504 N.E.2d 1058
399 Mass. 1006
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Suffolk.
David DOE v. Liisa DOE et al.
(FN1)
Argued Feb. 4, 1987.
Decided March 16, 1987.
Custody proceedings
were brought by Department of Social
Services, at instigation of wife,
during pendency of New Hampshire divorce
action, based on allegations of sexual
abuse by husband. Following
order awarding temporary legal custody
to Department, husband brought petition
seeking stay or dismissal of proceedings.
A single justice of the Appeals Court,
Suffolk County, entered order vacating
order of temporary custody to Department
and staying Department's custody proceedings,
and wife appealed. The Supreme
Judicial Court held that remedy by
appeal at conclusion of custody proceeding
would result in considerable delay
and thus, order was not abuse of discretion
by single justice.
So ordered.
West Headnotes
[1]
Courts K> 207.1
106 ----
106VI Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
106VI(A) Grounds
of Jurisdiction in General
106k207 Issuance of Prerogative or
Remedial Writs
> 106k207.1
In General.
Single justice
may grant relief in form of stay or
dismissal to litigant who cannot be
placed in statu quo in regular course
of appeal. > M.G.L.A. c.
211,§ 3.
[2]
Courts K> 207.1
106 ----
106VI Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
106VI(A) Grounds
of Jurisdiction in General
106k207 Issuance of Prerogative or
Remedial Writs
> 106k207.1
In General.
Order staying custody
proceedings brought by Department
of Social Services, at instigation
of wife, while New Hampshire divorce
action was pending, based on allegations
of sexual abuse by husband, was not
abuse of discretion of single justice;
remedy by appeal at conclusion of
Massachusetts proceeding would result
in considerable delay. >
M.G.L.A. c. 119, §§ 26, > 27;
> c. 211, § 3.
[399 Mass. 1007]
Frederic C. Harris, Waltham, for defendants.
Floyd H. Anderson,
Boston, for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS,
LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR,
JJ.
[399 Mass. 1006]
RESCRIPT.
The defendant appeals
from the order of a single justice
of this court granting the
plaintiff, a resident of New Hampshire,
relief pursuant to > G.L. c. 211,
§ 3 (1984 ed.). The facts in
the petition which are not in dispute
establish that the defendant filed
a petition for divorce and custody
in New Hampshire. In August,
1985, the plaintiff was denied visitation
rights with his child based on allegations
of sexual abuse pending investigation
by a court-appointed psychologist.
The defendant refused to participate
in the court-ordered investigation.
The New Hampshire court then granted
legal custody to the New Hampshire
Division of Welfare; temporary
physical custody of the child was
granted to the plaintiff's sister-in-law.
Just prior to the
entry of the New Hampshire court order,
the defendant filed for divorce and
custody in the Probate and Family
Court for Middlesex County.
A Probate Court judge determined that
the Massachusetts courts should defer
to the New Hampshire courts.
The Appeals Court affirmed that decision.
> (FN2)
[399 Mass. 1007]
Approximately one month later, at
the instigation of the defendant,
the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services sought and was awarded temporary
legal custody, see > G.L. c. 119,
§ 26 (1984 ed.), in the Ayer Division
of the District Court Department based
on the same allegations of sexual
abuse which were the subject of the
New Hampshire court order. The
plaintiff filed his petition pursuant
to > G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeking
a stay or dismissal of the Ayer District
Court proceeding. At the hearing,
the plaintiff agreed that physical
custody of the child should remain
with the defendant during the pendency
of the proceedings between the parties.
The single justice then vacated the
order of the temporary custody to
the Massachusetts Department of Social
Services and stayed the proceedings
in the Ayer District Court.
The defendant appeals.
[1]---
[2] The defendant
claims that it was an abuse of discretion
for the single justice to stay the
proceedings because there is an appellate
remedy available at the conclusion
of > c. 119, § 26, proceedings
under > c. 119, § 27 (1984 ed.).
This argument misses the point.
A single justice may grant relief
to a litigant who "cannot be
placed in statu quo in the regular
course of appeal." >
Morrissette v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass.
197, 198, 402 N.E.2d 492 (1980).
In this case, the plaintiff says that
the normal course of trial and appeal
do not provide adequate protection,
see > Hadfield v. Commonwealth,
387 Mass. 252, 255 n. 2, 439 N.E.2d
279 (1982), because of the delay involved.
The appellate process provided by
> G.L. c. 119, § 27, is not adequate
in this circumstance. Another
Massachusetts proceeding would result
in considerable delay. "Unless
proceedings involving the custody
of a minor are expedited, they fail
to accomplish their purposes.
Circumstances may change rapidly,
and the harm sought to be avoided
may worsen with the passage of time."
> Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass.
755, 764, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983).
In another context, we have said that
where a person claims that retrial
would violate principles of double
jeopardy, relief prior to the second
trial pursuant to > G.L. c. 211,
§ 3, is available. See, e.g.,
> Commonwealth v. Chatfield-Taylor,
399 Mass. 1, 3, 502 N.E.2d 512;
> Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass.
793, 797, 473 N.E.2d 1115 (1985);
> Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass.
607, 615, 400 N.E.2d 242 (1980).
After the order
of the Appeals Court, there was no
basis for further proceedings in Massachusetts.
Consequently, there was no error and
no abuse of discretion in the order
of the single justice. The order
is affirmed.
So ordered.
-- (FN1.) The
Department of Social Services.
The department has not appealed from
the order of the single justice.
-- (FN2.) The
Appeals Court ordered that the defendant
be given time to seek a hearing.
The defendant requested the hearing
in New Hampshire pursuant to this
order, but she failed to appear at
the time set for hearing.
|