Case Law on Judicial Conduct
and Pro Se Treatment
Please find below a list of case laws concerning:
1- Judge's misconduct, violations of Constitution, loss of jurisdiction, etc.
They can be used in state courts too. Remember, federal law supersedes the state
law and each and every state law HAS to defer to the federal law and ultimately
to the United States Constitution, which is incorporated into every state's
constitution, hence the judge would be violating the state constitution too.
2- Rights and expectation under the law for the pro se litigant.
If there are other areas that you might be interested in having case laws,
please let me know. The areas of law I that have been dabbling in are those that
have impinged on my quest to get back the custody of my children as a result of
fraud and constitutional violations of the former wife, her attorney and the
judges in the custody case. Therefore, I have been involved in custody law
(Indiana) and federal laws, primarily constitutional and those related to fraud,
void orders, jurisdiction, tort, judicial immunity, federal removal, and related
Clause Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution (This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . .
. shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to
the Contrary notwithstanding.)
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he
acts no longer as a judge, but as a " minister" of his own prejudices.
[386 U.S. 547, 568]
A judge is liable for injury caused by a ministerial
act; to have immunity the judge must be performing a judicial function.
See, e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 ; 2 Harper & James, The Law
of Torts 1642-1643 (1956).
The presence of malice and the intention to deprive a
person of his civil rights is wholly incompatible with the judicial
U.S. Supreme Court Reports, PIERSON v. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
386 U.S. 547 PIERSON ET AL. v. RAY ET AL.
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts
no longer as a judge, but as a " minister" of his own prejudices. [386 U.S. 547,
A judge is liable for injury caused by a ministerial act; to have immunity the
judge must be performing a judicial function. See, e. g., Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 ; 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts 1642-1643 (1956). The presence of
malice and the intention to deprive a person of his civil rights is wholly
incompatible with the judicial function.
"a judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary
"a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities" and should act so as to "promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary
When the jurisdiction of a judge is challenged, as has been maintained for
some time by the Respondent, it is not for the judge to state that he has
jurisdiction. It is the adversarial party, Petitioner in this case, who has to
prove that the Judge does indeed have jurisdiction with clear and convincing
evidence. The Petitioner has not done so, and indeed could not do so because
overwhelming evidence show that the Judge has indeed lost personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in this instant case.
"Jurisdiction, although once obtained, may be lost, and in such case proceedings
cannot be validly continued beyond the point at which jurisdiction ceases".
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 75 L.Ed. 1324, 51 S.Ct.
For the purposes of review, it has been said that clear violations of laws on
reaching the result, such as acting without evidence when evidence is required,
or making a decision contrary to all the evidence, are just as much
jurisdictional error as is the failure to take proper steps to acquire
jurisdiction at the beginning of the proceeding. Borgnis v. Falk Co., 133 N.W.
"No sanction can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction". Stanard v. Olesen, 74
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proved." Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S.
533, n. 3.
"As previously observed in this opinion, the diversity statute must be
strictly construed, and the jurisdiction cannot be assumed by a District Court
nor conferred by agreement of the parties, but it is incumbent upon Plaintiff to
allege in CLEAR terms, the necessary facts showing jurisdiction, which must be
proved by CONVINCING evidence." Harris v. American Legion, ____ F.Supp. 633
"Mere fact that parties stipulated to jurisdiction does not automatically vest
authority in district court to adjudicate all issues presented, for subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be assumed by the court, nor can it be waived by
parties." Bush v. U.S. 703 F.2d 491 (1983); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line, 678
F.2d 992 (1982), quoting F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12 (h) (3).
"The authority which the statute vests in the court to enforce the limitations
of its jurisdiction precludes the idea that jurisdiction may be maintained by
mere averment or that the party asserting jurisdiction may be relieved of his
burden by formal procedure. If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are
challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by
competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still
insist that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed,
and for that purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction
justify his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence." McNutt v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 S.Ct. 1372 (1936).
Affidavits or arguments do not expand the grounds of the jurisdictional
challenge motion. Josephson v. Superior Court, 219 CA2nd 354 , 33 Cal. Rptr. 196
"It has also been held that jurisdiction must be affirmatively shown and will
not be presumed". Special Indemn. Fund v. Prewitt, 205 F.2d 306.
Without jurisdiction, the acts or judgments of the court are void and open to
collateral attack. McLean v. Jephson, 123 N.Y. 142, 25 N.E. 409.
As can be seen, the court cannot grant or assume jurisdiction. It must be
affirmatively pled by the party seeking it, i.e. the Petitioner. If challenged,
and the party seeking it cannot overcome the challenge, there is no
jurisdiction, and all orders, judgments, decisions, etc. are void.
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that if a court is "without authority, its judgments and orders
are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no
bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They
constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such
judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers."
Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).
When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the
law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void,
of no legal force or effect.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687
(1974) stated that "when a state officer acts under a state law in a
manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he "comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to
him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United
States." [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state
The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "No state legislator or executive or
judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his
undertaking to support it.".
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United
States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the
Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.
If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are
void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction,
and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge
is engaged in an act or acts of treason. S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101
S.Ct. 471, 66
L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County
is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985).
Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become
principals in the criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 1, and since no judges
have reported the criminal activity of the judges who have been convicted, the
other judges are as guilty as the convicted judges.
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a
void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become
trespassers of the law, and are engaged in treason (see below).
The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757
(N.D. Ill. 1962) held that "not every action by a judge is in exercise of his
judicial function. ... it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an
intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse."
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County
is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Maloney 71 F.3d 645 (CA7 1995), cert. Denied, 519
U.S. ___ (1996). “Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and
convicted through ‘Operation Greylord,’ a labyrinthine federal investigation of
judicial corruption in Chicago. In United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645
(CA7 1995), cert. Denied, 519 U.S. ___ (1996); see generally J. Tuohy & R.
Warden, “Greylord Justice, Chicago Style (1989). Maloney served as a judge from
1977 until he retired in 1990, and it appears he has the dubious distinction of
being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case. (ftnt.
omitted.) Before he was appointed to the bench, Maloney was a criminal defense
attorney with close ties to organized crime, who often paid off judges in
criminal cases. App.54-66; 81F.3d 684 (CA7 1996) (Rovner J., dissenting) (‘[B]y
the time Maloney ascended to the bench in 1997, he was well groomed in the art
of judicial corruption’). Once a judge, Maloney exploited many of the
relationships and connections he had developed while bribing judges to solicit
bribes for himself. For example, Lucius Robinson, a bailiff through whom Maloney
had bribed judges while in practice, and Robert McGee, one of Maloney’s former
associates, both served as ‘bag men,’ or intermediaries, between Maloney and
lawyers looking for a fix. Two such lawyers, Robert J. Cooley and William A.
Swano, were key witnesses against Maloney at this trial. Maloney, supra, at
The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in
Cook County, when it stated that Judge "Maloney was one of many dishonest judges
exposed and convicted through 'Operation Greylord', a labyrinthine federal
investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago". Bracey v. Gramley, 520
U.S. 899, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 1797 (1997).
Going one step further, the court in Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279 (C.A.6
(Ohio) 1998) (former husband's action, seeking a declaration that the state
divorce decree was void as a violation of due process, was not a core domestic
relations case to which the domestic-relations exception applied). Catz did not
seek declaration of marital or parental status, but instead presented a
constitutional claim in which it was incidental that the underlying action
involved a divorce. Id. Fourteenth Amendment. The domestic-relations exception
has no generally recognized application as a limitation on federal question
jurisdiction; it applies only as a judicially implied limitation on diversity
jurisdiction. U.S. v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (C.A.4 (Va.) 1997).
Child Support, Garnishment, Contempt, Enforcement, Arrest
That, the use of garnishment is
governed by the Indiana statutes such as IC 24-4.5-5-104 and IC
24-4.5-5-105 [specifically paragraph 4 stating, “(4) No court may
make, execute, or enforce an order or process in violation of this section.”]
[similar one exist in other states' codes] , and / or any other, and / or
the federal statutes such as 15 USC 1673, and its companion law,15
USC 1675 pertaining to the very existence, or potential existence of
enforcement of any order violating the maximum certain percentages of actual
disposable income-- rendering the support and/or garnishment order in
violation of the law,-- (particularly see paragraph C therein). Whichever
statute (federal or Indiana) that provides greater protection to the Respondent,
These Indiana and federal statutes guarantee protection (to the Respondent) from
having “imputed income” orders.
Furthermore, these statutes provide (to the Respondent) protection of his rights
to be free from unlawful child support or any kind of garnishment.
That, child support is a civil
matter and there is no probable cause to seek or issue body attachment,
bench warrant, or arrest in child support matters because it is a civil
matter. The use of such instruments (body attachment, bench warrants, arrests,
etc) presumably is a method to "streamline" arresting people for child support
and circumventing the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and is used as a debt-collecting tool using unlawful arrests and imprisonment to
collect a debt or perceived debt.
The arrest of non-custodial parents in which men make up significant majority of
the "arrestees", is "gender profiling", "gender biased discrimination" and a
"gender biased hate crime" in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
A man, pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution of the United
States, cannot be arrested in a civil matter as a woman is not.
There is no escaping the fact that there is no probable cause in a civil
matter to arrest or issue body attachment. "Probable cause" to arrest requires a
showing that both a crime has been, or is being committed, and that the person
sought to be arrested committed the offense. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend.
4. In the instant case, no probable cause can exist, because the entire matter
has arisen out of a civil case.
Therefore, seeking of body attachment, bench warrant, or arrest by the
Petitioner (and her attorney), and/or issuing of the same by the court, in this
civil case would be against the law and the Constitution.
Under U.S. v. Rylander ignorance of the order or the inability
to comply with the [child support] order, or as in this case, to pay, would be a
complete defense to any contempt sanction, violation of a court order or
violation of litigant's rights.
Every U.S. Court of Appeals that has addressed this issue, has held that child
support is a common, commercial (and civil) debt, See, U.S. v. Lewko,
269 F.3d 64, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2001)(citations omitted) and U.S. v. Parker,
108 F.3d 28, 31 (3rd Cir. 1997).
Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232 (9th Cir. 1995), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (citing cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits)“by definition, probable cause to arrest
can only exist in relation to criminal conduct; civil disputes cannot give
rise to probable cause”; Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204
F.3d 425, 435 (3rd Cir. 2000) (Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement
officers from arresting citizens without probable cause. See, Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), therefore, no body attachment, bench
warrant or arrest order may be issued.
If a person is arrested on less than probable cause, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that the aggrieved party has a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (1967).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 818 (there can be no objective
reasonableness where officials violate clearly established constitutional rights
(a) United States Constitution, Fourth
Amendment (including Warrants Clause), Fifth Amendment (Due Process and Equal
Protection), Ninth Amendment (Rights to Privacy and Liberty), Fourteenth
Amendment (Due Process and Equal Protection).
The Supreme Court ruled in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344
(1986), that the mere fact that a judge or magistrate issues an arrest warrant
does not automatically insulate the officer from liability for an
unconstitutional arrest. "Only where the warrant application is so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable...will the shield of immunity be lost". Malley at
As can be ascertained, the body attachment is a debt-collecting tool using
unlawful arrests and unlawful imprisonment for debt to collect a debt. Hence, it
is illegal and unconstitutional, hence, rendering the issuing authority of such
an order in violation of the law and the Constitution, stripping him of his
jurisdiction, and, therefore, his judicial immunity.
Furthermore, it would also render the Petitioner (and her attorney) liable to
prosecution under federal (and state) statutes.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1- Because the Plaintiff is pro se, the Court
has a higher standard when faced with a motion to dismiss, White v. Bloom, 621
F.2d 276 makes this point clear and states: A court faced with a motion to
dismiss a pro se complaint must read the complaint's allegations expansively,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652
(1972), and take them as true for purposes of deciding whether they state a
claim. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2D 263
2- Pro se litigants' Court
submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards
than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the submissions,
it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of
legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's
unfamiliarity with rule requirements.
Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251
(1976)(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80
(1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972);
McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding pro se petition cannot be
held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58
F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999).
3- The courts provide pro se parties
wide latitude when construing their pleadings and papers. When interpreting pro
se papers, the Court should use common sense to determine what relief the party
desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582 (11th Cir. 1992). See also,
United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Court has special
obligation to construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally); Poling v.
K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000).
3- Defendant has the right to submit
pro se briefs on appeal, even though they may be in artfully drawn but the court
can reasonably read and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th
Cir. 1998). Courts will go to particular pains to protect pro se litigants
against consequences of technical errors if injustice would otherwise result.
U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
4- Moreover, "the court is under a
duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief
on any possible theory." Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331,
1334 (8th Cir. 1975) (quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir.
1974)) [Plaintiff's bold and italic print]. Thus, if this court were to
entertain any motion to dismiss this court would have to apply the standards of
White v. Bloom. Furthermore, if there is any possible theory that would entitle
the Plaintiff to relief, even one that the Plaintiff hasn't thought of, the
court cannot dismiss this case.
JUDGE'S OATH IN MASSACHUSETTS
TITLE 28--JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART I--ORGANIZATION OF
CHAPTER 21--GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES
Sec. 453. Oaths of justices and judges
Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the following oath or
affirmation before performing the duties of his office:
``I, ___ ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and
that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties
incumbent upon me as ___ under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
So help me God.''
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall
hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive
for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office.
Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a
party;--to controversies between two or more states;--between a state and
citizens of another state;--between citizens of different states;--between
citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and
between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.