
p.38.
[26] Sandra Svoboda, "Children's
rights groups turn to
class-action suits for reform,"
Toledo Blade, February
11, 2001.
[27] Nancy Cook Lauer, "Kearney
says her agency is
making gains," Tallahassee Democrat,
February 23,
2001.
[28] "Status of ASFA Reviews,"
Note 23, supra.
[29] Elizabeth Bettendorf, "Issues
in foster care
system reviewed," Tampa Tribune,
October 26, 2000,
Metro p.4.
[30] Shana Gruskin, "Critics:
Foster care still
limping," Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
February 15,
2001, p.1B.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Wayne Washington, "Abuse
reports started in
1994," St. Petersburg Times,
May 12, 2000, p.1B, and
"Unsafe Havens," St. Petersburg
Times, June 19, 2000,
p.1A.
[33] Bill Douthat, "Response
to Crowding at Foster
Home Angers Judge," Palm Beach
Post, June 17, 2000.
[34] 31 Foster Children. note 5 Supra,
p.27.
[35] The figure of 82 deaths in 1998
was provided to
the author by the DCF Communications
Office. But
according to the Florida Department
of Health's
Florida Child Abuse Death Review (September,
2000) the
figure for 1998 was 80, and the source
they cite is a
DCF publication, Child Abuse and Neglect
Deaths: 1998.
[36] Carol Marbin Miller, "Child
Abuse Deaths
Studied," Miami Herald, December
12, 2000.
[37] According to the DCF Communications
Office, child
abuse death figures were as follows:
1994: 80, 1995:
62, 1996: 82, 1997: 71, 1998: 82.
[38] Bill Cotterell, "Agencies
want blabbing kept to a
minimum," Tallahassee Democrat,
January 29, 2001,
p.1B, and Bill Cotterell, "State
workers read between
Bush's words," Tallahassee Democrat,
February 5, 2001,
p.1B.
[39] William Cooper, Jr., "State
failed to protect
2-year-old, report says," Palm
Beach Post, October 31,
2000 and Emily J. Minor and William
Cooper, Jr.,
"Joshua's tale: Little boy loved
and lost," Palm Beach
Post, December 3, 2000, p.1A.
[40] William Cooper Jr., "Saccone
Report Cites DCF
Failures," Palm Beach Post, February
3, 2001, p.1B.
[41] William Cooper, Jr., "5
fired DCF Workers Say
Dismissals Were Unwarranted,"
Palm Beach Post
[42] Scott McCabe, "DCF Reinstates
3 It Fired In
Saccone Tot's Death," Palm Beach
Post, December 30,
2000, p.1B.
[43] Shana Gruskin, "Transfer
of duties shifts
backlog," Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
July 6, 2000,
p.1B.
[44] "Joshua's tale." Note
34, Supra.
[45] Ed Horton, "Foster care
system's biggest need is
preventive programs," Palm Beach
Post, January 9,
2000, p.4E.
[46] Shana Gruskin, "Child abuse
workers call for
curbs on hotline," Ft. Lauderdale
Sun-Sentinel,
January 14, 2001.
[47] Affidavit of Dr. Ivor Groves,
Valerie Ward v.
Edward Feaver, Case No. 98-7137-CIV,
United States
District Court Southern District of
Florida, Fort
Lauderdale Division, pp. 6, 10.
[48] Personal communication.
[49] Shana Gruskin, "DCF Administrator
confident of
transition" Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel,
March 25,
2000, p. 8B.
[50] U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development,
Family Unification Program,
www.hud.gov/progdesc/famuni8.html
[51] Department of Housing and Urban
Development,
Cuomo Awards $46.8 million in Family
Unification
Grants, http://www.hud.gov/pressrel/famuncht.html
[52] Nova Southeastern University
Children First
Project Kinship Support Center, Relative
Caregiver
Town Meetings: A Report to Policymakers
and the
Community, June 19, 2000.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Illinois Department of Children
and Family
Services, Signs of Progress in Child
Welfare Reform,
http://www.state.il.us/dcfs/signsplsub.shtml
[55] Elizabeth Hamilton, "No
one took care of Alex,"
Hartford Courant, October 29, 2000,
p.1
[56] Laws of Florida, Sec. 39.303(2)
[57] The text of the law, as amended,
can be found at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/cgi-bin/view_page.pl?Tab=session&Submenu=1&FT=D&File=hb0855er.html&Directory=session/2000/House/bills/billtext/html/
[58] Kathleen Wobie, Marylou Behnke
et. al., To Have
and To Hold: A Descriptive Study of
Custody Status
Following Prenatal Exposure to Cocaine,
paper
presented at joint annual meeting
of the American
Pediatric Society and the Society
for Pediatric
Research, May 3, 1998.
[59] Elizabeth Bettendorf, "Determined
to win," Tampa
Tribune, May 13, 2000, p.1
[60] Author's interview with John
Perry, Senior
Management Analyst, Department of
Children and
Families.
[61] Florida's e-budget,
www.ebudget.state.fl.us/BDactivityDetail.asp?ActRecNum=1
[62] Florida's e-budget,
www.ebudget.state.fl.us/BDActivityDetail.asp?ActRecNum=2
[63] Florida's e-budget,
www.ebudget.state.fl.us/BDactivityDetail.asp?ActRecNum=2
[64] Interview with John Perry, note
10, Supra.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Status of ASFA Reviews, note
23, supra.
[67] Interview with John Perry, note
10, supra.
[68] Carol Marbin Miller, "State
to lose foster
bonus," Miami Herald Sept. 22,
2000.
[69] 31 Foster Children, note 5, Supra.
[70] Anthony Colarossi, "Boys
Ranch Escapes Trial,"
Orlando Sentinel (Lake County edition)
January 3,
2001, p.1., Anthony Colarossi, "Rise
and Fall of the
Boys Ranch" Orlando Sentinel
(Lake County Edition)
February 4, 2001, p.1.
[71] William Cooper, Jr., "Bid
to privatize county's
foster care rejected," Palm Beach
Post, December 20,
2000, p.1B; "Rejected agency
back in good graces,"
Palm Beach Post, January 13, 2001,
p.3B.
[72] Data on Allegheny County are
from personal
communication with the public information
office at
the Allegheny County Department of
Human Services and
from Allegheny County Department of
Human Services,
Office of Children, Youth and Families,
Ensuring
Permanency in Allegheny County. The
report is
available online at
http://trfn.clpgh.org/acdhs/CYF/permrep799.htm
[73] To find the most recent such
report, for
November, 2000, go to the DCF website,
click on
"publications," then on
"Mission Support and Planning
Team" choose the November Situation
Report, click on
"the complete Situation Report"
and scroll to page
p.33.
[74] Study Findings: Study of National
Incidence and
Prevalence of Child Abuse and Neglect:
1988
(Washington: U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services,
National Center on Child Abuse and
Neglect, 1988),
Chapter 6, Page 5.
[75] Title V, Chapter 39.01
[76] Title XLVI, Chapter 827.03(3)(a)
[77] Special Child Welfare Advisory
Panel, Advisory
Report on Front Line and Supervisory
Practice, March
9, 2000, pp. 47,78.
[78] Personal communication.
[79] Personal communication.
[80] State of Florida, Study Commission
on Child
Welfare, A Survey of Florida's Child
Protective
Investigators, April, 1991, pp.10,
28.
--------------------------------------------------
--- Wayne Jewett
<Nuhusky82@AOL.COM
wrote:
Bullshit!!!!!!!!!!!! DSS is evil,
give a break.
Who are you