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If a judge tries to arrest you for contempt ask:


1) Is it civil or criminal?

2) Who is the injured party?

2) May I see the contract?

If no contract can be produced then it is a felony to arrest you!

You are always appearing as "Sui Juris" (your own person without giving up any rights) not a 14th amendment

Information provided by Court Watcher group in California

Article VI, Paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution is known as the Supremacy Clause:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be Supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

The Supremacy Clause establishes the Constitution, Federal Statutes, and U.S. treaties as "the supreme law of the land." The Constitution is the highest form of law in the American legal system. State judges are required to uphold it, even if state laws or Constitutions conflict with it.

Treaties must comply with the Constitution. However, the treaty making power of the U.S. Government is broader than the law making power of Congress. The Supreme Court ruled in Missouri v. Holland (1920) that pursuant to a treaty with Britain, the United States could regulate the hunting of migratory birds, even though Congress had no independent authority to pass such legislation.

In the legal system of the United States, preemption generally refers to the displacing effect that federal law will have on a conflicting or inconsistent state law. The Supremacy Clause (Article VI, section 2) of the United States Constitution states that the Constitution and other federal laws are the "supreme Law of the Land". Thus, when there is a conflict between a state law and federal law, the federal laws trumps--or "preempts"--the state law. The term is also sometimes used to refer to the displacing effect state laws might have on ordinances enacted by municipalities.

Types of preemption

Two situations where preemption claims might arise: express preemption and implied preemption.

  1. Express preemption occurs where Congress says within the statute 'we hereby preempt.' Here, federal laws are explicitly precluding state and local regulations.
  2. Implied preemption has, within itself, three sub-categories: conflicts preemption, preemption because state law impedes the achievement of a federal objective, and preemption because federal law occupies the field.
    • Conflicts preemption is where it is impossible to comply with both the federal statute and the state or local law. In this situation, the federal statute must be followed. It is, however, appropriate to have two laws, one federal and one state, that differ. The federal law, in this case, may be a minimum standard, while the state enacts a law to be more strict. State law, therefore, would not be preempted. Preemption would only occur if the federal and state laws were mutually exclusive.
    • The second type of implied preemption is preemption because state law impedes the achievement of a federal objective. This type of preemption occurs when a state or local law interferes with a goal or objective Congress was trying to attain with a federal statute. The purpose of each law must be determined and compared to each other. If both laws are trying to achieve the same goal, federal law will preempt the state or local regulation.
    • The final type of implied preemption is preemption because federal law occupies the field. In this situation, one must look at Congress's intent, and whether the federal law was meant to be exclusive in that area. The most common examples are in areas of foreign policy and immigration.
Jury nullification
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Jury nullification is a jury's refusal to render a verdict according to the law, as instructed by the court, regardless of the weight of evidence presented. Instead, a jury bases its judgment on other grounds. Historically, examples include the unjustness of the law, injustice of its application, the race of a party, or the jury’s own common sense.

Jury nullification is a de facto power of the jury, and is not ordinarily described as a right. The power of jury nullification derives from an inherent quality of most modern common law systems—a general unwillingness to inquire into jurors' motivations during or after deliberations. A jury's ability to nullify the law is further supported by two common law precedents: the prohibition on punishing jury members for their verdict, and the prohibition on retrying criminal defendants after an acquittal (see related topic Double jeopardy).

Jury nullification is the source of much debate. Some maintain that it is an important safeguard of last-resort against wrongful imprisonment and government tyranny. Others view it as an abuse of the right to a trial by jury that undermines the law and violates the oath sworn to by jurors.

Nevertheless, few doubt the ability of a jury to nullify the law. Today, there are two primary issues raised by jury nullification. First, whether juries can or should be instructed or informed of their power to nullify. Second, whether a judge may remove jurors "for cause" when they refuse to apply the law as instructed.



Common Law Precedent

The early history for juries supports the recognition of the de facto power of nullification. By the 12th century, common law courts began using juries for more than administrative duties. Juries were composed primarily of "laymen" from the local community. They provided a somewhat efficient means of dispute resolution with the benefit of supplying legitimacy.

Largely, the earliest juries returned verdicts in accordance with the judge or the crown. This was achieved by either "packing the jury" or by "writ of attaint". Juries were packed by hand-selecting or by bribing the jury so as to return the desired verdict. In cases of treason or sedition, this was frequently the case. In addition, the writ of attaint allowed a judge to retry the case in front of a second jury when the judge believed the first jury returned a "false verdict". If the second jury returned a different verdict, that verdict was imposed and the first jury was imprisoned or fined.

This history, however, is marked by a number of notable exceptions. In 1554, a jury acquitted Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, but was severely punished by the court. More than a century later, in 1649, a jury likewise acquitted Sir John Lilburne for his part in exciting a rebellion against the Cromwell regime. Bernstein wrote of John Lilburne's trial:

"His contention that the constitution of the Court was contrary to the fundamental laws of the country was unheeded, and his claim that the jury was legally entitled to judge not only as to matters of fact but also as to the application of the law itself, as the Judges represented only 'Norman intruders', whom the jury might here ignore in reaching a verdict, was described by an enraged judge as 'damnable, blasphemous heresy.' This view was not shared by the jury, which, after three days’ hearing, acquitted Lilburne – who had defended himself as skilfully as any lawyer could have done – to the great horror of the Judges and the chagrin of the majority of the Council of State. The Judges were so astonished at the verdict of the jury that they had to repeat their question before they would believe their ears, but the public which crowded the judgment hall, on the announcement of the verdict, broke out into cheers so loud and long as, according to the unanimous testimony of contemporary reporters, had never before been heard in the Guildhall. The cheering and waving of caps continued for over half an hour, while the Judges sat, turning white and red in turns, and spread thence to the masses in London and the suburbs. At night bonfires were lighted, and even during the following days the event was the occasion of joyful demonstrations."

By the late 17th century, the court's ability to punish juries was removed legislatively. This was tested almost immediately in Bushnell's case involving a juror on the case against William Penn.

In 1670, William Penn was arrested for illegally preaching a Quaker sermon. Despite the fact that the judge demanded a guilty verdict and that preaching the sermon may have been illegal, the jury in that case acquitted Penn and was subsequently imprisoned and fined as a result. Four jurors refused to pay the fine, and one obtained a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Justice Vaughn, sitting on the highest court in England, discharged the writ, released them, and called the power to punish a jury "absurd".

In 1681, a grand jury refused to indict the Earl of Shaftsbury. Then in 1688, a jury acquitted the Archbishop of Canterbury and six other Anglican bishops of seditious libel.

Juries continued, even in non-criminal cases, to act in defiance of the crown. In 1763 and in 1765, a juries awarded £4,000 and £300 to John Wilkes and John Entwick, respectively, in separate suits for trespass against the crown's messengers. In both cases, messengers were sent by Lord Halifax to seize allegedly libelous papers.


Nullification in the United States

John Peter Zenger, a printer in the English colony of New York, was tried for seditious libel. The jury acquitted Zenger despite the judge's instructions; this is perhaps the most famous early instance of jury nullification in the colonies that became the United States.

The use of the jury to act as a protection of last-resort was espoused by many influential people surrounding the framing of the U.S. Constitution. For example, John Adams said of jurors: "It is not only his right but his duty...to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court."


Nullification in Practice

Nullification has a mixed history in the United States. Jury nullification appeared in the pre-Civil War era when juries occasionally refused to convict for violations of the Fugitive Slave Act. However, during the Civil Rights era, all-white juries were known to refuse to convict white defendants for the murder of African-Americans. [1] During Prohibition, juries often nullified alcohol control laws [2], possibly as often as 60% of the time [3].

In the 21st century, many discussions of jury nullification center around drug laws that some consider unjust either in principle or because they are seen to discriminate against African-Americans. A jury nullification advocacy group estimates that 3-4% of all jury trials involve nullification [4], and a recent rise in hung juries (from an average of 5% to nearly 20% in recent years) is considered additional evidence that juries have begun to consider the validitiy or fairness of the laws themselves [5].


Court Rulings

The 1895 decision of Sparf v. U.S. held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice in United States courtrooms in which juries are instructed to find guilt or innocence according to the letter of the law.

In 2001, a California Supreme Court ruling led to a new jury instruction that requires jurors to inform the judge whenever a fellow panelist appears to be deciding a case based on his or her dislike of a law [6]. However, the ruling could not overturn the practice of jury nullification itself because of double jeopardy: a defendant who has been acquitted of a charge cannot be charged a second time with it, even if the court later learns jury nullification played a role in the verdict.


Advocacy Groups

Advocacy groups such as the Fully Informed Jury Association believe that jurors have the right to nullify verdicts, and lobby for changes in the law regarding the instructions given to jurors.