UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
NEW JERSEY COUNCIL FOR CHILDREN'S
ON THE BRIEF:
Table Of Authorities
Briscoe v. LaHue,
103 S.Ct. 1108 at 1121 (1983). . .
. . . . . 5
Butz v. Economou,
438 US 506,98 S.Ct.2901(1978). . .
. . . . . 2
Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Washburn County,
2 Wis.2d 214,85 N.W.2d 840 (1957).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Hodgson v. Scarlett,
106 Eng. Rep. 86, 91 (K.B. 1818) (Holroyd
Kendillon v. Maltby
174 Eng. Rep. 562, 566 (N.P. 1842)
(Lord Denman, C.J.). . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Lake v. Speziale
580 F.Supp. 1318 (1984) . . . . .
. . . . . . 9
Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 227, 284 n.8 (1980) . . .
. . 3
Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290(7th Cir.
1968) . . . 3
Monell v. Department
of Social Services, 436 U.S., at 665.
. . 8
Monroe v. Pape,
365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961). . . . .
. . . . . . 4
Rabon v. Rowen
Memorial Hosp., Inc. 269 NS1, 13,
485, 493 (1967). . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 243. . . . . .
. . . . . . . 5
Shore v. Howard,
414F.Supp. 379. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . 3
Will v. Michigan
Dept.,of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71. . . 4, 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
) CIVIL ACTION No.
) AMICUS CURIAE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL
) FOR CHILDREN'S
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
This brief is presented on behalf
of New Jersey Council for Children's
Rights (NJCCR) which is a statewide,
not for profit, tax exempt organization.
NJCCR is a member of the National
Council For Children's Rights.
NJCCR has a substantial interest in
assuring that claims under the Civil
Rights Act asserting the torts done
to children and parents by the Superior
Court Judges in the state of New Jersey
are not thwarted by an act without
constitutional authority of the United
States Supreme Court. Only congress
has the Constitutional standing to
enact law. Congress has enacted
a law that permits redress from state
judicial defendants, the Civil Rights
Plaintiff Babinski's complaint clearly
defines and he will prove the tortious
capitulation of responsibility and
violation of ethics, rules and laws
by the judicial officers and other
defendants, all acting in conspiracy
under color of law. There are
many and frequent other unconstitutional
abuses of the terrible swift sword
of justice from the family court bench
committed against NJCCR members.
Many NJCCR members, and others, have
been denied their constitutional right
to redress for these torts committed
upon them by the New Jersey Superior
Court Judiciary. We wish to
argue against judicial immunity.
1. Robert J. Mega was
a law clerk to Hon. John Boyle during
part of the litigation of plaintiff
Mark Babinski's divorce. Judge
Boyle was the assigned judge to hear
plaintiff Babinski's divorce.
Mr. Mega subsequently left the employ
of the court and entered private practice
as a member of the firm of Richard
H. Kress. Plaintiff Babinski
complained to the defendant judges
and Mr. Kress and Mr. Mega. of the
violation of rules by the defendants.
Richard H. Kress is the attorney representing
plaintiff Babinski's ex-wife, and
Mr. Mega personally appeared in court
on behalf of plaintiff's adversary
in the very same matter he dealt with
as a law clerk under Judge Boyle.
Mr. Mega, Mr. Kress, Hon. Renee J.
Weeks and Hon. John J. Callahan particularly
were in violation of the provisions
of the attorney ethics and judicial
ethics rules. None of the defendants
took any action to prevent or stop
the unethical activity.
2. As a result of this
unlawful affiliation between the court
and the opposing counsel plaintiff
Babinski was denied lawful fair and
unbiased treatment by the state court.
As a result he suffered a substantial
3. State Judges are quick
to cry "Judicial Immunity"
whenever an accusation of this nature
lands in their court. The validity
of the complaint is put aside, they
only say "I have no responsibility
for my actions". This extent
of abuse has been recognized by the
courts when it has, on its own merits,
been considered. A finding that
the judges were outside their judicial
authority was not required.
Judges whose abuse of office is characteristic
of the judicial defendants in this
case have been held liable for damages.
The Supreme Court of the United States
said in Butz v. Economou, 438 US 506,98
S.Ct.2901(1978) "The resolution
of immunity questions requires a balance
between the evils inevitable in any
available alternative. In situations
of abuse of office, an action for
damages may offer the only realistic
avenue for vindication of Constitutional
4. Even the state Courts
have held that State Judges do not
have immunity. It was most eloquently
stated in Rabon v. Rowen Memorial
Hosp., Inc. 269 NS1, 13, 152 S.E.2d
485, 493 (1967) that, "Immunity
fosters neglect and breeds irresponsibility,
while liability promotes care and
caution, which caution and care is
owed by the Government to its people."
5. And in 42 U.S.C.A.
1983 Shore v. Howard, 414F.Supp. 379
the court was definitive in saying,
"There is no Judicial immunity
to civil actions for equitable relief
under the Civil Rights Act of 1871."
6. It was decided that,
"Government immunity violates
the common law maxim that everyone
shall have a remedy for an injury
done to his person or property."
in the case of Fireman's
Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Washburn
County, 2 Wis.2d 214,85 N.W.2d 840
7. It is well established
that a question of immunity to suit
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 et seq.
raises an issue of Federal law and
that state law cannot immunize conduct
of state actors which may otherwise
violate constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court held in Martinez
v. California, 444 U.S. 227, 284 n.
8 (1980) that:"Conduct by persons
acting under color of state law which
is wrongful under 42 U.S.C.
1983 or 42 U.S.C. 1985 cannot
be immunized by state law. A
construction of the federal statute
which permitted a state immunity defense
to have controlling effect would transmute
a basic guarantee into an illusory
promise; and the supremacy clause
of the Constitution insures that proper
construction may be enforced.
See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287, 290(7th Cir. 1968) "The
immunity claim raises a question of
federal law. . . ."
8. If immunity from liability
were granted, carte blanche, to anyone
or any class of state officials, it
would serve to deny the right to redress
for wrongs and torts committed under
color of law. The very intent
of the civil rights act of 1871 is
to insure that these wrongs and torts
are actionable. If there be
any truth to the notion that, "Justice
Will Be Done," Judges and
Court officers should be measured
by an even more stringent set of rules
than ordinary citizens, and by a higher
authority. The terrible swift
sword of justice is an awesome weapon
when improperly wielded.
9. The judicial defendants
are properly sued, by plaintiff Babinski,
in their individual capacity for tortious
acts committed under color of law.
The right to sue turns on the fact
that their tortious acts were committed
in their official capacity under color
of law. The suit in this case
is properly against the judicial defendants
in their individual capacity for acts
performed in their official capacity
and under color of law.
10. Through 1983, Congress
sought "to give a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights,
privileges and immunities by an official's
abuse of his position." Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 172 (1961).
Accordingly, it authorized suits to
redress deprivations of civil rights
by persons acting under color of any
[state] statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage."
42 U. S. C. 1983. The
requirement of action under color
of state law means that the judicial
defendants become liable for tortious
acts they commit precisely because
of their authority as judicial officers.
11. The judicial defendants
are state judicial officers sued in
their individual capacities, and are
"persons" within the persons"
meaning of 1983. Unlike
official-capacity defendants-who are
not "persons" because
they assume the identity of the government
that employs them, in Will v. Michigan
Dept.,of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71, officers sued in their personal
capacity come to the court as individuals
and thus fit comfortably within the
statutory term "person,"
cf. 491 U.S., at 71, n.10.
Moreover, 1983's authorization
of suits to redress deprivations of
civil rights by persons acting under
color of state law means that judicial
defendants may be held liable for
the torts committed precisely because
of their authority as judicial officials.
That the acts are both within the
official's authority and constitute
the performance of court functions
should not be considered acts of the
State that cannot give rise to a personal-capacity
action against these defendants.
That contention ignores the Supreme
Court's holding that 1983 was
enacted to enforce provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment against those
who carry a badge of a State and represent
it in some capacity, whether they
act in accordance with their authority
or misuse it. Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 243.
12. The Eleventh Amendment does
not bar 1983 personal-capacity
suits against state officials in federal
court. Id., at 237, 238.
Will's language concerning suits against
state officials cannot be read as
establishing the limits of liability
under the Amendment. Although
imposing personal liability on state
judicial officers may hamper their
performance of public duties, such
concerns pale compared to the damage
done in a judicial immunity environment.
13. Supreme Court Justice Marshall's
opinion in Briscoe v. LaHue, 103 S.Ct.
1108 at 1121 (1983), contains the
following dissertation on immunity
based on congressional intent when
the Civil Rights Act was enacted:
At petitioners' urging, the Court
has extensively examined the legislative
history of 2 of the 1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13, now codified
as 42 U.S.C. 1985(3).
However, the forerunner of 1983
was 1 of the 1871 Act, not 2.
As the majority points out, ante,
at 12, 16, the two sections differ
significantly in their language and
purpose. It is thus
hardly surprising that debates over
2 shed little light on 1.
In my view the inquiry should focus
on the history of 1. Only
by examining the genesis of that provision
can it be determined whether Congress
intended to abrogate certain common-law
The origin of 1 is not open to
serious question. The language
and concept of the provision were
derived in large part from 2
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14
Stat. 27. The author of
1 clearly stated the relationship
between the two acts in introducing
the 1871 measure: "My
first inquiry as to the warrant which
we have for enacting such a section
as this [1 of the 1871 Act].
The model for it will be found in
the second section of the act of April
9, 1866, known as the `Civil
Rights Act.' THAT SECTION PROVIDES
A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IN IDENTICALLY
THE SAME CASE AS THIS ONE PROVIDES
A CIVIL REMEDY FOR, except that the
deprivation under color of State law
must, under the Civil Rights Act,
have been on account of race, color,
of former slavery. This section
of the bill, ON THE SAME STATE OF
FACTS, not only provides a civil remedy
for persons whose former condition
may have been that of slaves, but
to all people where, under color of
State law, they or any of them may
be deprived of rights to which they
are entitled under the Constitution
by reason and virtue of their national
Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess.
at App. 689(1871)(emphasis added)
Because the two provisions
are so intimately connected, a full
examination of the
history of 1 must begin with
2 of the 1866 Act.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the
first federal statute to provide broad
protection in the field of civil rights.
. . The liability
of judicial officials and all official
participants in state judicial proceedings
under 2 was explicitly and repeatedly
affirmed. The notion of immunity
for such was thoroughly discredited.
The Senate sponsor of the Act deemed
the idea "akin to the maxim of
the English law that the King can
do no wrong. It places officials
above the law. It is the
very doctrine out of which the rebellion
[the Civil War] was hatched."
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Id., at 1155(Rep.Eldridge).
See also Id.,at 1778(Sen. Johnson,
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee)(2
of the 1866 Act "strikes at the
judicial department of the governments
of the States").
Two unsuccessful efforts were made
to amend 2. First, Representative
Miller introduced an amendment to
exempt state judges from criminal
liability. Id., at 1156. Second,
and of particular significance, Representative
Bingham introduced an
amendment to substitute a civil action
for criminal sanctions contained in
the proposal. Id.,at 1266, 1271-1272.
The sponsor of the 1866 Act, Representative
Wilson, opposed the amendment
largely on the ground that it would
place the financial burden of protecting
civil rights on poor individuals instead
of government. Id., at 1295. At the
same time he stressed that there was
"no difference in the principal
involved" between a civil remedy
and a criminal sanction.
After the 1866 bill passed the Senate
and House, President Andrew Johnson
vetoed it. His opposition was
based in part on the fact that 2
of the bill "invades the judicial
power of the State." Veto
Message, in Id., at 1680. The
President warned that "judges
of the State courts...[and]marshals
and sheriffs, who should, as ministerial
officers, execute processes, sanctioned
by the State laws and issued by State
judges in execution of their judgements,
could be brought before other tribunals
and there subjected to fine and imprisonment
for the performance of the duties
which the State law might impose."
Ibid. Within two weeks, both
the Senate and the House overrode
the veto. Various Congressmen
responded to the President's criticisms
and freely admitted that 2 of
the legislation was aimed at state
judicial systems. As a member
of the House Judiciary committee,
Representative Lawrence, declared:
"I answer it is better to invade
the judicial power of the State than
to permit it to invade, strike down,
and destroy the civil rights of citizens.
A judicial power perverted to such
uses should be speedily invaded. The
grievance would be insignificant."
Id., at 1837. See also Id.,
at 1758 (response of Sen. Trumbull
to President's veto message); id.,
at 1838 (statement of Rep. Clarke).
The bill became law on April 9, 1866
This Court has from time to time read
1983 against the "background"
of common-law tort liability.
Far more pertinent to this case, however,
is the background provided by the
1866 Civil Rights Act. Representative
Bingham, who had introduced the amendment
to substitute civil liability for
criminal liability in the 1866 Act
had become chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee by the time of the 42d Congress.
Senator Trumbull, the Senate sponsor
of the 1866 Act, was chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee in 1871.
Representative Shellabarger, who had
participated in the debates on the
1866 legislation, drafted the 1871
Congress was well aware that the "model"
for 1 of the 1871 law could be
found in the 1866 Civil Rights
act. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. App. 68 (1871) (Rep. Shellabarger).
the manager of the bill in the Senate,
George Edmunds, stressed that 1
"gives a civil remedy parallel
to the penal provision" in the
Civil Rights Act. "If this
penal section is valid, and no one
dares controvert it, the civil remedy
is legal and unquestionable."
Id., at 461. See also is., at
429 (Rep. McHenry in opposition) ("The
first section of the bill is intended
as an amendment of the civil rights
act"); id., at 3385 (Rep. Arthur
in opposition) (1 is "cumulative,
as far as it goes, with certain provisions
in the civil rights bill.")
The fact that 2 of the Civil
Rights Act was the model for 1
of the 1871 Act explains why the debates
in the 42d Congress on 1 were
so perfunctory. Of all the measures
in the Ku Klux Klan Act, 1 generated
the least controversy since it merely
provided a civil counterpart to the
far more controversial criminal provision
in the 1866 Act. See id., at
568 (Sen. Edmunds) ("The first
section is one that I believe nobody
objects to"); id., at 313 (Rep.
Burchard) ("To the first section,
giving an injured party redress by
suit at law in the United States courts
in the cases enumerated, I can see
no objections.") Monell
v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S., at 665 (debate on 1
was limited and the section passed
without amendment); Developments in
the Law -- Section 1983 and Federalism,
90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1155, (1977).
Opponents of 1 of the 1871 Act
repeated the same arguments that had
been made against 2 of the 1866
Act. They warned of the liability
for judicial officers that would result
from enactment of 1. Indeed,
in portraying the inevitable consequences
of the 1871 Act, Senator Thurman pointed
to criminal prosecutions of state
judicial officers that had already
taken place under the 1866 Act.
These statements can hardly be dismissed
as exaggerated rhetoric from opponents
of the 1871 act. Instead, they simply
reflect the fact that the battle over
liability for those integral to the
judicial process had already been
fought in 1866 when Congress adopted
the far more serious criminal sanction
aimed at state judicial systems."
Section 1, in contrast provided for
"the mild remedy of a civil action."
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess.
482 (1871) (Rep. Wilson, member of
the House Judiciary Committee).
So it was not surprising that the
arguments of the opponents to the
1871 Act would fall on deaf ears.
It is also noteworthy that Rep. Shellabarger,
who was hardly reluctant to interrupt
speakers who were misconstruing his
proposal, never disputed the opponents'
characterizations with regard to the
liability of state judicial officers.
To assume that congress, which had
enacted a criminal sanction directed
against state judicial officials,
intended sub silentio to exempt those
same officials from the civil counterpart
approaches the incredible. Sheriffs
and marshalls, while performing a
quintessentially judicial function
such as serving process, were clearly
liable under the 1866 Act, notwithstanding
President Johnson's objections.
Because, as Representative Shellabarger
stated, 1 of the 1871 Act provided
a civil remedy "in identically
the same case" or " on the
same state of facts" as 2
of the 1866 Act, it obviously overrode
whatever immunity many have existed
at common law for these participants
in the judicial process in 1871.
14. Congress clearly intended
judicial defendants to be responsible
for their acts in violation of
1983 et. seq. The discussions
on the congressional floor in 1866
and 1871 were plain that the state
judiciary should not be excluded from
liability under the Civil Rights Act.
As a member of the House Judiciary
committee(see above), Representative
Lawrence, declared: " . . .it
is better to invade the judicial power
of the State than to permit it to
invade, strike down, and destroy the
civil rights of citizens. A
judicial power perverted to such uses
should be speedily invaded.
The grievance would be insignificant."
Congress then passed the bill and
it was law. The law did not
grant judicial immunity. Judicial
immunity was then created by the courts.
The courts do not have the constitutional
standing to immunize a class of persons
to the law.
15. There has never been a question
of judicial immunity in any action
except that judges might be immune
from civil liability. In Lake
v. Speziale 580 F.Supp. 1318 (1984)
the Superior Court Judges of the State
were maintained as a defendant class.
Since the Civil Rights Act was enacted
the courts have at various times upheld
or denied judicial immunity and immunity
for other court officers. When
judicial immunity was reestablished
it was not on the statutes or the
Act but by judges acting in defense
of their colleagues and based on the
common law of our English past.
It was on the doctrine of, "The
King can do no wrong," as extended
to the king's judges.
16. The Civil Rights Act was
enacted in 1871 to establish a broad
avenue for citizens with civil rights
complaints against all state officials
to travel to Federal Court.
It is the state courts and enforcement
officers that are the specific target
of the Act. It is only the state
judicial defendants that ".
. . have the power to prevent . .
. the commission of same."
The pendulum is now swinging toward
denying judicial immunity and immunity
for other court officers. In
Lake Supra, the District Court for
the district of Connecticut not only
allowed a civil action to proceed
against state Superior Court Judges
but it maintained the "Superior
Court Judges of the state of Connecticut"
as the defendant class. By maintaining
the class the Court for all intent
and purposes exhibited no concern
for mal-feasance, non- feasance and
non-judicial acts of the individual
judges but made the good and bad judges
equally responsible to uphold the
laws and Constitution. This
even extends the lack of consideration
to qualified immunity. It demonstrates
an unqualified disregard of judicial
immunity in Civil Rights actions by
17. It is clear that the intent
of the Legislators in 1871 was to
provide an avenue of redress in which
the people could file civil suit against
state court officers and Judges.
The concept of liability but only
for certain kinds of civil relief
is repugnant to the constitution.
That the Federal Court has jurisdiction
to proceed against state judicial
officials is not at question.
The Federal Court has often granted
injunctive relief. The question
is whether the Federal Court trying
a case against state judicial defendants
may impose only injunctive relief
to prevent future wrongs by the state
judicial defendants or may grant redress
to all negligent or deliberate tortious
acts by the state judicial defendants.
It was not the intent of congress
to allow injunctive relief and disallow
compensatory and punitive relief.
18. The concept of Judicial
immunity finds its origin in Common
Law of England. Our system of
jurisprudence was created on a foundation
of English common law. There
are two mitigating reasons why we
should look skeptically at the common
law doctrines bequeathed to us.
The first reason is readily apparent;
our forefathers didn't like English
rule and revolted. The revolution
was successful and we established
our own government, constitution and
laws. The doctrine of, "The
King can do no wrong" as was
extended to the king's judges is not
and should not be a part of our legal
heritage. The second reason
is that even though we forswear English
law as mitigating in the instant case
we cannot take English law as the
foundation of our laws without accepting
the fact that its evolution did not
end when our forefathers revolted
against England. After our country
was established, English law continued
to grow and change. English
jurisprudence has grown to permit
civil judicial liability claims.
If the argument for judicial immunity
is founded on English Common Law it
is founded on axiom that no longer
exists. See Hodgson v. Scarlett,
106 Eng. Rep. 86, 91 (K.B. 1818) (Holroyd
J.) and Kendillon v. Maltby 174 Eng.
Rep. 562, 566 (N.P. 1842) (Lord Denman,
19. The idea that judicial defendants
are not the direct target of the civil
rights act is dispelled by the language
of 1986: "EVERY person
who, having knowledge that any of
the wrongs conspired to be done, and
mentioned in section 1985 of this
title, are about to be committed,
and having power to prevent or aid
in preventing the commission of same,
neglects or refuses to do, if such
wrongful act be committed, shall be
liable to the party injured, or his
legal representatives, for all damages
for such wrongful act, which such
person by reasonable diligence could
have prevented...." (emphasis
The law addresses "EVERY person,"
it noes not exclude anyone, not even
the state judiciary. The judicial
defendants "fit comfortably"
in the "EVERY person" description.
If the "person" addressed
by 1983 et seq. is not the state
judicial officer in court where the
wrongs complained of occur who is
it? There is no
one else in the court or anywhere
else that has the power to prevent
the wrongs described. The only
person that fits the description in
1986 of who "...shall be
liable to the party injured..."
is the judge. The language and
the intent of the legislators is too
clear to circumvent and overrides
existent doctrine and precedent.
Since the civil rights act became
law it was not amended to exclude
judicial defendants. The only
immunity granted was by other judges
improperly protecting their state
20. It is equally incredible
to assume that the framers of the
Civil Rights Act intended to foreclose
jurisdiction in cases relying on diversity
of citizenship that fall below the
dollar threshold for jurisdiction
since diversity jurisdiction has a
dollar amount threshold. If
that were the case judicial liability
would attach in cases within a state
for injunctive relief, but in diversity
jurisdiction injunctive relief would
also be barred if the claimed amount
were insufficient to pass muster.
The amount of damages could not pass
muster if the judicial defendants
were excused since they are the prime
target of civil relief under 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
This would then bar injunctive relief
in cases of diversity jurisdiction.
It was also clearly not the intent
of Congress to allow any judicial
immunity in Civil Rights Act litigation
involving diversity jurisdiction.
It was the expressed intent of the
Congress while passing the Civil Rights
Act to provide the citizens with the
right to litigate for torts and wrongs
as civil liability against "any
person" including the state judiciary,
in the Federal Courts.
21. Now that the state judiciary
is running amuck on the constitution
it is well past time to hold their
feet to the fire. When statements
like, "We are setting aside the
Constitution for today" issue
from the state bench it is past time
for the Federal Courts to extinguish
this outrageous behavior for all time.
This writer would prefer a judge burn
"Old Glory" on his bench
than set aside the constitution for
even one second.
22. The acts by the state judges
complained of were committed outside
the strict confines of judicial authority.
By acting outside the Constitution
and their judicial authority, these
perpetrators of Constitutional demise
pierced their own veil of judicial
immunity if any had heretofore existed.
23. Even if the state Judicial
defendants successfully evade liability
for civil damages by way of judicial
immunity the immunity does not extend
to a claim for costs under 1988
nor to injunctive relief and they
should not be dismissed as defendants.
24. The loss of liberty, property
and Constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights that flowed from these persons
operating under color of law, to plaintiff
Mark Babinski is therefore actionable
under the Civil Rights Act, Title
42 1983, 1985, 1986,
1988 and this court has jurisdiction
of all parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1331 and 1343(a).
25. The amicus brief of New
Jersey Council For Children's Rights
demonstrates that the civil rights
act was enacted with the intent of
preventing abuses of state power by
"persons" acting under color
of law, including judges.
26. The central purpose of the
Civil Rights Act is to guarantee individuals
the protections and remedies afforded
by the constitution and laws of the
United States. This can only
be accomplished by a fair and consistent
application of 1983 et seq.
27. Accordingly, New Jersey
Council For Children's Rights submits
that the Judicial Defendants are not
entitled to immunity from liability
in a suit under the Civil Rights Act,
by application of Federal law as written
and the clear intent of the legislators
who wrote it. The immunity later
granted by a non-legislative organ
of government is, therefore, Void
Ab Initio. Respectfully Submitted,
Dated: December 28, 1991
Board of Directors,
New Jersey Council for Children's
271A Route 516
Matawan, New Jersey 07747