Santosky v Kramer
455 US 745 (1982)
The fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child is protected
by the 14th Amendment, and does not
evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to
the State. A parental
rights termination proceeding interferes
with that fundamental liberty interest.
When the State moves to destroy weakened
familial bonds, it must provide the
parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
Lassiter v Department of Social Services
452 US 18 (1981)
The Court's decisions have by now
made plain that a parent's desire
for and right to "the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his
or her children" is an important
interest that "undeniably warrants
deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection." A parent's
interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is, therefore,
a commanding one.
Quilloin v Walcott
434 US 246 (1978)
We have little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended "if
a State were to attempt to force the
breakup of a natural family, over
the objections of the parents and
their children, without some showing
of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in
the children's best interest."
Whatever might be required in other
situations, we cannot say that the
State was required in this situation
to find anything more than that the
adoption, and denial of legitimation,
were in the "best interests of
the child."
Smith v Organization of Foster Care
Families
431 US 816 (1977)
In this action, individual foster
parents and a foster parents organization,
sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against New York State and
New York City officials, alleging
that the statutory and regulatory
procedures for removal of foster children
from foster homes violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the 14th Amendment. The ruling
contains an analysis of the rights
of natural parents as balanced against
the rights of foster parents, as well
as a comprehensive discussion of foster
care conditions.
Moore v East Cleveland
431 US 494 (1977)
The Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A host of cases, tracing
their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters
have consistently acknowledged a "private
realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." When the government
intrudes on choices concerning family
living arrangements, the Court must
examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced.
Cleveland Board of Education v La
Fleur
414 US 632 (1974)
The Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is a right "to
be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget
a
child."
Stanley v Illinois
405 US 645 (1972)
The private interest here, that of
a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and protection. The integrity of the
family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause
of the 14th Amendment, and the 9th
Amendment.
Wisconsin v Yoder
406 US 205 (1972)
In this case involving the rights
of Amish parents to provide for private
schooling of their children, the Court
held: "The history and culture
of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern
for the nurture and upbringing of
their children. This primary role
of the parents in the upbringing of
their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition."
Loving v Virginia
388 US 1 (1967)
In this case involving interracial
marriage, the Court reaffirmed the
principles set forth in Pierce and
Meyers, finding that marriage is one
of the basic civil rights of man,
fundamental to our very existence
and survival. "The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom
of choice
to marry not be restricted by invidious
racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry,
or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State."
Griswold v Connecticut
381 US 479 (1965)
The 4th and 5th Amendments were described
as protection against all governmental
invasions "of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of
life." The Court referred to
the 4th Amendment as creating a "right
to privacy, no less important than
any other right carefully and
particularly reserved to the people."
Reaffirming the principles set forth
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters and
Meyers v Nebraska.
Prince v Massachusetts
321 US 158 (1944)
It is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition
of this that these decisions have
respected the
private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.
Skinner v Oklahoma
316 US 535 (1942)
"We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race."
Pierce v Society of Sisters
268 US 510 (1925)
The liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education
of children was abridged by a proposed
statute to compell public education.
"The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general
power of the state to
standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations."
Meyer v Nebraska
262 US 390 (1923)
"No state ... shall deprive any
person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
"While this court has not attempted
to define with exactness the liberty
thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely
stated. Without doubt, it denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the
individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."
The "liberty interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control
of their children is perhaps the oldest
of the fundamental liberty interests"
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Troxel v.
Granville, 527 U.S. 1069 (1999). Moreover,
the companionship, care, custody,
and management of a parent over his
or her child is an interest far more
precious than any property right.
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533,
(1952). As such, the parent-child
relationship is an important interest
that undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing
interest, protection. Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services, 452
U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
The law has long recognized and respected
the rights and duties of parents in
the raising of children. The Supreme
Court has been consistent in recognizing
the importance of respecting Parents
authority in the raising of their
children. Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 639 (1968). Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has
stated, "It is cardinal with
us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first with the
parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder."
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944).
A corollary to this fundamental principle
is that parents have broad discretion
in the disciplining of their children
and are allowed to use corporal punishment.
Under California state law, a parent
has the right to reasonably discipline
a child by physical punishment and
may administer reasonable punishment
without being liable for battery.
People v. Whitehurst, 9 Cal.App.4th
1045, 1050 (1992). In order to be
considered disciplinary the punishment
must be necessary (i.e. there must
be behavior by the child deserving
punishment), and the punishment must
be reasonable (i.e not excessive).
Id. It is important to remember that
the reasonableness of the punishment
will be judged by a third party and
it does not matter if the parent believes
the punishment was reasonable.
CRAWFORD v. WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT RULES 9-0
ON MARCH 8, 2004, SUPREME COURT RULES
THAT HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IS NOT
ADMISSIBLE. PARENTS HAVE THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO CONFRONT THEIR ACCUSER UNDER
THE 6TH AMENDMENT. COMPLY WITH THE
6TH AMENDMENT IN CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"a) The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child is protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, and does
not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. A parental rights termination
proceeding interferes with that fundamental
liberty interest. When the State moves
to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally
fair procedures. Pp. 752-754."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Before a State may sever completely
and irrevocably the rights of parents
in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its
allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence. A "clear
and convincing evidence" standard
adequately conveys to the fact finder
the level of subjective certainty
about his factual conclusions necessary
to satisfy due process."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment demands more
than this. Before a State may sever
the rights of parents in [455 U.S.
745, 748] their natural child, due
process requires that the State support
its allegations by at least clear
and convincing evidence."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"In Lassiter, it was "not
disputed that state intervention to
terminate the relationship between
[a parent] and [the] child must be
accomplished by procedures meeting
the requisites of the Due Process
Clause." Id., at 37 (first dissenting
opinion); see id., at 24-32 (opinion
of the Court); id., at 59-60 (STEVENS,
J., dissenting). See also Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13 (1981). The
absence of dispute reflected this
Court's historical recognition that
freedom of personal choice in matters
of family life is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
255 (1978); Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Cleveland Board of Education
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 -640
(1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 -652 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534 -535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody,
and management of their child does
not evaporate simply because they
have not been model parents or have
lost temporary custody of their child
to the State. Even when blood relationships
are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable
destruction of their family life.
If anything, persons faced with forced
dissolution of their parental rights
have a more critical need for procedural
protections than do those resisting
state intervention into ongoing family
affairs. When the State moves to [455
U.S. 745, 754] destroy weakened familial
bonds, it must provide the parents
with fundamentally fair procedures."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Lassiter declared it "plain beyond
the need for multiple citation"
that a natural parent's "desire
for and right to `the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his
or her children'" is an interest
far more precious than any property
[455 U.S. 745, 759] right. 452 U.S.,
at 27 , quoting Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S., at 651 . "When the
State initiates a parental rights
termination proceeding, it seeks not
merely to infringe that fundamental
liberty interest, but to end it. "If
the State prevails, it will have worked
a unique kind of deprivationà A parent's
interest in the accuracy and justice
of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is, therefore,
a commanding one." 452 U.S.,
at 27.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"At such a proceeding, numerous
factors combine to magnify the risk
of erroneous fact finding. Permanent
neglect proceedings employ imprecise
substantive standards that leave determinations
unusually open to the subjective values
of the judge. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S., at 835.
Raising the standard of proof would
have both practical and symbolic consequences.
Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.,
at 426 . The Court has long considered
the heightened standard of proof used
in criminal prosecutions to be "a
prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual
error." In re Winship, 397 U.S.,
at 363 . An elevated standard of proof
in a parental rights termination proceeding
would alleviate "the possible
risk that a factfinder might decide
to [deprive] an individual based solely
on a few isolated instances of unusual
conduct [or] . . . idiosyncratic behavior."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 427
. "Increasing the burden of proof
is one way to impress the fact finder
with the importance [455 U.S. 745,
765] of the decision and thereby perhaps
to reduce the chances that inappropriate
terminations will be ordered. Ibid.
The court's theory assumes that termination
of the natural parents' rights invariably
will benefit the child. Yet we have
noted above that the parents and the
child share an interest in avoiding
erroneous termination. Even accepting
the court's assumption, we cannot
agree with its conclusion that a preponderance
standard fairly distributes the risk
of error between parent and child.
Use of that standard reflects the
judgment that society is nearly neutral
between erroneous termination of parental
rights and erroneous failure to terminate
those rights. Cf. In re Winship, 397
U.S., at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring).
For the child, the likely consequence
of an erroneous failure to terminate
is preservation of [455 U.S. 745,
766] an uneasy status quo. For the
natural parents, however, the consequence
of an erroneous termination is the
unnecessary destruction of their natural
family. A standard that allocates
the risk of error nearly equally between
those two outcomes does not reflect
properly their relative severity.
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
Two state interests are at stake in
parental rights termination proceedings
- a parens patriae interest in preserving
and promoting the welfare of the child
and a fiscal and administrative interest
in reducing the cost and burden of
such proceedings. A standard of proof
more strict than preponderance of
the evidence is consistent with both
interests."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"while there is still reason
to believe that positive, nurturing
parent-child relationships exist,
the parens patriae interest favors
preservation, not [455 U.S. 745, 767]
severance, of natural familial bonds.
17 384-b.1.(a)(ii). "[T]he State
registers no gain towards its declared
goals when it separates children from
the custody of fit parents."
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S., at
652."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The logical conclusion of this
balancing process is that the "fair
preponderance of the evidence"
standard prescribed by Fam. Ct. Act
622 violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
noted in Addington: "The individual
should not be asked to share equally
with society the risk of error when
the possible injury to the individual
is significantly greater than any
possible harm to the state."
441 U.S., at 427. Thus, at a parental
rights termination proceeding, a near-equal
allocation of risk between the parents
and the State is constitutionally
intolerable."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The next question, then, is
whether a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" or a "clear and convincing"
standard is constitutionally mandated.
In Addington, the Court concluded
that application of a reasonable-doubt
standard is inappropriate in civil
commitment proceedings for two reasons
- because of our hesitation to apply
that unique standard "too broadly
or casually in non-criminal cases,"
id., at 428, and because the psychiatric
evidence ordinarily adduced at commitment
proceedings is [455 U.S. 745, 769]
rarely susceptible to proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id., at 429-430,
432-433. To be sure, as has been noted
above, in the Indian Child Welfare
Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, 102(f),
92 Stat. 3072, 25 U.S.C. 1912(f) (1976
ed., Supp. IV), Congress requires
"evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt" for termination of Indian
parental rights, reasoning that "the
removal of a child from the parents
is a penalty as great [as], if not
greater, than a criminal penaltyà"
H. R. Rep. No. 95-1386, p. 22 (1978)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"two federal courts have addressed
the issue. Each has held that allegations
supporting parental rights termination
must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Sims v. State Dept. of Public
Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179, 1194 (SD
Tex. 1977), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415
(1979); Alsager v. District Court
of [455 U.S. 745, 751] Polk County,
406 F. Supp. 10, 25 (SD Iowa 1975),
aff'd on other grounds, 545 F.2d 1137
(CA8 1976)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"the standard of proof is a crucial
component of legal process, the primary
function of which is `to minimize
the risk of [455 U.S. 745, 758] erroneous
decisions.'" Post, at 785, quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,
442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979). àonly the standard
of proof "instruct[s] the fact
finder concerning the degree of confidence
our society thinks he should have
in the correctness of factual conclusions"
he draws from that information. In
re Winship, 397 U.S., at 370 (Harlan,
J., concurring). The statutory provision
of right to counsel and multiple hearings
before termination cannot suffice
to protect a natural parent's fundamental
liberty interests if the State is
willing to tolerate undue uncertainty
in the determination of the dispositive
facts."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"The Family Court Judge in the
present case expressly refused to
terminate petitioners' parental rights
on a "non-statutory, no-fault
basis." App. 22-29. Nor is it
clear that the State constitutionally
could terminate a parent's rights
without showing parental unfitness.
See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978). "We have little
doubt that the Due Process Clause
would be offended `[i]f a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children's
best interest,'" quoting Smith
v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (1977)."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"Any parens patriae interest
in terminating the natural parents'
rights arises only at the dispositional
phase, after the parents have been
found unfit."
SANTOSKY v. KRAMER, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
"à the interest of parents in
their relationship with their children
is sufficiently fundamental to come
within the finite class of liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, supra, at 862-863."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. Finding: "... the
Federal Constitution permits a State
to interfere with this right (infringing
on parents' fundamental right to rear
their children) only to prevent harm
or potential harm to the child...".137
Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d 21, affirmed."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling
interest in second-guessing a fit
parent's decision..."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice O'Connor,
joined by The Chief Justice, Justice
Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, concluded
that º26.10.160(3), as applied to
Granville and her family, violates
her due process right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and
control of her daughters. Pp. 5ù17."
"(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause has a substantive
component that "provides heightened
protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and
liberty interests," Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720,
including parents' fundamental right
to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children,
see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651. Pp. 5ù8." "(b)"..
broad statute effectively permits
a court to disregard and overturn
any decision by a fit custodial parentà
based solely on the judge's determination
of the child's best interest. A parent's
estimation of the child's best interest
is accorded no deference." (Arbitrary
Classification at work)
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "A combination
of several factors compels the conclusion
that º26.10.160(3)àexceeded the bounds
of the Due Process Clauseà no court
has found, that Granville was an unfit
parent. There is a presumption that
fit parents act in their children's
best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442
U.S. 584, 602; there is normally no
reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family
to further question fit parents' ability
to make the best decisions regarding
their children, see, e.g., Reno v.
Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000), 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "The ... Court
intervened, but that when it did so,
it gave no special weight to à determination
of HER daughters' best interests."
"àit placed à the burden of disproving
that visitation would be in her daughters'
best interest and thus failed to provide
any protection for her fundamental
right." "These factors,
when considered with the ... Court's
slender findings, show that this case
involves nothing more than a simple
disagreement between the court and
Granville concerning her children's
best interests, and that the visitation
order was an unconstitutional infringement
on Granville' (the Parent's) right
to make decisions regarding the rearing
of her children. Pp. 8ù 14."
TROXEL V. GRANVILLE (99-138) 530 U.S.
57 (2000) 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P.2d
21, affirmed. "Justice Thomas
agreed that this (US Supreme) Court's
recognition of a fundamental right
of parents to direct their children's
upbringing resolves this case, but
concluded that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard of review
to apply to infringements of fundamental
rights. Here, the State lacks a compelling
interest in second-guessing a fit
parent's decisionà"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
463 U.S. 248, "Where an à father
demonstrates a full commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood
by "com[ing] forward to participate
in the rearing of his child, à his
interest in personal contact with
his child acquires substantial protection
under the Due Process Clause."
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979),
"à sex-based distinction in ...
between à mothers and à fathers violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it bears
no substantial relation to any important
state interest. Pp. 388-394. [441
U.S. 380, 381]. Gender-based distinctions
"must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives"
in order to withstand judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). See also Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971). Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978), "recognized
the due process right of natural fathers
to maintain a parental relationship
with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit as parents."
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , "statutory
"classifications `must be reasonable,
not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.' Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)." Judical decisions on
the basis of gender are therefore
arbitrary and UnConstitutional.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246. "In Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
this Court held that the State of
Illinois was barred, as a matter of
both due process and equal protection,
from taking custody of the children
of a à father, absent a hearing and
a particularized [434 U.S. 246, 248]
finding that the father was an unfit
parent. The Court concluded, on the
one hand, that a father's interest
in the "companionship, care,
custody, and management" of his
children is "cognizable and substantial,"
id., at 651-652, and, on the other
hand, that the State's interest in
caring for the children is "de
minimis" if the father is in
fact a fit parent, id., at 657-658."
De Minimus defined: Trifling or insignificant
matters, with which a court will not
concern itself. The full expression
is de minimis non curat lex. This
is a Latin phrase which means "the
law does not care about very small
matters". It can be used to describe
a component part of a wider transaction,
where it is in itself insignificant
or immaterial to the transaction as
a whole, and will have no legal relevance
or bearing on the end result.
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246, "à unless
and until the child is legitimated,
the mother is the only recognized
parent and is given exclusive authority
to exercise all parental prerogatives,
74-203."
QUILLOIN v. WALCOTT, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), 434 U.S. 246, "We have
recognized on numerous occasions that
the relationship between parent and
child is constitutionally protected.
See, e. g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 231-233 (1972); Stanley
v. Illinois, supra; Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 -401 (1923). "It
is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
And it is now firmly established that
"freedom of personal choice in
matters of . . . family life is one
of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639 -640 (1974). We have little doubt
that the Due Process Clause would
be offended "[i]f a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of
a natural family, over the objections
of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do
so was thought to be in the children's
best interest." Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
862 -863 (1977).
MEYER v. STATE OF NEBRASKA, 262 U.S.
390 (1923), 'No state ... shall deprive
any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.' While
this court has not attempted to define
with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed,
the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have
been definitely stated. Without doubt,
it denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations
of life, to acquire useful knowledge,
to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men." Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Butchers' Union
Co. v. Crescent City Co ., 111 U.S.
746 , 4 Sup. Ct. 652; Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 , 6 Sup. Ct. 1064; Minnesota
v. Bar er, 136 U.S. 313 , 10 Sup.
Ct. 862; Allegeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578 , 17 Sup. Ct. 427; Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 , 25 Sup.
Ct. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; Twining
v. New Jersey 211 U.S. 78 , 29 Sup.
Ct. 14; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.
v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 , 31 Sup.
Ct. 259; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D,
545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Adams v.
Tanner, 224 U.S. 590 , 37 Sup. Ct.
662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas.
1917D, 973; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 , 38 Sup. Ct.
337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Truax v.
Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , 42 Sup. Ct.
124; Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(April 9, 1923), 261 U.S. 525 , 43
Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. --; Wyeth
v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200
Mass. 474, 86 N. E. 925, 128 Am. St.
Rep. 439, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 147.
The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered [262
U.S. 390, 400] with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest,
by legislative action which is arbitrary
or without reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency
of the state to effect. Determination
by the Legislature of what constitutes
proper exercise of police power is
not final or conclusive but is subject
to supervision by the courts. Lawton
v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 , 14
S. Sup. Ct. 499."
Equal Protection Case Law CALIFANO
v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977),
"To withstand constitutional
challenge,à classifications by gender
must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially
related to [430 U.S. 199, 211] the
achievement of those objectives."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Such classifications, however,
have frequently been revealed on analysis
to rest only upon "old notions"
and "archaic and overbroad"
generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S., at 14 ; Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S., at 508 ; cf. Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 512 -513 (1976),
and so have been found to offend the
prohibitions against denial of equal
protection of the law. Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Stanton
v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren,
supra. See also Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975)."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The concept of equal justice
under law requires the State to govern
impartially. New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
587 (1979). The sovereign may not
draw distinctions between individuals
based solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 76 (1971). 24 Specifically, [463
U.S. 248, 266] it may not subject
men and women to disparate treatment
when there is no substantial relation
between the disparity and an important
State purpose. Ibid.; Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
Justice Stewart correctly observed:
"Even if it be assumed that each
married parent after divorce has some
substantive due process right to maintain
his or her parental relationship,
cf. Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862 -863 (opinion
concurring in judgment), it by no
means follows that each unwed parent
has any such right. Parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent
and child. They require relationships
more enduring." 441 U.S., at
397 (emphasis added). In a similar
vein, the other three dissenters in
Caban were prepared to "assume
that, if and when one develops, the
relationship between a father and
his natural child is entitled to protection
against arbitrary state action as
a matter of due process." Caban
v. Mohammed, supra, at 414 (emphasis
added). [463 U.S. 248, 261]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. When that Clause
is invoked in a novel context, it
is our practice to begin the inquiry
with a determination of the precise
nature of the private interest that
is threatened by the State. We therefore
first consider the nature of the interest
in liberty for which appellant claims
constitutional protection and then
turn to a discussion of the adequacy
of the procedure that New York has
provided for its protection."
"The intangible fibers that connect
parent and child have infinite variety.
They are woven throughout the fabric
of our society, providing it with
strength, beauty, and flexibility.
It is self-evident that they are sufficiently
vital to merit constitutional protection
in appropriate cases. In deciding
whether this is such a case, however,
we must consider the broad framework
that has traditionally been used to
resolve the legal problems arising
from the parent-child relationship"
"When an unwed father demonstrates
a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood by "com[ing] forward
to participate in the rearing of his
child," Caban, 441 U.S., at 392
, his interest in personal contact
with his child acquires substantial
protection under the Due Process Clause.
At that point it may be said that
he "act[s] as a father toward
his children." Id., at 389, n.
7. But the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection. The actions of judges
neither create nor sever genetic bonds.
"[T]he importance of the familial
relationship, to the individuals involved
and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive
from the intimacy of daily association,
and from the role it plays in `promot[ing]
a way of life' through the instruction
of children . . . as well as from
the fact of blood relationship."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 844 (1977) (quoting Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 -233 (1972)).
17 [463 U.S. 248, 262]"
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),"..
the Federal Constitution supersedes
state law and provides even greater
protection for certain formal family
relationships. In those cases, as
in the state cases, the Court has
emphasized the paramount interest
in the welfare of children and has
noted that the rights of the parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities
they have assumed. Thus, the "liberty"
of parents to control the education
of their children that was vindicated
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), was described
as a "right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare
[the child] for additional obligations."
Id., at 535. The linkage between parental
duty and parental right was stressed
again in Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), when the
Court declared it acardinal principle
"that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside [463 U.S. 248,
258] first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation
for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." Ibid. In
these cases the Court has found that
the relationship of love and duty
in a recognized family unit is an
interest in liberty entitled to constitutional
protection. See also Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(plurality opinion). "[S]tate
intervention to terminate [such a]
relationship àmust be accomplished
by procedures meeting the requisites
of the Due Process Clause." Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
There are also a few cases in which
this Court has considered the extent
to which the Constitution affords
protection to the relationship between
natural parents and children born
out of wedlock. In some we have been
concerned with the rights of the children,
see, e. g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972). In this case, however,
it is a parent who claims that the
State has improperly deprived him
of a protected interest in liberty.
This Court has examined the extent
to which a natural father's biological
relationship with his child receives
protection under the Due Process Clause
in precisely three cases: Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979), "The significance
of the biological connection is that
it offers the natural father an opportunity
that no other male possesses to develop
a relationship with his offspring.
If he grasps that opportunity and
accepts some measure of responsibility
for the child's future, he may enjoy
the blessings of the parent-child
relationship and make uniquely valuable
contributions to the child's development.
If he fails to do so, the Federal
Constitution will not automatically
compel a State to listen to his opinion
of where the child's best interests
lie."
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"The Equal Protection Claim."
The concept of equal justice under
law requires the State to govern impartially.
New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
The sovereign may not draw distinctions
between individuals based solely on
differences that are irrelevant to
a legitimate governmental objective.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
24 Specifically, [463 U.S. 248, 266]
it may not subject men and women to
disparate treatment when there is
no substantial relation between the
disparity and an important state purpose.
Ibid.; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 -199 (1976).
LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983),
"In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380 (1979), the Court held that it
violated the Equal Protection Clause
to grant the mother a veto [over the
adoption of a 4-year-old girl and
a 6-year-old boy,] but not to grant
a veto to their father, who had admitted
paternity and had participated in
the rearing of the children. The Court
made it clear, however, that if the
father had not "come forward
to participate in the rearing of his
child, nothing in the Equal Protection
Clause [would] preclud[e] the State
from withholding from him the privilege
of vetoing the adoption of that child."
Id., at 392."
CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979)
"Gender, like race, is a highly
visible and immutable characteristic
that has historically been the touchstone
for pervasive but often subtle discrimination.
Although the analogy to race is not
perfect and the constitutional inquiry
therefore somewhat different, gender-based
statutory classifications deserve
careful constitutional examination
because they may reflect or operate
to perpetuate mythical or stereotyped
assumptions about the proper roles
and the relative capabilities of men
and women that are unrelated to any
inherent differences between the sexes.
Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 . Sex-based
classifications are in many settings
invidious because they relegate a
person to the place set aside for
the group on the basis of an attribute
that the person cannot change. Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 ; Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 ; Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 ; Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 ; Orr
v. Orr, supra. Such laws cannot be
defended, as can the bulk of the classifications
that fill the statute books, simply
on the ground that the generalizations
they reflect may be true of the majority
of members of the class, for a gender-based
classification need not ring false
to work a discrimination that in the
individual case might be invidious."'...
parental rights without proof of unfitness
on his part violates the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Secondarily,
he attacks 111 (1) (c)'s disparate
[441 U.S. 380, 402] treatment of natural
mothers and natural fathers as a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of
the same Amendment." "if
and when one develops, the relationship
between a father and his natural child
is entitled to protection against
arbitrary state action as a matter
of due process. See Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645, 651 "...some Members
of the [US Supreme] Court have concluded
that greater protection is due the
"private realm of family life,"
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (emphasis added), e. g.,
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 "For a traditional classification
is more likely to be used without
pausing to consider its justification
than is a newly created classification.
Habit, rather than analysis, makes
it seem acceptable and natural to
distinguish between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and
illegitimate; for too much of our
history there was the same inertia
in distinguishing between black and
white. But that sort of stereotyped
reaction [441 U.S. 380, 404] may have
no rational relationship û other than
pure prejudicial discrimination -
to the stated purpose for which the
classification is being made."
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520
-521. First Amendment Rights U.S.
Constitution, First Amendment û pertaining
to the right to absolute religious
freedom. Holy Bible, Matthew Chapter
28, verses 17-19: "The Great
Commission of Jesus Christ" "Therefore
go and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of |
