Case Law on Fathers Rights in Divorce,
Custody and Property
10/18/2000 Gatliff v. Sisson, No. CA A102854
http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A102854.htm
Criteria
1. Best Interest of Child
2. Must Show Harm
3. Prior Grandparent/Grandchild Relationship
4. Effect on Parent/Child Relationship
5. Any Marital Status of Parents
6. Parents are Deceased, Divorced and/or Unmarried.
United States Supreme Court Parental Rights Caselaw
In its order granting the Appellate' motion for summary judgment, the district
court began its analysis by setting forth the elements of a § 1983 claim against
an individual state actor as follows:
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed constitutional right's of which (s)he was
deprived;
(2) the acts or omissions of the defendant were intentional;
(3) the defendant acted under color of law; and
(4) the acts or omissions of the defendant caused the constitutional
deprivation. Estate of Macias v. Lopez, 42 F. Supp.2d 957, 962 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
The court also stated that, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must
show that
(1) [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which (s)he was
deprived;
(2) the municipality had a policy or custom;
(3) this policy or custom amounts to deliberate indifference to [the
plaintiff's] constitutional right; &
(4) the policy or custom caused constitutional deprivation.
In the early 1920s, the United States Supreme Court first reviewed the rights,
liberties and obligations of parents to direct the upbringing of their children.
Two important decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
established a legacy which was followed by a
series of decisions holding that parenting is a fundamental constitutional
right, and among "the basic civil rights of man." Choices about marriage, family
life, and the upbringing of children are
among those rights the Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our society,"
and as sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State's unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.
Assembled here are a majority of those cases defining or reaffirming these
fundamental rights. Links are provided to each case on the FindLaw Internet
Legal Resources service. Each is in hypertext format, with links to related
opinions of the court contained in the ruling.
---------------------------------
The construction of a constitutional theory which will protect various aspects
of family life under Section 1983 rightly continues to command a good deal of
judicial interest.
The right of a parent to raise his children has long been recognized as a
fundamental constitutional right, "far more precious than property rights."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972), quoting May v. Anderson, 345,
U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, (1942); Meyer v
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), See, e.q. Castigno v Wholean, 239 Conn. 336
(1996); In re Alexander V., 223 Conn. 557 (1992). In Re: May V Anderson (1953)
345 US 528, 533, 73 S. Ct. 840, 843 97 L. Ed. 1221, 1226, This case involved a
mother stripped of her rights without the right to utter a single word in her
defense. The order was originally granted for 6 months in which the court
allowed the mother to "fight" for her rights back, but kept getting delayed so
that the child would incur more time with the father. This case was reversed
upon appeal, and also gave rise to the statute citing that, Presumption (750
ILCS 5/603) "A court may consider the period of time that a child has spent with
a parent by virtue of a temporary custody order but there is no presumption in
favor of the existing custodian under 750 ILCS 5/602 as there is in modification
cases under 750 ILCS 5/610. In Re Hefer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 73, 217 Ill. Dec 701,
667 N.E. 2nd 1094 (4 Dist. 1996). Obviously, the argument is that one parent may
manipulate the system to prolong proceedings that he/she may think there is an
automatic award of custody. The 602 standards still are mandated to be applied,
one of them including the wishes of the children as well as other issues such as
safety and well-being of the children (self-mutilation, in this case due to
psychological and/or other abuse in the Petitioner/Mother's residence).
M. L. B. v. S. L. J.
___ US ___, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as "of basic importance in our
society," rights sheltered by the 14th Amendment against the State's unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect. This case,
involving the State's authority to sever permanently a parent-child bond,
demanded the close consideration the Court has long required when a family
association so undeniably important was at stake.
Santosky v Kramer
455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child is protected by the 14th Amendment, and does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State. A parental
rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty interest.
When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
Lassiter v Department of Social Services
452 US 18 (1981)
The Court's decisions have by now made plain that a parent's desire for and
right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children" is an important interest that "undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." A parent's interest in
the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status
is, therefore, a commanding one.
Quilloin v Walcott
434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "if a State
were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of
the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the
sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest." Whatever might be required in other situations,
we cannot say that the State was required in this situation to find anything
more than that the adoption, and denial of legitimation, were in the "best
interests of the child."
Smith v Organization of Foster Care Families
431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster parents and a foster parents organization,
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against New York State and New York
City officials, alleging that the statutory and regulatory procedures for
removal of foster children from foster homes violated the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment. The ruling contains an analysis of the
rights of natural parents as balanced against the rights of foster parents, as
well as a comprehensive discussion of foster care conditions.
Moore v East Cleveland
431 US 494 (1977)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A host of cases, tracing their lineage to
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
have consistently acknowledged a "private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." When the government intrudes on choices concerning family living
arrangements, the Court must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced.
Cleveland Board of Education v La Fleur
414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is a right "to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."
Stanley v Illinois
405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and protection. The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, and the 9th
Amendment.
Wisconsin v Yoder
406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights of Amish parents to provide for private
schooling of their children, the Court held: "The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and
upbringing of their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition."
Loving v Virginia
388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial marriage, the Court reaffirmed the principles
set forth in Pierce and Meyers, finding that marriage is one of the basic civil
rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival. "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice
to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
Griswold v Connecticut
381 US 479 (1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were described as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." The Court
referred to the 4th Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no less important
than any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people." Reaffirming the principles set forth in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Meyers v Nebraska.
Prince v Massachusetts
321 US 158 (1944)
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
Skinner v Oklahoma
316 US 535 (1942)
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."
Pierce v Society of Sisters
268 US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children was abridged by a proposed statute to compell public education. "The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes any general power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
Meyer v Nebraska
262 US 390 (1923)
"No state ... shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law."
"While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to
enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."
The "liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests" recognized
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Troxel v.
Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). Moreover, the companionship, care, custody, and
management of a parent over his or her child is an interest far more precious
than any property right. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, (1952). As such,
the parent-child relationship is an important interest that undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
The law has long recognized and respected the rights and duties of parents in
the raising of children. The Supreme Court has been consistent in recognizing
the importance of respecting Parents authority in the raising of their children.
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court has stated, "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first with the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
A corollary to this fundamental principle is that parents have broad discretion
in the disciplining of their children and are allowed to use corporal
punishment. Under California state law, a parent has the right to reasonably
discipline a child by physical punishment and may administer reasonable
punishment without being liable for battery.
People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be considered
disciplinary the punishment must be necessary (i.e. there must be behavior by
the child deserving punishment), and the punishment must be reasonable (i.e not
excessive). Id. It is important to remember that the reasonableness of the
punishment will be judged by a third party and it does not matter if the parent
believes the punishment was reasonable.
CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT RULES 9-0
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD
ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS HAVE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSER UNDER THE 6TH AMENDMENT. COMPLY
WITH THE 6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "a) The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. A
parental rights termination proceeding interferes with that fundamental liberty
interest. When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures. Pp. 752-754."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "Before a State may sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing
evidence. A "clear and convincing evidence" standard adequately conveys to the
fact finder the level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions
necessary to satisfy due process."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment demands more than this. Before a State may sever the rights
of parents in [455 U.S. 745, 748] their natural child, due process requires that
the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "In Lassiter, it was "not disputed that
state intervention to terminate the relationship between [a parent] and [the]
child must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due
Process Clause." Id., at 37 (first dissenting opinion); see id., at 24-32
(opinion of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). See also Little
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499
(1977) (plurality opinion); Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 639 -640 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 -652 (1972); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534 -535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary
custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained,
parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of
their family life. If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their
parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs. When the State
moves to [455 U.S. 745, 754] destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide
the parents with fundamentally fair procedures."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Lassiter declared it "plain beyond the
need for multiple citation" that a natural parent's "desire for and right to
`the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children'" is an
interest far more precious than any property [455 U.S. 745, 759] right. 452
U.S., at 27 , quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 651 . "When the State
initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to
infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it. "If the State
prevails, it will have worked a unique kind of deprivationà A parent's interest
in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental
status is, therefore, a commanding one." 452 U.S., at 27.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "At such a proceeding, numerous factors
combine to magnify the risk of erroneous fact finding. Permanent neglect
proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that leave determinations
unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S., at 835. Raising the standard of proof would have
both practical and symbolic consequences. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at
426 . The Court has long considered the heightened standard of proof used in
criminal prosecutions to be "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
convictions resting on factual error." In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 363 . An
elevated standard of proof in a parental rights termination proceeding would
alleviate "the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to [deprive] an
individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] . .
. idiosyncratic behavior." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 427 . "Increasing
the burden of proof is one way to impress the fact finder with the importance
[455 U.S. 745, 765] of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances
that inappropriate terminations will be ordered. Ibid. The court's theory
assumes that termination of the natural parents' rights invariably will benefit
the child. Yet we have noted above that the parents and the child share an
interest in avoiding erroneous termination. Even accepting the court's
assumption, we cannot agree with its conclusion that a preponderance standard
fairly distributes the risk of error between parent and child. Use of that
standard reflects the judgment that society is nearly neutral between erroneous
termination of parental rights and erroneous failure to terminate those rights.
Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). For the child, the
likely consequence of an erroneous failure to terminate is preservation of [455
U.S. 745, 766] an uneasy status quo. For the natural parents, however, the
consequence of an erroneous termination is the unnecessary destruction of their
natural family. A standard that allocates the risk of error nearly equally
between those two outcomes does not reflect properly their relative severity.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), Two state interests are at stake in
parental rights termination proceedings - a parens patriae interest in
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and
administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings. A
standard of proof more strict than preponderance of the evidence is consistent
with both interests."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "while there is still reason to believe
that positive, nurturing parent-child relationships exist, the parens patriae
interest favors preservation, not [455 U.S. 745, 767] severance, of natural
familial bonds. 17 384-b.1.(a)(ii). "[T]he State registers no gain towards its
declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at 652."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The logical conclusion of this
balancing process is that the "fair preponderance of the evidence" standard
prescribed by Fam. Ct. Act 622 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court noted in Addington: "The individual should not be asked to
share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the
individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state." 441
U.S., at 427. Thus, at a parental rights termination proceeding, a near-equal
allocation of risk between the parents and the State is constitutionally
intolerable."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The next question, then, is whether a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" or a "clear and convincing" standard is
constitutionally mandated. In Addington, the Court concluded that application of
a reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings for
two reasons - because of our hesitation to apply that unique standard "too
broadly or casually in non-criminal cases," id., at 428, and because the
psychiatric evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment proceedings is [455 U.S.
745, 769] rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at
429-430, 432-433. To be sure, as has been noted above, in the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f)
(1976 ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" for
termination of Indian parental rights, reasoning that "the removal of a child
from the parents is a penalty as great [as], if not greater, than a criminal
penaltyà" H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "two federal courts have addressed the
issue. Each has held that allegations supporting parental rights termination
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Sims v. State Dept. of Public
Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (SD Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Alsager v. District Court of [455 U.S. 745,
751] Polk County, 406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (SD Iowa 1975), aff'd on other grounds,
545 F.2d 1137 (CA8 1976)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "the standard of proof is a crucial
component of legal process, the primary function of which is `to minimize the
risk of [455 U.S. 745, 758] erroneous decisions.'" Post, at 785, quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). àonly the standard
of proof "instruct[s] the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our
society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions" he
draws from that information. In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The statutory provision of right to counsel and multiple hearings
before termination cannot suffice to protect a natural parent's fundamental
liberty interests if the State is willing to tolerate undue uncertainty in the
determination of the dispositive facts."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "The Family Court Judge in the present
case expressly refused to terminate petitioners' parental rights on a
"non-statutory, no-fault basis." App. 22-29. Nor is it clear that the State
constitutionally could terminate a parent's rights without showing parental
unfitness. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). "We have little
doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended `[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest,'"
quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863
(1977)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "Any parens patriae interest in
terminating the natural parents' rights arises only at the dispositional phase,
after the parents have been found unfit."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), "à the interest of parents in their
relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the
finite class of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. Finding: "... the Federal Constitution permits a State to interfere
with this right (infringing on parents' fundamental right to rear their
children) only to prevent harm or potential harm to the child...".137 Wash. 2d
1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. "Justice Thomas agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's recognition of a
fundamental right of parents to direct their children's upbringing resolves this
case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks a
compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision..."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. "Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and
Justice Breyer, concluded that º26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her
family, violates her due process right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of her daughters. Pp. 5ù17." "(a) The Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause has a substantive component that "provides
heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests," Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720,
including parents' fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651. Pp. 5ù8." "(b)".. broad statute effectively permits a court to
disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial parentà based solely on
the judge's determination of the child's best interest. A parent's estimation of
the child's best interest is accorded no deference." (Arbitrary Classification
at work)
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. "A combination of several factors compels the conclusion that
º26.10.160(3)àexceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clauseà no court has found,
that Granville was an unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act
in their children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602; there is
normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the
family to further question fit parents' ability to make the best decisions
regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. "The ... Court intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special
weight to à determination of HER daughters' best interests." "àit placed à the
burden of disproving that visitation would be in her daughters' best interest
and thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right." "These
factors, when considered with the ... Court's slender findings, show that this
case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement between the court and
Granville concerning her children's best interests, and that the visitation
order was an unconstitutional infringement on Granville' (the Parent's) right to
make decisions regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. 8ù 14."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S. 57 (2000) 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21,
affirmed. "Justice Thomas agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's recognition of a
fundamental right of parents to direct their children's upbringing resolves this
case, but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State lacks a
compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decisionà"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), 463 U.S. 248, "Where an à father
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child, à his interest in personal
contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process
Clause." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), "à sex-based distinction in ... between
à mothers and à fathers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it bears no substantial relation to any important state
interest. Pp. 388-394. [441 U.S. 380, 381]. Gender-based distinctions "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives" in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See also
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978),
"recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a parental
relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit as
parents." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , "statutory "classifications `must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)." Judical decisions on the basis of gender
are therefore arbitrary and UnConstitutional.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246. "In Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972), this Court held that the State of Illinois was barred, as a
matter of both due process and equal protection, from taking custody of the
children of a à father, absent a hearing and a particularized [434 U.S. 246,
248] finding that the father was an unfit parent. The Court concluded, on the
one hand, that a father's interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and
management" of his children is "cognizable and substantial," id., at 651-652,
and, on the other hand, that the State's interest in caring for the children is
"de minimis" if the father is in fact a fit parent, id., at 657-658." De Minimus
defined: Trifling or insignificant matters, with which a court will not concern
itself. The full expression is de minimis non curat lex. This is a Latin phrase
which means "the law does not care about very small matters". It can be used to
describe a component part of a wider transaction, where it is in itself
insignificant or immaterial to the transaction as a whole, and will have no
legal relevance or bearing on the end result.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "à unless and until the
child is legitimated, the mother is the only recognized parent and is given
exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, 74-203."
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is
constitutionally protected. See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231-233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
-401 (1923). "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). And it is now firmly established that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of . . . family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640 (1974). We have
little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[i]f a State were to
attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole
reason that to do so was thought to be in the children's best interest." Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977).
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), 'No state ... shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.' While this
court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of
the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish
a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co .,
111 U.S. 746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct.
1064; Minnesota v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup. Ct. 862; Allegeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25
Sup. Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup. Ct.
14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 , 31 Sup. Ct. 259; Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283;
Adams v. Tanner, 224 U.S. 590 , 37 Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas.
1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct. 337,
Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , 42 Sup. Ct. 124; Adkins
v. Children's Hospital (April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525 , 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L.
Ed. --; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am.
St. Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147. The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered [262 U.S. 390, 400] with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state
to effect. Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper exercise
of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the
courts. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 499."
Equal Protection Case Law CALIFANO v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), "To
withstand constitutional challenge,à classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to [430 U.S.
199, 211] the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976). Such classifications, however, have frequently been revealed on
analysis to rest only upon "old notions" and "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S., at 14 ; Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S., at 508 ; cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512 -513 (1976), and so
have been found to offend the prohibitions against denial of equal protection of
the law. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton,
supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The concept of equal justice under law
requires the State to govern impartially. New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign may not draw distinctions
between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). 24
Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject men and women to disparate
treatment when there is no substantial relation between the disparity and an
important State purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), Justice Stewart correctly observed:
"Even if it be assumed that each married parent after divorce has some
substantive due process right to maintain his or her parental relationship, cf.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion
concurring in judgment), it by no means follows that each unwed parent has any
such right. Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring."
441 U.S., at 397 (emphasis added). In a similar vein, the other three dissenters
in Caban were prepared to "assume that, if and when one develops, the
relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection
against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process." Caban v. Mohammed,
supra, at 414 (emphasis added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law. When that Clause is invoked in a novel context, it is our
practice to begin the inquiry with a determination of the precise nature of the
private interest that is threatened by the State. We therefore first consider
the nature of the interest in liberty for which appellant claims constitutional
protection and then turn to a discussion of the adequacy of the procedure that
New York has provided for its protection." "The intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven throughout the fabric of
our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It is
self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection
in appropriate cases. In deciding whether this is such a case, however, we must
consider the broad framework that has traditionally been used to resolve the
legal problems arising from the parent-child relationship" "When an unwed father
demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child," Caban, 441 U.S., at 392 ,
his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he "act[s] as a
father toward his children." Id., at 389, n. 7. But the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. The actions
of judges neither create nor sever genetic bonds. "[T]he importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems
from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily
association, and from the role it plays in `promot[ing] a way of life' through
the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of blood
relationship." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,
431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 -233
(1972)). 17 [463 U.S. 248, 262]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),".. the Federal Constitution supersedes
state law and provides even greater protection for certain formal family
relationships. In those cases, as in the state cases, the Court has emphasized
the paramount interest in the welfare of children and has noted that the rights
of the parents are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed.
Thus, the "liberty" of parents to control the education of their children that
was vindicated in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), was described as a "right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare [the child] for additional obligations."
Id., at 535. The linkage between parental duty and parental right was stressed
again in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), when the Court
declared it acardinal principle "that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside [463 U.S. 248, 258] first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." Ibid. In these cases the Court has found that the relationship of love
and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to
constitutional protection. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977) (plurality opinion). "[S]tate intervention to terminate [such a]
relationship àmust be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the
Due Process Clause." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), There are also a few cases in which this
Court has considered the extent to which the Constitution affords protection to
the relationship between natural parents and children born out of wedlock. In
some we have been concerned with the rights of the children, see, e. g., Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974);
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). In this case,
however, it is a parent who claims that the State has improperly deprived him of
a protected interest in liberty. This Court has examined the extent to which a
natural father's biological relationship with his child receives protection
under the Due Process Clause in precisely three cases: Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), "The significance of the biological connection is
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the
blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of
where the child's best interests lie."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "The Equal Protection Claim." The
concept of equal justice under law requires the State to govern impartially. New
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979). The sovereign
may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject men and
women to disparate treatment when there is no substantial relation between the
disparity and an important state purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), "In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979), the Court held that it violated the Equal Protection Clause to grant the
mother a veto [over the adoption of a 4-year-old girl and a 6-year-old boy,] but
not to grant a veto to their father, who had admitted paternity and had
participated in the rearing of the children. The Court made it clear, however,
that if the father had not "come forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclud[e] the State from
withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child." Id.,
at 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) "Gender, like race, is a highly visible
and immutable characteristic that has historically been the touchstone for
pervasive but often subtle discrimination. Although the analogy to race is not
perfect and the constitutional inquiry therefore somewhat different,
gender-based statutory classifications deserve careful constitutional
examination because they may reflect or operate to perpetuate mythical or
stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles and the relative capabilities of
men and women that are unrelated to any inherent differences between the sexes.
Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 . Sex-based classifications are in many settings
invidious because they relegate a person to the place set aside for the group on
the basis of an attribute that the person cannot change. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 ; Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 ;
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 ; Orr v. Orr, supra. Such laws cannot be
defended, as can the bulk of the classifications that fill the statute books,
simply on the ground that the generalizations they reflect may be true of the
majority of members of the class, for a gender-based classification need not
ring false to work a discrimination that in the individual case might be
invidious."'... parental rights without proof of unfitness on his part violates
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Secondarily, he attacks 111 (1) (c)'s disparate [441 U.S. 380, 402] treatment of
natural mothers and natural fathers as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the same Amendment." "if and when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state action as a matter of due process. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 "...some Members of the [US Supreme] Court have concluded that
greater protection is due the "private realm of family life," Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (emphasis added), e. g., Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 "For a traditional classification is more likely to be
used without pausing to consider its justification than is a newly created
classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and
natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate
and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in
distinguishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped reaction
[441 U.S. 380, 404] may have no rational relationship û other than pure
prejudicial discrimination - to the stated purpose for which the classification
is being made."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 -521. First Amendment Rights U.S.
Constitution, First Amendment û pertaining to the right to absolute religious
freedom. Holy Bible, Matthew Chapter 28, verses 17-19: "The Great Commission of
Jesus Christ" "Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in
the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them
to obey everything I have commanded you." Holy Bible, 2nd Corinthians, Chapter
5, Verse 20 -"à we are ambassadors for Christà"; Holy Bible, Ephesians Chapter
6, verse 4 - "à Parents, do not provoke your children to anger, but bring them
up in the discipline and instruction of the Lord." Holy Bible, Deuteronomy
Chapter 6, Verses 6¡7: "And you must think constantly about these commandments I
am giving you today. You must teach them to your children and talk about them
when you are at home or out for a walk; at bedtime and the first thing in the
morning." Holy Bible, Proverbs Chapter 22, Verse 6: "Train a child in the way he
should go, and when he is old he will not turn from it."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944) "rests squarely on freedom of
religion under the First Amendment, applied by the Fourteenth to the states. She
buttresses this foundation, however, with a claim of parental right as secured
by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446. "two claimed liberties are at stake.
One is the parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for
appellant means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith. The
other freedom is the child's, to observe these;" "If by this position appellant
seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection than for freedom of the
mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the First
Article (US Constitution) can be given higher place than the others. All have
preferred position in our basic scheme. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , 60
S.Ct. 146; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 , 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A. L.R.
1352. All are interwoven there together. Differences there are, in them and in
the modes appropriate for their exercise. But they have unity in the charter's
prime place because they have unity in their human sources and [321 U.S. 158,
165] functionings. Heart and mind are not identical. Intuitive faith and
reasoned judgment are not the same. Spirit is not always thought. But in the
everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of
personality find inseparable expression in a thousand ways. They cannot be
altogether parted in law more than in life."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "To make accommodation between
these freedoms and an exercise of state authority always is delicate. It hardly
could be more so than in such a clash as this case presents. On one side is the
obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice. With
it is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the
rearing of her children. The parent's conflict with the state over control of
the child and his training is serious enough when only secular matters are
concerned. It becomes the more so when an element of religious conviction
enters. Against these sacred private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the
interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the state's
assertion of authority to that end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only
secular things were involved. The last is no mere corporate concern of official
authority. It is the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that
children be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of
such weight, the safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already
marked out, not precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where
this battle has gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights of children to
exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to
encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant
sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here,
most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
[321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained
the parent's authority to provide religious with secular schooling, and the
child's right to receive it, as against the state's requirement of attendance at
public schools. "
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's rights to receive teaching in
languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the state's
encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder. Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this that these decisions
have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
But it is said the state cannot do so here. This, first, because when state
action impinges upon a claimed religious freedom, it must fall unless shown to
be necessary for or conducive to the child's protection against some clear and
present danger, cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 , 39 S.Ct. 247; and,
it is added, there was no such showing here. " Accordingly, in view of the
preferred position the freedoms of the First Article occupy, the statute in its
present application must fall. It cannot be sustained by any presumption of
validity. Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 , 60 S.Ct. 146. And, finally, it
is said, the statute is, as to children, an absolute prohibition, not merely a
reasonable regulation, of the denounced activity."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), " "Religious training and
activity, whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate
reasonable regulations adopted for the protection of the public health, morals
and welfare." "à The state court has construed these statutes to cover the
activities here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94,
thereby imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the
free exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is
no less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the con- [321
U.S. 158, 173] stitutional guarantee of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children is thus presented.
In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly or indirectly infringe
religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their children in the
practice of a religious belief, we are not aided by any strong presumption of
the constitutionality of such legislation. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 , 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, note 4.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "On the contrary, the human
freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried over into the Fourteenth
Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any attempt to sweep away
those freedoms is prima facie invalid. It follows that any restriction or
prohibition must be justified by those who deny that the freedoms have been
unlawfully invaded."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The great interest of the state
in shielding minors from the evil vicissitudes of early life does not warrant
every limitation on their religious training and activities. If the right of a
child to practice its religion in that manner is to be forbidden by
constitutional means, there must be convincing proof that such a practice
constitutes a grave and immediate danger to the state or to the health, morals
or welfare of the child. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 , 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1186.
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom of religion,
which is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,' Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152.""The state, in my opinion,
has completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any
grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully protect." "Nor
can parents or guardians be subjected to criminal liability because of vague
possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child.
The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 262 , 62 S.Ct. 190, 193. Yet there is not the slightest indication in
this record, or in sources subject to judicial notice, that children engaged in
distributing literature pursuant to their religious beliefs have been or are
likely to be subject to any of the harmful 'diverse influences of the street.'
Indeed, if probabilities are to be indulged in, the likelihood is that children
engaged in serious religious endeavor are immune from such influences."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "No chapter in human history has
been so largely written in terms of persecution and intolerance as the one
dealing with religious freedom. From ancient times to the present day, the
ingenuity of man has known no limits in its ability to forge weapons of
oppression for use against rights of those [321 U.S. 158, 176]à" See Mulder and
Comisky, 'Jehovah's Witnesses Mold Constitutional Law,' 2 Bill of Rights Review,
No. 4, p. 262
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "To them, along with other
present-day religious minorities, befalls the burden of testing our devotion to
the ideals and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom." "Religious
freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted or prohibited in any degree
without convincing proof that a legitimate interest of the state is in grave
danger. " "[ Footnote 8 ] The due process claim, as made and perhaps
necessarily, extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter.
"
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "àa claim of parental right as
secured by the due process clause of the latter Amendment. 8 Cf. Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446." PRINCE v. COM. OF
MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "...two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the
parent's, to bring up the child in the way he should go."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "àit is allied the parent's claim
to authority in her own household and in the rearing of her children. The
parent's conflict with the state over control of the child and his training is
serious enough when only secular matters are concerned."à" Against these sacred
private interests, basic in a democracy, stand the interests of society to
protect the welfare of children, and the state's assertion of authority to that
end, made here in a manner conceded valid if only secular things were involved.
The last is no mere corporate concern of official authority. It is the interest
of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be both safeguarded
from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and independent
well-developed men and citizens. Between contrary pulls of such weight, the
safest and most objective recourse is to the lines already marked out, not
precisely but for guides, in narrowing the no man's land where this battle has
gone on."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The rights of children to
exercise their religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to
encourage them in the practice of religious belief, as against preponderant
sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition here,
most recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
[321 U.S. 158, 166] 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178. Previously in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 , 45 S.Ct. 571, 39 A.L.R. 468, this Court had sustained
the parent's authority to provide religiousà" "And in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 , 43 S. Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446, children's rights to receive teaching
in languages other than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the
state's encroachment." "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, supra. And it is in recognition of this
that these decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the
state cannot enter."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "Religious training and activity,
whether performed by adult or child, are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against interference by state action, except insofar as they violate reasonable
regulations adopted for the protection of the public health, morals and
welfare....The state court has construed these statutes to cover the activities
here involved, cf. State v. Richardson, 92 N.H. 178, 27 A.2d 94, thereby
imposing an indirect restraint through the parents and guardians on the free
exercise by minors of their religious beliefs. This indirect restraint is no
less effective than a direct one. A square conflict between the con- [321 U.S.
158, 173] Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and the state's
legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its children is thus
presented." "The human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried
over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be invulnerable and any
attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima facie invalid."
PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944), "The vital freedom of religion,
which is 'of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,' Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 , 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, cannot be erased by slender
references to the state's power to restrict the ... activities of children."
"Nor can parents or guardians be subjected to liability because of vague
possibilities that their religious teachings might cause injury to the child.
The evils must be grave, immediate, substantial. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193." PRINCE v. COM. OF MASS., 321 U.S. 158 (1944),
"If the Murdock doctrine standsàa foundation is laid for any state intervention
in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion, provided it is
done in the name of their health or welfare. (Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146 A.L.R. 82; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 , 63 S.Ct.
862; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 , 141 A.L.R. 514; Id., 19 U.S. 103 , 63 S.Ct.
890; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882.)
MOORE v. EAST CLEVELAND, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), "(b) When the government intrudes
on choices concerning family living arrangements, the usual deference to the
legislature is inappropriate; and the Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they
are served by the challenged regulation." d) The strong constitutional
protection of the sanctity of the family established in numerous decisions of
this Court extends to the family choice involved in this case and is not
confined within an arbitrary boundary drawn at the limits of the nuclear family
(essentially a couple [431 U.S. 494, 495] and their dependent children).
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary
lines but from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (Harlan, J., concurring). The history and
tradition of this Nation compel a larger conception of the family."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In 1798, when this Court was
asked to hold another Connecticut law unconstitutional, Justice Iredell said:
""[I]t has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually,
framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people of the
United States, when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with
precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise
within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the
Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is
unquestionably void;"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The principles laid down in this
opinion [by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029] affect
the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than
the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious
circumstances; they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employers of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes
the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence, it is the
invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of
[381 U.S. 479, 485]." In spite of having committed no crimes OR being found
unfit OR incompetent as a parent, my Right to Constitutional protection, Equal
Treatment Under the Law and My God Given Liberties as a Law Abiding Citizen of
the United States of America, have been violated by the Circuit Court for Howard
County Maryland, and the State Maryland. My personal property - my children -
have been effectively seized and without a Constitutional basis OR the "clear
establishment of unfitness as a parent" as mandated by Federal case law.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." "àthe familiar principle,
so often applied by this Court, that a "governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments
were described in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, as protection
against all governmental invasions "of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life." * We recently referred [381 U.S. 479, 485] in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656 , to the Fourth Amendment as creating a "right to privacy, no
less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the
people." See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev.
212; Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960).
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Court stated many years ago
that the Due Process Clause protects those liberties that are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." The
[state] is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its
own conception of policy and fairness, unless in so doing it offends some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 , 111 S.,
112, 29 S.Ct. 14; Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 , 26 S.Ct. 87; Maxwell v.
Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 604 , 20 S.Ct. 494; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 , 4
S.Ct. 111, 292; Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 , 35 S.Ct. 582; Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 84 A.L.R. 527.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In determining which rights are
fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their
personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the "traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people" to determine whether a principle is "so
rooted [there] à as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 . The inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such a character
that it cannot be denied without violating those `fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions' à." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 . "Liberty" also "gains
content from the emanations of . . . specific [constitutional] guarantees" and
"from experience with the requirements of a free society." Poe [381 U.S. 479,
494] v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The protection guaranteed by the
[Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
[381 U.S. 479, 495]."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's statement in
his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 -552: "Certainly the
safeguarding of the home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property
rights. The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the
integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right. Of this whole `private realm of family life' it is
difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations." By Extension of Natural Law, this same level of
Constitutional protection of Family Rights must be extended to the unemancipated
minor offspring of that lawful and law abiding marital relation û even in event
of marital divorce.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The entire fabric of the
Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees
demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family
are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Although the Constitution does
not speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe
that it offers these fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no
particular provision of the Constitution [381 U.S. 479, 496] explicitly forbids
the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family - a relation as
old and as fundamental as our entire civilization - surely does not show that
the Government was meant to have the power to do so. Rather, as the Ninth
Amendment expressly recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as
this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government though not
specifically mentioned in the Constitution." Natural Laws clearly indicate that
Father's is to serve his children in the capacity of a highly-valued roles of
provider, protector, role-model and family leader û facts which have been
clearly established throughout human history and tradition. Through its
anti-Father AND Anti-Male AND Anti-Family rulings û AND with no legal basis to
do so û the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the State of Maryland,
have engaged in what can only be defined as the arbitrary classification of all
males. The actions of this Court AND this State, have no basis in Constitutional
Law, AND offends countless principles of justice that are so deeply rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our Nation's people, AND which are considered
fundamental principles of the family by these very people.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "a ... State may à serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments,' New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 , 311 (dissenting opinion), I do not believe that
this includes the power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens
à" "The vice of the dissenters' views is that it would permit such
experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal rights of
its citizens. I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such power either to
the States or to the Federal Government." The systematic exclusion of Fathers
from the traditional Family by the Courts, represents little more than a "social
experiment" which violates Natural Law and the fundamental personal rights of
its citizens. As such, the Court's social-experiment - the systematic exclusion
of Fathers from the lives of their children - in the absense of any law breaking
or wrong doing on the part of the Father - IS UnConstitutional. Based up the
state of the American Family AND Our Nation, this social experiment as clearly
gone-awry, and must be immediately eliminated from Our Families and Our Nation.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "the Government, absent a showing
of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not decree à." [381 U.S.
479, 497] "Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not
be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no
provision of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from
curtailing the marital right to bear children and raise a family." "à the Court
today holds that the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy, in my
view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal liberty guaranteed by
the Constitution does not include protection against such totalitarian[ism] à,
which is at complete variance with our constitutional concepts. Yet, if upon a
showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing [voluntary birth
control] by married persons is valid, then, by the same reasoning, a law
requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my view,
however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital
privacy which are constitutionally protected." Just as the Government does not
have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into the issue regarding
the decision by it's Citizens to bear children, so it is also true that the same
Government does not have the Constitutional authority to interject itself into
any issue regarding the raising of those children once they are born û unless
AND until the law abiding parents are "clearly established to be unfit as
parents" or engage any some other form(s) of lawlessness. By extension, it holds
true that the offspring of Citizens are not wards of, nor property of, the
Government OR it's Courts, and therefore beyond the authority of the Government
or it's Courts so long as those Citizens AND off spring are abiding by the
Constitutionally authorized laws of this Nation.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In a long series of cases this
Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may
not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has
some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. "Where
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail
only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," Bates v. Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 . The law must be shown "necessary, and not merely
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 . See Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S.
147, 161."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "...law obviously encroaches upon
a fundamental personal liberty, the State does not show that the law serves any
"subordinating [state] interest which is compelling" or that it is "necessary
[381 U.S. 479, 498] à to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy." The
State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation between this statute
and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of state concern. à The rationality
of this justification is dubious,à see Tileston v. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 26 A.
2d 582. "But, in any event, it is clear that the state interest àcan be served
by a more discriminately tailored statute, which does not, like the present one,
sweep unnecessarily broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt
with and intruding upon the privacy of all married couples. See Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307
-308; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196. Here, as elsewhere, where, "[p]recision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438. "... without the need to
"invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at 307. See
McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 , the Court, referring to the Fourteenth Amendment, stated: "While this
Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also [for example,] the right ... to marry, establish a home and
bring up childrenà"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "This Court, in a series of
decisions, has held that the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the
States those specifics of the first eight amendments which express fundamental
personal rights. The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional
amendments. The Ninth Amendment reads, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." The Amendment is almost entirely the work of James Madison. It was
introduced in Congress by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no
debate and virtually no change in language. It was proffered to quiet expressed
fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently
broad to cover all essential [381 U.S. 479, 489] rights and that the specific
mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were
protected. In presenting the proposed Amendment, Madison said: "It has been
objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands
of the General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the
most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill
of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I
have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the [381 U.S. 479, 490]
last clause of the fourth resolution [the Ninth Amendment]." Annals of Congress
439 (Gales and Seaton ed. 1834).
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "This clause (9th Amendment) was
manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingenious misapplication of the
well-known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in
all others; and, e converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an
affirmation in all others." Id., at 651. "These statements of Madison and Story
make clear that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be
construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution
guaranteed to the people."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "While this Court has had little
occasion to interpret the Ninth Amendment, "[i]t cannot be presumed that any
[381 U.S. 479, 491] clause in the constitution is intended to be without
effect." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174. In interpreting the
Constitution, "real effect should be given to all the words it uses." Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be
regarded by some as a recent discovery and may be forgotten by others, but since
1791 it has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are sworn to uphold.
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society
as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed because that right is not
guaranteed in so many words by the first eight amendments to the Constitution is
to ignore the Ninth Amendment and to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a
judicial construction that this fundamental right is not protected by the
Constitution because it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first
eight amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth
Amendment, which specifically states that [381 U.S. 479, 492] "[t]he enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment simply shows
the intent of the Constitution's authors that other fundamental personal rights
should not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way simply
because they are not specifically listed in the first eight constitutional
amendments. I do not see how this broadens the authority [381 U.S. 479, 493] of
the Court; rather it serves to support what this Court has been doing in
protecting fundamental rights. "
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 , held simply that a State could not, consistently with
due process, refuse a lawyer a license to practice law on the basis of a finding
that he was morally unfit when there was no evidence in the record, 353 U.S., at
246 -247, to support such a finding."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "See Patterson, The Forgotten
Ninth Amendment (1955). "Mr. Patterson urges that the Ninth Amendment be used to
protect unspecified "natural and inalienable rights." P. 4. The Introduction by
Roscoe Pound states that "there is a marked revival of natural law ideas
throughout the world. Interest in the Ninth Amendment is a symptom of that
revival." P. iii. In Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the
People"?, 37 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 787, Professor Redlich, in advocating reliance on
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to invalidate the Connecticut law before us,
frankly states: "But for one who feels that the marriage relationship should be
beyond the reach of a state law à, the à case poses a troublesome and
challenging problem of constitutional interpretation. He may find himself
saying, `The law is unconstitutional - but why?' There are two possible paths to
travel in finding the answer. One is to revert to a frankly flexible due process
concept even on matters that do not involve specific constitutional
prohibitions. The other is to attempt to evolve a new constitutional framework
within which to meet this and similar problems which are likely to arise." Id.,
at 798." The Courts finding was that a citizen had absolute freedom from the
state with respect to the parents decision to produce offspring. By Natural
extension, this same Constitutional protection must be extended to include
protection from those same States following the birth of these "protected"
children. Insofar as no Constitutionally recognized laws are broken by these
citizens (parents and children) - the "sacred familial domain" must be
"Constitutionally Protected from the Arbitrary and unlawful interjection by the
States' and their illegal courts.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Compare Nicchia v. New York, 254
U.S. 228, 231 , upholding a New York dog-licensing statute on the ground that it
did not "deprive dog owners of liberty without due process of law." And as I
said concurring in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 , "I believe that
faithful adherence to the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights insures a
more permanent protection of individual libertyà"
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Ninth Amendment, like its
companion the Tenth, which this Court held "states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124, was framed by James Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear
that the adoption of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that [381 U.S.
479, 530] the Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited
powers, and that all rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the
people and the individual States."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "MR. JUSTICE STEWART, whom MR.
JUSTICE BLACK joins, dissenting. "The Ninth Amendment, like its companion the
Tenth, which this Court held "states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 , was framed by
James Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption
of the Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that [381 U.S. 479, 530] the
Federal Government was to be a government of express and limited powers, and
that all rights and powers not delegated to it were retained by the people and
the individual States."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "At the oral argument in this case
we were told that the Connecticut law does not "conform to current community
standards." But it is not the function of this Court to decide cases on the
basis of community standards. We are here to decide cases "agreeably to the
Constitution and laws of the United States. It is the essence of judicial [381
U.S. 479, 531] duty to subordinate our own personal views..."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The Amendments in question were,
as everyone knows, originally adopted as limitations upon the power of the newly
created Federal Government, not as limitation upon the powers of the individual
States. But the Court has held that many of the provisions of the first eight
amendments are fully embraced by the Fourteenth Amendment as limitations upon
state action, and some members of the Court have held the view that the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment made every provision of the first eight amendments
fully applicable against the States. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "The first 10 amendments were
proposed and adopted largely because of fear that Government might unduly
interfere with prized individual liberties. The people wanted and demanded a
Bill of Rights written into their Constitution. The amendments embodying the
Bill of Rights were intended to curb all branches of the Federal Government in
the fields touched by the amendments-Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments were pointedly aimed at confining exercise
of power by courts and judges within precise boundaries, particularly in the
procedure used for the trial of criminal cases. Past history provided strong
reasons [332 U.S. 46 , 71] for the apprehensions which brought these procedural
amendments into being and attest the wisdom of their adoption. For the fears of
arbitrary court action sprang largely from the past use of courts in the
imposition of criminal punishments to suppress [ion of] speech, press, and
religion. Hence the constitutional limitations of courts' powers were, in the
view of the Founders, essential supplements to the First Amendment, which was
itself designed to protect the widest scope for all people to believe and to
express the most divergent political, religious, and other views." "With full
knowledge of the import of the Barron decision, the framers and backers of the
Fourteenth Amendment proclaimed its purpose to be to overturn the constitutional
rule that case had announced àIn construing other constitutional provisions,
this Court has almost uniformly followed the precept of Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S.
1, 12 , 787, that 'It is never to be forgotten that in the construction of the
language of the Constitution, as indeed in all other instances where
construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as nearly as possible
in the condition of the men who framed that instrument.' See also Everson v.
Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 , 67 S. Ct. 504; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 , 95, 102, 740, 744; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 89 , 106, 766, 772;
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 ; Barron v. Baltimore, supra, Pet.
at pages 250, 251; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 416-420.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "...this Court also held in a
number of cases that [colored] people must, because of the Fourteenth Amendment,
be accorded equal protection of the laws. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 ; cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 ; see also Yick Wo. v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 ." à "when Munn v. Illinois, supra, was decided, this
Court steadfastly declined to invalidate states' legislative regulation of
property rights or business practices under the Fourteenth Amendment unless
there were [racial] discrimination involved in the state law challenged. The
first significant breach in this policy came in 1889, in Chicago, M. & St. P.R.
Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 702. "A state's railroad rate regulatory statute
was there stricken as violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This was accomplished by reference to a due process formula which did
not necessarily operate so as to protect the Bill of Rights' personal liberty
safeguards, but which gave a new and hitherto undiscovered scope for the Court's
use of the due process clause to protect property rights under natural law
concepts. And in 1896, in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 , [332
U.S. 46 , 80] this Court, in effect, overruled Davidson v. New Orleans, supra,
by holding, under the new due process-natural law formula, that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbade a state from taking privateà." "Later decisions of this Court
have completely undermined the phase of the Twining doctrine which broadly
precluded reliance on the Bill of Rights to determine what is and what is not a
'fundamental' right. Later cases have also made the Hurtado case an inadequate
support for this phase of the Twining formula. For despite Hurtado and Twining,
this Court has now held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects from state
invasion the following 'fundamental' rights safeguarded by the Bill of Rights:
right to counsel in criminal cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 , 63, 84,
A.L.R. 527, limiting the Hurtado case; see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 ,
and De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 ; freedom of assembly, De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 259; at the very least, certain types of cruel and
unusual punishment and former jeopardy, State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 ; the right of an accused in a criminal case to be in-
[332 U.S. 46 , 85] formed of the charge against him, see Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 , 332, 90 A.L.R. 575; the right to receive just
compensation on account of taking private property for public use, Chicago, B. &
Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 . And the Court has now through the Fourteenth
Amendment literally and emphatically applied the First Amendment to the States
in its very terms. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 ; West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 , 1186, 147 A.L.R. 674;
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 , 196, 159 A.L.R. 1346."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "I cannot consider the Bill of
Rights to be an outworn 18th Century 'strait jacket' as the Twining opinion did.
Its provisions may be thought outdated abstractions by some. à In my judgment
the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long as a Bill of Rights like
ours survives and its basic purposes are conscientiously interpreted, enforced
and respected so as to afford continuous protection against old, as well as new,
devices and practices which might thwart those purposes. I fear to see the
consequences of the Court's practice of substituting its own concepts of decency
and fundamental justice for the language of the Bill of Rights as its point of
departure in interpreting and enforcing that Bill of Rights. If the choice must
be between the selective process of the Palk decision applying some of the Bill
of Rights to the States, or the Twining rule applying none of them, I would
choose the Palko selective process. But rather than accept either of these
choices. I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all the people of the nation the complete
protection of the Bill of Rights. To hold that this Court can determine what, if
any, provisions of the Bill of Rights will be enforced, and if so to what
degree, is to frustrate the great design of a written Constitution. [332 U.S.
46, 90].
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S.
131, 'à the first ten Amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power,
yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental [332 U.S. 46, 122]
rights-common law rights-of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of
the man as citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "Mr. Justice Field in his
dissenting opinion in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 , 361, 698, 707,
stated that 'after much reflection' he had become persuaded that the definition
of privileges and immunities given by Mr. Tucker in Spies v. Illinois, supra,
'is correct.' And Mr. Justice Field went on to say that 'While, therefore, the
ten amendments as limitations on power, and, so far as they accomplish their
purpose and find their fruition in such limitations, are applicable only to the
federal government and not to the states, yet, so far as they declare or
recognize the rights of persons they are rights belonging to them as citizens of
the United States under the constitution; and the fourteenth amendment, as [332
U.S. 46 , 123] to all such rights, places a limit upon state power by ordaining
that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge them."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "every citizen of the United
States is protected from punishments which are cruel and unusual. It is an
immunity which belongs to him, against both state and federal action. The state
cannot apply to him, any more than the United States, the torture, the rack, or
thumb-screw, or any cruel and unusual punishment, or any more than it can deny
to him security in his house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures, or compel him to be a witness against himself in a criminal
prosecution. These rights, as those of citizens of the United States, find their
recognition and guaranty against federal action in the constitution of the
United States, and against state action in the fourteenth amendment. The
inhibition by that amendment is not the less valuable and effective because of
the prior and existing inhibition against such action in the constitutions of
the several states. 144 U.S. at page 363, 12 S.Ct. at page 708.
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "It is one thing when the State
exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who
may marry, but it is quite another when, having acknowledged a marriage and the
intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal
law the details of that intimacy." GIVEN that the intimacy between the law
abiding Parties is "Constitutionally off limits and beyond the regulation of the
Courts", so-too, must be the result(s) of that intimacy (the law abiding Parties
unemancipated minor children) be ""Constitutationally off-limits" so long as
"the Parties remain law abiding" AND are "not clearly established as unfit
parents."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), "In the final analysis, it seems
to me that the Boyd doctrine, though perhaps not required by the express
language of the Constitution strictly construed, is amply justified from an
historical standpoint, soundly based in reason, [367 U.S. 643, 663] and entirely
consistent with what I regard to be the proper approach to interpretation of our
Bill of Rights - an approach well set out by Mr. Justice Bradley in the Boyd
case: "Constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should
be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half
their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it
consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." And yet, in spite of the Constitutional protections that
are clearly in place, the Circuit Court for Howard County Maryland, and the
State of Maryland, have illegal interjected themselves into the private sanctity
of the law abiding Parties' familial domain, and willfully attempted to damage,
if not altogether destroy, the critical relationship between the plaintiff and
his unemancipated minor children - in violation of Natural Law, in the total
absence of a lawful suspension of Writ of Habeas Corpus, and is therefore in
violation of numerous Rights and Protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), æWhen we allowed States to give
constitutional sanction to the "shabby business" of unlawful entry into a home
(to use an expression of Mr. Justice Murphy, Wolf v. Colorado, at 46), we did
indeed rob the Fourth Amendment of much meaningful force."
GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), " à the principle of privacy
"which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment." (Id., at 27.) It would not be
proper to expect or impose any precise equivalence, either as regards the scope
of the right or the means of its implementation, between the requirements of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. For the Fourth, unlike what was said in Wolf
of the Fourteenth, does not state a general principle only; it is a particular
command, having its setting in a pre-existing legal context on which both
interpreting decisions and enabling statutes must at least build." Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 656, "Seventy-five years ago, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886), considering the Fourth 4 and Fifth Amendments as running
"almost into each other" on the facts before it, this Court held that the
doctrines of those Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers,
[367 U.S. 643, 647] that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property." The Plaintiff, AND the Parties, are law abiding citizens of
the United States, have never been charge OR adjudicated as "unlawful" or
"clearly established as unfit to parent." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, The
Court noted that: "constitutional provisions for the security of person and
property should be liberally construed àIt is the duty of courts to be watchful
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon." At p. 635." The Circuit Court of Howard County, the
State of Maryland, and all States within the United States, have indeed been
"stealthy" in their systematic encroachment upon the Rights of the Citizens of
the Unites States of America. However, the Plaintiff (and countless Fathers
throughout this land) now have their eyes fully opened, and are cognizant of the
fact that their basic Civil and Human Rights are being systematically encroached
upon by the States and their illegal courts. As guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, the Plaintiff (and countless Fathers throughout this land), are
also now very cognizant of the fact that they have the absolute Right to be Let
Alone, (The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212; Griswold,55
Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 . "We find that, as
to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, as to the
States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy.....,' Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 -544 "The philosophy of each Amendment and of
each freedom is complementary to, although not dependent upon, that of the other
in its sphere of influence -" 367 U.S., at 656 -657.
BOYD v. U S, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), "Court held that the doctrines of those
Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, [367 U.S. 643, 647]
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property."
MALLOY v. HOGAN, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), "In 1961, the [378 U.S. 1, 6] Court held
that in the light of later decisions, it was taken as settled that "àthe Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmentà"
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "1. Under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment petitioner was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as
a parent before his children were taken from him. Pp. 647-658." "(b) The State
cannot, consistently with due process requirements, merely presume that
[unmarried] fathers in general and petitioner in particular are unsuitable and
neglectful parents. Parental unfitness must be established on the basis of
individualized proof. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 . Pp. 649-658.
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "The Court has frequently emphasized
the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed "essential," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
"basic civil rights of man," Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and
"rights far more precious . . . than property rights," May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533 (1953).
STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation [of those children] for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity of the family unit has found protection
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra,
at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v.
Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)."
SKINNER v. STATE OF OKL. EX REL. WILLIAMSON, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) ".one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental rights..."
Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1778 (1992), the court observed that the Supreme Court has "recognized the fact
that the writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.' Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). "Therefore, the writ must be "administered
with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of
justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." Harris, 394 U.S. at 291.
Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct.
1778 (1992), "The writ of habeas corpus serves as an important check on the
manner in which state courts pay respect to federal constitutional rights. The
writ is "the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action." Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91
(1969). Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "The Court observed that"[t]he writ of habeas corpus is one
of the centerpieces of our liberties." Brown v. Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778 (1992), "Dismissal of habeas
petition under the "total exhaustion" rule of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520
(1982). Each of the claims raised by petitioner must be exhausted before
district court may reach the merits of any claim in habeas petition. Brown v.
Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1166 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1778
(1992), "a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief only if it can be established
that the constitutional error had "substantial and injurious effectà" Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 & n.9 (1993). Whether the constitutional error
was harmless is not a factual determination entitled to the statutory
presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d). Dickson, 849 F.2d at 405;
Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987)." What could be more
"substantial and injurious" to a law abiding Citizen of the United States AND a
loving and committed Parent, than the unlawful denial of a sustained and healthy
relationship with his legitimated, unemancipated minor children? Through the
illegal and unconstitutional actions of the Circuit Court for Howard County û
which represents nothing short of "systemic-wrongs" being perpetrated against
the absolutely law abiding, loving and committed Plaintiff/Father. Through it's
illegal actions, the Circuit Court for Howard County is inflicting extreme pain
and suffering upon the Parties unemancipated minor children, which they would
never been subjected to had these governmental entities simply "minded there own
business" (The Constitutional Right to Privacy, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 212;
Griswold,55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 216 (1960) and left the private matters of the law
abiding familial domain, to those best-equipped to address those matters û THE
PARTIES. See Also: O'NEIL v. VERMONT, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); TWINING v. STATE OF
NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Calder v.
Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 399;Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.105 , 63 S.Ct. 870, 146
A.L.R. 82; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 , 63 S.Ct. 877, 882; MEYER v.
STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
GARNER v. TEAMSTERS UNION, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), "(c) When federal power
constitutionally is exerted for the protection of public or private interests,
or both, it becomes the supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed,
circumvented or extended by a state procedure merely because such procedure will
apply some doctrine of private right. Pp. 492-501. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978), "recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a
parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they are unfit
as parents."
ATLANTIC COAST LINE R. CO. v. DOUGHTON, 262 U.S. 413 (1923) 262 U.S. 41, " an
arbitrary classification is obnoxious to the equal protection clause, Southern
Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 , 30 Sup. Ct. 287, 17 Ann. Cas. 1247." ARBITRARY
Defined: adj. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity,
reason, or principle. Based on or subject to individual judgment or preference.
Established by a court or judge rather than by a specific law or statute. Not
limited by law; despotic.
|