Date: Mon, 02 Jan
2006 20:22:47 -0000
From: "ravenwaverider" <ravenwaverider@yahoo.com>
Subject: Re: INQUIRY??????????? CaseLaw4FamilyRights.txt
http://f5.grp.yahoofs.com/v1/QIa5Q8Z1bugG-jPIfXxY8Yl3c6tjhF_XlehBUvmgNQ5Sb6_fCHj_B3doVCCLqzrGlgM7yFpi-94pduLiDYJhyg/CaseLaw4FamilyRights.txt
In its order granting
the Appellees' motion for summary
judgment,
the district court began its analysis
by setting forth the elements of a
§ 1983 claim against an individual
state actor as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional
right's of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant
were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color
of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant
caused the constitutional deprivation.
Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F.
Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
The court also stated that, to establish
municipal liability, a plaintiff must
show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional
right of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy
or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts
to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff's] constitutional right;
&
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional
deprivation.
My rights as a parents where violated:
The right of a parent to raise his
children has long been recognized
as a fundamental constitutional right,
"far more precious than
property rights." Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972),
quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S.
528, 533 (1953); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942);
Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean,
239 Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander
V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May
V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533,
73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221,
1226.
10/18/2000 Gatliff v. Sisson, No.
CA A102854
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A102854.htm
Criteria
1. Best Interest of Child
2. Must Show Harm
3. Prior Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship
4. Effect on Parent/Child Relationship
5. Any Marital Status of Parents
6. Parents are Deceased, Divorced
and/or Unmarried.
United States Supreme Court Parental
Rights Caselaw
In its order granting the Appellate'
motion for summary judgment, the district
court began its analysis by setting
forth the elements
of a § 1983 claim against an individual
state actor as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional
right's of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant
were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color
of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant
caused the constitutional deprivation.
Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F.
Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
The court also stated that, to establish
municipal liability, a plaintiff must
show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional
right of which (s)he was deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy
or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts
to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff's] constitutional right;
&
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional
deprivation.
In the early 1920s, the United States
Supreme Court first reviewed the rights,
liberties and obligations of parents
to direct the
upbringing of their children. Two
important decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
established a legacy
which was followed by a series of
decisions holding that parenting is
a fundamental constitutional right,
and among "the basic civil rights
of man." Choices about marriage,
family life, and the upbringing of
children are among those rights the
Court has ranked as "of basic
importance in our society," and
as sheltered by the 14th Amendment
against the State's unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or disrespect. Assembled
here are a majority of those cases
defining or reaffirming these fundamental
rights. Links are provided to each
case on the FindLaw Internet Legal
Resources service. Each is in hypertext
format, with links to related opinions
of the court contained in the ruling.
---------------------------------
The construction of a constitutional
theory which will protect various
aspects of family life under Section
1983 rightly continues
to command a good deal of judicial
interest.The right of a parent to
raise his children has long been recognized
as a fundamental constitutional right,
"far more precious than property
rights." Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972),
quoting May v. Anderson, 345, U.S.
528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239
Conn. 336 (1996); In re Alexander
V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May
V Anderson (1953) 345 US 528, 533,
73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221,
1226, This case involved a mother
stripped of her rights without the
right to utter a single word in her
defense. The order was originally
granted for 6 months in which the
court allowed the mother to "fight"
for her rights back, but kept getting
delayed so that the child would incur
more time with the father. This case
was reversed upon appeal, and also
gave rise to the statute citing that,
Presumption (750 ILCS 5/603) "A
court may consider the period of time
that a child has spent with a parent
by virtue of a temporary custody order
but there is no presumption in favor
of the existing custodian under 750
ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification
cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re
Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill.
Dec 701, 667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist.
1996). Obviously, the argument is
that one parent may manipulate the
system to prolong proceedings that
he/she may think there is an automatic
award of custody. The 602 standards
still are mandated to be applied,
one of them including the wishes of
the children as well as other issues
such as safety and well-being of the
children (self-mutilation, in this
case due to psychological
and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother's
residence).
M. L. B. v. S. L.
J.
___ US ___, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
Choices about marriage, family life,
and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court
has ranked as "of basic
importance in our society," rights
sheltered by the 14th Amendment against
the State's unwarranted usurpation,
disregard, or
disrespect. This case, involving the
State's authority to sever permanently
a parent-child bond, demanded the
close consideration the Court has
long required when a family association
so undeniably important was at stake.
Santosky v Kramer 455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child is protected
by the 14th
Amendment, and does not evaporate
simply because they have not been
model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State.
A parental rights termination proceeding
interferes with that fundamental liberty
interest. When the State moves to
destroy weakened familial bonds, it
must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures.
Lassiter v Department of Social
Services 452 US 18 (1981)
The Court's decisions have by
now made plain that a parent's desire
for and right to "the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his
or her children" is an important
interest that "undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection." A parent's
interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is, therefore,
a
commanding one.
Quilloin v Walcott 434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended
"if a State were to attempt to
force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest."
Whatever might be required in other
situations, we cannot say that the
State was required in this situation
to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation,
were in the "best interests of
the child."
Smith v Organization of Foster
Care Families 431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster
parents and a foster parents organization,
sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against New
York State and New York City officials,
alleging that the statutory and regulatory
procedures for removal of foster children
from foster
homes violated the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th
Amendment. The ruling contains an
analysis of the rights of
natural parents as balanced against
the rights of foster parents, as well
as a comprehensive discussion of foster
care conditions.
Moore v East Cleveland 431 US 494
(1977)
The Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host
of cases, tracing their lineage to
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters have consistently acknowledged
a "private realm of family life
which the state cannot enter."
When the government intrudes on choices
concerning family living arrangements,
the Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests
advanced.
Cleveland Board of Education v
La Fleur 414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. There
is a right "to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child."
Stanley v Illinois 405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that
of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and protection. The
integrity of the family unit has found
protection in the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the
14th Amendment, and the 9th Amendment.
Wisconsin v Yoder 406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights
of Amish parents to provide for private
schooling of their children, the Court
held: "The history
and culture of Western civilization
reflect a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing
of their children.
This primary role of the parents in
the upbringing of their children is
now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition."
Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial
marriage, the Court reaffirmed the
principles set forth in Pierce and
Meyers, finding that marriage
is one of the basic civil rights of
man, fundamental to our very existence
and survival. "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the
freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations.
Under our Constitution, the freedom
to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual
and cannot be infringed by the State."
Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479
(1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were
described as protection against all
governmental invasions "of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life." The Court referred
to the 4th Amendment as creating a
"right to privacy, no less important
than any other right
carefully and particularly reserved
to the people." Reaffirming the
principles set forth in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska.
Prince v Massachusetts 321 US 158
(1944)
It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.
And it is in recognition of this that
these
decisions have respected the private
realm of family life which the state
cannot enter.
Skinner v Oklahoma 316 US 535 (1942)
"We are dealing here with
legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental
to the very existence and survival
of the race."
Pierce v Society of Sisters 268
US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education
of children was abridged by a proposed
statute to compel
public education. "The fundamental
theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the
state to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child
is not the mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations."
Meyer v Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923)
"No state ... shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
"While this court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."
The "liberty interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control
of their children is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests"
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Troxel v.Granville, 527 U.S. 1069
(1999). Moreover, the companionship,
care, custody, and management of a
parent over his or her child is an
interest far more precious than any
property right. May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533, (1952). As such,
the parent-child relationship is an
important interest that undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
The law has long recognized and respected
the rights and duties of parents in
the raising of children. The Supreme
Court has been
consistent in recognizing the importance
of respecting Parents authority in
the raising of their children. Ginsberg
v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first
with the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
A corollary to this fundamental principle
is that parents have broad discretion
in the disciplining of their children
and are allowed to
use corporal punishment. Under California
state law, a parent has the right
to reasonably discipline a child by
physical punishment
and may administer reasonable punishment
without being liable for battery.
People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th
1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be
considered disciplinary the punishment
must be necessary (i.e.
there must be behavior by the child
deserving punishment), and the punishment
must be reasonable (i.e. not excessive).
Id. It is
important to remember that the reasonableness
of the punishment will be judged by
a third party and it does not matter
if the parent
believes the punishment was reasonable.
CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT RULES 9-0
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD
ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASES IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS HAVE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT
THEIR ACCUSER UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT.
COMPLY WITH THE 6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD
ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASES.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S.
745 (1982), "a) The fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management
of their child is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, and does not
evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to
the State. A parental rights termination
proceeding interferes with that fundamental
liberty interest. When the State moves
to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures. Pp. 752-754."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Before a State may sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents
in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its
allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence. A "clear
and convincing evidence" standard
adequately conveys to the fact finder
the level of subjective certainty
about his factual conclusions necessary
to satisfy due process."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S.
745 (1982), "the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
demands more than this. Before a State
may sever the rights of parents in
[455 U.S. 745, 748] their natural
child, due process requires that the
State support its allegations by at
least clear and convincing evidence."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"In Lassiter, it was "not
disputed that state intervention to
terminate the relationship
between [a parent] and [the] child
must be accomplished by procedures
meeting the requisites of the Due
Process Clause." Id.,
at 37 (first dissenting opinion);
see id., at 24-32 (opinion of the
Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J.,
dissenting). See also Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The
absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that
freedom of personal choice
in matters of family life is a fundamental
liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(plurality opinion); Cleveland Board
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639 -640 (1974);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651 -652 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does
not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. Even when blood relationships
are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life.
If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights
have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting
state intervention into ongoing family
affairs. When the State moves to [455
U.S. 745, 754] destroy weakened familial
bonds, it must provide the parents
with fundamentally fair procedures."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond
the need for multiple citation"
that a natural
parent's "desire for and right
to `the companionship, care, custody,
and management of his or her children'"
is an interest far more
precious than any property [455 U.S.
745, 759] right. 452 U.S., at 27 ,
quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.,
at 651 . "When the State
initiates a parental rights termination
proceeding, it seeks not merely to
infringe that fundamental liberty
interest, but to end
it. "If the State prevails, it
will have worked a unique kind of
deprivation A parent's interest in
the accuracy and justice of the
decision to terminate his or her parental
status is, therefore, a commanding
one." 452 U.S., at 27.
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"At such a proceeding, numerous
factors combine to magnify the risk
of erroneous fact
finding. Permanent neglect proceedings
employ imprecise substantive standards
that leave determinations unusually
open to the subjective values of the
judge. See Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S., at 835.
Raising the standard of proof would
have both practical and symbolic consequences.
Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.,
at 426 . The Court has long considered
the heightened standard of proof used
in criminal prosecutions to be "a
prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual
error." In re Winship, 397 U.S.,
at 363 . An elevated standard of
proof in a parental rights termination
proceeding would alleviate "the
possible risk that a factfinder might
decide to [deprive] an individual
based solely on a few isolated instances
of unusual conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic
behavior." Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S., at 427 . "Increasing
the burden of proof is one way to
impress the fact
finder with the importance [455 U.S.
745, 765] of the decision and thereby
perhaps to reduce the chances that
inappropriate
terminations will be ordered. Ibid.
The court's theory assumes that termination
of the natural parents' rights invariably
will benefit
the child. Yet we have noted above
that the parents and the child share
an interest in avoiding erroneous
termination. Even accepting
the court's assumption, we cannot
agree with its conclusion that a preponderance
standard fairly distributes the risk
of error between
parent and child. Use of that
standard reflects the judgment that
society is nearly neutral between
erroneous termination of parental
rights and erroneous failure to terminate
those rights. Cf. In re Winship, 397
U.S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
For the child,
the likely consequence of an erroneous
failure to terminate is preservation
of [455 U.S. 745, 766] an uneasy status
quo. For the
natural parents, however, the consequence
of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural
family.
A standard that allocates the risk
of error nearly equally between those
two outcomes does not reflect properly
their relative severity.
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Two state interests are at
stake in parental rights termination
proceedings - a parens patriae interest
in preserving and promoting the welfare
of the child and a fiscal and administrative
interest in reducing the cost and
burden of such proceedings. A standard
of proof more strict than preponderance
of the evidence is consistent with
both interests."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"while there is still reason
to believe that positive, nurturing
parent-child
relationships exist, the parens patriae
interest favors preservation, not
[455 U.S. 745, 767] severance, of
natural familial
bonds. 17 384-b.1.(a)(ii). "[T]he
State registers no gain towards its
declared goals when it separates children
from the custody of
fit parents." Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S., at 652."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The logical conclusion of this
balancing process is that the "fair
preponderance of the
evidence" standard prescribed
by Fam. Ct. Act 622 violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court noted in Addington: "The
individual should not be asked to
share equally with society the risk
of error when the possible injury
to the individual
is significantly greater than any
possible harm to the state."
441 U.S., at 427. Thus, at a parental
rights termination proceeding, a
near-equal allocation of risk between
the parents and the State is constitutionally
intolerable."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The next question, then, is
whether a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or a "clear and convincing"
standard is constitutionally mandated.
In Addington, the Court concluded
that application of a reasonable-doubt
standard is inappropriate in civil
commitment proceedings for two reasons
- because of our hesitation to apply
that unique standard "too broadly
or casually in non-criminal cases,"
id., at 428, and because the psychiatric
evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment
proceedings is
[455 U.S. 745, 769] rarely susceptible
to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., at 429-430, 432-433. To be
sure, as has been noted
above, in the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f),
92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) (1976
ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires
"evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt" for termination of Indian
parental rights, reasoning that "the
removal of a child from the parents
is a penalty as great [as], if not
greater, than a criminal penalty"
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"two federal courts have addressed
the issue. Each has held that allegations
supporting parental rights termination
must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Sims v. State Dept.
of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179,
1194 (SD Tex. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442
U.S. 415 (1979); Alsager v. District
Court of [455 U.S. 745, 751] Polk
County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (SD Iowa
1975), aff'd on other grounds, 545
F.2d 1137 (CA8 1976)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"the standard of proof is a crucial
component of legal process, the primary
function of which is `to minimize
the risk of [455 U.S. 745, 758] erroneous
decisions.'" Post, at 785, quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). only the standard
of proof "instruct[s] the fact
finder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions"
he draws from that information. In
re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 (Harlan,
J., concurring). The statutory provision
of right to counsel and multiple hearings
before termination cannot suffice
to protect a
natural parent's fundamental liberty
interests if the State is willing
to tolerate undue uncertainty in the
determination of the dispositive facts."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The Family Court Judge in the
present case expressly refused to
terminate petitioners' parental rights
on a "non-statutory, no-fault
basis." App. 22-29. Nor is
it clear that the State constitutionally
could terminate a
parent's rights without showing parental
unfitness. See Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). "We
have little doubt that the
Due Process Clause would be offended
`[i]f a State were to attempt to force
the breakup of a natural family, over
the objections of the
parents and their children, without
some showing of unfitness and
for the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's
best interest,'" quoting Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977)."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Any parens patriae interest
in terminating the natural parents'
rights arises only at
the dispositional phase, after the
parents have been found unfit."
SANTOSKY
v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"a the interest of parents in
their relationship with their children
is sufficiently
fundamental to come within the finite
class of liberty interests protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Smith
v. Organization of
Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."
TROXEL
V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. Finding: "... the
Federal Constitution
permits a State to interfere with
this right (infringing on parents'
fundamental right to rear their children)
only to prevent harm or potential
harm to the child...".137 Wash.
2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."
TROXEL
V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks
a compelling interest in second-guessing
a fit parent's decision..."
TROXEL
V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice O'Connor,
joined by The Chief Justice, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded
that 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville
and her family, violates her due
process right to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of
her daughters. Pp. 5ù17." "(a)
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause has a substantive component
that "provides heightened protection
against government interference with
certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests," Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720, including parents'
fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and
control of their children, see, e.g.,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
651. Pp. 5ù8." "(b)"..
broad statute effectively permits
a court to disregard and overturn
any decision by a fit custodial parent
based solely on the judge's determination
of the child's best interest. A parent's
estimation of the child's best interest
is accorded no deference." (Arbitrary
Classification at work)
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530
U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969
P.2d 21, affirmed. "A combination
of several factors compels the conclusion
that 26.10.160(3) exceeded the bounds
of the Due Process Clause no court
has found, that Granville was an unfit
parent. There is a presumption that
fit parents act in their children's
best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442
U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no
reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family
to further question fit parents' ability
to make the best
decisions regarding their children,
see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 304."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138)
530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1,
969 P.2d 21, affirmed. "The ...
Court intervened, but that when it
did so, it gave no special weight
to determination of HER daughters'
best interests." "it placed
the burden of disproving that
visitation would be in her daughters'
best interest and thus failed to provide
any protection for her fundamental
right." "These
factors, when considered with the
... Court's slender findings, show
that this case involves nothing more
than a simple disagreement
between the court and Granville concerning
her children's best interests, and
that the visitation order was an unconstitutional
infringement on Granville' (the Parent's)
right to make decisions regarding
the rearing of her children. Pp. 8ù
14."
TROXEL
V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000) 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny
is the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks a
compelling interest in second-guessing
a fit parent's decision"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983), 463 U.S. 248, "Where
an father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood
by "com[ing] forward to participate
in the rearing of his child, his
interest in personal contact with
his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due
Process Clause." Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S.
380 (1979), "a sex-based distinction
in ... between a mothers and a fathers
violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because
it bears no substantial relation to
any important state interest. Pp.
388-394. [441 U.S. 380, 381]. Gender-based
distinctions "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to
achievement of those objectives"
in order to withstand judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). See also Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit as parents."
Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , "statutory
"classifications `must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation,
so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall
be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)."
Judical decisions on the basis of
gender are therefore
arbitrary and UnConstitutional.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246. "In
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972), this Court held that the State
of Illinois was barred, as a matter
of both due process and equal protection,
from taking custody of the children
of a father,
absent a hearing and a particularized
[434 U.S. 246, 248] finding that the
father was an unfit parent. The Court
concluded, on the one
hand, that a father's interest in
the "companionship, care, custody,
and management" of his children
is "cognizable and substantial,"
id., at 651-652, and, on the other
hand, that the State's interest in
caring for the children is "de
minimis" if the father is in
fact
a fit parent, id., at 657-658."
De Minimus defined: Trifling or
insignificant matters, with which
a court will not concern itself.
The full expression is de minimis
non curat lex. This is a Latin phrase
which means "the law does not
care about very small matters".
It can be used to describe a component
part of a wider transaction, where
it is in itself insignificant or immaterial
to the transaction
as a whole, and will have no legal
relevance or bearing on the end result.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S.
246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "a
unless and until the child is legitimated,
the mother is the only
recognized parent and is given exclusive
authority to exercise all parental
prerogatives, 74-203."
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S.
246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We
have recognized on numerous occasions
that the relationship between parent
and child is constitutionally protected.
See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley
v.
Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 -401 (1923). "It
is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations
the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
And it is now firmly established that
"freedom of personal
choice in matters of . . . family
life is one of the liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974). We
have little doubt that the Due Process
Clause would be
offended "[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a
natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their
children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to
be in the children's best interest."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977).
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), 'No state ...
shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process
of law.' While this court has not
attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed, the term
has received much
consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely
freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36;
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City
Co ., 111 U.S. 746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652;
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ,
6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota v. Bar
er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup. Ct. 862;
Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
, 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup. Ct. 539,
3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey
211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup. Ct. 14; Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549 , 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 , 36 Sup. Ct.
7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas.
1917B, 283; Adams v. Tanner, 224 U.S.
590 , 37 Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F,
1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357
, 38 Sup. Ct. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E,
593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
, 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins v. Children's
Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U.S.
525 , 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --;
Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health,
200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am.
St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.)
147. The established doctrine is that
this liberty may not be interfered
[262 U.S. 390, 400] with, under the
guise of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency
of the state to effect. Determination
by the Legislature of what constitutes
proper exercise
of police power is not final or conclusive
but is subject to supervision by the
courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S.
133, 137 , 14
S. Sup. Ct. 499."
Equal Protection Case Law CALIFANO
v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977),
"To withstand constitutional
challenge, classifications by gender
must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially
related to [430 U.S. 199, 211] the
achievement of
those objectives." Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Such
classifications, however, have frequently
been revealed on analysis
to rest only upon "old notions"
and "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S., at 14 ; Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S., at 508 ; cf.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512
-513 (1976), and so have been found
to offend the prohibitions
against denial of equal protection
of the law. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, supra;
Craig v. Boren, supra. See also Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975)."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983), "The concept of
equal justice under law requires the
State to govern impartially. New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign
may not draw distinctions between
individuals based solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically,
[463 U.S. 248, 266] it may not
subject men and women to disparate
treatment when there is no substantial
relation between the
disparity and an important State purpose.
Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983), Justice Stewart correctly
observed: "Even if it be assumed
that each married parent after divorce
has some substantive due process right
to maintain his or her parental relationship,
cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion
concurring in judgment), it by no
means follows that each unwed parent
has any such right.
Parental rights do not spring full-blown
from the biological connection between
parent and child. They require relationships
more
enduring." 441 U.S., at 397 (emphasis
added). In a similar vein, the other
three dissenters in Caban were prepared
to "assume that, if
and when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child
is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state
action as a matter of due process."
Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis
added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983), "The Fourteenth Amendment
provides that no State shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. When that
Clause is invoked in a novel context,
it is our practice to begin the inquiry
with a determination of the precise
nature of the private interest that
is threatened by the State. We therefore
first consider the nature of
the interest in liberty for which
appellant claims constitutional protection
and then turn to a discussion of the
adequacy of the
procedure that New York has provided
for its protection." "The
intangible fibers that connect parent
and child have infinite
variety. They are woven throughout
the fabric of our society, providing
it with strength, beauty, and flexibility.
It is self-
evident that they are sufficiently
vital to merit constitutional protection
in appropriate cases. In deciding
whether this is such a
case, however, we must consider the
broad framework that has traditionally
been used to resolve the legal problems
arising from
the parent-child relationship"
"When an unwed father demonstrates
a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood by "com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing
of his child," Caban, 441 U.S.,
at 392 , his interest in personal
contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause. At that point
it may be said that he "act[s]
as a father toward his children."
Id., at 389, n. 7. But the mere existence
of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection.
The actions of judges neither create
nor sever genetic bonds. "[T]he
importance of the familial relationship,
to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays
in `promot[ing] a way of life' through
the instruction of children . . .
as well as from the fact of blood
relationship." Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families for Equality and
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231 -233 (1972)). 17 [463 U.S. 248,
262]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983),".. the Federal Constitution
supersedes state law and provides
even greater protection for certain
formal family relationships. In those
cases, as in the state cases, the
Court has emphasized the paramount
interest in the
welfare of children and has noted
that the rights of the parents are
a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed. Thus,
the "liberty" of parents
to control the education of their
children that was vindicated in Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), was described as
a "right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare [the
child] for additional obligations."
Id., at 535. The linkage between parental
duty and parental right was stressed
again in Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944),
when the Court declared it a cardinal
principle "that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
[463 U.S. 248, 258] first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations
the state
can neither supply nor hinder."
Ibid. In these cases the Court has
found that the relationship of love
and duty in a recognized family
unit is an interest in liberty entitled
to constitutional protection. See
also Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494
(1977) (plurality opinion). "[S]tate
intervention to terminate [such a]
relationship must be accomplished
by procedures meeting the
requisites of the Due Process Clause."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
There are also a few cases in which
this Court has considered the extent
to which the
Constitution affords protection to
the relationship between natural parents
and children born out of wedlock.
In some we have been
concerned with the rights of the children,
see, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628
(1974); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In
this case, however, it is a parent
who claims that the State has
improperly deprived him of a protected
interest in liberty. This Court has
examined the extent to which a natural
father's biological
relationship with his child receives
protection under the Due Process Clause
in precisely three cases: Stanley
v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), "The
significance of the
biological connection is that it offers
the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship
with his offspring. If he grasps
that opportunity and accepts some
measure of responsibility for the
child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship
and make uniquely valuable contributions
to the child's development. If he
fails to do
so, the Federal Constitution will
not automatically compel a State to
listen to his opinion of where the
child's best interests lie."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The Equal Protection Claim."
The concept of equal justice under
law requires the State to govern impartially.
New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
The sovereign may not draw distinctions
between individuals based solely on
differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
24 Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266]
it may not subject men and women
to disparate treatment when there
is no substantial
relation between the disparity and
an important state purpose. Ibid.;
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
-199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S.
248 (1983), "In Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979), the Court held
that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause to grant the mother
a veto [over the adoption of a 4-year-old
girl and a 6-year-old boy,] but not
to grant a veto to
their father, who had admitted paternity
and had participated in the rearing
of the children. The Court made it
clear, however, that if
the father had not "come forward
to participate in the rearing of his
child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause [would] preclud[e]
the State from withholding from him
the privilege of vetoing the adoption
of that child." Id., at 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S.
380 (1979) "Gender, like race,
is a highly visible and immutable
characteristic that has historically
been the touchstone for pervasive
but often subtle discrimination. Although
the analogy to race is not perfect
and the constitutional
inquiry therefore somewhat different,
gender-based statutory classifications
deserve careful constitutional examination
because
they may reflect or operate to perpetuate
mythical or stereotyped assumptions
about the proper roles and the relative
capabilities of
men and women that are unrelated to
any inherent differences between the
sexes. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268
. Sex-based classifications are
in many settings invidious because
they relegate a person to the place
set aside for the group on the basis
of an attribute that the person cannot
change. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ;
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677 ; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 ; Orr v. Orr, supra. Such
laws cannot be defended, as can the
bulk of the classifications that fill
the statute books, simply on the ground
that the generalizations they reflect
may be true of the majority of members
of the class, for a gender-based classification
need not ring false to work a discrimination
that in the individual case might
be
invidious."'... parental
rights without proof of unfitness
on his part violates the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause
of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Secondarily,
he attacks 111 (1) (c)'s disparate
[441 U.S. 380, 402] treatment of natural
mothers and
natural fathers as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the
same Amendment." "if and
when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child
is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state action as a matter
of due process. See Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 "...some
Members of the [US Supreme] Court
have concluded that greater protection
is due the "private
realm of family life," Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(emphasis added), e. g., Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 "For
a traditional classification is more
likely to be used without pausing
to consider its justification than
is a newly created
classification. Habit, rather than
analysis, makes it seem acceptable
and natural to distinguish between
male and female, alien
and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate;
for too much of our history there
was the same inertia in distinguishing
between black
and white. But that sort of stereotyped
reaction [441 U.S. 380, 404] may have
no rational relationship other than
pure prejudicial
discrimination - to the stated purpose
for which the classification is being
made."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 520 -521. First Amendment Rights
U.S. Constitution, First Amendment
pertaining to the right to
absolute religious freedom. Holy Bible,
Matthew Chapter 28, verses 17-19:
"The Great Commission of Jesus
Christ" "Therefore go and
make disciples of all nations, baptizing
them in the name of the Father and
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,
and teaching them to obey everything
I have commanded you." Holy Bible,
2nd Corinthians, Chapter 5, Verse
20 -"a we are ambassadors for
Christa"; Holy Bible, Ephesians
Chapter 6, verse 4 - "a Parents,
do not provoke your children to anger,
but bring them up in the discipline
and
instruction of the Lord." Holy
Bible, Deuteronomy Chapter 6, Verses
6¡7: "And you must think constantly
about these commandments I am giving
you today. You must teach them to
your children and talk about them
when you are at home or out for a
walk; at bedtime and
the first thing in the morning."
Holy Bible, Proverbs Chapter 22, Verse
6: "Train a child in the way
he should go, and when he is old
he will not turn from it."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944) "rests squarely
on freedom of religion under the First
Amendment, applied by the
Fourteenth to the states. She buttresses
this foundation, however, with a claim
of parental right as secured by the
due process clause
of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S.
Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446. "two
claimed liberties are at stake. One
is the parent's, to bring up the child
in the way he should go, which for
appellant means to teach him the tenets
and the practices
of their faith. The other freedom
is the child's, to observe these;"
"If by this position appellant
seeks for freedom of
conscience a broader protection than
for freedom of the mind, it may be
doubted that any of the great liberties
insured by the First
Article (US Constitution) can be given
higher place than the others. All
have preferred position in our basic
scheme. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146; Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 60
S.Ct. 900, 128 A. L.R. 1352. All are
interwoven there together.
Differences there are, in them and
in the modes appropriate for their
exercise. But they have unity in the
charter's prime place
because they have unity in their human
sources and [321 U.S. 158, 165] functionings.
Heart and mind are not identical.
Intuitive faith
and reasoned judgment are not the
same. Spirit is not always thought.
But in the everyday business of living,
secular or
otherwise, these variant aspects of
personality find inseparable expression
in a thousand ways. They cannot be
altogether parted in
law more than in life."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "To make accommodation
between these freedoms and an exercise
of state authority always is delicate.
It hardly could be more so than in
such a clash as this case presents.
On one side is the obviously earnest
claim for freedom of conscience and
religious practice. With it is allied
the parent's claim to authority in
her own household and in the rearing
of her children. The parent's conflict
with the state over control of the
child and his training is serious
enough when only secular
matters are concerned. It becomes
the more so when an element of religious
conviction enters. Against these sacred
private interests,
basic in a democracy, stand the interests
of society to protect the welfare
of children, and the state's assertion
of authority to that
end, made here in a manner conceded
valid if only secular things were
involved. The last is no mere corporate
concern of official
authority. It is the interest of youth
itself, and of the whole community,
that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given
opportunities for growth into free
and independent well-developed men
and citizens. Between contrary pulls
of such weight, the safest
and most objective recourse is to
the lines already marked out, not
precisely but for guides, in narrowing
the no man's land where this battle
has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights
of children to exercise their religion,
and of parents to give them
religious training and to encourage
them in the practice of religious
belief, as against preponderant sentiment
and assertion of
state power voicing it, have had recognition
here, most recently in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. [321
U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178.
Previously in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571,
39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained
the parent's authority to provide
religious with secular schooling,
and the child's right to receive it,
as against the state's requirement
of attendance at public schools. "
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), And in Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R.
1446, children's rights to receive
teaching in languages other than the
nation's common tongue were guarded
against the state's encroachment.
It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, supra. And it is in
recognition of this that these decisions
have respected the private realm
of family life which the state cannot
enter. But it is said
the state cannot do so here. This,
first, because when state action impinges
upon a claimed religious freedom,
it must fall unless shown
to be necessary for or conducive to
the child's protection against some
clear and present danger, cf. Schenck
v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 , 39 S.Ct. 247; and, it
is added, there was no such showing
here. " Accordingly, in view
of the preferred position the freedoms
of the First Article occupy, the statute
in its present application must fall.
It cannot be sustained by any presumption
of validity. Cf. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146. And,
finally, it is said, the statute is,
as to children, an absolute prohibition,
not merely a reasonable regulation,
of the denounced activity."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), " "Religious
training and activity, whether performed
by adult or child, are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment against interference
by state action, except insofar as
they violate reasonable regulations
adopted for the protection of the
public health, morals and welfare."
"a The state court has construed
these statutes to cover the activities
here involved, cf. State v. Richardson,
92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing
an indirect restraint through the
parents and guardians on the free
exercise by minors of their religious
beliefs. This indirect restraint is
no less effective than a direct one.
A square conflict between the con-
[321 U.S. 158, 173] stitutional guarantee
of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting
the welfare of its children is thus
presented. In dealing with the validity
of statutes which directly or indirectly
infringe religious freedom and the
right of parents to encourage their
children in the practice of a religious
belief, we are not aided by any strong
presumption of the constitutionality
of such legislation. United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 , 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, note
4.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "On the contrary,
the human freedoms enumerated in the
First Amendment and carried over into
the Fourteenth Amendment are to be
presumed to be invulnerable and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms
is prima facie invalid. It follows
that any restriction or prohibition
must be justified by those who deny
that the freedoms have been unlawfully
invaded."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "The great interest
of the state in shielding minors from
the evil vicissitudes of early
life does not warrant every limitation
on their religious training and activities.
If the right of a child to practice
its religion in that manner is to
be forbidden by constitutional means,
there must be convincing proof that
such a practice constitutes a grave
and immediate danger to the state
or to the health, morals or welfare
of the child. West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 , 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom
of religion, which is 'of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.""The
state, in my opinion, has completely
failed to sustain its burden of proving
the existence of any grave or immediate
danger to any interest which it may
lawfully protect." "Nor
can parents or guardians be subjected
to criminal liability because of vague
possibilities that their religious
teachings might cause injury to the
child. The evils must be grave,
immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 ,
62 S.Ct. 190, 193. Yet there is
not the slightest indication in this
record, or in sources subject to judicial
notice, that children engaged in distributing
literature pursuant to their religious
beliefs have been or are likely to
be subject to any of the harmful 'diverse
influences of the street.' Indeed,
if probabilities are to be indulged
in, the likelihood is that children
engaged in serious religious endeavor
are immune from such influences."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "No chapter
in human history has been so largely
written in terms of persecution and
intolerance as the one dealing with
religious freedom. From ancient times
to the present day, the ingenuity
of man has known no limits in its
ability to forge weapons of oppression
for use against rights of those [321
U.S. 158, 176]a" See Mulder and
Comisky, 'Jehovah's Witnesses Mold
Constitutional Law,' 2 Bill of Rights
Review, No. 4, p. 262
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "To them, along
with other present-day religious minorities,
befalls the burden of
testing our devotion to the ideals
and constitutional guarantees of religious
freedom." "Religious freedom
is too sacred a right to be
restricted or prohibited in any degree
without convincing proof that a legitimate
interest of the state is in grave
danger. " "[ Footnote
8 ] The due process claim, as made
and perhaps necessarily, extends no
further than that to freedom of religion,
since in the
circumstances all that is comprehended
in the former is included in the latter.
"
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "a claim of
parental right as secured by the due
process clause of the latter Amendment.
8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S.
158 (1944), "...two claimed liberties
are at stake. One is the parent's,
to bring up the child in the way he
should go."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "ait is allied
the parent's claim to authority in
her own household and in the rearing
of her children. The parent's conflict
with the state over control of the
child and his training is serious
enough when only secular
matters are concerned. "a"
Against these sacred private interests,
basic in a democracy, stand the interests
of society to protect the
welfare of children, and the state's
assertion of authority to that end,
made here in a manner conceded valid
if only secular things
were involved. The last is no mere
corporate concern of official authority.
It is the interest of youth itself,
and of the whole
community, that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities
for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens. Between
contrary pulls of such weight, the
safest and most objective recourse
is to the lines already marked out,
not precisely but for guides, in narrowing
the no man's land where this battle
has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights
of children to exercise their religion,
and of parents to give them religious
training and to encourage them in
the practice of religious belief,
as against preponderant sentiment
and assertion of state power voicing
it, have had recognition here, most
recently in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
[321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct.
1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct.
571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had
sustained the parent's authority to
provide religiousa" "And
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
, 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's
rights to receive teaching in languages
other than the nation's common tongue
were guarded against the state's encroachment."
"It is cardinal with us that
the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra.
And it is in recognition of this that
these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "Religious training
and activity, whether performed by
adult or child, are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment against interference
by state action, except insofar as
they violate reasonable regulations
adopted for
the protection of the public health,
morals and welfare....The state court
has construed these statutes to cover
the activities here involved, cf.
State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178,
27 A.2d 94, thereby imposing an indirect
restraint through the parents and
guardians on the free exercise by
minors of their religious beliefs.
This indirect restraint is no less
effective than a direct one. A square
conflict between the con- [321 U.S.
158, 173] Constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting
the welfare of its children is thus
presented." "The human freedoms
enumerated in the First Amendment
and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be
invulnerable and any attempt to sweep
away those freedoms is prima facie
invalid."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321
U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom
of religion, which is 'of the very
essence of a scheme of ordered
liberty,' Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152,
cannot be erased by slender references
to the state's power to
restrict the ... activities of children."
"Nor can parents or guardians
be subjected to liability because
of vague possibilities that their
religious teachings might cause injury
to the child. The evils must be grave,
immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262,
62 S.Ct. 190, 193." PRINCE v.
COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
"If the Murdock doctrine standsaa
foundation is laid for any state intervention
in the indoctrination and participation
of children in religion, provided
it is done in the name of their health
or welfare. (Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R.
82; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 , 63 S.Ct. 862; Jones v. Opelika,
316 U.S. 584 , 141 A.L.R. 514; Id.,
19 U.S. 103 , 63 S.Ct. 890; Douglas
v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct.
877, 882.)
MOORE v. EAST CLEVELAND, 431
U.S. 494 (1977), "(b) When the
government intrudes on choices concerning
family living
arrangements, the usual deference
to the legislature is inappropriate;
and the Court must examine carefully
the importance
of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation."
d) The strong
constitutional protection of the sanctity
of the family established in numerous
decisions of this Court extends to
the family choice involved in this
case and is not confined within an
arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits
of the nuclear family (essentially
a couple [431 U.S. 494, 495] and their
dependent children). Appropriate limits
on substantive due process come not
from drawing arbitrary lines but from
careful "respect for the teachings
of history [and] solid recognition
of the basic values that underlie
our society." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
The history and tradition of this
Nation compel a larger conception
of the family."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"In 1798, when this Court was
asked to hold another Connecticut
law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell
said: ""[I]t has been
the policy of all the American states,
which have, individually, framed their
state constitutions since the revolution,
and of the people of the United States,
when they framed the Federal Constitution,
to define with precision the objects
of the legislative power, and to restrain
its exercise within marked and settled
boundaries. If any act of Congress,
or of the Legislature of a state,
violates those constitutional provisions,
it is unquestionably void;"
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The principles laid down
in this opinion [by Lord Camden in
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St.
Tr. 1029] affect the very essence
of constitutional liberty and security.
They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court,
with its adventitious circumstances;
they apply to all invasions on the
part of the government and its
employers of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal
liberty and private property, where
that right has never been forfeited
by his conviction of some public offence,
it is the
invasion of this sacred right which
underlies and constitutes the essence
of [381 U.S. 479, 485]." In
spite of having committed no
crimes OR being found unfit OR incompetent
as a parent, my Right to Constitutional
protection, Equal Treatment Under
the Law and My God Given Liberties
as a Law Abiding Citizen of the United
States of America, have been violated
by the Circuit Court for Howard County
Maryland, and the State Maryland.
My personal property - my children
- have been effectively seized and
without a Constitutional basis OR
the "clear establishment of unfitness
as a parent" as mandated by Federal
case law.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." "the familiar
principle, so often applied by this
Court, that a "governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms." NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307. GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were described in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection against
all governmental invasions "of
the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." * We recently
referred [381 U.S. 479, 485] in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 , to the
Fourth Amendment as creating a "right
to privacy, no less important than
any other right carefully and particularly
reserved to the people." See
Beaney, The Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,
The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The Court stated many years
ago that the Due Process Clause protects
those liberties that are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
The [state] is free to regulate the
procedure of its courts in accordance
with its own conception of policy
and fairness, unless in so doing it
offends some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78,
106 , 111 S., 112, 29 S.Ct. 14; Rogers
v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 , 26 S.Ct.
87; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
604 , 20 S.Ct. 494; Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 , 4 S.Ct. 111, 292; Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 , 35
S.Ct. 582; Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 67 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R.
527.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"In determining which rights
are fundamental, judges are not left
at large to decide cases in light
of their personal and private notions.
Rather, they must look to the "traditions
and [collective] conscience of our
people" to determine whether
a principle is "so rooted [there]
a as to be ranked as fundamental."
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 . The inquiry is whether
a right involved "is of such
a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those `fundamental
principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions' a."
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
67 . "Liberty" also "gains
content from the emanations of . .
. specific [constitutional] guarantees"
and "from experience with the
requirements of a free society."
Poe [381 U.S. 479, 494] v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 517."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The protection guaranteed by
the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments
is much broader in scope. The makers
of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect.
They knew that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of
life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."
[381 U.S. 479, 495]."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's statement
in his dissenting opinion in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 -552: "Certainly
the safeguarding of the home does
not follow merely from the sanctity
of property rights. The home derives
its pre-eminence as the seat of family
life. And the integrity of that life
is something so fundamental that it
has been found to draw to its protection
the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right. Of this
whole `private realm of family life'
it is difficult to imagine what is
more private or more intimate than
a husband and wife's marital relations."
By Extension of
Natural Law, this same level of Constitutional
protection of Family Rights must be
extended to the unemancipated minor
offspring of that lawful and law abiding
marital relation û even in event of
marital divorce.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The entire fabric of the Constitution
and the purposes that clearly underlie
its specific guarantees demonstrate
that the rights to marital privacy
and to marry and raise a family are
of similar order and magnitude as
the fundamental rights specifically
protected."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"Although the Constitution does
not speak in so many words of the
right of privacy in marriage, I cannot
believe that it offers these fundamental
rights no protection. The fact that
no particular provision of the Constitution
[381 U.S. 479, 496] explicitly forbids
the State from disrupting the traditional
relation of the family - a relation
as old and as fundamental as our entire
civilization - surely does not show
that the Government was meant to have
the power to do so. Rather, as the
Ninth Amendment expressly recognizes,
there are fundamental personal rights
such as this one, which are protected
from abridgment by the Government
though not specifically mentioned
in the Constitution." Natural
Laws clearly indicate that Father's
is
to serve his children in the capacity
of a highly-valued roles of provider,
protector, role-model and family leader,
facts which have
been clearly established throughout
human history and tradition. Through
its anti-Father AND Anti-Male AND
Anti-Family rulings AND
with no legal basis to do so the Circuit
Court for Howard County Maryland,
and the State of Maryland, have engaged
in what can only
be defined as the arbitrary classification
of all males. The actions of this
Court AND this State, have no basis
in Constitutional Law,
AND offends countless principles of
justice that are so deeply rooted
in the traditions and conscience of
our Nation's people, AND
which are considered fundamental principles
of the family by these very people.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"a ... State may a serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and
economic
experiments,' New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 , 311
(dissenting opinion), I do not
believe that this includes the power
to experiment with the fundamental
liberties of citizens a"
"The vice of the dissenters'
views is that it would permit such
experimentation by the States in the
area of the fundamental personal rights
of its citizens. I cannot agree that
the Constitution grants such power
either to the States or to the Federal
Government." The systematic
exclusion of Fathers from the traditional
Family by the Courts, represents little
more than a "social experiment"
which violates Natural Law and the
fundamental personal rights of its
citizens. As such, the Court's social-experiment
- the systematic exclusion of Fathers
from the lives of their children -
in the absense of any law breaking
or wrong doing on the part of the
Father - IS UnConstitutional. Based
up the state of the American Family
AND Our Nation, this social experiment
as clearly gone-awry, and must be
immediately eliminated from Our Families
and Our Nation.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"the Government, absent a showing
of a compelling subordinating state
interest, could not decree a."
[381 U.S. 479, 497] "Yet by their
reasoning such an invasion of marital
privacy would not be subject to constitutional
challenge because, while it might
be "silly," no provision
of the Constitution specifically prevents
the Government from curtailing the
marital right to bear children and
raise a family." "a the
Court today holds that the Constitution
protects the right of marital privacy,
in my view it is far more shocking
to believe that the personal liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution does
not include protection against such
totalitarian[ism] a, which is at complete
variance with our constitutional concepts.
Yet, if upon a showing of a slender
basis of rationality, a law outlawing
[voluntary birth control] by married
persons is valid, then, by the same
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory
birth control also would seem to be
valid. In my view, however, both types
of law would unjustifiably intrude
upon rights of marital privacy which
are constitutionally protected."
Just as the Government does not
have the Constitutional authority
to interject itself into the issue
regarding the decision by it's Citizens
to bear children, so it is also true
that the same Government does not
have the Constitutional authority
to interject itself into any issue
regarding the raising of those children
once they are born unless AND until
the law abiding parents are "clearly
established to be unfit as parents"
or engage any some other form(s) of
lawlessness. By extension, it
holds true that the offspring of Citizens
are not wards of, nor property of,
the Government OR it's Courts, and
therefore beyond the authority of
the Government or it's Courts so long
as those Citizens AND off spring are
abiding by the Constitutionally authorized
laws of this Nation.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"In a long series of cases this
Court has held that where fundamental
personal liberties are involved, they
may not be abridged by the States
simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship
to the effectuation of a proper state
purpose. "Where there is a significant
encroachment upon personal liberty,
the State may prevail only upon showing
a subordinating interest which is
compelling," Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 . The law
must
be shown "necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible state
policy." McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 196 . See Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"...law obviously encroaches
upon a fundamental personal liberty,
the State does not show that the law
serves any "subordinating [state]
interest which is compelling"
or that it is "necessary [381
U.S. 479, 498] a to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy."
The State, at most, argues that there
is some rational relation between
this statute and what is admittedly
a legitimate subject of state concern.
The rationality of this justification
is dubious, a see Tileston v.
Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A. 2d 582.
"But, in any event, it is clear
that the state interest can be served
by a more discriminately
tailored statute, which does not,
like the present one, sweep unnecessarily
broadly, reaching far beyond the evil
sought to be
dealt with and intruding upon the
privacy of all married couples. See
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500, 514 ; NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 -308; McLaughlin
v. Florida, supra, at 196. Here,
as elsewhere, where, "[p]recision
of regulation must be
the touchstone in an area so closely
touching our most precious freedoms."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438.
"... without the need
to "invade the area of protected
freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama,
supra, at 307. See McLaughlin v. Florida,
supra, at 196.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
, the Court, referring to the Fourteenth
Amendment, stated: "While this
Court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also [for example,]
the right ... to marry, establish
a home and bring up children"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "This Court, in a
series of decisions, has held that
the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and
applies to the States those specifics
of the first eight amendments which
express fundamental personal rights.
The language and history of the Ninth
Amendment reveal that the Framers
of the Constitution believed that
there are additional fundamental rights,
protected from governmental infringement,
which exist alongside those fundamental
rights specifically mentioned in the
first eight constitutional amendments.
The Ninth Amendment reads, "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." The
Amendment is almost entirely the work
of James Madison. It was
introduced in Congress by him and
passed the House and Senate with little
or no debate and virtually no change
in language. It was
proffered to quiet expressed fears
that a bill of specifically enumerated
rights could not be sufficiently broad
to cover all
essential [381 U.S. 479, 489] rights
and that the specific mention of certain
rights would be interpreted as a denial
that others were
protected. In presenting the proposed
Amendment, Madison said: "It
has been objected also against a bill
of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions
to the grant of power, it would disparage
those rights which were not placed
in that enumeration;
and it might follow by implication,
that those rights which were not singled
out, were intended to be assigned
into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently
insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard
urged against the
admission of a bill of rights into
this system; but, I conceive, that
it may be guarded against. I have
attempted it, as gentlemen
may see by turning to the [381 U.S.
479, 490] last clause of the fourth
resolution [the Ninth Amendment]."
Annals of Congress 439 (Gales and
Seaton ed. 1834).
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"This clause (9th Amendment)
was manifestly introduced to prevent
any perverse or ingenious misapplication
of the well-known maxim, that an affirmation
in particular cases implies a negation
in all others;
and, e converso, that a negation in
particular cases implies an affirmation
in all others." Id., at 651.
"These statements of
Madison and Story make clear that
the Framers did not intend that
the first eight amendments be construed
to exhaust the basic and
fundamental rights which the Constitution
guaranteed to the people."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"While this Court has had little
occasion to interpret the Ninth Amendment,
"[i]t cannot be presumed that
any [381 U.S. 479, 491] clause in
the constitution is intended to be
without effect." Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 174. In interpreting
the Constitution, "real effect
should be given to all the words it
uses." Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 151. The Ninth Amendment
to the Constitution may be regarded
by some as a recent discovery and
may be forgotten by others, but since
1791 it has been a basic part of the
Constitution which we are sworn to
uphold. To hold that a right so
basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted
in our society as the right of privacy
in marriage may be infringed because
that right is not guaranteed in so
many words by the first eight amendments
to the Constitution is to ignore the
Ninth Amendment and to give it no
effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial
construction that this fundamental
right is not protected by the Constitution
because it is not mentioned in explicit
terms by one of the first eight amendments
or elsewhere in the Constitution would
violate the Ninth Amendment, which
specifically states that [381 U.S.
479, 492] "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"The Ninth Amendment simply shows
the intent of the Constitution's authors
that other fundamental personal rights
should not be denied such protection
or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically
listed in the first eight constitutional
amendments. I do not see how this
broadens the authority [381 U.S. 479,
493] of the Court; rather it serves
to support what this Court has been
doing in protecting fundamental rights.
"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), "Schware v. Board
of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 , held
simply that a State could not, consistently
with due process, refuse a lawyer
a license to practice law on the basis
of a finding that he was morally unfit
when there was no evidence in the
record, 353 U.S., at 246 -247, to
support such a finding."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"See Patterson, The Forgotten
Ninth Amendment (1955). "Mr.
Patterson urges that the Ninth Amendment
be used to protect unspecified "natural
and inalienable rights." P. 4.
The Introduction by Roscoe Pound states
that "there is a marked revival
of natural law ideas throughout the
world. Interest in the Ninth Amendment
is a symptom of that revival."
P. iii. In Redlich, Are There "Certain
Rights . . . Retained by the People"?,
37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor
Redlich, in advocating reliance on
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to
invalidate the Connecticut law before
us, frankly states: "But for
one who feels that the marriage relationship
should be beyond the reach of a state
law a, the a case poses a troublesome
and challenging problem of constitutional
interpretation. He may find himself
saying, `The law is unconstitutional
- but why?' There are two possible
paths to travel in finding the answer.
One is to revert to a frankly flexible
due process concept even on matters
that do not involve specific constitutional
prohibitions. The other is to attempt
to evolve a new constitutional framework
within which to meet this and similar
problems which are likely to arise."
Id., at 798." The Courts finding
was that a citizen had absolute freedom
from the state with respect to the
parents decision to produce offspring.
By Natural extension, this same Constitutional
protection must be extended to include
protection from those same States
following the birth of these "protected"
children. Insofar as no Constitutionally
recognized laws are broken by these
citizens (parents and children) -
the "sacred familial domain"
must be "Constitutionally Protected
from the Arbitrary and unlawful interjection
by the States' and their illegal courts.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "Compare Nicchia
v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 , upholding
a New York dog-licensing statute on
the ground that it did not "deprive
dog owners of liberty without due
process of law." And as I said
concurring in Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe
that faithful adherence to the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures
a more permanent protection of individual
libertya"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth
Amendment, like its companion the
Tenth, which this Court held "states
but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered,"
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124, was framed by James Madison and
adopted by the States simply to make
clear that the adoption of the Bill
of Rights did not alter the plan that
[381 U.S. 479, 530] the Federal Government
was to be a government of express
and limited powers, and that all rights
and powers not delegated to it were
retained by the people and the individual
States."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR.
JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting. "The
Ninth Amendment, like its companion
the Tenth, which this Court held "states
but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered,"
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 , was framed by James Madison
and adopted by the States simply to
make clear that the adoption of the
Bill of Rights did not alter the plan
that [381 U.S. 479, 530] the Federal
Government was to be a government
of express and limited powers, and
that all rights and powers not delegated
to it were retained by the people
and the individual States."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"At the oral argument in
this case we were told that the Connecticut
law does not "conform to current
community standards." But it
is not the function of this Court
to decide cases on the basis of community
standards. We are here to decide
cases "agreeably to the Constitution
and laws of the United States. It
is the essence of judicial [381 U.S.
479, 531] duty to subordinate our
own personal views..."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "The Amendments
in question were, as everyone knows,
originally adopted as limitations
upon the power of the newly created
Federal Government, not as limitation
upon the powers of the individual
States. But the Court has held that
many of the provisions of the first
eight amendments are fully embraced
by the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations
upon state action, and some members
of the Court have held the view that
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
made every provision of the first
eight amendments fully applicable
against the States. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 .
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "The first 10
amendments were proposed and adopted
largely because of fear that Government
might unduly interfere with prized
individual liberties. The people wanted
and demanded a Bill of Rights written
into their Constitution. The amendments
embodying the Bill of Rights were
intended to curb all branches of the
Federal Government in the fields touched
by the amendments-Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial. The Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments were pointedly
aimed at confining exercise of power
by courts and judges within precise
boundaries, particularly in the procedure
used for the trial
of criminal cases. Past history provided
strong reasons [332 U.S. 46 , 71]
for the apprehensions which brought
these procedural
amendments into being and attest the
wisdom of their adoption. For the
fears of arbitrary court action sprang
largely from the past use
of courts in the imposition of criminal
punishments to suppress [ion of] speech,
press, and religion. Hence the constitutional
limitations of courts' powers were,
in the view of the Founders, essential
supplements to the First Amendment,
which was itself
designed to protect the widest scope
for all people to believe and to express
the most divergent political, religious,
and other
views." "With full knowledge
of the import of the Barron decision,
the framers and backers of the Fourteenth
Amendment proclaimed its
purpose to be to overturn the constitutional
rule that case had announced aIn construing
other constitutional provisions, this
Court
has almost uniformly followed the
precept of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 12 , 787, that 'It is never to
be forgotten that in the
construction of the language of the
Constitution, as indeed in all other
instances where construction becomes
necessary, we are to
place ourselves as nearly as possible
in the condition of the men who framed
that instrument.' See also Everson
v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 , 67 S. Ct. 504; Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 , 95, 102,
740, 744; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S.
41, 89 , 106, 766, 772;
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 162 ; Barron v. Baltimore, supra,
Pet. at pages 250, 251; Cohens v.
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 416-420.
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"...this Court also held in a
number of cases that [colored] people
must, because of the Fourteenth Amendment,
be accorded equal protection of the
laws. See, e.g., Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 ; cf. Virginia
v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ; see also
Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
." a "when Munn v. Illinois,
supra, was decided, this Court steadfastly
declined to invalidate states' legislative
regulation of property rights or business
practices under the Fourteenth Amendment
unless there were [racial] discrimination
involved in the state law challenged.
The first significant breach in this
policy came in
1889, in Chicago, M. & St. P.R.
Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 702.
"A state's railroad rate regulatory
statute was there stricken
as violative of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
was accomplished by reference to a
due process formula which did not
necessarily operate so as to protect
the Bill of Rights' personal liberty
safeguards, but which gave a new and
hitherto
undiscovered scope for the Court's
use of the due process clause to protect
property rights under natural law
concepts. And in 1896, in
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 , [332 U.S. 46 , 80]
this Court, in effect, overruled Davidson
v. New Orleans, supra, by holding,
under the new due process-natural
law formula, that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbade a state from taking privatea."
"Later decisions of this Court
have completely undermined the phase
of the Twining doctrine which broadly
precluded reliance on the Bill of
Rights to determine what is and what
is not a 'fundamental' right. Later
cases have also made the Hurtado case
an inadequate support for this phase
of the Twining formula. For despite
Hurtado and Twining, this Court has
now held that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects from state invasion the following
'fundamental' rights safeguarded by
the Bill of Rights: right to counsel
in criminal cases, Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 67 , 63, 84, A.L.R. 527,
limiting the Hurtado case; see also
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ,
and De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S.
663 ; freedom of assembly, De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 259;
at the very least, certain types of
cruel and unusual punishment and former
jeopardy, State of Louisiana ex rel.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459
; the right of an accused in a criminal
case to be in- [332 U.S. 46 , 85]
formed of the charge against him,
see Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105 , 332, 90 A.L.R. 575; the
right to receive just compensation
on account of taking private property
for public use, Chicago, B. &
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
. And the Court has now through the
Fourteenth Amendment literally and
emphatically applied the First Amendment
to the States in its very terms. Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
; West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 1186,
147 A.L.R. 674; Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 268 , 196, 159 A.L.R.
1346."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "I cannot consider
the Bill of Rights to be an outworn
18th Century 'strait jacket' as the
Twining opinion did. Its provisions
may be thought outdated abstractions
by some. a In my judgment the people
of no nation can lose their liberty
so long as a Bill of Rights like ours
survives and its basic purposes are
conscientiously interpreted, enforced
and
respected so as to afford continuous
protection against old, as well as
new, devices and practices which might
thwart those purposes. I fear to see
the consequences of the Court's practice
of substituting its own concepts of
decency and fundamental justice for
the language of the Bill of Rights
as its point of departure in interpreting
and enforcing that Bill of Rights.
If the choice must be between the
selective process of the Palk decision
applying some of the Bill of Rights
to the States, or the Twining rule
applying none of them, I
would choose the Palko selective process.
But rather than accept either of these
choices. I would follow what I believe
was the
original purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment-to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection
of the Bill of Rights.
To hold that this Court can determine
what, if any, provisions of the Bill
of Rights will be enforced, and if
so to what degree, is to
frustrate the great design of a written
Constitution. [332 U.S. 46, 90].
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S.
131, 'a the first ten Amendments were
adopted as limitations on Federal
power, yet in so far as they secure
and recognize fundamental [332 U.S.
46, 122] rights-common law rights-of
the man, they make them privileges
and immunities of the man as citizen
of the United States, and cannot now
be abridged by a State
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "Mr. Justice
Field in his dissenting opinion in
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337
, 361, 698, 707, stated that 'after
much reflection' he had become persuaded
that the definition of privileges
and immunities given by Mr. Tucker
in Spies v. Illinois, supra, 'is correct.'
And Mr. Justice Field went on to say
that 'While, therefore, the ten
amendments as limitations on power,
and, so far as they accomplish their
purpose and find their fruition in
such limitations, are
applicable only to the federal government
and not to the states, yet, so far
as they declare or recognize the rights
of persons they
are rights belonging to them as citizens
of the United States under the constitution;
and the fourteenth amendment, as [332
U.S. 46 ,
123] to all such rights, places a
limit upon state power by ordaining
that no state shall make or enforce
any law which shall
abridge them."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
"every citizen of the United
States is protected from punishments
which are cruel and unusual. It is
an immunity which belongs to him,
against both state and federal action.
The state cannot apply to him, any
more than the United States, the torture,
the rack, or thumb-screw, or any cruel
and unusual punishment, or any more
than it can deny to him security in
his house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures,
or compel him to be a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution.
These rights, as those of citizens
of the United States, find their recognition
and guaranty against federal
action in the constitution of the
United States, and against state action
in the fourteenth amendment. The inhibition
by that amendment
is not the less valuable and effective
because of the prior and existing
inhibition against such action in
the constitutions of the
several states. 144 U.S. at page 363,
12 S.Ct. at page 708.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "It is one thing
when the State exerts its power either
to forbid extra-marital
sexuality . . . or to say who may
marry, but it is quite another when,
having acknowledged a marriage and
the intimacies inherent in
it, it undertakes to regulate by means
of the criminal law the details of
that intimacy." GIVEN that the
intimacy between the law
abiding Parties is "Constitutionally
off limits and beyond the regulation
of the Courts", so-too, must
be the result(s) of that
intimacy (the law abiding Parties
unemancipated minor children) be ""Constitutationally
off-limits" so long as "the
Parties remain
law abiding" AND are "not
clearly established as unfit parents."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), "In the final
analysis, it seems to me that the
Boyd doctrine, though perhaps not
required by the express language of
the Constitution strictly construed,
is amply justified from an historical
standpoint, soundly
based in reason, [367 U.S. 643, 663]
and entirely consistent with what
I regard to be the proper approach
to interpretation of our
Bill of Rights - an approach well
set out by Mr. Justice Bradley
in the Boyd case: "Constitutional
provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed.
A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads
to
gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than
in substance. It is the duty of the
courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen,
and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon." And yet, in spite
of the Constitutional
protections that are clearly in place,
the Circuit Court for Howard County
Maryland, and the State of Maryland,
have illegal interjected
themselves into the private sanctity
of the law abiding Parties' familial
domain, and willfully attempted to
damage, if not
altogether destroy, the critical relationship
between the plaintiff and his unemancipated
minor children - in violation of Natural
Law,
in the total absence of a lawful suspension
of Writ of Habeas Corpus, and is therefore
in violation of numerous Rights and
Protections guaranteed by the United
States Constitution."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
When we allowed States to give
constitutional sanction to the "shabby
business" of unlawful entry into
a home (to use an expression of Mr.
Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado,
at 46), we did indeed rob the Fourth
Amendment of much meaningful force."
GRISWOLD
v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
" a the principle of privacy
"which is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment." (Id., at 27.)
It would not be proper to expect or
impose any precise equivalence, either
as regards the scope of the right
or the means
of its implementation, between the
requirements of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. For the Fourth, unlike
what was said in Wolf of the Fourteenth,
does not state a general principle
only; it is a particular command,
having its setting in a pre-existing
legal
context on which both interpreting
decisions and enabling statutes must
at least build." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656, "Seventy-five
years ago, in Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), considering
the Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendments
as running "almost
into each other" on the facts
before it, this Court held that the
doctrines of those Amendments "apply
to all invasions on the part of
the government and its employees of
the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life. It is not the breaking
of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, [367 U.S.
643, 647] that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."
The Plaintiff, AND the Parties, are
law abiding citizens of the
United States, have never been charge
OR adjudicated as "unlawful"
or "clearly established as unfit
to parent." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S.
643, 656, The Court noted that: "constitutional
provisions for the security of person
and property should be liberally construed
aIt is
the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." At p.
635." The Circuit Court of Howard
County, the State of Maryland, and
all States within the United States,
have indeed been "stealthy"
in
their systematic encroachment upon
the Rights of the Citizens of the
Unites States of America. However,
the Plaintiff (and countless
Fathers throughout this land) now
have their eyes fully opened, and
are cognizant of the fact that their
basic Civil and Human Rights
are being systematically encroached
upon by the States and their illegal
courts. As guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, the
Plaintiff (and countless Fathers throughout
this land), are also now very cognizant
of the fact that they have the absolute
Right to be
Let Alone, (The Constitutional Right
to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212;
Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 .
"We find that, as to the Federal
Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and, as to the States, the freedom
from
unconscionable invasions of privacy.....,'
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532,
543 -544 "The philosophy of each
Amendment and of each freedom is complementary
to, although not dependent upon, that
of the other in its sphere of influence
-" 367 U.S., at 656 -657.
BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
"Court held that the doctrines
of those Amendments "apply to
all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, [367 U.S.
643, 647] that constitutes the essence
of the offence; but it is the invasion
of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal
liberty and private property."
MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), "In 1961, the [378 U.S.
1, 6] Court held that in the light
of later decisions, it was taken as
settled that "athe Fourth Amendment's
right of privacy has been declared
enforceable against the States through
the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenta"
STANLEY
v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
"1. Under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner
was entitled to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent before his children were
taken from him. Pp. 647-658."
"(b) The State cannot, consistently
with due process requirements, merely
presume that [unmarried] fathers in
general and petitioner in particular
are unsuitable and neglectful parents.
Parental unfitness must be established
on the basis of individualized proof.
See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 .
Pp. 649-
658.
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), "The Court has frequently
emphasized the importance of the family.
The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed "essential,"
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923), "basic civil rights of
man,"
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942), and "rights
far more precious . . . than property
rights," May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S.
645 (1972), "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation [of those
children] for obligations the state
can neither supply nor
hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity
of the family unit has found protection
in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399,
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,
Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541,
and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496
(1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring)."
SKINNER v. STATE OF OKL. EX REL.
WILLIAMSON, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
".one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental rights..."
Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), the
court observed that the Supreme Court
has "recognized the fact that
the writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action.'
Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91
(1969). "Therefore,
the writ must be "administered
with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages
of justice within its reach
are surfaced and corrected."
Harris, 394 U.S. at 291. Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1778 (1992), "The writ of habeas
corpus serves as an important check
on the manner in which state courts
pay respect to federal constitutional
rights. The writ is "the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual
freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state
action." Harris v. Nelson, 394
U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The Court
observed that"[t]he writ of habeas
corpus is one of the centerpieces
of our liberties." Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1778 (1992), "Dismissal of habeas
petition under the "total
exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy,
455 U.S. 509, 520 (1982). Each of
the claims raised by petitioner must
be exhausted before district
court may reach the merits of any
claim in habeas petition. Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "a petitioner
is entitled to habeas relief only
if it can be established that the
constitutional error
had "substantial and injurious
effecta" Brecht v. Abrahamson,
113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993).
Whether the constitutional error was
harmless is not a factual determination
entitled to the statutory presumption
of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d).
Dickson, 849
F.2d at 405; Marino v. Vasquez, 812
F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987)."
What could be more "substantial
and injurious" to a law abiding
Citizen of the United States AND a
loving and committed Parent, than
the unlawful denial of a sustained
and healthy relationship with his
legitimated, unemancipated minor children?
Through the illegal and unconstitutional
actions of the Circuit Court for Howard
County which represents nothing short
of "systemic-wrongs" being
perpetrated against the absolutely
law abiding, loving and committed
Plaintiff/Father. Through it's illegal
actions, the Circuit Court for Howard
County is inflicting extreme pain
and suffering upon the
Parties unemancipated minor children,
which they would never been subjected
to had these governmental entities
simply "minded there own business"
(The Constitutional Right to Privacy,
1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55
Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960) and
left the private matters of the law
abiding familial domain, to those
best-equipped to address those matters
û THE PARTIES. See Also: O'NEIL v.
VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); TWINING
v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78
(1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105
, 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Douglas
v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct.
877, 882; MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
GARNER v. TEAMSTERS
UNION, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), "(c)
When federal power constitutionally
is exerted for the protection of public
or private interests, or both, it
becomes the supreme law of the land
and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely
because such procedure will apply
some doctrine of private right. Pp.
492-501. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a
finding that they are unfit as parents."
ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON,
262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, "
an arbitrary classification is obnoxious
to the equal protection clause, Southern
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 ,
30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247."
ARBITRARY Defined: adj. Determined
by chance, whim, or impulse, and not
by necessity, reason, or principle.
Based on or subject to individual
judgment or preference. Established
by a court or judge rather than by
a specific law or statute. Not limited
by law; despotic.
According to the Crowley Amicus, Franz
v United States (over Bork's dissent),
as someone mentioned on the list did
address, for the first time approached
a non-custodial parent rights:
Similarly,
the D.C. Circuit holds that a non-custodial
parent’s fundamental liberty interest
in maintaining a relationship with
his child and directing the child’s
education and upbringing survives
a divorce decree. Franz v. United
States, 707 F.2d 582, 594-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). In Franz, a non-custodial
father lost contact with his children
when they went into the witness protection
program with their mother and step-father.
In response to the father’s claim
of a substantive due process right
to maintain a relationship with his
children, the court observed that
while the right is “acknowledged to
be potent,” it might be argued that
it is “less formidable when asserted
by a non-custodial parent – one who
retains and regularly exercises ‘visitation
rights’ but who participates little
in the day-to-day care and nurturing
of his children.” Id. at 595.
The
court then rejected this argument,
concluding that “the bulk of the pertinent
precedent seems to suggest that we
should not differentiate between custodial
and non-custodial contexts when deciding
what protections are constitutionally
due a parent-child relationship.”
Id. at 595-96 (collecting cases).
The court also conducted an extensive
analysis focusing on the importance
of parent-child relations in our culture,
the social functions served by shielding
such relations, and 16 the profound
importance of the parent-child bond
to the emotional life of both. Id.
at 597-602. It concluded that the
non-custodial father’s interests were
in critical respects comparable.
Troxel,
Santosky and Prince cases
Also:
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972), this crucial (6-1) decision
invalidated a Massachusetts statute
making it a crime for anyone to distribute
contraceptives, other than doctors
and pharmacists prescribing them to
married persons. The lead opinion,
written by Brennan and getting the
vote of three others, went far past
the limited right of "marital
privacy" found in Griswold
by holding that the right to privacy
inheres in the individual not married
couples--and that the law therefore
violates the Equal Protection Clause
by discriminating against unmarried
people. Brennan's oft quoted opinion
says: "If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted government
intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."
Eisenstadt at 453.
If
there is an “award” of children, it
should be to the father. “The
father owns the child against the
mother as well as against the world…which
no court is to disregard.” State
v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 277.
When a state court implicates (infringes,
denies, deprives) a parental right
(temporarily or permanently), the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts absolutely
intrudes upon the parent-child relationship
by implicating each parent's fundamental
liberty right to custody of their
minor child(ren). "When
a state officer acts under a state
law in a manner violative of the
Federal Constitution, he "comes
into conflict with the superior
authority of that Constitution,
and he is in that case stripped
of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has
no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.",
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) citing
EX PARTE YOUNG, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
The Defendant disagrees that by itself,
the best interests of the child
is a talisman to dissolve all constitutional
protections (United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)).
Strict scrutiny is an extremely high
bar to legislation that presumes a
law is invalid unless it satisfies
both the elements of the test, and
as already demonstrated, any law or
court order that determines custody
unequally where both parents are reasonably
fit, and both assert their fundamental
rights, cannot pass that bar.
A rather articulate citation on what
is truly best for the child was noted
in the New Jersey Court decision stating:
"The greatest benefit a court
can bestow upon children is to insure
that they shall not only retain the
love of both parents but shall at
all times and constantly be deeply
imbued with love and respect for both
parents." Smith v. Smith,
205 A.2d 83 (New Jersey, 1964)
"The statist
notion that government may supercede
parental authority in order to ensure
bureaucratically or judicially determined
"best interests" of children
has been rejected as repugnant to
American traditions. Judges and state
officials are ill-equipped to second
guess parents and are precluded from
intervening in absence of powerful
countervailing interests." Zummo
v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa.
Super. 1990), citing Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985,
2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982).
Parental unfitness
is not focused upon "whether
the parent is a good one, let alone
an ideal one; rather, the inquiry
is whether the parent is so bad as
to place the child at serious risk
of peril from abuse, neglect, or other
activity harmful to the child."
Care & Protection of Bruce, 44
Mass. App. Ct. 758, 761 (1998). "Parental
unfitness . . . means more than ineptitude,
handicap, character flaw, conviction
of a crime, unusual life style, or
inability to do as good a job as the
child's foster parent. Rather, the
idea of 'parental unfitness'
means 'grievous shortcomings or handicaps'
that put the child's welfare much
at hazard. (Footnotes omitted.) Adoption
of Katharine, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 25,
28 (1997), quoting [from] Petition
of the New England Home for Little
Wanderers to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 646 (1975)."
Adoption of Greta, 431 Mass. 577,
587 (2000).
Parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in maintaining custody
of their children, which is protected
by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Care &
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass.
52, 58, 60, 556 N.E.2d 993 (1990).
In re Erin,
443 Mass. 567, 570, 823 N.E.2d 356,
360 (2005)
|