From
Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia.
Jury
nullification is a
jury's refusal
to render a
verdict according
to the
law, as
instructed by
the
court, regardless
of the weight of
evidence presented.
Instead, a jury bases
its
judgment on other
grounds. Historically,
examples include the
unjustness of the
law, injustice of
its application, the
race of a
party, or the
jury’s own
common sense.
Jury
nullification is a
de facto power
of the jury, and is
not ordinarily described
as a
right. The power
of jury nullification
derives from an inherent
quality of most modern
common law systems—a
general unwillingness
to inquire into jurors'
motivations during
or after
deliberations.
A jury's ability to
nullify the law is
further supported
by two common law
precedents: the
prohibition on punishing
jury members for their
verdict, and the prohibition
on retrying
criminal defendants
after an
acquittal (see
related topic
Double jeopardy).
Jury
nullification is the
source of much debate.
Some maintain that
it is an important
safeguard of last-resort
against wrongful imprisonment
and government tyranny.
Others view it as
an abuse of the right
to a
trial by jury
that undermines the
law and violates the
oath sworn to
by jurors.
Nevertheless,
few doubt the ability
of a jury to nullify
the law. Today, there
are two primary issues
raised by jury nullification.
First, whether juries
can or should be instructed
or informed of their
power to nullify.
Second, whether a
judge may remove jurors
"for cause"
when they refuse to
apply the law as instructed.
Common
Law Precedent
The
early history for
juries supports the
recognition of the
de facto power of
nullification. By
the 12th century,
common law courts
began using juries
for more than administrative
duties. Juries were
composed primarily
of "laymen"
from the local community.
They provided a somewhat
efficient means of
dispute resolution
with the benefit of
supplying legitimacy.
Largely,
the earliest juries
returned verdicts
in accordance with
the judge or the crown.
This was achieved
by either "packing
the jury" or
by "writ
of attaint".
Juries were packed
by hand-selecting
or by
bribing the jury
so as to return the
desired verdict. In
cases of
treason or
sedition, this
was frequently the
case. In addition,
the writ of attaint
allowed a judge to
retry the case in
front of a second
jury when the judge
believed the first
jury returned a "false
verdict". If
the second jury returned
a different verdict,
that verdict was imposed
and the first jury
was imprisoned or
fined.
This
history, however,
is marked by a number
of notable exceptions.
In
1554, a jury acquitted
Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton,
but was severely punished
by the court. More
than a century later,
in
1649, a jury likewise
acquitted Sir
John Lilburne
for his part in exciting
a rebellion against
the
Cromwell regime.
Bernstein wrote
of John Lilburne's
trial:
- "His contention
that the constitution
of the Court was
contrary to the
fundamental laws
of the country was
unheeded, and his
claim that the jury
was legally entitled
to judge not only
as to matters of
fact but also as
to the application
of the law itself,
as the Judges represented
only 'Norman intruders',
whom the jury might
here ignore in reaching
a verdict, was described
by an enraged judge
as 'damnable, blasphemous
heresy.' This view
was not shared by
the jury, which,
after three days’
hearing, acquitted
Lilburne – who had
defended himself
as skilfully as
any lawyer could
have done – to the
great horror of
the Judges and the
chagrin of the majority
of the Council of
State. The Judges
were so astonished
at the verdict of
the jury that they
had to repeat their
question before
they would believe
their ears, but
the public which
crowded the judgment
hall, on the announcement
of the verdict,
broke out into cheers
so loud and long
as, according to
the unanimous testimony
of contemporary
reporters, had never
before been heard
in the Guildhall.
The cheering and
waving of caps continued
for over half an
hour, while the
Judges sat, turning
white and red in
turns, and spread
thence to the masses
in London and the
suburbs. At night
bonfires were lighted,
and even during
the following days
the event was the
occasion of joyful
demonstrations."
By
the late 17th century,
the court's ability
to punish juries was
removed legislatively.
This was tested almost
immediately in Bushnell's
case involving a juror
on the case against
William Penn.
In
1670, William
Penn was arrested
for illegally preaching
a
Quaker sermon.
Despite the fact that
the judge demanded
a guilty verdict and
that preaching the
sermon may have been
illegal, the jury
in that case acquitted
Penn and was subsequently
imprisoned and fined
as a result. Four
jurors refused to
pay the fine, and
one obtained a
writ of habeas corpus.
Chief Justice Vaughn,
sitting on the highest
court in England,
discharged the writ,
released them, and
called the power to
punish a jury "absurd".
In
1681, a
grand jury refused
to
indict the Earl
of Shaftsbury. Then
in
1688, a jury acquitted
the
Archbishop of Canterbury
and six other
Anglican bishops
of
seditious libel.
Juries
continued, even in
non-criminal cases,
to act in defiance
of the crown. In
1763 and in
1765, a juries
awarded £4,000 and
£300 to John Wilkes
and John Entwick,
respectively, in separate
suits for
trespass against
the crown's messengers.
In both cases, messengers
were sent by
Lord Halifax to
seize allegedly
libelous papers.
Nullification
in the United States
John Peter Zenger,
a printer in the English
colony of New York,
was tried for
seditious libel.
The jury acquitted
Zenger despite the
judge's instructions;
this is perhaps the
most famous early
instance of jury nullification
in the colonies that
became the United
States.
The
use of the jury to
act as a protection
of last-resort was
espoused by many influential
people surrounding
the framing of the
U.S. Constitution.
For example,
John Adams said
of jurors: "It
is not only his right
but his duty...to
find the verdict according
to his own best understanding,
judgment, and conscience,
though in direct opposition
to the direction of
the court."
Nullification
in Practice
Nullification
has a mixed history
in the United States.
Jury nullification
appeared in the pre-Civil
War era when juries
occasionally refused
to convict for violations
of the
Fugitive Slave Act.
However, during the
Civil Rights era,
all-white juries were
known to refuse to
convict white defendants
for the murder of
African-Americans.
[1] During
Prohibition, juries
often nullified alcohol
control laws
[2], possibly
as often as 60% of
the time
[3].
In
the 21st century,
many discussions of
jury nullification
center around drug
laws that some consider
unjust either in principle
or because they are
seen to discriminate
against African-Americans.
A jury nullification
advocacy group estimates
that 3-4% of all jury
trials involve nullification
[4], and a recent
rise in hung juries
(from an average of
5% to nearly 20% in
recent years) is considered
additional evidence
that juries have begun
to consider the validitiy
or fairness of the
laws themselves
[5].
Court
Rulings
The
1895 decision
of
Sparf v. U.S.
held that a trial
judge has no responsibility
to inform the jury
of the right to nullify
laws. This decision,
often cited, has led
to a common practice
in
United States
courtrooms in which
juries are instructed
to find guilt or innocence
according to the letter
of the law.
In
2001, a California
Supreme Court ruling
led to a new jury
instruction that requires
jurors to inform the
judge whenever a fellow
panelist appears to
be deciding a case
based on his or her
dislike of a law
[6]. However,
the ruling could not
overturn the practice
of jury nullification
itself because of
double jeopardy: a
defendant who has
been acquitted of
a charge cannot be
charged a second time
with it, even if the
court later learns
jury nullification
played a role in the
verdict.
Advocacy
Groups
Advocacy
groups such as the
Fully Informed Jury
Association believe
that jurors have the
right to nullify verdicts,
and lobby for changes
in the law regarding
the instructions given
to jurors.