For
their sponsorship of Michigan
Attorney General Mike Cox Sucker's
www.paykids.com
his Paykids Foundation, boycott the
listed sponsors, including Art
Van Furniture, Meijer
Stores, Michigan
State Medical Society (warning,
the MSMS website does not like to
let you out when you click the back
button), SBC
Communications, and Michigan
Health and Hospital Association
and tell them why you are boycotting
them! Go to the Michigan
Enemies of Freedom Page and read
letters by Stan
Rains and Terry
Lear for more information as to
why, and read Domino's
Pizza, Inc.'s letter to me in
response to my concerns about PayKid's
use of Domino's
Pizza gift certificates as a prize
in their loathsome Billboard contest,
which was CANCELLED!!
Not to be outdone,
we are announcing our own
billboard contest!
Libertarian
Party Presidential Candidate
Michael Badnarik is now on record
as saying
that imprisonment for child support
is PEONAGE, and he promises to direct
the civil rights divisions of the
Department of Justice to crack down
on states that in their family law
practices violate the 13th Amendment,
the 14th Amendment, and the Antipeonage
Act. Way to go Badnarik!!!
Recently,
the Seattle
Post-Intelligencer
published an article by Michelle Nicolosi
on the trafficking of humans, and
she actually used the term "debt
bondage" to describe their condition!
We call that "peonage" Ms.
Nicolosi! Guest columnist
Tom Thompson wrote an editorial column
about how slavery is booming in the
21st Century. Employers
are constantly looking for ways to
get labor without paying living wages
for it. It really helps when
the "at-will doctrine" is
there for the employer but NOT there
for the employee.
What he describes he calls "debt
slavery". We call that
"peonage" Mr. Thompson.
Over
at the Seattle
Weekly, Nina Shapiro wrote her
take on modern slavery and human trafficking.
This resulted in
these letters to the editor on the
subject. "Debt bondage".
"Debt slavery". Why
can't people just call it peonage?
The women themselves
admit it's slavery: Click
here for their Yahoo! Group Ex Husband
Now My Slave.
Recently,
I challenged a contempt prosecution
with a Statutory
Writ Action in King County Superior
Court. What happened is
that the State actually admitted into
evidence hard copies of pages from
this web site and some of the War
Posters. They appear to
be trying to punish me for exercising
my right to freedom of speech with
a contempt prosecution and to be prejudicing
the family court commissioners against
me. I suppose their defense
is that it is as impossible to prejudice
a family court commissioner against
a noncustodial dad more than he already
is as it is impossible to prejudice
a Nazi against a Jew more than he
already is!
In Knight
v. Schmitz, 9th Cir. 01-35459
I argued that excessive child support
orders violate the parent's fundamental
rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This
effort was killed by the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, which brings me to ask this
question: How come the
Lovings were able to attack the
validity of their old state court
felony conviction for unlawful marriage
in a class action civil lawsuit brought
in federal court? I realize
Feldman came down in 1983,
but
Rooker has been there since
1923. I wonder if the federal
judiciary and the Senate and Presidents
who appointed it decided that the
Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960's
and '70's is something we cannot allow
to happen again? How else can
we explain the rapid and complete
embrace of
Younger and
Rooker-Feldman?
After the Washington Legislature passed
the WorkFirst Act in 1997, I have
had several opportunities to challenge
its validity. In response to
two letters from the
Washington State Department of Social
and Health Services threatening
license suspension, I brought action
in the state courts to have this multi-subject
bill struck down on the grounds that
multi-subject bills are prohibited
by the Washington Constitution.
The briefs are listed on the page
Knight
v. DSHS, Wash. Court of Appeals
No. 46753-1-I.
Finally
in September 2001, the DSHS
decided to actually suspend my driver's
license. Even though I previously
filled out a change of address form
that was effective for both of my
vehicle registration and for my operating
license, they are pretending that
they "lost" this document
and mailed the notice to an address
different than either my old address
or the new address I notified them
of. What's more, they've acknowledged
my change of address for vehicle registration,
just not for my vehicle operating
license!!!
We
would not want to start trusting the
government now, do we? Our government
does everything it can to disabuse
us of that notion!!
How I found out was that I started
being pulled over and charged with
driving while license suspended.
This has resulted in several new actions.
The pleadings are listed on Knight
v. Seattle, No. C02-201R,
Knight v. Mercer Island, No. C02-879L,
and Knight
v. Serpas, No. C02-1641C.
We have a VICTORY
in Mercer
Island v. Knight! On
January 17, 2003, the charges were
dismissed with prejudice on remand
because the City
of Mercer Island elected to not
continue the prosecution.
After that, on March 11, 2003 the
King
County Sheriff's Department served
me the licenses suspension paperwork
that should have been properly served
before. So now we have the
Administrative Procedure Act adjudication
in Knight
v. State of Washington and DSHS.
And, it appears that the King
County Prosecutor does not understand
collateral estoppel, I
have had to fight a new battle and
this time plead collateral estoppel!
The way I was treated by all too real
Judge Pro Tempore Leonard
Stephen Rochon has inspired the
good folks at Li, Miles, and Furlong,
my imaginary law firm, they are located
at 451 Fahrenheit, Suite 16, Seattle,
Washington, to draft a dummy
motion to vacate decisions by fictional
Judge Pro Tempore Olive Howell, on
behalf of that made up character,
Lenora Blanchard. Lenora
Blanchard may be a real character,
but she is not a real person. Just
imagine her sister Virginia Blanchard!
And
I ultimately won this fight!
See the
CQ54646KC main page for this lovely
little dustup.
In
No.
C02-879L, Judge Lasnik not
only dismissed my action on September
25, 2002, he barred me from litigating
in federal court concerning child
support issues. .tif file.
Of course, I will appeal. This
is the consequence of my having to
fight this battle virtually alone.
Had we some
concerted activity, we could have
achieved a different result.
Before filing an appeal, I filed my
Motion
to Amend Judgment to illustrate
how wrong this is. On January
30, 2003, he denied
my Motion. On to the Ninth
Circuit, with a
Motion for Stay of Judgment Imposing
Litigation Bar Pending Appeal, FRAP
8. Which
Judge Lasnik immediately denied.
We
made this motion in the Ninth.
To
show the all purpose nature of attacking
Washington laws as being based on
multi-subject bills, Mr. James Mullins
has blessed my decision to post the
Brief
of Appellant the attorneys I work
with have filed in State v. Mullins,
Washington
Court of Appeals Division One,
No. 49183-1-I. This is an assault
on the Violence Reduction Act of 1994,
which included changes in gun control
laws. On November 25, 2002,
Judge H.
Joseph Coleman wrote an Unpublished
Opinion affirming the superior
court result. He was joined
by Judges Susan
Agid and Anne
Ellington. Jim filed
a
Petition for Review with the Supreme
Court of Washington. In
fairness to this panel of judges,
I must say that they were caught between
the rock of
In re Boot which upheld the
VRA (though not cited and argued by
the State in its Brief), and the hard
place of
Amalgamated Transit which
reversed
Boot's essential logic to
toss Initiative 695. As for
the
Smith and
Cruz test,
State v. Schmidt, the 5-4
split decision denying the claim that
the VRA firearm provisions constitute
and ex post facto law when applied
to old felony convictions, did presume
retroactive effect while not addressing
how the
Smith and
Cruz decisions apply to the
VRA.
In
Washington Association of Neighborhood
Stores v. State of Washington,
(2003) 149 Wash. 2d. 359, 70 P. 3d.
920, the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld Initiative
773, the Tobacco Tax Initiative.
That is fine as far as that goes,
but they weaseled on what they said
about
Article II Section 19 in
Amalgamated Transit.
In
Neighborhood Stores, the 5
justice majority in an opinion written
by Charles W. Johnson (joined by Barbara
Madsen, Faith Ireland, Tom Chambers,
and Charles Smith) said that
necessity of implementation was not
necessary to prove "rational
unity" in a bill with a general
title. Never mind that is exactly
what they said in
Amalgamated Transit and
Burien v. Kiga about the Tim
Eyman Initiatives. They now
say that "rational unity"
is demonstrated where each provision
is necessary to implement the other
provisions, rational unity may also
be demonstrated if the provisions
"directly relate" to each
other and to the title. Unfortunately
the
dissent written by Justice Richard
Sanders and joined by Gerry Alexander,
Susan Owens and Bobbie Bridge
fails to criticize this "clarification"
of the test for rational unity in
Article II Section 19 challenges
to multi-subject bills. What
they criticize is that if the Initiative
does not mandate appropriations for
health care, then it violates the
subject in title part of
Article II Section 19. This
line of reasoning is further developed
in
Citizens for Responsible Wildlife
Management v. State of Washington,
(2003) 149 Wash. 2d. 622, 71 P. 3d.
644. Fortunately,
Citizens rejected a suggestion
that Initiatives be given less deference
than Acts of the Legislature, both
are to be given the same scrutiny.
If only they would live up to that
and not deny review to such cases
where the Court
of Appeals rejected an
Article II Section 19 argument
in an unpublished decision.
But then, that is one of the reasons
that the unpublished decision rule
trashes the expectation for consistent
application of the law. It frees
the appellate courts from having to
live with decisions in which they
deliberately deviate from precedent
to shaft a citizen, attorney, or an
argument they do not like. To
say that the judges are not political
is like saying the ocean is not salty.
While the Supreme
Court of Washington sometimes
grants review to unpublished decisions,
they don't have the same incentive
to do so unless the press is covering
it like brown covers shit. And
hot damn if the press usually doesn't
even mention such cases while editorially
criticizing Tim Eyman for presenting
two subject Initiatives! That
ranks up there on the hypocrisy meter
with editorially whining about the
corrupting effects of campaign contributions
while charging more for political
ads than for commercial ads.
On June 3, 2003, in the case of
Bennett v. State of Washington,
No. 29173-8, the State
Court of Appeals, Division Two
upheld the WorkFirst Act as a single
subject bill without ANY analysis
of its contents under the test for
rational unity established in
Amalgamated Transit,
Burien v. Kiga,
Neighborhood Stores and
Citizens. Because of
the generous 250 megabytes offered
by Zero
Catch, and because I contacted
Mark Bennett, who has supplied me
computer file copies of his briefs,
I have, with his permission, posted
his briefs with the reference
page for Bennett v. State of Washington.
We are also moving
for leave to file a Brief
of Amici Curiae with the Supreme
Court of Washington in that case.
It was granted. However, Mark
Bennett's Petition for Review
itself was ultimately denied.
Needless
to say, we had to rewrite the dummy
briefs we have placed on this website
to account for
Neighborhood Stores and
Citizens. As you can
see from reading these briefs, we
can still make a powerful argument
against these multi-subject bills,
if the two parts of Initiative 695
or Initiative 722 do not "directly
relate" to each other, which
is the only way by which
Amalgamated Transit and
Kiga can be sustained, then
the same can be said for the WorkFirst
Act and the other bills challenged
in these dummy briefs and the real
briefs we have filed on behalf of
myself and
James Mullins. We cannot
change these already filed briefs,
of course, but do take
Neighborhood Stores and
Citizens into account when
drafting your challenge to a multi-subject
bill.
I
do not fault the folks at Lane
Powell who challenged Initiative
773. I am certain that they
did a very good job. If they
used the briefs posted on this website
as part of their research, then the
function of this website has been
performed. Lane
Powell need not confirm or deny
looking at this website as part of
their research.
We
have done research on behalf of another
client finding that liquor law violations
are vulnerable because the original
Liquor Control Acts of the 1930's
easily embraced more than one subject
and some of the bills passed since
then amending the liquor laws breach
the firewall between defining crimes
and non-criminal matters. City
ordinances are also governed by the
single subject limitation. We
posted a brief
with the client referred to by the
dummy name Gloria N.X. Celsius, represented
by Justin Case of Li, Miles, and Furlong.
In real life, John
R. Scannell presented this argument
on behalf of Sun H. Winegar, for whom
we Move
for Discretionary Review.
Winslow Bainbridge is a strange fellow.
Juanita Kirkland found him intriguing
at first but her infatuation dimmed
and she got creeped out by his manner
and telephone calls. She obtained
a protection order under
chapter 10.14 RCW and the City
of Seattle charged him with violating
the order. Upon a little research,
the good folks at Li, Miles, and Furlong
determined that SMC 12A.06.180 does
not cover protection orders granted
under
chapter 10.14 RCW. They
brought a motion to dismiss on behalf
of their client Winslow Bainbridge.
It turns out such a charge is better
made under SMC 12A.06.190. But
not to worry, we can analyze the Ordinance
that created SMC 12A.06.190 for multi-subjectness.
Our challenge to SMC 12A.06.180 as
being based on multi-subject Ordinances
is still valid for the client who
is charged with violating a domestic
violence related protection order.
Another
of Justin Case's hypothetical clients,
Millie Graham, is charged with a felony
count of violation of
RCW 69.50.401(f). Her son
Michael Graham was busted for
delivering a controlled substance
and she put him up to it. Our
motion to dismiss the charge on the
grounds that subsection (f) was added
by a multi-subject bill, Laws 1987
chapter 458. Michael Graham
was charged with delivering more than
two kilograms of a Schedule I or II
controlled substance, cocaine,
RCW 69.50.401(a)(1)(i)(B).
He's in a heap of trouble and Li,
Miles, and Furlong is gonna have to
go the distance to save his butt. Senior
partner Qiahao Yiqian Li has joined
Justin Case in representing him. Take
a look at Laws 1971 1st ex. sess.
chapter 308, the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
chapter 69.50 RCW. Take a good
look at RCW 69.50.301-312. I would
say that it provides for regulation
and licensing of LEGAL manufacturing
and distribution of controlled substances,
which is a different subject than
defining CRIMES. In addition
to the
UCSA, there is Laws 1989 chapter
271, the Omnibus Alcohol and Controlled
Substances Act. Anytime you
see the word "Omnibus" in
the name of a bill, you know that
it is the product of everyone and
their kid brother coming to the Legislature
with their wish list and the Legislature
accommodating the wishes. Congress
is allowed to do that but the Washington
Legislature is prohibited by
Article II Section 19 of the Washington
Constitution. The reason
I increased Michael Graham's quantity
of cocaine to five pounds is to better
establish his standing to challenge
this lovely multi-subject monstrosity.
It not only breaches the firewall
between defining crimes and providing
for non-criminal matters, it breaches
the often enforced firewall between
funding and appropriations measures
and provisions affecting substantive
rights. Here is the Michael
Graham Brief.
Justin
Case wrote a brief
for Ella Vader, arrested for possessing
amphetamine with intent to deliver.
Laws 1998 chapter 82 actually contains
a provision that declares itself null
and void absent the passage of a funding
bill by June 30, 1998. Tsk.
Tsk. Tsk. It makes you
feel like the school teacher with
a particularly creative bunch of excuse
makers. And then there is his
client Magnus
Olsen, arrested for possessing a firearm
at Rainier Beach High School.
We will provide the motion to dismiss.
You
will be seeing more briefs along this
line, as we draft multi-subject bill
challenges to a whole bunch of RCW's.
For parties, we'll use dummy names
such as Roman Miles, Bonnie Lake,
and Franklin Stove unless our client
agrees to allow us to use the actual
brief on this website. My favorite
dummy corporation is Imperial Quartz,
Sand, and Gravel, Inc., I hear they've
retained Li, Miles, and Furlong.
Not to mention Smith Foundry and Machine
Shop, Inc. and Cooper Container Corporation.
It's
really very simple: You have a client
adversely affected by an RCW.
Well, shucks! You just waltz
on over to the Law Library and look
up all of the Laws of Washington that
went into the statute. You find
a multi-subject bill creating or amending
the statute, you have a good faith
motion to dismiss or argument on appeal,
if prior to the amendment, the statute
did not prohibit your client's actions.
Such as owning a long firearm after
a felony conviction. We can blast
BIG UGLY HOLES in the Revised Code
of Washington this way and force the
Legislature to re-pass all of the
provisions in single subject bills.
The
problem is the absolute lack of similarity
of the Supreme
Court of Washington decisions
in
In re Boot, which upheld the
obscenely multi-subject Violence Reduction
Act because all of the subjects are
related to violence reduction, and
Amalgamated Transit, which
struck down Initiative 695 because
one provision was not necessary to
implement the other. Then
Neighborhood Stores revises
that to the "directly relate"
test. WELL, WHICH IS IT? If the relatedness
of all of the provisions of a bill
to the subject of its title render
it single subject, regardless of how
many firewalls between appropriations
and substantive law, defining and
punishing crimes and non-criminal
matters, etc. are breached, then Initiative
695 is a single subject bill. If the
lack of direct relationship of each
provision to each other provision
is what defines a bill as two subject,
then the Violence Reduction Act, the
WorkFirst Act, the Omnibus Alcohol
and Controlled Substances Act, the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
the Liquor Control Act, and many other
bills are all void as multi-subject
bills.
To
boil this down to a three minute oral
argument, you would tell the court:
"The
Washington Federation of State Employees
case,
In re Boot, the
Jenkins,
Acevedo, and
Knight cases cited by
Boot, and
Amalgamated Transit,
Burien v. Kiga,
Washington Assoc. of Neighborhood
Stores v. State, and
Citizens for Responsible Wildlife
Management all found that
the bills and initiatives at issue
had general titles. All held
that all that was necessary was that
there be 'rational unity' in all of
the provisions with respect to the
subject of the general title.
However,
Amalgamated Transit,
Kiga,
Neighborhood Stores. and
Citizens together established
a test to determine rational unity:
Each and every provision of a bill
or initiative with a general title
must directly relate to each and every
other provision, or it lacks rational
unity. As an example, had the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act
been passed without the 300 series
sections concerning the lawful uses
of controlled substances by the health
care industry, it would meet the
Amalgamated Transit rational
unity test. The provisions providing
for law enforcement powers and responsibilities
directly relate to the provisions
defining crimes and the penalties
for the crimes. These provisions
do not directly relate to the provisions
concerning lawful health care uses
of controlled substances and vice
versa.
Amalgamated Transit made this
exact point with Initiative 695: absent
the section providing for a vote on
all tax increases, all of the other
provisions would have had rational
unity with the repeal of the MVET
and the establishment of the flat
$30 license tab fee. Because
the previous decisions concerning
the Violence Reduction Act, the Omnibus
Alcohol and Controlled Substances
Act and other omnibus bills do not
analyze these bills under the direct
relation test subsequently established
by
Amalgamated Transit and
Neighborhood Stores, these
omnibus bills passed by the Legislature
must be re-analyzed under this test
for there to be 'rational unity' in
the way this state's courts interpret
Article II Section 19."
Given
that most of our fellow citizens are
angry at the disallowance of Initiatives
695 and 722, this argument may prove
exceptionally persuasive with elected
judges. One would think so.
You
want to stick it to the seat belt
Nazis? We join the clickitstickit
campaign with our
challenge to a seat belt citation.
This
website will continue on. We
will just keep adding more and more
information. The reason there
is only text, lots of links in blue,
and so little graphics is to pile
on as much information as possible
for the bytes of server that I am
using. Other ways of fighting
this battle, might be to sue a deputy
sheriff and his elected boss for bad
faith arrest. If an arrest is
the crime defined by 18
U.S.C. §1581, then of course it
is bad faith and he has no immunity
to a 42
U.S.C. §1983 assault. If
you have other ideas, feel free to
pursue them and then e-mail me about
them. I would also appreciate
those who link to this site from their
sites. I will happily return the favor.
Mike
Galluzzo is going at it in Ohio!
He is challenging the practice
of a court assigning custodial and
non-custodial parent status upon an
UNANSWERED MOTION!!!
This link is to my page where, with
his permission, I post pdf files of
some of his pleadings in Galluzzo
v. Champaign County Court of Common
Pleas, S.D.
Ohio No. C3-01-174 and his appeal,
6th
Cir. No. 04-3527.
I
have also tried my hand as a fiction
writer, you can find samples of my
fiction at my Neanderthal
Return website. If you wish
to support me in my endeavor, purchasing
my novel
Neanderthal Return from
www.authorhouse.com is a great
way to do it. A good friend of
mine, Ivy Rose Nightscales, has placed
her book of poetry,
Garden of Words, on
www.authorhouse.com. If
you like poetry, please give her book
a look. And for a better understanding
of our problems, there is
Blind Baseball - A Father's War,
by A. Green, also on www.authorhouse.com.
Over the years, I
have written letters
to the editor of our local papers.
Most were not published, but a few
were. Enjoy. Some very
important comments on the continuing
erosion of our freedoms are in these
letters.
To
show that I have my lighter moments,
my comment on the Area 51 phenomenon.
I have done my own
versions of some of the famous war
posters. Click War
Posters to find them. You
should love them, they are great satire.
We have allies in
this fight: Click
here for links to some of our allies.
One ally is Mr.
Perry Manley. He was prosecuted
for child support contempt and had
the case
dropped. He was recently
reported
on the front page of Real
Change.
Then on
June 20, 2005 he went into the United
States Courthouse in Seattle with
something that looked like a grenade.
After 20 minutes of negotiations,
he was shot and killed by police.
Related
article.
We are very
saddened by this turn of events.
The way to honor
Mr. Manley is to fight to make America
live up to her promises of freedom
and to demand that that NO INTEREST
OF GOVERNMENT IS SO COMPELLING AS
TO JUSTIFY THE VIOLATION OF ANY RIGHTS
PROVISION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
OR THE 50 STATE CONSTITUTIONS!
Perry recently wrote
an e-mail to Representative
Jay Inslee (D) Washington on these
issues. The congressman is either
a
dunce or he disrespects our intelligence.
On
this link you can read his response
to Mr. Perry and my response to that.
In response to comments
that Perry abandoned his family and
his responsibilities, please consider
that his divorce case is Kitsap
County No.
89-3-01537-0 and
he is listed as the RESPONDENT.
Please consider that
RCW 26.09.080 declares that property
division shall be "without regard
to marital misconduct".
It is the policy in Washington that
a wife can sabotage her marriage and
then fleece her breadwinning husband
and HE HAS NO DEFENSE AND NO WAY TO
STOP IT!!!! It matters not whether
he ever did anything wrong. The Administrator
of the Washington Courts now has a
superior
courts lookup page where you can
search for almost every case in the
Washington superior courts since 1970.
After he was killed
at the United States Courthouse, his
ex-wife was interviewed on local television
news. (Best if you have broadband,
Videos are slow download for the dial-up
modem) She said that it was
all about the money, as in "Don't
tell me what to do with my money!"
Well, yes it is.
That is what the American Revolution
was all about. That is what
motivated the
Minutemen at Lexington and Concord.
That is what the flag with the rattlesnake
and the caption "Don't tread
on me" meant. Mr. Manley
would have been happy to raise his
children but his ex-wife and a government
gone mad took that away from him.
And then they did
not have the good sense to just leave
him alone after stripping his family
away from him. They treaded
on him.
Commentary by Roger F. Gay at
www.mensnewsdaily.com
Commentary
by David R. Usher at
www.mensnewsdaily.com
After these terrible
events at the federal courthouse,
Judge Thomas
S. Zilly is
quoted by press reports as not really
understanding what relief Perry was
asking for.
So I thought I would
go and look up Perry's federal case.
It is Manley v. State of Washington
et al, W.D.
Wash. No. C03-167Z:
Complaint
pdf file a big sucka, 1,613 kb (They
say patience is its own reward.
Yeah, right!) It is all of the attached
exhibits, of course. You will
please notice that some of these exhibits
include pleadings from State v.
Manley, King
County No.
02-3-04633-2 SEA listed on this
web page. Perry used a res
judicata or collateral estoppel argument
that having bailed on the state court
contempt case when he asserted the
protection of the Antipeonage Act,
the state was now barred from claiming
the validity of any of its efforts
to enforce the support order and therefore,
under the federal civil rights statutes
he quotes therein, he was entitled
to declaratory and other relief in
the federal
court.
Yet Judge Zilly,
who was actually admitted to the Washington
State Bar Association in 1962
on the strength of having completed
a course of study in the law and passing
the bar exam, claimed
he could not understand what it was
Perry was asking for. Said
so in an Order
requiring Perry to file an Amended
Complaint. Which Perry did
listing all of the federal statutes
and legal grounds that grant the federal
courts the power to act. While
one might not blame Judge
Zilly for concluding that Perry
was being sarcastic, neither can one
blame Perry for being sarcastic.
Judge Zilly
dismissed the case with an Order,
and that is the basis for Perry's
claim that the judge, by allowing
the Constitution and laws of the United
States be violated after having been
duly and properly informed of their
violation, committed treason.
I suppose Perry's
paperwork could have been better written.
If you will look at my pleadings listed
on my Knight
v. Maleng, 9th Cir. 00-35625,
W.D. Wash. No. C00-151Z page,
you might conclude that I did a better
job of apprising Judge Zilly
of the Antipeonage Act and of the
relief he could grant. He just
did not grant it.
I
also list links to neutral source
of information.
Please
click here for my reaction to the
terrible destruction of the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon.
As angry as I am about the government
violating my rights, there is no way
in HELL I would support the use of
civilian jetliners built by Boeing,
the company I once worked for, and
their innocent passengers, to commit
such acts of mass murder. It
is an Act of War by those who certainly
do not believe in American freedom.
This nation can count on my full support
in resolving these terrible events
as it can count on all noncustodial
parents who are also American citizens.
I
believe I have an explanation as to
why these crazies hate us.
On
the issue of violence, I
must comment on the sad case of Tacoma
Police Chief Brame. Yes,
we protest the loose and rather inclusive
definitions of domestic violence,
and the lack of due process when it
comes to establishing restraining
orders that seriously restrict the
freedom of the respondents, particularly
where the facts do NOT meet even these
expanded definitions of domestic violence.
But spouses should refrain from physically
assaulting each other and ought not
to murder each other. An interesting
revelation is that I do not believe
that those who lash out at their wives
and girlfriends are motivated by the
same issues that motivate us to oppose,
with arguments as to law, the support
orders, their enforcement, or even
anti-harassment orders.
Click
here for a brief history behind the
Antipeonage Act.
Congress
reacted to the practice of peonage
in New Mexico Territory as described
in this site's History
page, when it passed the Antipeonage
Act, original statute recorded at
14
Stat 546. New Mexico used
its peonage system to enforce all
kinds of debts and obligations: debts
arising from express or implied contracts,
awards for attorney's fees, tort judgments,
and the duty of a husband to support
his wife and children, whether divorced
or not.
I
kid you not! When we use contempt
proceedings, arrest, and imprisonment
to enforce orders to pay child support,
orders that can be complied with only
by employment, we commit the crime
defined by 18
U.S.C. §1581. Everyone involved
with enforcing support orders is guilty
of this crime: the prosecutors, the
deputy sheriffs who serve the warrants,
the judges and family court commissioners
who issue the warrants and blatantly
order noncustodial parents to seek
employment or punish them for quitting
employment, the custodial parents
and their attorneys who bring contempt
actions or actions to establish child
support, and the welfare agencies
who actively establish and enforce
support orders and pursue those noncustodials
who, like Atlas, shrug when overburdened.
All of these people are CRIMINALLY
liable.
Click
here for a list of some of our enemies,
people who violate our rights under
the 13th Amendment and the Antipeonage
Act. Please read about an
interesting trend with respect to
elected county prosecutors in some
of the western states. One
enemy is Michael Hlinka, Toronto Radio
Personality. Then there
is Representative
Jay Inslee (D) Washington.
He is either a
dunce or disrespects our intelligence.
All can and should be indicted
by the local United States Grand Jury.
If you are on the Grand Jury, you
do not need the permission of anyone,
not the Assistant United States Attorney
who presents you with cases to indict,
and not the judge who supervises you.
YOU and only YOU, can decide whether
to indict or "no true bill"
a case. YOU can decide what
crimes to investigate, issue your
own subpoenas, review the paperwork
that comes in as a result of the subpoenas,
and question people you target for
possible indictment for any felony
defined by the laws of the United
States.
Why do this? Integrity of the
law. When we create an exception
to the protection of the laws to allow
us to "go after" a group
of people we think are not doing their
share, we open the way for all to
lose their Constitutional rights.
If the duty to support a child justifies
denying a parent the protection of
the
Thirteenth Amendment, then what
is to stop the government from ordering
any parent, with or without custody
of her children, into forced labor
and visiting upon said parent all
of the indignities currently imposed
upon the noncustodial parents?
Answer: NOTHING. Say a state
agency, Child Protective Services,
investigates a family and decides
that while the children are not being
abused or neglected, the parents are
not earning enough money to "properly
support" the children.
The father works his 40 hours a week
plus overtime, but he is non-union
blue collar and worried about his
job being shipped to China or Mexico.
He does not make much more than minimum
wage. However, they do not use
food stamps or other public benefits
and take care of themselves, even
though the mother stays home with
the kids. The state social worker
decides that the father is doing all
he can, but the mother must work at
least 20 hours per week to better
financially provide for the children.
What is to stop the social worker
from getting a court order REQUIRING
the mother, on PAIN OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS,
ARREST, AND IMPRISONMENT, to work
at least 20 hours per week?
Answer:
NOTHING. NOT
IF WE HAVE ALREADY CONCEDED THAT THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT
PROTECT THE FATHER IF HE IS NO LONGER
MARRIED TO THE MOTHER OR NEVER MARRIED
TO THE MOTHER.
That
is what we are talking about! Please
forgive us for being frustrated with
all of the "sheeple" who
refuse to "get it" and tolerate
what we do to the noncustodial parents.
If the
Thirteenth Amendment does not
protect the noncustodials, it does
not protect ANY parent! You
who are on the Grand Jury can start
fixing this problem RIGHT NOW with
the enforcement of 18
U.S.C. §1581, not to mention 18
U.S.C. §2 aiding and abetting,
and 18
U.S.C. §241, conspiracy to deny
civil rights. The rest of you
can start fixing this problem by getting
off your rear ends and doing the heavy
lifting necessary to make our republic
work the way it was designed to work.
You do not have to vote to re-elect
the problem. You could vote
for the other guy even if you have
to hold your nose. You
can always get rid of her the next
time around. You can use the
initiative process (but use it wisely).
Lest you think that "it won't
do any good" ask yourself when
was the last time you saw kilometers
on road signs in the United States?
When WE the PEOPLE say we don't want
something, we get listened to.
We just have to say it in numbers.
And feel free to exercise your
First Amendment rights as to this
issue, it is how we protect the other
Amendments.
Letter
to New Zealand Member of Parliament
Muriel Newman. She is at
muriel.newman@parliament.govt.nz
In this letter I make what I believe
to be the kind of argument that just
might get through the thick skulls
of those who cannot otherwise seem
to grasp that this is a vital issue
of FREEDOM, without which, we CANNOT
be the parents our children need.
The "natives" are restless,
and the power structure knows it.
People simply do not trust government.
Asked about re-electing the problem,
voters will tell you that the opposite
party nominee, if there is one, is
often not a viable alternative.
Meaning the Republican is too much
of an anti-abortionist, too much in
the thrall of "big business"
or too "law and order" to
be one likely to promote greater respect
for constitutional rights. Or
the Democrat is too much of a "tax
and spender," too "disrespectful
of the
Second Amendment," or too
much into "avant-garde"
ideas such as mandatory seat-belt
laws, banning tobacco smoking everywhere,
the Metric System, public support
for ugly and offensive art, or engaging
in the hate campaign against noncustodial
fathers along with the social conservative
Republicans, to be one likely to promote
greater respect for constitutional
rights. Both are all too willing
to sell those rights for federal funds.
So people who have been abused by
Child Protective Services, now called
the Children's
Administration, by the child support
system, by excessive taxes, by smoking
restrictions, by enforcement of the
marijuana laws, by irrational court
decisions, by a complete lack of response
by the local government or school
district for their concerns, will
enthusiastically collect signatures
for Tim
Eyman because he is trying to
starve the system that abuses them
of its operating funds. People
are afraid of CPS,
they do not trust them. Why
is that? One explanation starts
with the celebrated case of William
and Kathleen Swan. Those who
have been abused by this state's agencies
are inclined to believe that they
were railroaded. After a dispassionate
and fresh review of
State v. Swan, (1990) 114 Wash.
2d. 613, 790 P. 2d. 610, I am
inclined to agree, though I freely
admit that my life experience causes
me to have this inclination.
Please
review my quick and dirty analysis
of this decision and how this case
has lead to the nightmare we know
so well in Wenatchee and other places
where there were mass prosecutions
for child sexual abuse properly known
as Salem
style witch hunts.
It is interesting to note that recent
books and web
sites on the subject of people
believing unreasonable things list
the allegations of a massive
child sexual abuse ring in Wenatchee
and the proposition that Bill and
Kathy Swan sexually abused their daughter
and her toddler neighbor, as being
on a par with the proposition that
crop circles are made by somebody
other than Earth humans.
In
Hickman v. Block,
Silveira v. Lockyer, and
Nordyke v. King, the Ninth
Circuit did to the
Second Amendment what the
Ballek
Court
did to the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Here is my comment on that and why
rights must be considered held by
individuals or they are not rights.
Any Fourth Grader who passes the Basic
Skills Test can see that what comes
before the comma is simply a explanation
of necessity for the right that is
stated after the comma. That is what
the Fifth
Circuit concluded in United
States v. Emerson, (9th Cir. 2002)
270 F. 3d. 203, 227, and what
Judge Gould concluded in his Special
Concurrence in
Nordyke. However, having
found that the
Second Amendment protected an
individual right to keep and bear
arms, the Fifth
Circuit then failed to enforce
the right in the case of a restraining
order obtained in a domestic relations
case. I criticize that too,
because often the threats at issue
in such restraining orders are made
in the heat of high emotion by people
who are not ordinarily a danger to
society. Once the emotions cool down,
most such people have no intention
of ever carrying out the things they
say. The finding of fact is
not made by a jury of our peers, but
by a judge with all of the institutional
prejudices and blindnesses that come
with being a judge, particularly in
family law including the blindness
to the
Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage
Act extensively illustrated by this
website. For an example of the
perfectly legal if somewhat strange
behavior that can result in a restraining
order, see our dummy brief for Winslow
Bainbridge. Facts as innocuous
as described therein do result in
restraining orders, often with exclusion
radii as long as 500 yards.
It is not rational to deprive Winslow
of his right to keep and bear arms,
not on the basis of any actual stalking
or surveillance he perpetrated, but
only on the unsupported belief of
such surveillance by a nervous ex-girlfriend.
And certainly not on the basis of
strange phone calls that do not include
any legally definable threats, but
only denials of such threats.
Not infringing the right of the people
to keep and bear arms is the only
guarantee that a well regulated militia
can be formed, whenever such proves
necessary for the security of a free
state, regardless of the circumstances.
Sawed off shotguns and fully automatic
rifles may be the weapons such a citizen's
militia needs to deal with the emergency
at hand. The state that infringes
such right is not a free state, and
has made the Faustian bargain Ben
Franklin warned against, trading an
essential liberty for the illusion
of security. To say that the
Second Amendment does not guarantee
an individual right is like saying
imprisonment for child support is
not imprisonment for debt and saying
that coercion of employment to pay
child support is not involuntary servitude.
It is an absurdity.
Because this website is visible around
the Planet Earth, I sent a
Letter by e-mail to the High
Court of Australia concerning
their recent decision in Dow
Jones & Company v. Gutnick.
Consider this question if you will:
You publish a pamphlet within the
State of Washington and distribute
it within the State of Washington,
anticipating that you would be governed
by the defamation law of Washington
as developed within
Article I Section 5 of the Washington
Constitution and the
First Amendment. An Australian
obtains a copy of your printed material.
She gets on an aircraft and takes
it home to Australia. You have
no control over this. She then
passes it around to her friends in
Australia. An Australian mentioned
in your pamphlet believes himself
to be libeled. Should he be
allowed to sue you in an Australian
court under Australian libel principles
and not under Washington defamation
law as developed within our constitutional
guarantees? The High
Court of Australia said yes.
A defense to such an Australian action
is suggested by Yahoo!,
Inc. v. La
Ligue contre le Racisme et l'Antisemitisme,
(N.D. Cal. 2001) 145 F. Supp. 2d.
1168 and 169
F. Supp. 2d. 1181. Yahoo!
obtained a declaratory judgment in
the American court that a French
court order requiring it to render
inaccessible to computer users in
France portions of its auction service
wherein Nazi artifacts and propaganda
is offered for sale and any links
through its browser to web sites with
allegedly pro-Nazi viewpoints and
allegedly in support of the proposition
that the Holocaust did not happen
is unenforceable in the United States
because such enforcement offends the
First Amendment.
The
Ninth
Circuit three judge panel made
their
decision in the appeal of this on
August 23, 2004. I apologize
for not seeing this sooner, but I
have been busy. Judges Ferguson
and Tashima ducked the issue by vacating
the district court decision on grounds
that the French organizations had
not yet made themselves proper parties
to any proceeding in California.
Yes, they sued Yahoo!
in a French court over activities
Yahoo!
conducted in California and obtained
a French
court order requiring Yahoo!
to perform certain activities with
respect to its servers located in
California: Either remove the Nazi
artifacts from its pages where users
may offer items for sale, or block
such pages from being available to
Internet surfers within the territories
under French jurisdiction. Such
territories include France, Corsica,
St. Pierre and Miquelon, and a few
other scattered possessions.
Fines and damages are being assessed
everyday that Yahoo!
does not comply. Yahoo!
France is excluded from this judgment.
However, Ferguson and Tashima found
that no American court can decide
whether enforcement of a foreign court
order offends the United States Constitution
and other American law until such
time the foreign parties avail themselves
of the jurisdiction of any American
judicial or administrative agency
to enforce such order. And on
February 10, 2005, the
Ninth Circuit
vacated this three judge panel decision
and has agreed to re-hear it en banc.
The
problem with this, and Judge Brunetti
nails this home with
his dissent, is this: Yahoo!
will now have to suffer increasing
liability in a foreign jurisdiction
with its rights as an American corporation
held in limbo until La
Ligue deigns fit to attempt to
collect on its French
court judgment in the United States.
La
Ligue can thus pick the time and
place to start such an American lawsuit,
including such time when the American
against whom it has such judgment
is financially or otherwise embarrassed
and therefore at a reduced ability
to defend such an action. Yahoo!
can handle this because it has become
a large presence on the Internet and
can therefore retain the legal representation
necessary to handle any foray by La
Ligue into any American court.
Such a foray by La
Ligue will also command media
coverage of the sort that deters chicanery
by the judges. But many of us
Americans of more modest means, including
myself, can be harassed by people
like La
Ligue, or in my case, more likely
a foreign feminist organization, who
could obtain judgments against us
in their foreign courts and then harass
us in American courts when we don't
have the resources of Yahoo!
with which to fight back and the media
attention that provides incentive
to the judges to be respectful of
our rights under the United States
Constitution.
I
would hope the Ninth
Circuit, in en banc, adopts Judge
Brunetti's position. If not,
then we need to lobby Congress to
pass a bill providing the federal
courts with the jurisdiction necessary
to allow Americans sued overseas to
obtain protection against any foreign
judgment offensive to our American
constitutional rights. Otherwise,
our right to freedom of speech, at
least with respect to the Internet,
can be seriously chilled by foreign
jurisdictions which, to put it mildly,
do not share our values of freedom
of speech.
British libel judgments are likewise
unenforceable, and so are Australian
libel judgments, particularly if rendered
in the courts of Queensland and New
South Wales. Queensland and
NSW do not consider truth of the speech
to be an absolute defense to an action
for libel. At least Victoria,
where Gutnick
originated, does. But even in
Victoria, the burden of proof is different
than in the United States. In
Victoria, a libel defendant, such
as Dow Jones and Company, is required
to prove the truth of its statement.
In the United States, a defendant
merely has to prove that it had a
good faith belief in the truth of
the statement. Public figures,
such as celebrities and politicians,
must prove actual malice on the part
of the alleged defamer. Liberace,
as an example, won a libel suit by
showing that the defendant had no
evidence or reason to believe that
Liberace was a homosexual. The
defendant maliciously said so.
But O.J. Simpson has no reasonable
chance to win any libel suit against
any person who calls him a wife killer.
(Unless he becomes a resident of Australia.)
He was acquitted in the criminal trial,
found financially responsible for
the deaths in a civil trial, and Jay
Leno can joke about him finding the
"real killer" in the mirror
with impunity.
Another
defense to a libel or defamation lawsuit
in a foreign court is suggested by
Young
v. New Haven Advocate, (4th Cir.
December 13, 2002) ____ F. 3d. ____.
This American federal appeals court
decision found that newspapers
in Connecticut who publishes some
of their content on the Internet cannot
be sued in a court in the State of
Virginia, including a
federal district court in Virginia,
unless there is a showing of "minimal
contacts" with the State of Virginia
as required by the
5th and
14th Amendment due process clauses.
Merely publishing content on the Internet
which can be downloaded and read in
Virginia, does not grant a Virginia
court or a federal
court located in Virginia in personam
jurisdiction over the party who posted
the material on the Internet, to hear
a claim for libel or defamation.
Mr. Young, a
Virginia prison warden, made the
Gutnick
argument: the allegedly defamatory
information was posted on the Internet
by defendants who knew he was
a Virginia resident, who knew that
content posted on the Internet can
be downloaded in Virginia, and the
damage to his reputation occurred
mostly in Virginia. While the
federal district court agreed
with Mr. Young, the federal
Court of Appeals disagreed and
reversed the denial of motion to dismiss
the suit. Young
cited a copyright infringement case,
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service
Consultants, Inc., (4th Cir. 2002)
293 F. 3d. 707, which set a standard
for interstate Internet cases.
Both Fourth
Circuit cases find that a plaintiff
must show that an out of state Internet
web master specifically aimed his
content at an audience within the
state the plaintiff wishes to bring
suit. In the case of New
Haven Advocate and the Hartford
Courant, most of the content is
aimed at Connecticut residents, i.e.
local weather reports and real estate
want ads. Therefore, the Connecticut
newspaper cannot be sued in Virginia
merely because its web site can be
read in Virginia. This is in
direct conflict with the finding in
Dow
Jones & Company v. Gutnick.
To
take advantage of this defense, do
not aim your content at an Australian
audience. Most of the content
on this web site concerns American
law and those who enforce such American
law (or fail to, depending upon which
American law we're referring to).
While an Australian citizen may work
in the United States for an agency
that enforces child support orders
and therefore be in a position to
take umbrage at my assertion that
she is thus violating 18
U.S.C. §1581, she cannot say that
such assertion is aimed at an Australian
audience, even if Australians can
download this website in Sidney and
Melbourne. Even if I aim this
web site at an Australian audience,
say by listing Australian citizens
who arrested American noncustodial
parents found within Australia with
the intent to enforce the American
support orders (when I obtain such
information, I might do that), and
therefore say they violate 18
U.S.C. §1581, I can still assert
in an American court that any judgment
obtained in such a suit is unenforceable
in the United States without offending
the
First Amendment, because I can
show a good faith belief in the truth
of such statement, and Australian
courts do not consider that to be
good enough defense to a libel action.
In
the decision made April 7, 2003 in
Virginia
v. Black, I must say the Supremes
did a pretty good job. I would
concur with Justice
O'Connor's opinion, but I understand
where Justice
Thomas comes from in his dissent.
A quick look at the facts:
There are two events from which this
case originates. The one case,
involving Mr. Black, was a Klan rally
on private property with the owner's
permission and participation.
It appears to be a typical Klan rally:
speeches, songs, standing around in
a circle in white robe and pointy
hat costumes, and a 25 foot tall cross
was lit up while they sang Amazing
Grace. Doesn't that just
make your skin crawl! To say
that this gathering is not protected
would be a terrible departure from
previous
First Amendment jurisprudence
(Brandenburg
v. Ohio,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
Dist.,
Texas v. Johnson, and
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul).
In the other case, several teenagers
angry with a black neighbor who spoke
to their mother about their shooting
guns at a target range, retaliated
by burning a small cross in the neighbor's
back yard. The Supreme
Court struck down the Virginia
statute in question, but they
said that a state can regulate the
behavior of those who trespass on
private property with a clear intent
to intimidate so long as the statute
is content neutral and dependent upon
the traditional legal tests for determining
when speech constitutes an unprotected
threat of violence. Simply put,
when people gather for a private rally
on private property, their speech
and expression, including burning
a cross, is protected as long as there
is no direct "true" threat.
Even if we cannot stand that it was
a Klan rally with a burning cross
and seriously disagree with the sentiments
expressed therein. But in the
case of the two kids who burned a
cross on a neighbor's lawn, perhaps
Virginia can prosecute them if they
rewrite the jury instructions to require
proof of the element to intimidate.
I must agree with this.
However, when it comes to intimidation,
there are distinctions that must be
made if we are to have freedom of
speech that is legally protected.
Those who enforce support orders may
be intimidated by this website asserting
that what they do is the felony of
peonage. 1) It is the purpose
of any criminal statute, including
18
U.S.C. §1581, to intimidate people
from committing the actions it proscribes.
That is a legitimate form of intimidation.
2) Those who oppose a government policy,
including on the grounds that it violates
another government policy long forgotten
but not repealed, have to be able
to express their opposition without
being subject to charges of "intimidating"
or "harassment" or "making
threats". Simply put, I
am protected in my speech as long
as I do not come out and say that
those who violate
18 U.S.C. §1581 in the enforcement
of child support will be "dealt
with", or some other expression
indicating illegal violence.
However, if I say that I will continue
to plead the Antipeonage Act and encourage
others to do so, and while that can
lead to the criminal prosecution of
those who enforce support orders,
the possibility of criminal prosecution
is the legitimate outcome of our being
right about the meaning and the purpose
of the Antipeonage Act. Those
who violate it should suffer consequences.
But my saying so is not a "true
threat" and it is protected by
the
First Amendment, Virginia
v. Black being one of many
cases that supports this position.
As another practical
matter, what about a film company
producing a movie where the plot involves
a Klan rally?
Mississippi Burning comes
to mind. So noted in Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Virginia
v. Black. Granted, everyone
understands that actors in white robes
are playing parts, not being the parts.
But that cross will burn for as many
"takes" as the director
deems required to get the scene right.
More kerosene will be added to the
burlap as necessary to keep it flaming.
No doubt the producers of
Mississippi Burning scrounged
up Klan artifacts and replica Klan
artifacts for use as props.
A costumer had to fill an order for
Klan robes and pointy hats.
Nevertheless, I have never heard of
such a movie production company prosecuted
for displaying a burning cross.
Likewise
I have never heard of a movie production
company being prosecuted for its use
of Nazi flags, uniforms, and artifacts.
Movie industry costumers may have
made more Nazi uniforms than were
made in Germany during the Nazi era.
A
comment on the French laws against
Nazi artifacts and propaganda:
Numerous artifacts including flags,
Hitler
Youth daggers,
armbands,
and even copies of Mein
Kampf signed by Adolf Hitler
himself, were brought home by American
troops as souvenirs and spoils of
war. (And soon, perhaps paintings
and posters of Saddam Hussein and
elegant fixtures from his palaces,
maybe even a Republican Guard arm
patch or two.) In this context, the
items have a valid historical significance
and are symbolic of victory over this
regime, and not of this regime's "Triumph
of the Will". It is
not surprising that such war souvenirs
are offered for sale on Yahoo!
and eBay.
Perhaps the French court can cut some
slack for the heirs of those who liberated
France who sell the artifacts they
inherited. Furthermore, France
has allowed on her soil the filming
of movies based on World War II.
Such movies necessarily require the
use of Nazi artifacts and uniforms
or replicas of Nazi artifacts and
uniforms. I guess we cannot
sell copies of Saving
Private Ryan, Schindler's
List or any Indiana
Jones movie to French citizens
living within France because of all
of the Nazi artifacts and replica
Nazi artifacts filmed in these movies.
And forget documentaries and entertainment
movies that use clips from films produced
or sponsored by the Nazi
Propaganda Ministry. The
History Channel had better censor
itself where it broadcasts into French
territory, which includes a couple
of small islands, St. Pierre and Miquelon,
that are a FEW MILES south of the
Canadian province of Newfoundland.
To broadcast a documentary on Nazi
propaganda out of Newfoundland or
Nova Scotia could violate French law. |