504 N.E.2d 1058
399 Mass. 1006
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.
David DOE v. Liisa DOE et al.
(FN1)
Argued Feb. 4, 1987.
Decided March 16, 1987.
Custody proceedings were brought by Department of Social Services, at
instigation of wife, during pendency of New Hampshire divorce action, based on
allegations of sexual abuse by husband. Following order awarding temporary
legal custody to Department, husband brought petition seeking stay or dismissal
of proceedings. A single justice of the Appeals Court, Suffolk County, entered
order vacating order of temporary custody to Department and staying Department's
custody proceedings, and wife appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court held that
remedy by appeal at conclusion of custody proceeding would result in
considerable delay and thus, order was not abuse of discretion by single
justice.
So ordered.
West Headnotes
> [1] Courts K> 207.1
106 ----
106VI Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
106VI(A) Grounds of Jurisdiction in General
106k207 Issuance of Prerogative or Remedial Writs
> 106k207.1 In General.
Single justice may grant relief in form of stay or dismissal to litigant who
cannot be placed in statu quo in regular course of appeal. > M.G.L.A. c. 211,§
3.
> [2] Courts K> 207.1
106 ----
106VI Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
106VI(A) Grounds of Jurisdiction in General
106k207 Issuance of Prerogative or Remedial Writs
> 106k207.1 In General.
Order staying custody proceedings brought by Department of Social Services,
at instigation of wife, while New Hampshire divorce action was pending, based on
allegations of sexual abuse by husband, was not abuse of discretion of single
justice; remedy by appeal at conclusion of Massachusetts proceeding would
result in considerable delay. > M.G.L.A. c. 119, §§ 26, > 27; > c. 211, § 3.
[399 Mass. 1007] Frederic C. Harris, Waltham, for defendants.
Floyd H. Anderson, Boston, for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
[399 Mass. 1006] RESCRIPT.
The defendant appeals from the order of a single justice of this court
granting the
plaintiff, a resident of New Hampshire, relief pursuant to > G.L. c. 211, § 3
(1984 ed.). The facts in the petition which are not in dispute establish that
the defendant filed a petition for divorce and custody in New Hampshire. In
August, 1985, the plaintiff was denied visitation rights with his child based on
allegations of sexual abuse pending investigation by a court-appointed
psychologist. The defendant refused to participate in the court-ordered
investigation. The New Hampshire court then granted legal custody to the New
Hampshire Division of Welfare; temporary physical custody of the child was
granted to the plaintiff's sister-in-law.
Just prior to the entry of the New Hampshire court order, the defendant
filed for divorce and custody in the Probate and Family Court for Middlesex
County. A Probate Court judge determined that the Massachusetts courts should
defer to the New Hampshire courts. The Appeals Court affirmed that decision. >
(FN2)
[399 Mass. 1007] Approximately one month later, at the instigation of the
defendant, the Massachusetts Department of Social Services sought and was
awarded temporary legal custody, see > G.L. c. 119, § 26 (1984 ed.), in the Ayer
Division of the District Court Department based on the same allegations of
sexual abuse which were the subject of the New Hampshire court order. The
plaintiff filed his petition pursuant to > G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeking a stay or
dismissal of the Ayer District Court proceeding. At the hearing, the plaintiff
agreed that physical custody of the child should remain with the defendant
during the pendency of the proceedings between the parties. The single justice
then vacated the order of the temporary custody to the Massachusetts Department
of Social Services and stayed the proceedings in the Ayer District Court. The
defendant appeals.
> [1]> [2] The defendant claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the
single justice to stay the proceedings because there is an appellate remedy
available at the conclusion of > c. 119, § 26, proceedings under > c. 119, § 27
(1984 ed.). This argument misses the point. A single justice may grant relief
to a litigant who "cannot be placed in statu quo in the regular course of
appeal." > Morrissette v. Commonwealth, 380 Mass. 197, 198, 402 N.E.2d 492
(1980). In this case, the plaintiff says that the normal course of trial and
appeal do not provide adequate protection, see > Hadfield v. Commonwealth, 387
Mass. 252, 255 n. 2, 439 N.E.2d 279 (1982), because of the delay involved. The
appellate process provided by > G.L. c. 119, § 27, is not adequate in this
circumstance. Another Massachusetts proceeding would result in considerable
delay. "Unless proceedings involving the custody of a minor are expedited, they
fail to accomplish their purposes. Circumstances may change rapidly, and the
harm sought to be avoided may worsen with the passage of time." > Custody of a
Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 764, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983). In another context, we have
said that where a person claims that retrial would violate principles of double
jeopardy, relief prior to the second trial pursuant to > G.L. c. 211, § 3, is
available. See, e.g., > Commonwealth v. Chatfield-Taylor, 399 Mass. 1, 3, 502
N.E.2d 512; > Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 797, 473 N.E.2d 1115
(1985); > Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 607, 615, 400 N.E.2d 242 (1980).
After the order of the Appeals Court, there was no basis for further
proceedings in Massachusetts. Consequently, there was no error and no abuse of
discretion in the order of the single justice. The order is affirmed.
So ordered.
> (FN1.) The Department of Social Services. The department has not appealed
from the order of the single justice.
> (FN2.) The Appeals Court ordered that the defendant be given time to seek a
hearing. The defendant requested the hearing in New Hampshire pursuant to this
order, but she failed to appear at the time set for hearing.
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