Law on Judicial Conduct and Pro Se Treatment
|Please find below
a list of case laws concerning:
misconduct, violations of Constitution,
loss of jurisdiction, etc. They can
be used in state courts too. Remember,
federal law supersedes the state law
and each and every state law HAS to
defer to the federal law and ultimately
to the United States Constitution,
which is incorporated into every state's
constitution, hence the judge would
be violating the state constitution
2- Rights and expectation under the
law for the pro se litigant.
If there are other areas that you
might be interested in having case
laws, please let me know. The areas
of law I that have been dabbling in
are those that have impinged on my
quest to get back the custody of my
children as a result of fraud and
constitutional violations of the former
wife, her attorney and the judges
in the custody case. Therefore, I
have been involved in custody law
(Indiana) and federal laws, primarily
constitutional and those related to
fraud, void orders, jurisdiction,
tort, judicial immunity, federal removal,
and related matters.
Supreme Clause Article VI, Clause
2 of the Constitution (This Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; . . . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.)
When a judge acts intentionally
and knowingly to deprive a person
of his constitutional rights he
exercises no discretion or individual
judgment; he acts no longer as
a judge, but as a " minister"
of his own prejudices.
[386 U.S. 547,
A judge is liable
for injury caused by a ministerial
act; to have immunity the judge
must be performing a judicial
function. See, e. g., Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 ; 2 Harper
& James, The Law of Torts
of malice and the intention to
deprive a person of his civil
rights is wholly incompatible
with the judicial function.
|U.S. Supreme Court Reports, PIERSON
v. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
386 U.S. 547 PIERSON ET AL. v. RAY ET
When a judge
acts intentionally and knowingly to
deprive a person of his constitutional
rights he exercises no discretion
or individual judgment; he acts no
longer as a judge, but as a "
minister" of his own prejudices.
[386 U.S. 547, 568];
A judge is liable for injury caused
by a ministerial act; to have immunity
the judge must be performing a judicial
function. See, e. g., Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339 ; 2 Harper & James,
The Law of Torts 1642-1643 (1956).
The presence of malice and the intention
to deprive a person of his civil rights
is wholly incompatible with the judicial
|"a judge shall uphold the integrity
and independence of the judiciary
|"a judge should avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in
all his activities" and should
act so as to "promote public confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of
When the jurisdiction of a judge is
challenged, as has been maintained
for some time by the Respondent, it
is not for the judge to state that
he has jurisdiction. It is the adversarial
party, Petitioner in this case, who
has to prove that the Judge does indeed
have jurisdiction with clear and convincing
evidence. The Petitioner has not done
so, and indeed could not do so because
overwhelming evidence show that the
Judge has indeed lost personal and
subject matter jurisdiction in this
"Jurisdiction, although once
obtained, may be lost, and in such
case proceedings cannot be validly
continued beyond the point at which
jurisdiction ceases". Federal
Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283
U.S. 643, 75 L.Ed. 1324, 51 S.Ct.
For the purposes of review, it has
been said that clear violations of
laws on reaching the result, such
as acting without evidence when evidence
is required, or making a decision
contrary to all the evidence, are
just as much jurisdictional error
as is the failure to take proper steps
to acquire jurisdiction at the beginning
of the proceeding. Borgnis v. Falk
Co., 133 N.W. 209.
"No sanction can be imposed absent
proof of jurisdiction". Stanard
v. Olesen, 74 S.Ct. 768.
|"Once jurisdiction is challenged,
it must be proved." Hagans v. Levine,
415 U.S. 533, n. 3.
observed in this opinion, the diversity
statute must be strictly construed,
and the jurisdiction cannot be assumed
by a District Court nor conferred
by agreement of the parties, but it
is incumbent upon Plaintiff to allege
in CLEAR terms, the necessary facts
showing jurisdiction, which must be
proved by CONVINCING evidence."
Harris v. American Legion, ____ F.Supp.
"Mere fact that parties stipulated
to jurisdiction does not automatically
vest authority in district court to
adjudicate all issues presented, for
subject matter jurisdiction cannot
be assumed by the court, nor can it
be waived by parties." Bush v.
U.S. 703 F.2d 491 (1983); Jackson
v. Seaboard Coast Line, 678 F.2d 992
(1982), quoting F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12
"The authority which the statute
vests in the court to enforce the
limitations of its jurisdiction precludes
the idea that jurisdiction may be
maintained by mere averment or that
the party asserting jurisdiction may
be relieved of his burden by formal
procedure. If his allegations of
jurisdictional facts are challenged
by his adversary in any appropriate
manner, he must support them by competent
proof. And where they are not
so challenged the court may still
insist that the jurisdictional facts
be established or the case be dismissed,
and for that purpose the court may
demand that the party alleging jurisdiction
justify his allegations by a preponderance
of the evidence." McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 S.Ct.
Affidavits or arguments do not expand
the grounds of the jurisdictional
challenge motion. Josephson v. Superior
Court, 219 CA2nd 354 , 33 Cal. Rptr.
|"It has also been held that
jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown
and will not be presumed". Special
Indemn. Fund v. Prewitt, 205 F.2d 306.
|Without jurisdiction, the acts
or judgments of the court are void and
open to collateral attack. McLean v.
Jephson, 123 N.Y. 142, 25 N.E. 409.
|As can be seen, the court cannot
grant or assume jurisdiction. It must
be affirmatively pled by the party seeking
it, i.e. the Petitioner. If challenged,
and the party seeking it cannot overcome
the challenge, there is no jurisdiction,
and all orders, judgments, decisions,
etc. are void.
law which is applicable to all states,
the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
if a court is "without authority,
its judgments and orders are regarded
as nullities. They are not voidable,
but simply void; and form no bar to
a recovery sought, even prior to a
reversal in opposition to them. They
constitute no justification; and all
persons concerned in executing such
judgments or sentences, are considered,
in law, as trespassers."
|Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340,
26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).
When a judge acts as a trespasser
of the law, when a judge does not
follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter
jurisdiction and the judges orders
are void, of no legal force or effect.
The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated
a state officer acts under a state
law in a manner violative of the Federal
Constitution, he "comes into
conflict with the superior authority
of that Constitution, and he is in
that case stripped of his official
or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences
of his individual conduct. The
State has no power to impart to him
any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United
States." [Emphasis supplied
in original]. By law, a judge is a
|The judge then acts not as a judge,
but as a private individual (in his
The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that "No state
legislator or executive or judicial
officer can war against the Constitution
without violating his undertaking to
|Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
| Any judge who does not comply with
his oath to the Constitution of the
United States wars against that Constitution
and engages in acts in violation of
the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge
is engaged in acts of treason.
|If a judge does not fully comply
with the Constitution, then his orders
are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S.
200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction,
and he/she has engaged in an act or
acts of treason.
|Whenever a judge acts where he/she
does not have jurisdiction to act, the
judge is engaged in an act or acts of
treason. S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,
216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66
|L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404,
5 L.Ed 257 (1821).
The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Circuit
Court of Cook County is a criminal
enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768F.2d
1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985).
Since judges who do not report the
criminal activities of other judges
become principals in the criminal
activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 1, and
since no judges have reported the
criminal activity of the judges who
have been convicted, the other judges
are as guilty as the convicted judges.
When judges act when they do not have
jurisdiction to act, or they enforce
a void order (an order issued by a
judge without jurisdiction), they
become trespassers of the law,and
are engaged in treason (see below).
The Court in Yates v. Village
of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209
F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held
that "not every action by a judge
is in exercise of his judicial function.
... it is not a judicial function
for a judge to commit an intentional
tort even though the tort occurs in
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the Circuit Court of Cook
County is a criminal enterprise. U.S.
v. Murphy, 768F.2d 1518, 1531
(7th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Maloney 71 F.3d 645 (CA7 1995),
cert. Denied, 519 U.S. ___ (1996).
“Maloney was one of many dishonest
judges exposed and convicted through
‘Operation Greylord,’ a labyrinthine
federal investigation of judicial
corruption in Chicago. In United
States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645
(CA7 1995), cert. Denied, 519 U.S.
___ (1996); see generally J. Tuohy
& R. Warden, “Greylord Justice,
Chicago Style (1989). Maloney served
as a judge from 1977 until he retired
in 1990, and it appears he has the
dubious distinction of being the only
Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing
a murder case. (ftnt. omitted.) Before
he was appointed to the bench, Maloney
was a criminal defense attorney with
close ties to organized crime, who
often paid off judges in criminal
cases. App.54-66; 81F.3d 684 (CA7
1996) (Rovner J., dissenting) (‘[B]y
the time Maloney ascended to the bench
in 1997, he was well groomed in the
art of judicial corruption’). Once
a judge, Maloney exploited many of
the relationships and connections
he had developed while bribing judges
to solicit bribes for himself. For
example, Lucius Robinson, a bailiff
through whom Maloney had bribed judges
while in practice, and Robert McGee,
one of Maloney’s former associates,
both served as ‘bag men,’ or intermediaries,
between Maloney and lawyers looking
for a fix. Two such lawyers, Robert
J. Cooley and William A. Swano, were
key witnesses against Maloney at this
trial. Maloney, supra, at 650-652.”
The United States Supreme Court recently
acknowledged the judicial corruption
in Cook County, when it stated that
Judge "Maloney was one of many
dishonest judges exposed and convicted
through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine
federal investigation of judicial
corruption in Chicago". Bracey
v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117
S.Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997).
Going one step further, the court
in Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279 (C.A.6
(Ohio) 1998) (former husband's action,
seeking a declaration that the state
divorce decree was void as a violation
of due process, was not a core domestic
relations case to which the domestic-relations
exception applied). Catz did not seek
declaration of marital or parental
status, but instead presented a constitutional
claim in which it was incidental that
the underlying action involved a divorce.
Id. Fourteenth Amendment. The
domestic-relations exception has no
generally recognized application as
a limitation on federal question jurisdiction;
it applies only as a judicially implied
limitation on diversity jurisdiction.
U.S. v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (C.A.4
|Child Support, Garnishment,
Contempt, Enforcement, Arrest
That, the use
of garnishment is governed by the
Indiana statutes such as IC
24-4.5-5-104 and IC 24-4.5-5-105
[specifically paragraph 4 stating,
“(4) No court may make, execute,
or enforce an order or process in
violation of this section.”]
[similar one exist in other states'
codes] , and / or any other, and
/ or the federal statutes such as
15 USC 1673, and its companion
law,15 USC 1675 pertaining
to the very existence, or potential
existence of enforcement of any order
violating the maximum certain percentages
of actual disposable income-- rendering
the support and/or garnishment order
in violation of the law,--
(particularly see paragraph C therein).
statute (federal or Indiana) that
provides greater protection to the
These Indiana and federal statutes
guarantee protection (to the Respondent)
from having “imputed income” orders.
Furthermore, these statutes provide
(to the Respondent) protection of
his rights to be free from unlawful
child support or any kind of garnishment.
support is a civil matter and there
is no probable cause to seek
or issue body attachment, bench warrant,
or arrest in child support matters
because it is a civil matter. The
use of such instruments (body attachment,
bench warrants, arrests, etc) presumably
is a method to "streamline"
arresting people for child support
and circumventing the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution,
and is used as a debt-collecting tool
using unlawful arrests and imprisonment
to collect a debt or perceived debt.
The arrest of non-custodial parents
in which men make up significant majority
of the "arrestees", is "gender
biased discrimination" and a
"gender biased hate crime"
in that it violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A man, pursuant to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution of the
United States, cannot be arrested
in a civil matter as a woman is not.
There is no
escaping the fact that there is no
probable cause in a civil matter to
arrest or issue body attachment. "Probable
cause" to arrest requires a showing
that both a crime has been, or is
being committed, and that the person
sought to be arrested committed the
offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4. In the instant case, no probable
cause can exist, because the entire
matter has arisen out of a civil case.
Therefore, seeking of body attachment,
bench warrant, or arrest by the Petitioner
(and her attorney), and/or issuing
of the same by the court, in this
civil case would be against the law
and the Constitution.
v. Rylander ignorance of the
order or the inability to comply with
the [child support] order, or as in
this case, to pay, would be a complete
defense to any contempt sanction,
violation of a court order or violation
of litigant's rights.
Every U.S. Court of Appeals that has
addressed this issue, has held that
child support is a common, commercial
(and civil) debt, See, U.S.
v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 68-69
(1st Cir. 2001)(citations omitted)
and U.S. v. Parker,
108 F.3d 28, 31 (3rd Cir. 1997).
City of Portland, 73 F.3d
232 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals (citing cases from
the U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits)“by definition,
probable cause to arrest can only
exist in relation to criminal conduct;
civil disputes cannot give rise to
probable cause”; Paff
v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425,
435 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Fourth Amendment
prohibits law enforcement officers
from arresting citizens without probable
cause. See, Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), therefore,
no body attachment, bench warrant
or arrest order may be issued.
If a person is arrested on less
than probable cause, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized
that the aggrieved party has a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights.
Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald
457 U.S. 800, 818 (there can be no
objective reasonableness where officials
violate clearly established constitutional
rights such as--
Fourth Amendment (including Warrants
Clause), Fifth Amendment (Due Process
and Equal Protection), Ninth Amendment
(Rights to Privacy and Liberty), Fourteenth
Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection).
The Supreme Court ruled in Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344
(1986), that the mere fact that a
judge or magistrate issues an arrest
warrant does not automatically insulate
the officer from liability for an
unconstitutional arrest. "Only
where the warrant application
is so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief
in its existence unreasonable...will
the shield of immunity be lost".
Malley at 344-45.
can be ascertained, the body attachment
is a debt-collecting tool using unlawful
arrests and unlawful imprisonment
for debt to collect a debt. Hence,
it is illegal and unconstitutional,
hence, rendering the issuing authority
of such an order in violation of the
law and the Constitution, stripping
him of his jurisdiction, and, therefore,
his judicial immunity.
Furthermore, it would also render
the Petitioner (and her attorney)
liable to prosecution under federal
(and state) statutes.
SE STANDARD OF REVIEW
the Plaintiff is pro se, the Court
has a higher standard when faced with
a motion to dismiss, White v. Bloom,
621 F.2d 276 makes this point clear
and states: A court faced with a motion
to dismiss a pro se complaint must
read the complaint's allegations expansively,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21,
92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972), and take them as true for
purposes of deciding whether they
state a claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31
L. Ed. 2D 263 (1972).
se litigants' Court submissions are
to be construed liberally and held
to less stringent standards than submissions
of lawyers. If the court can reasonably
read the submissions, it should do
so despite failure to cite proper
legal authority, confusion of legal
theories, poor syntax and sentence
construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity
with rule requirements.
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106,
97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251
(1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d
80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d
652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State
Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir.
1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d
39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro
se petition cannot be held to same
standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys);
Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422,
429 (D.N.J. 1999).
courts provide pro se parties wide
latitude when construing their pleadings
and papers. When interpreting pro
se papers, the Court should use common
sense to determine what relief the
party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott,
953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992).
See also, United States v. Miller,
197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999)
(Court has special obligation to construe
pro se litigants' pleadings liberally);
Poling v. K.Hovnanian Enterprises,
99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).
has the right to submit pro se briefs
on appeal, even though they may be
in artfully drawn but the court can
reasonably read and understand them.
See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354
(5th Cir. 1998). Courts will go to
particular pains to protect pro se
litigants against consequences of
technical errors if injustice would
otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez,
88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
"the court is under a duty to
examine the complaint to determine
if the allegations provide for relief
on any possible theory." Bonner
v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526
F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716
(8th Cir. 1974)) [Plaintiff's bold
and italic print]. Thus, if this court
were to entertain any motion to dismiss
this court would have to apply the
standards of White v. Bloom. Furthermore,
if there is any possible theory that
would entitle the Plaintiff to relief,
even one that the Plaintiff hasn't
thought of, the court cannot dismiss