The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a rule of civil procedure enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in two cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine holds that lower United States federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has enacted legislation that specifically authorized such relief.
An example of legislation that has been interpreted to this effect is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which authorizes federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus. Another explicit legislative exception to this doctrine was the "Palm Sunday Compromise," a statute passed by Congress to permit federal courts to review the decisions of Florida courts in the Terri Schiavo case.
The doctrine has been held to apply to any state court decisions that are judicial in nature. For example, a judge's decision not to hire an applicant for a job is not a "judicial" decision.
In 2005, the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries, Inc., 544 U.S. ___ (2005). The Court affirmed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was statutory, and not jurisdictional, holding that it applies only in cases "brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments."
See, D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); and
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
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THE ADA, ROOKER-FELDMAN, AND YOUNGER ABSTENTION
I. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
A. Description: A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final state court determinations or to decide claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court determination. This has been interpreted to mean that a federal court cannot decide a claim where granting the relief the plaintiff seeks would require the court to decide that a state court determination was wrong or render the state court determination effectively void.
B. When Raised: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been raised by defendants attempting to block consideration of ADA and other federal disability claims in many different contexts. The doctrine is raised when there is a state court decision that involves issues related to the plaintiff's federal claims. Courts have also applied the doctrine where there is an administrative adjudication, such as a bar examiners' decision, but generally the decision must have been approved or affirmed by a state court in order for the doctrine to apply (compareCampbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1996) with Kotz v. Florida, 33 F. Supp.2d 1019, 1026 (M.D. Fla. 1998)). The doctrine is not applicable when a state court has engaged in non-adjudicative or ministerial acts, such as creating new eligibility requirements for bar applicants. District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1983). The only exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is where a federal statute authorizes federal court review of final state court decisions. See, e.g., Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1993).
Following is a list of the some of the types of state court proceedings which defendants have used as a basis for raising the Rooker-Feldman doctrine:
commitment proceedings (to block ADA integration mandate claims)
termination of parental rights or custody proceedings (to block ADA claims)
zoning (to block Fair Housing Act claims)
guardianship (to block ADA or constitutional claims)
licensing determinations such as medical or bar admissions (to block ADA claims)
workers compensation or retirement board hearings (to block ADA employment claims)
C. Source: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arises out of two Supreme Court cases that interpreted a federal statute. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, provides that the Supreme Court may review decisions of the highest state courts. The Supreme Court interpreted this provision to bar lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). In District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983), the Court held that federal courts lack jurisdiction "over challenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional."
1. Is the plaintiff asking for review of a state court determination?
Frequently the issues considered by the state court are different, though related, to those that must be decided in hearing the plaintiff's federal claims.
Plaintiffs have successfully argued that ruling favorably on their federal claims would not require the federal court to overrule a state court determination because the state court did not decide the same issues.
For example, in many states, ADA integration mandate plaintiffs faced with the argument that they are precluded from raising their claims because of the existence of state court decisions involuntarily committing them can respond that the state commitment statute requires the court to consider only community services that are currently "available" rather than services that could be developed by the state or services that could be provided if reasonable accommodations were made.
Additionally, civil commitment statutes generally require determinations covering different periods of time than those required by the ADA. These statutes generally require a determination of whether the individual meets the commitment standard at the time of the hearing. Commitment decisions under such statutes do not operate as adjudications of whether the individual continues to be dangerous at any future point; no further court determination is generally required in order for the individual to be released. Rather, the individual must be released as soon as the facility determines that he no longer meets commitment standards. Thus, defendants cannot rely on a commitment decision to argue that a state court has already decided that the most integrated setting appropriate is an institution.
Similarly, a decision to deny admission to a bar applicant based on a test result may not involve consideration of whether reasonable accommodations in the testing process could have been provided to the applicant, as required by the ADA.
2. Are the plaintiff's federal claims "inextricably intertwined" with the state court determination?
According to most courts, Plaintiff's federal claims will be "inextricably intertwined" with the state court determination only when granting the relief the plaintiff seeks in federal court would require a determination that the state court determination was wrong or would effectively void the state court determination. See, e.g., Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999); Marks v. Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 886 n.11 (3d Cir. 1994).
Thus, the fact that the issues raised in both proceedings may be very closely related does not make the proceedings intertwined.
Additionally, the plaintiff's federal claims will not be "inextricably intertwined" if the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to raise these claims in the state court proceedings. See, e.g., Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, No. 99-1831, 2000 WL 526068, at *6 (4th Cir. May 2, 2000); Long v. Shorebank Devel. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1999);Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997) As discussed in the section concerning Younger abstention, plaintiffs frequently will not have an opportunity to raise their federal claims in state court proceedings. In fashioning their response to this argument, plaintiffs should look at the same considerations discussed below in the Younger abstention section concerning whether there was an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims in state court.
E. Caselist: Following is a list of cases in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was raised in an attempt to block disability claims.
Sheehan v. Marr, 207 F.3d 35, 39-41 (1st Cir. 2000): State court's affirmance of retirement board's adjudication that police lieutenant was totally and permanently incapacitated with regard to his job duties and must be involuntarily retired did not preclude the man's ADA claim alleging that his employer had failed to provide reasonable accommodations.
Walczak v. Massachusetts State Retirement Bd., 141 F.3d 1150 (Table), 1998 WL 8847, *1 (1st Cir. 1998): district court was barred from entertaining ADA claim because it would require the court to review the state court judgment concerning the denial of plaintiff's application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626-27 (11th Cir. 1997): Plaintiff's ADA claims against the state and board of bar examiners alleging that they discriminated against him based on a perceived disability were precluded based on the state court's confirmation of the bar examiners' recommendation to accept his application for admission.
Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1996): ADA claim challenging state court decision requiring bar applicant to submit additional medical documentation was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as the state court proceedings were judicial in nature. The fact that the decision merely required the submission of additional documentation was not significant; the state court denied the application for admission subject to renewal upon the submission of appropriate medical evidence.
Snodderly v. Kansas, 79 F. Supp.2d 1241, 1245-49 (D. Kan. 1999): ADA employment claim was not barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on parallel state court action that plaintiff was pursuing simultaneously. Contains good explication of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, its sources, and its distinction from issue and claim preclusion.
Kotz v. Florida, 33 F. Supp.2d 1019, 1026 (M.D. Fla. 1998): ADA claim against state and medical board challenging the board's decision to withhold approval of a medical license pending submission of additional information about her disability was not precluded under Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The board's decision was not a state court judgment.
Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp.2d 460, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1998): ADA integration mandate claim was not barred based on state court involuntary commitment decisions.
Bronstein v. Supreme Court of Colorado, 981 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Colo. 1997): ADA action challenging state court's denial of bar admission was precluded by Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Ware v. Wyoming Bd. of Law Examiners, 973 F.Supp. 1339, 1356 (D. Wyo. 1997): ADA claim challenging bar examiners' failure to provide reasonable accommodations in application process was not barred based on the board's denial of admission. Plaintiff here was not challenging a final adjudication on the merits of her application by the board or a state court.
Kaufman v. Civil Court of the City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 4566 (PKL), 1997 WL 431047, at * 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 1997): ADA claim challenging state court rule requiring litigants to appear personally to argue motions was not barred based on the state court's dismissal of plaintiff's actions. Plaintiff, a pro se litigant in state court, had filed two lawsuits that were dismissed due to plaintiff's failure to appear personally to argue in response to motions to dismiss. The ADA claim was not presented to the state court and, in any event, plaintiff's ADA claim was a general challenge to the validity of a rule rather than a challenge to an adjudication.
Baggett v. Baird, No. CIV.A.4:94CV0282-HLM, 1997 WL 151544 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 1997): Fair Housing Act claim brought by personal care home provider challenging state regulations requiring residents to be ambulatory was barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the provider had raised the FHA claims on numerous occasions during the course of enforcement litigation in state court. Resident plaintiffs' claims were not barred, however, as they were not parties to the state court litigation.
Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 623 (1998): ADA claim brought by criminally committed individual was barred by Rooker-Feldman doctrine based on commitment proceedings.
Johnson v. Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Kan. 1995): ADA claim challenging denial of bar admission was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. While plaintiff attempted to cast his ADA claim as a general challenge to policies and practices, such as denying admission to applicants with a history of chronic mental illness and refusing to consider certain accommodations, his claim was inextricably intertwined with the state court decision, and the federal court could not grant relief without invalidating the state court judgment.
II. Younger Abstention
A. Description: Due to comity concerns, a federal court should abstain from hearing federal claims where there is an ongoing state proceeding implicating an important state interest, deciding the federal claims will interfere with that proceeding, the state proceeding affords an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.
B. When Raised: Younger abstention is generally raised in similar circumstances to those in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is raised. For Younger abstention, there must be an ongoing proceeding in state court, where as with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, there must be a final state court decision. Frequently, defendants raise both doctrines when a series of proceedings are occurring in state court. In order for abstention to apply, state court proceedings must have been initiated "before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court." Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
There is an exception to the abstention doctrine providing that the Younger principles do not apply where a state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith, or where the challenged statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional provisions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it." Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977); see also Oxford House-Evergreen v. City of Plainfield, 769 F. Supp. 1329, 1337-40 (D.N.J. 1991) (abstention inapplicable where zoning board failed to consider applicability of Fair Housing Act despite court order to do so).
1. Is the state proceeding ongoing?
Defendants often claim that civil commitment proceedings are ongoing because of the periodic review hearings that are held. In most states, civil commitment statutes require the state court to make a determination about whether the individual meets the commitment standard at the time of the hearing, and require the individual to be discharged without any further court hearing as soon as the individual no longer meets that standard. Thus, ADA integration mandate plaintiffs have successfully argued that each commitment hearing is a separate proceeding. Defendants have also claimed that guardianship proceedings are ongoing because of the possibility that the appointments of guardians may need to be re-examined. Plaintiffs may respond that a proceeding does not become ongoing based on the mere possibility that the parties may return to court at some point in the future.
2. Would deciding the federal claims interfere with the state court proceedings?
Even if there is an ongoing state proceeding that would have afforded an adequate opportunity to raise plaintiff's federal claims, Younger abstention should not come into play unless deciding the federal claims would actually interfere with the state court proceedings. In many circumstances, strong arguments may be made that granting relief in the federal proceedings would not interfere with a state court judgment. For example, discharging a civilly committed individual who is appropriate for community-based services under the ADA would not interfere with a commitment order determining that the individual should be committed only because no "available" community placement already existed.
3. Do the state proceedings implicate an important state interest?
In the contexts in which Younger abstention is raised, it is generally difficult to make persuasive arguments that the state interests implicated are not important.
4. Do the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise plaintiff's federal claims?
Frequently the state proceedings will not afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.
In reality, state court judges considering the issues before them often will not be receptive to hearing federal claims. In theory, however, the federal claims may be within the state court's power to decide.
Plaintiffs should look at whether the state court proceedings in question afford the judge jurisdiction to decide the federal claims. The court's jurisdiction may be limited by statute or by caselaw. For example, in the context of termination of parental rights decisions, a number of state courts have decided that their jurisdiction is limited to consideration of the child welfare laws and that they have no jurisdiction to hear ADA claims. See, e.g., In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716 (Vt.1997); In re Anthony B., 1998 WL 285848 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998). In addition, regardless of whether there is reported caselaw, the state may have previously taken the position in similar state court proceedings that ADA claims could not be raised in those proceedings.
D. Caselist: Following is a list of cases in which the Younger abstention doctrine was raised in an attempt to block disability claims:
Doe v. Connecticut Dep't of Health Servs., 75 F.3d 81, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1996): Abstention was warranted where plaintiff brought ADA claims against state, department of health services, and medical licensing board challenging proceedings to revoke medical license.
Kotz v. Florida, 33 F. Supp.2d 1019, 1022-26 (M.D. Fla. 1998): Abstention warranted where plaintiff brought ADA claim against state and medical board challenging the board's decision to withhold approval of a medical license pending submission of additional information about her disability.
Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp.2d 460, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1998): Abstention was not warranted based on civil commitment proceedings where plaintiff state hospital residents brought ADA integration mandate claim.
Greist v. Norristown State Hosp., No. CIV. A. 96-CV-8495, 1997 WL 661097, at * 9-11 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 1997), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1224 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 623 (1998): Abstention was warranted where criminally committed individual brought ADA claim seeking discharge from state hospital.
Discovery House v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 970 F. Supp. 655, 658-60 (S.D. Ind. 1997): Abstention from hearing ADA and Section 504 claims of drug treatment center operator was warranted due to operator's pending appeal of zoning board decision that the center was not a permitted use.
Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp. 641, 658-60 (D.N.J. 1995): Abstention was warranted, based on condemnation proceedings, where health care facility operator brought Fair Housing Act and ADA claims challenging passage of an ordinance condemning of property on which construction of a treatment facility was planned. Abstention was not warranted for the claims of disabled individual plaintiffs, who were not parties to the condemnation proceedings.
Public Law: 100-352 (06/27/88)
OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
A bill to improve the administration of justice by providing greater discretion to the Supreme Court in selecting the cases it will review, and for other purposes.
STATUS: Floor Actions
06/27/88 Public Law 100-352
06/17/88 Measure presented to President
06/17/88 Measure enrolled in Senate
06/16/88 Measure enrolled in House
06/07/88 Measure passed House
06/07/88 Measure considered in House
06/07/88 Measure called up under motion to suspend rules and pass in House
05/26/88 Reported to House from the Committee on the Judiciary, H. Rept. 100-660
03/22/88 Referred to House Committee on the Judiciary
03/18/88 Measure passed Senate, amended
03/18/88 Measure considered in Senate
03/18/88 Call of calendar in Senate
03/16/88 Reported to Senate from the Committee on the Judiciary with amendment, S. Rept. 100-300
STATUS: Detailed Legislative Status
Apr 8, 87: Read twice and referred to the Committee on Judiciary.
Apr 28, 87:Referred to Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice.
Nov 18, 87:Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice. Approved for full committee consideration with an amendment favorably.
Dec 3, 87:Committee on Judiciary. Ordered to be reported with amendments favorably.
Mar 16, 88: Committee on Judiciary. Reported to Senate by Senator Byrd for Senator Biden with amendments. With written report No. 100-300.
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 586.
Mar 18, 88: Passed Senate with amendments by Voice Vote.
Mar 22, 88: Message on Senate action sent to the House.
Mar 22, 88: Referred to House Committee on The Judiciary.
Mar 24, 88:Referred to Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice.
Apr 28, 88:Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice Discharged.
Apr 28, 88:Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held.
May 3, 88:Ordered to be Reported.
May 26, 88:Reported to House by House Committee on The Judiciary. Report No: 100-660.
May 26, 88: Placed on Union Calendar No: 388.
Jun 7, 88: Called up by House Under Suspension of Rules.
Passed House by Voice Vote.
Jun 7, 88: Cleared for White House.
Jun 17, 88: Measure Signed in Senate.
Presented to President.
Jun 27, 88: Signed by President.
Became Public Law No: 100-352.
COMMITTEE(S) OF REFERRAL:
Ssc Courts and Administrative Practice
Hsc Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice
Sen Grassley -
SUMMARY AS OF:
(REVISED AS OF 03/18/88 -- Measure passed Senate, amended)
Repeals the provision of the judicial code authorizing any party (in a proceeding to which the United States is a party) to appeal directly to the Supreme Court from a Federal court order which declares an Act of Congress unconstitutional.
Repeals Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction to hear appeals from a Federal appellate court decision holding a State statute unconstitutional.
Repeals Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the highest court of a State (including Puerto Rico) which hold that: (1) a Federal treaty or statute is invalid; or (2) a State law is valid.
28 USC Sec. 125701/02/01
TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
PART IV - JURISDICTION AND VENUE
CHAPTER 81 - SUPREME COURT
Sec. 1257. State courts; certiorari
(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
(b) For the purposes of this section, the term ''highest court of a State'' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 929; Pub. L. 91-358, title I, Sec. 172(a)(1), July 29, 1970, 84 Stat. 590; Pub. L. 100-352, Sec. 3, June 27, 1988, 102 Stat. 662.)
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
Based on title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 344 (Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Sec. 236, 237, 36 Stat. 1156; Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, Sec. 2, 39 Stat. 726; Feb. 17, 1922, ch. 54, 42 Stat. 366; Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, Sec. 1, 43 Stat. 937; Jan. 31, 1928, ch. 14, Sec. 1, 45 Stat. 54).
Provisions of section 344 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., relating to procedure for review of decisions of State courts are incorporated in section 2103 of this title.Other provisions of such section 344 of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., are incorporated in section 2106 of this title.
The revised section applies in both civil and criminal cases.In Twitchell v.Philadelphia, 1868, 7 Wall. 321, 19 L.Ed. 223, it was expressly held that the provisions of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85, on which title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Sec. 344, is based, applied to criminal cases, and many other Supreme Court decisions impliedly involve the same holding inasmuch as the Court has taken jurisdiction of criminal cases on appeal from State courts.See, for example, Herndon v.Georgia, 1935, 55 S.Ct. 794, 295 U.S. 441, 79 L.Ed. 1530 and Ashcraft v.Tennessee, 1944, 64 S.Ct. 921, 322 U.S. 143, 88 L.Ed. 1192.
Provision, in section 344(b) of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed., for review and determination on certiorari ''with the same power and authority and with like effect as if brought up by appeal'' was omitted as unnecessary.The scope of review under this section is unrestricted.
Words ''and the power to review under this paragraph may be exercised as well where the Federal claim is sustained as where it is denied,'' in said section 344(b), were omitted as surplusage.
The last sentence in said section 344(b) relating to the right to relief under both subsections of said section 344, was omitted as unnecessary.
Changes were made in phraseology.
1988 - Pub. L. 100-352 struck out ''appeal;'' before ''certiorari'' in section catchline and amended text generally.
Prior to amendment, text read as follows: ''Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
''(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
''(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
''(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
''For the purposes of this section, the term 'highest court of a State' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.'' 1970 - Pub. L. 91-358 provided that for the purposes of this section, the term ''highest court of a State'' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 100-352 effective ninety days after June 27, 1988, except that such amendment not to apply to cases pending in Supreme Court on such effective date or affect right to review or manner of reviewing judgment or decree of court which was entered before such effective date, see section 7 of Pub. L. 100-352, set out as a note under section 1254 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1970 AMENDMENT
Section 199(a) of title I of Pub. L. 91-358 provided that: ''The effective date of this title (and the amendments made by this title) (enacting sections 1363, 1451, and 2113 of this title and amending this section, sections 292 and 1869 of this title, section 5102 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees, and section 260a of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare) shall be the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after the date of the enactment of this Act (July 29, 1970).''
SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in title 15 section 3207; title 16 section 2633.