PAUL SCHENCK and
DWIGHT SAUNDERS,
PETITIONERS v.
PRO-CHOICE NETWORK OF WESTERN NEW YORK et al.
519 U.S. 357 (1997)
Leafletting and commenting on matters of public concern are
classic forms of speech that lie at the
heart of the First Amendment, and speech
in public areas is at its most protected
on public sidewalks, a prototypical
example of a traditional public forum.
See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312,
322 (1988); United States v. Grace, 461
U. S. 171, 180 (1983). On the other
hand, we have before us a record that
shows physically abusive conduct,
harassment of the police that hampered
law enforcement, and the tendency of
even peaceful conversations to devolve
into aggressive and sometimes violent
conduct. In some situations, a record of
abusive conduct makes a prohibition on
classic speech in limited parts of a
public sidewalk permissible.
See, e.g., Part II-D infra; Madsen,
512 U. S. at 769-770.
We uphold the fixed buffer zones
around the doorways, driveways, and
driveway entrances. These buffer zones
are necessary to ensure that people and
vehicles trying to enter or exit the
clinic property or clinic parking lots
can do so. As in Madsen, the record
shows that protest- ers purposefully or
effectively blocked or hindered people
from entering and exiting the clinic
doorways, from driving up to and away
from clinic entrances, and from driving
in and out of clinic parking lots. Based
on this conduct-both before and after
the TRO issued-the District Court was
entitled to conclude that the only way
to ensure access was to move back the
demonstrations away from the driveways
and parking lot entrances.