Here are some cites from Jones v Gallagher (2002) on permanent
RO's
Permanent order.
In 1990">
Here are some cites from Jones v Gallagher (2002) on permanent
RO's
Permanent order.
In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the statute, see St. 1990, c. 403, 3, adding
language that expressly grants the judge discretionary authority to "enter a
permanent order" at the renewal hearing, generally, the date set in the
original order when "the order is to expire" and "the matter will again be
heard." G. L. c. 209A, 3.[6]
See Crenshaw v. Macklin, 430 Mass. 633, 634-635 (2000). General Laws c. 209A,
3, mandates that initial relief be granted for a fixed period of time, not to
exceed a year, and that the order state on its face the date and time that the
order is to "expire" and the matter will again be "heard." Upon that date, if
the plaintiff appears, the court is directed to "determine" whether to extend
or make permanent the order. Without further action by the court, the
Legislature has directed that the order expire. There is no presumption that
the order be continued. There is no entitlement that the order be made
permanent. The order expires unless extended after a judicial determination,
essentially, a new finding, that the plaintiff continues to require protection
from "abuse" as explicitly defined in c. 209A, 1 -- in this case, requiring a
finding that a permanent order is, in fact, what is reasonably necessary to
protect Jones from being placed "in fear of imminent serious physical harm" by
Gallagher. See Commonwealth v. Molloy, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 306, 309 (1998)
("extension of an annual order pursuant to 3 . . . is . . . by no means
automatic"); Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 929-930.
There is no burden on a defendant to testify or present evidence. "The burden
is on the complainant to establish facts justifying the . . . continuance of
an abuse prevention order. . . . The plaintiff must make the case for the
awarding of relief." Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596. "Although it is not
expressly stated in G. L. c. 209A, . . . [the] plaintiff must make a case for
relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 597. See Smith v. Joyce,
421 Mass. at 522.
Susan B. JONES
v.
Joseph W. GALLAGHER.
Argued Jan. 17, 2002.
Decided May 29, 2002.
On expiration of original abuse protection order against ex-boyfriend,
ex-girlfriend sought extension of order. The District Court Department,
Concord Division, Middlesex County,
Paul L. McGill,
J., made order permanent. Ex-boyfriend appealed. The Appeals Court,
Mills,
J., held that ex-girlfriend was not entitled to extension of order.
Vacated.
West Headnotes
[1]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
Proceeding for issuance of abuse prevention order is a civil, and not a
criminal, proceeding.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1 et seq.
[2]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k16
k. Nature of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases
Issuance of an abuse prevention order effects entry of that order in the
Commonwealth's criminal records system, and the order can have an adverse
effect upon the defendant in any future abuse proceeding, and in certain
future bail proceedings.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1
et seq.
[3]
KeyCite Notes
35
Arrest
35II
On Criminal Charges
35k63
Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without Warrant
35k63.4
Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63.4(5)
k. Nature of Offense; Felony or Misdemeanor.
Most Cited Cases
Abuse prevention order can create criminal jeopardy specific to the
defendant, and subject him or her to arrest without a warrant.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1
et seq.
[4]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k16
k. Nature of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases
The judicial imprimatur on an abuse prevention order lends it significant
weight; this is not just a filing in court, but a determination by the
court. M.G.L.A. c.
209A, § 1 et seq.
[5]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring.
Most Cited Cases
In issuing an abuse protection order, a judge must consider carefully
whether serious physical harm is imminent, and should not issue an order
simply because it seems to be a good idea, or because it will not cause the
defendant any real inconvenience.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 1
et seq.
[6]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring.
Most Cited Cases
Ex-girlfriend was not entitled to extension of abuse prevention order
against ex-boyfriend; ex-girlfriend failed to showed reasonable fear of
imminent physical harm, and existence of original order did not provide
grounds for its extension.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[7]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring.
Most Cited Cases
The only criterion for extending an original abuse prevention order is a
showing of continued need for the order.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[8]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
There is no presumption that an abuse prevention order be continued or be
made permanent.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[9]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k16
k. Nature of Remedy.
Most Cited Cases
62
Breach of the Peace
KeyCite Notes
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k17
k. Grounds for Requiring.
Most Cited Cases
An abuse protection order expires unless extended after a judicial
determination, essentially a new finding, that the plaintiff continues to
require protection from abuse.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[10]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
The burden is on the complainant to establish facts justifying the
continuance of an abuse prevention order.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
[11]
KeyCite Notes
62
Breach of the Peace
62k15
Security or Order to Keep Peace or Protect Family
62k20
k. Application and Proceedings Thereon.
Most Cited Cases
Plaintiff must make a case for extension of abuse protection order by a
preponderance of the evidence.
M.G.L.A. c. 209A, § 3.
**1089
*883
Charles Allan Hope,
Somerville (John H.
Cunha, Jr., with him) for the
defendant.
Aderonke O. Lipede,
Boston, for the plaintiff.
Present: PORADA, DOERFER, &
MILLS,
JJ.
MILLS,
J.
At the time their personal relationship ended, the complainant Jones and
defendant Gallagher were coworkers in a school system. After their break-up,
Gallagher authored a
*884 poem with some
violent imagery that expressed his emotional upheaval.
[FN1] The poem (which appears as an
appendix to this opinion) came into Jones's possession and she, expressing
fear for her safety, requested an ex parte abuse prevention order pursuant
to G.L. c. 209A against Gallagher on August 6, 1998. Following a hearing, a
one-year abuse prevention order was entered by a District Court judge on
September 24, 1998, and upon its expiration, on September 23, 1999, a second
judge entered a permanent order against Gallagher, from which he now
appeals. He claims that the second judge erroneously placed the burden of
proof on him and that the evidence was insufficient to make the order
permanent.
FN1.
The poem was apparently written immediately after Jones and Gallagher broke
off their personal relationship, but was never sent directly to Jones. It
was however, sent as an attachment to a letter from Gallagher to a mutual
acquaintance of the parties.
1. Background. The 1998 order was published on the standard form
entitled "Abuse Prevention Order." Findings were recorded by checking off
the boxes that correspond to the pre-printed text. Gallagher was ordered
"not to abuse the plaintiff," "not to contact the plaintiff," and to "stay
away from the plaintiff's residence" and workplace. The box reciting
"[t]here is a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse" was also
checked. The order notified the defendant that "[v]iolation of this order is
a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment or fine or both." The order
recites an expiration date, as well as the "next hearing date," of September
23, 1999.
On that date, Gallagher, his counsel, and Jones were present. The proceeding
was brief and informal.
[FN2] At the proceeding, the judge
remarked that "[t]here have been extensive hearings apparently on this
matter in which exhibits and testimony were taken," and then asked, "How
have things been since the order went into effect?" Jones replied, "OK," and
upon the judge's inquiry, stated, "I'd like to have the order made
permanent." There was no other proof or offer of proof. The judge then
invited Gallagher's attorney to speak, whereupon
counsel recited that the parties had experienced a personal relationship
that *885
started "when they both were married," and lasted for approximately two and
one-half years. The relationship ended one and one-half years before the
initial order was granted, and the order had been issued on the basis of a
poem "that Mr. Gallagher had written about his own pain [using] imagery that
was violent in terms of his own pain...." Gallagher's attorney further
reported that there had been no physical contact between the parties for two
and one-half years, that they no longer worked together, and that they did
not live anywhere near each other. These representations were not
contradicted.
FN2.
The Legislature intended that domestic abuse prevention order proceedings be
as expeditious and informal as reasonably possible.
Zullo v. Goguen, 423
Mass. 679, 681, 672 N.E.2d 502 (1996).
The judge appears then to have examined the original file; however, the
record does not disclose exactly what he reviewed.
**1090
He subsequently explained his understanding of the law "in case there is an
appellate issue," noting that "if there is a hearing and the Judge makes a
finding that [the plaintiff] was in need of protection and there was a
sufficient basis for issuing that order, at the end of the year, [the
plaintiff] has a right to request that the order be
made permanent and ... the fact that no abuse occurred during that period of
time is not enough to dismiss or vacate the order." The judge made no
comment as to the order of proof or burden of proof.
The judge initiated a theoretical discussion with Gallagher's attorney
concerning the notions of reconsideration, reopening the order, and vacating
the expiring order, which counsel indicated were not appropriate to the
circumstances. The judge then stated, "I'm suggesting absent extraordinary
conditions, the statute says [the plaintiff] is entitled to have [the order]
made permanent or continued." The judge then asked Jones, "Do you feel you
are in need of protection, and if so, why?" To this she replied,
"Absolutely ... I feel that I am in imminent fear. I am in fear of imminent
physical and psychological harm.... First of all, the decision that was made
last year was made ... [and] it was the law that came in and protected me
for the last year in which time I haven't heard from him. I now face renewal
where it's going to end and I won't have that protection there. I've been in
fear of this day coming when I don't have the law there to protect me. I
also have a case at the Mass[achusetts] Commission
*886
Against Discrimination pending, and we will have contact again in the future
and I need that protection there for me."
After a brief comment by Gallagher's attorney concerning Jones's pending
case (apparently to be litigated in the Superior
Court), he asked the judge, "what is the reasonableness of her current
statement that she is in fear. Why is she in fear of imminent bodily harm?"
Gallagher's attorney also suggested that the order be extended until the end
of the MCAD litigation. The judge, nevertheless, entered a permanent order
and stated the following, in part:
"The basis for that in case you want to have something on record to appeal
is that I find that there is ongoing litigation matters between the two of
them that stem from the original time, apparently when they were both
working at the same location. That they have now separated that litigation
apparently it is going into the Superior Court and she is in reasonable fear
based on what [the issuing judge] apparently found in the past."
[1]
2.
Statutory background. Chapter 209A was inserted in the General Laws
in 1978. St. 1978, c. 447, § 2. "That statute, entitled 'Abuse Prevention,'
has been described as a 'statutory mechanism by which victims of family or
household abuse can enlist the aid of the State to prevent further abuse.' "
Commonwealth v.
Contach, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 247, 253, 712 N.E.2d 100 (1999),
quoting from
Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 344, 553 N.E.2d 915 (1990).
The statute was enacted "to address the problem of domestic violence through
the provision of judicial remedies,"
Turner v. Lewis, 434
Mass. 331, 332, 749 N.E.2d 122 (2001),
and the "c. 209A proceeding is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding."
Frizado v.
Frizado,
420 Mass. 592, 596
n. 3, 651 N.E.2d 1206 (1995). Some
orders, however, issued pursuant to the statute contain criminal penalties.
See Commonwealth
v. Finase, 435 Mass. 310, 312-314, 757 N.E.2d 721 (2001).
The "[v]iolence brought on by, or exacerbated by, familial relationships was
the 'mischief or imperfection to be remedied' by c. 209A."
**1091
Turner v. Lewis,
supra at 334, 749 N.E.2d 122,
quoting from
Adoption of Derrick, 415 Mass. 439, 444, 614 N.E.2d 987 (1993).
The statute attempts to balance sensitive issues, and often brutal aspects,
of fundamental human relationships.
*887
The person suffering from abuse may commence a proceeding by filing a
complaint, G.L. c.
209A, § 3, and those "proceedings
often take place in times of great turmoil in the parties' lives."
Commentary to guideline 1:01 of the Guidelines for Judicial Practice: Abuse
Prevention Proceedings (2000). "They are under considerable stress because
by the very nature of the process they are required to reveal to strangers
details of intimate relationships that have disintegrated into violence and,
indeed, even hatred." Commonwealth v. Contach, supra. Consequences of
the underlying situation, notwithstanding any order, tragically and too
frequently include the most serious violence and sometimes death of the
complainant. See
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 429 Mass. 745, 746, 711 N.E.2d 578 (1999)
(defendant convicted of first-degree murder and violating abuse prevention
order under G.L. c.
209A, § 7);
Commonwealth v. Bianchi,
435
Mass. 316, 317, 757 N.E.2d
1087 (2001) (same).
[2]
[3]
[4]
In
comparison, consequences to the defendant may appear to be much less severe,
but they too are negative. Issuance of an order effects entry of that order
in the Commonwealth's criminal records system, and the order can have an
adverse effect upon the defendant in any future
c. 209A
proceeding and in certain future bail proceedings.
[FN3]
Wooldridge v. Hickey,
45 Mass.App.Ct. 637, 638, 700 N.E.2d 296 (1998).
The order can also create criminal jeopardy specific to the defendant and
subject him or her to arrest without a warrant. See
Richardson v. Boston,
53 Mass.App.Ct. 201, 203, 758 N.E.2d 629 (2001).
"The judicial imprimatur on the 209A order lends it significant weight. This
is not just a filing in court but a determination by the court."
Commonwealth v. Foreman,
52 Mass.App.Ct. 510, 515, 755 N.E.2d 279 (2001).
[FN4]
FN3.
General Laws c. 276,
§ 57, as amended by St. 1992, c.
201, § 2, limits the persons authorized to admit to bail those arrested and
charged with a c.
209A offense, effectively
eliminating bail commissioners and clerk magistrates, and requiring that any
such bail requirement be determined by a judge.
FN4.
It is also important to note that the
c. 209A
process may be
used abusively by litigants for purposes of
discovery and harassment, and that it may make other family circumstances
(especially involving the parties' children) and relationships substantially
more complicated. See
Commonwealth v. Silva, 431 Mass. 194, 198, 726 N.E.2d 408 (2000);
Fabre v. Walton,
436 Mass. 517, 519, 766 N.E.2d 474 (2002);
Wooldridge v.
Hickey, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 637, 700 N.E.2d 296;
Commonwealth v.
Leger, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 232, 235, 752 N.E.2d 799 (2001);
Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 52 Mass.App.Ct. 755, 762, 756 N.E.2d 22 (2001);
Uttaro v. Uttaro, ante, (2002). While such abuses appear
infrequently, they damage a process which, in the great majority of
instances, performs essential service to victims of domestic violence. We
note that the motives and interests in
c. 209A
proceedings are as diverse as the human condition of personal relationships.
[5]
The
Legislature intended the
c. 209A
judicial process to be as
*888
"expeditious and as comfortable as it reasonably can be for a lay person to
pursue." Frizado
v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 598, 651 N.E.2d 1206.
[FN5] And, with great respect,
we note that "[j]udges often must
**1092
deal with large numbers of these emotional matters in busy court sessions."
Ibid. "A judge must consider carefully whether serious physical harm
is imminent and should not issue a G.L. c. 209A order simply because it
seems to be a good idea or because it will not cause
the defendant any real inconvenience."
Smith v. Joyce, 421
Mass. 520, 523 n. 1, 658 N.E.2d 677 (1995).
Judges have been instructed to be especially sensitive, and to examine such
cases with restraint and compassion, see
Commonwealth v. Contach,
47 Mass.App.Ct. at 253, 712 N.E.2d 100,
"in the context of the entire history of the parties' hostile relationship."
Pike v. Maguire,
47 Mass.App.Ct. 929, 930, 716 N.E.2d 686 (1999).
In the light of these ponderous, demanding, somewhat conflicting, and
complicated circumstances, many of which are beneath the surface of complex
lives, we state our understanding of the judicial inquiry and procedure upon
a complainant's request that a c. 209A order be made permanent.
FN5.
It has been recognized that trial judges can be sensitive to the
difficulties of pro se litigants, and although some leniency is appropriate
in determining whether a pro se litigant meets the requirements of
procedural rules, the rules bind pro se litigants as they bind other
litigants. Mmoe
v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 617, 620, 473 N.E.2d 169 (1985);
Mains v.
Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 35, 739 N.E.2d 1125 (2000).
[6]
[7]
3.
Evidence of abuse. For purposes of obtaining a protective
order under G.L. c. 209A, abuse is defined as "(a)
attempting to cause or causing physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of
imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another to engage involuntarily
in sexual relations by force, threat or duress."
G.L. c. 209A, § 1.
"Generalized apprehension, nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e.,
psychological distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there
is no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to the level
of fear of imminent serious physical harm.... The judge must focus on
whether serious physical harm is imminent and should not issue a
c. 209A
order on the theory that it will do no harm....RE Mass.App.Ct. 889>>."
Wooldridge v.
Hickey, 45 Mass.App.Ct. at 639, 700 N.E.2d 296.
We have made no distinction in this regard between an initial (after-notice)
order and a permanent order. "Abuse" has the same definition in either
context. "The only criterion for extending the original order is a showing
of continued need for the order."
Pike v. Maguire, supra
at 929, 716 N.E.2d 686.
[8]
[9]
4.
Permanent order. In 1990, the Legislature rewrote the statute, see
St. 1990, c. 403, § 3, adding language that expressly grants the judge
discretionary authority to "enter a permanent order" at the renewal hearing,
generally, the date set in the original order when "the order is to expire"
and "the matter will again be heard."
G.L. c. 209A, § 3.
[FN6] See
Crenshaw v. Macklin,
430 Mass. 633, 634-635, 722 N.E.2d 458 (2000).
General Laws c. 209A, § 3,
mandates that initial relief be granted for a fixed period of time, not to
exceed a year, and that the order state on its face the date and time that
the order is to "expire" and the matter will again be "heard." Upon that
date, if the plaintiff appears, the court is directed to "determine" whether
to extend or make permanent the order. Without further action by
**1093
the court, the Legislature has directed that the order expire. There is no
presumption that the order be continued. There is no entitlement that the
order be made permanent. The order expires unless extended after a judicial
determination, essentially, a new finding, that the plaintiff continues to
require protection from "abuse" as explicitly defined in
c. 209A, § 1--in
this case, requiring a finding that a permanent order is, in fact, what is
reasonably necessary to protect Jones from being placed "in fear of imminent
serious physical harm" by Gallagher. See
*890
Commonwealth v.
Molloy, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 306, 309, 690 N.E.2d 836 (1998)
( "extension of an annual order pursuant to
§ 3
... is ... by no means automatic");
Pike v. Maguire, 47
Mass.App.Ct. at 929-930, 716 N.E.2d 686.
FN6.
General Laws c.
209A, § 3, provides the following
in relevant part: "Any relief granted by the court shall be for a fixed
period of time not to exceed one year. Every order shall on its face state
the time and date the order is to expire and shall include the date and time
that the
matter will again be heard. If the plaintiff appears
at the court at the date and time the order is to expire, the court shall
determine whether or not to extend the order for any additional time
reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent
order.... The court may also extend the order upon motion of the plaintiff,
for such additional time as it deems necessary to protect from abuse the
plaintiff or any child in the plaintiff's care or custody. The fact that
abuse has not occurred during the pendency of an order shall not, in itself,
constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the order, of
allowing an order to expire or be vacated, or for refusing to issue a new
order."
[10]
[11]
There
is no burden on a defendant to testify or present evidence. "The burden is
on the complainant to establish facts justifying the ... continuance of an
abuse prevention order.... The plaintiff must make the case for the awarding
of relief."
Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. at 596, 651 N.E.2d 1206.
"Although it is not expressly stated in G.L. c. 209A, ... [the] plaintiff
must make a case for relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
at 597, 651 N.E.2d
1206. See
Smith v. Joyce, 421
Mass. at 522, 658 N.E.2d 677.
5. Evidentiary use of initial order and record. The mere fact that a
c. 209A order issued in the past, standing alone, is not enough for a judge
to conclude, on a request for renewal, that "additional
time [is] reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff."
G.L. c. 209A, § 3.
From the record in this case, we are concerned that the judge may have acted
upon a presumption that a complainant is entitled to have a one-year,
after-notice order made permanent, absent the defendant being able to prove
"extraordinary conditions" to persuade the court otherwise. It appears that
in making the order permanent the judge inappropriately used the mere
existence of the earlier order, issued by a different judge, at a different
time, as the sole basis for making the order permanent.
The permanent abuse prevention order is therefore vacated.
So ordered.
APPENDIX
Sue Me
To tear out your own heart with bloody
jagged teeth, you must first bite through
the breast plate, then the breast bone, past
several sore, cracked and bruised ribs.
You seize it between upper and lower incisors
drag it, broken but still beating into
the fresh horrors of a new day. The sun shines,
the clock ticks, the day stretches and yawns
*891 before you. You
wonder why you just don't die.
What tenuous connection keeps you still breathing.
Everything you loved and believed lies torn and twisted.
All thorns without the rose, bleeding and broken
another casual victim, no bandage can resuscitate.
Details at eleven, see obit. section, page 68.
The heart dies, but the body lives on--
"Miracle of science," reports the National Enquirer.
Inquiring minds don't want to know
what fucked up fate might befall them.
Instead, pretend that unendurable pain is sort
of fascinating, like twenty-two pound twins
delivered by menopausal grandmother,
**1094
or how scientific proof of heaven's existence
or is it hell's, lies just past the next galaxy.
Take it for granted--pictures on page 63.
It's the way of the world, no thought, no word,
no deed, need apply not necessary, not applicable.
Not to worry, have a nice day, life goes on
don't try to understand, go with the flow.
Life is a bumper sticker, a buzz word, life is a cabaret.
Life is a bitch, a bowl of cherries, a ten second sound
bite.
Use every available cliché to arm yourself against
any glimmer of self-awareness, comprehension or culpability.
Everything else is to blame except you or me. It's them,
they, those, others, always, all ways, Not us.
We did all we could. We did what we had to do.
We played the hand that was dealt us. We did
the best that we could. We did all that we could do.
We did everything that was humanly possible. We
went above and beyond what could be expected. We
put ourselves out, extended ourselves in extraordinary fashion.
We coped, hoped, discussed, dialoged, forgave,
forgot, taught, listened, learned, lectured
helped, hurt, healed, supported, sacrificed,
shared, screamed, dreamed, danced, denied,
delighted, desecrated and destroyed. What memories,
what stories we'll have to tell. Not to each other
of course, but to ourselves, not lonely of course, but alone.
In place of love and laughter the light of eternity or earth.
We'll have loss and regrets, but we'll remain reasonable.
We'll recognize the road too rocky, the cost too great.
And we're practical people, civilized, survivors.
We'll master the art of living as if it still mattered.
*892
You'll collect original haiku from the 5 th century Tang
dynasty reminding you of a poet you vaguely remember.
I'll hoard exquisite examples of calligraphy Pre-Raphaelite
period, lovely letters, like dancer's limbs
motionless without music, evocative, reminding me of some
thing I can't quite place, a faint silhouette of a familiar face.
Mass.App.Ct.,2002.
Jones v. Gallagher
54 Mass.App.Ct. 883, 768 N.E.2d 1088
END OF DOCUMENT
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