UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

I hereby certify to the best of my knowledge that the Amicus Brief complies with the type-volume limitation under Federal Appellate Rule (32)(a)(7)(B), pursuant to the computer processing system used to prepare the brief. The number of words is .

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on August _____, 2005, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing motion has been served upon Jim Petro, Ohio Attorney General, C/O Elise W. Portor, 20 East Broad Street, 17^th Floor, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, Stanford Flack, Attorney for Teresa A. Cook, 1010 North Fountain Avenue, Springfield, Ohio 45502, and Michael A. Galluzzo, Plaintiff and the Real Party of Interest, P.O. Box 710, 307 East Main Street, St. Paris, Ohio, 43072 on the date same was filed by first class U.S. mail postage prepaid.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that on August _____, 2005, that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amicus Brief has been served upon Jim Petro, Ohio Attorney General, C/O Elise W. Portor, 20 East Broad Street, 17^th Floor, Columbus, Ohio, 43215, Stanford Flack, Attorney for Teresa A. Cook, 1010 North Fountain Avenue, Springfield, Ohio 45502, and Michael A. Galluzzo, Plaintiff and the Real Party of Interest, P.O. Box 710, 307 East Main Street, St. Paris, Ohio, 43072 on the date same was filed by first class U.S. mail postage prepaid.

Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963). 31, 32

Adoption of Kelsey S., (1992)....................................................................................... 43

Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619..................................................................... 33, 63

Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923................................. 45

Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773 31

Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31.......................................................................... 37

Bennett Estate (1901) 134 C. 320, 66 P. 370............................................................................. 19, 52

Billings v. Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17.................................................................................... 32

Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394..................................................................... 19

Burlingame v. Traeger (1929), 101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051.............................................. 12

Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114.................................................................... 36

Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525.............................................. 41

Cecacci v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951...................................................... 41

Cheshire v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326.......................................................................... 19

City of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709................................. 19

Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203.................................................. 36

Cooke v. Cooke, 319 A.2d 841 (No. 757 1974)..................................................................... 53

Darwin v. Ganger (1959) 344 P.2d 353, 174 C.A2d 63................................................... 53

Davis v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099........................................................... 41

Degregory v. Attorney General of State of N.H, 86 S.Ct. 1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d 202. 64

Delaplane v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat. 457........................................................................ 26

DeManneville v. DeManneville (1804)...................................................................... 22

Dodge v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A. 318......... 19

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)...................................................................... 58

Eddlemon v. Eddlemon, 27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]................................. 44

Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)................................................. 63

Everson v. Board of Education, 330, U.S. 1, 64................................................................... 25

Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2 (1866).................................... 47

Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604................................................................................... 36, 52

Fanning v. Fanning, 2 Misc N.Y. 97........................................................................................... 21

Farnham v. Pierce, 141 Mass. 203; 55 Am.Rep. 452............................................................ 54

Ferguson v. Ferguson, et al (1865) 36 Mo. 197................................................................... 52

Finn. v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350 19

Fountain v. Fountain, 83 A.D.2d 694, 442 N.Y.S.2d 604 (3d Dep't 1981)...................... 53

Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553......................................................... 35

Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121...................................................... 19

Gibson, U., in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &. R. 323-329................................................... 27

Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843.................... 35

Grinberger v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983............................................................ 42

Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654 1882).............. 45

Guardianship of De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521]................................ 44

Hall v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161......... 19

Hanson v. Cushman 490 F.Supp. 109, at 112 (1980)........................................................ 59

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)................................................................ 48

Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)............................ 38, 64

Higgins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323.. 19

Horne v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510.............................................. 31

House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District (1944), (Id.) 25 C.2d 384, 153 P.2d 950 44

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516............................................................................. 63

Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516.............................................................................. 45

In Brown v. Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss 479..................................................................... 64

In J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978)....................................................................... 53

In re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.),.............................................. 44

In re Backes, 16 N.J. 430, 433-34 (1954)........................................................................................ 21

In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)................................................... 46

In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208..................................................... 35

In re Guardianship of Smith, (1954) 265 P.2d 888, 42 C.2d 91, 37 A.L.R.2d 867........... 53

In re Jessup, (1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742, 1028..................................................................... 19

In re Jessup, (1889) 81 C 408, 21 P. 972, 22 P.742, 1028, 6 LRA 594..................................... 52

In re Riley's Guardianship (1946) 165 P.2d 555, 72 C.A.2d 742...................................... 44

In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298............................................................ 59

In re Sloot's Guardianship (1949) 206 P.2d 862, 92 C.A.2d 296...................................... 44

In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]........................................................ 44

In Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966)......................................... 41

In re: Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4^th Dist. 1995)................ 21

In the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999)............................................................................................................................. 55

Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21. 22

Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162.................................................. 19

Johnson v. Fall (1856), 6 C. 359, 65 Am.Dec. 518.................................................... 38

Johnson v. Johnson, (1946) 165 P. 2d 552, 72 C.A.2d 721.................................................... 53

Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458....................................................................... 45

Katz v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967)......................................................... 64

Keharya v. Axton, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268........................................................... 31

Kepner v. Comm., 40 Pa. 124..................................................................................................... 24

Klienberg v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981, 983................................................. 19

Lawson v. Lawson, (1910) 158 C. 446, 111 P. 354]........................................................................... 20

Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281............................................................... 41

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982) 39

Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367 , 374] 45

Mackinley v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt 3 Wharton 369.................................... 20

Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 153 N.Y.2d 204; 207.................................................. 51

May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952)............................. 46

May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S. 113, 115............................................... 19

McCallen v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630.......................................................... 63

Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882............................................................................ 37

Milwaukee Industrial School v. Supervisors, 40 Wis. 328................................................ 54

Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410...................................................................... 31

Moran, et al. v. Liano, et ux., No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App............... 40

Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825, 828................................................. 19

Mumma v. Aguirre, Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220.................................................................. 41

Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105.................................................................................. 63

Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391........................................................ 31

Newby, v. Newby, 55 C.A. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921).......................................................... 52

Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503.................................................... 19

Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580................................................. 45

Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786...................................................................................... 35

Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357......................................................... 43

People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23.............................................................................................. 37

People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46....................................................................................... 37

People v. De La Guerra, 24 Cal. 76.................................................................................. 53

Petrosky v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, at 728 (Tenn. 1995)....................................................... 52

Phillips v. Phillips, supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596............................................................ 21

Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539....................................... 45

Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 38, 64

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558............................................... 32

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)............................................................ 33

Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248...................................................... 43

Re Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883)........................................................ 42

Reno v. ] Flores, 507 U. S. [292,] at 304........................................................................................ 39

Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58................................................................................................. 41

Robert D. v. Jamie T., 87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001) 44

Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109. (1772)............................................................... 30

Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]........................................................ 44

Sahlender Estate (1948), 89 C.A.2d. 329, 339, 201 P.2d 69................................... 38

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388.................. 39

Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 585 (1960)................................................................................. 21

Scott v. Singleton, 378 So.2d 885................................................................................ 51

Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796............................................................... 19

Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)........ 63

Shelf. Marriage, Ferg., 397, 398................................................................................... 22

Smith v. Morse 2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924).................................................................... 63

Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) at 862-63............................................. 20

South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)..................................................... 33

St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575.. 31

Starr v. Gorman, 136 N.J.L. 105, 40 A.2d 564, 565......................................................... 22

State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190................................................... 33

State v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660.......................... 33

State v. Dallas City, 72 Or. 337, 143 P. 1127, 1131, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 855............................................. 24

State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275................................................................... 41, 52

Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160............................................................................... 22

Troxel et vir. v. Granville, 530 US 57, 67 (2000)............................................................................. 39

Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 649, 242 Pac. 725....................................... 42

Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636........................................... 18, 46

Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469............................................................. 19

U.S. v. Smith, 4 N.J. Law 38....................................................................................................... 24

Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord 227............................................................................. 39

Waltham v. Waltham, (1857) 1 Lab. 146............................................................................... 53

Warren v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W. 323..................................................................... 42

Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F., 523..................................................................... 22

Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A. 672............................................ 41

Wilkenson v. Wilkenson, (1951) 233 P.2d 639, 105 C.A.2d 392....................................... 54

Williams v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856............................................................................. 37

Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553..................................................... 19

Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37.......................................................... 19

Wilson v. Roach, 4 Cal. 362............................................................................................... 42

Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356............................................................................... 37

Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990)................................... 39

1 Cor 11:3-13..................................................................................................................... 23

1 Tim. 3.1-5...................................................................................................................... 23

Gen. 3:16.......................................................................................................................... 22

St. 25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)........................................................................................ 50

St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368)...................................................................................... 50

St. 5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331)........................................................................................ 49

10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4........................................................................................... 25

1906 Decennial Edition of the American Digest, A Complete Digest of all Reported Cases from 1897 to 1906, Vol. 4, Carriers to Contractors, © 1908, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Mn. (4 Decen.Dig. ’06), p. 1431 26

2005 Father’s Rights Fact Sheet.......................................................................................... 61

3 Bouv. Inst. u. 3180................................................................................................................ 24

Address to the Commonwealth Club of California, 1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992 14

Barry Boyer, Trade Regulation Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1980 Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendations and Reports 33, 124-127.............................................. 57

Black’s Law Dictionary, 3^rd Edition, ã 1933, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. P. 1297. 24

Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition, ã 1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., p. 1251....... 31

Black’s Law Dictionary, 4^th Edition, ã 1968, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., p. 1419....... 30

Blacks Law Dictionary, 3^rd Edition, ã 1934, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. P. 1351......... 35

Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, ã 1891-1957, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn., p. 1765 22

Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856; 1 Ld. Ray. 699.................................................................. 11

Fiscal Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (1941). 57

Frank J. Hogan, President, American Bar Assn. (1939).................................................................... 32

Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice, Lawyers & Social Change in America (1976), Robert Rabin, Federal Regulation in Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1252-53 (1986)...................................................... 57

Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463, 479-481 (1983).............. 40

Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present & Future, 72 Va. L. Rev. 447, 453 (1986)................... 57

Paul Verkull, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258, 271 (1978) 57

The Evolved Matriarchal American Family & Fatherhood, by Gerald L. Rowles, Ph.D.. 15

The Garbage Generation, Dr. Daniel Amneus.................................................................. 14

The Nazis - A Warning From History, by Laurence Rees, The New Press, N.Y., pg. 159.. 60

Thomas Jefferson, letter to William Johnson, June 12, 1823, The Complete Jefferson, p. 322 32

Tucker's Blackstone is Copyright © 1997-2003, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND,.BOOK THE FIRST., Part Second, of the Nature of Laws in General, by Sir William Blackstone........................... 30

Webster’s 1828 Dictionary, ã 1995 Christian Technologies, Inc........................................ 26

California Civil Code, secs. 1389, 1390, 1391, 1392, 1393................................................. 54

California, the Government Code 11120.................................................................... 49

Congressional Globe, 39^th Congress, 1^st Session, at page 1757 (1866)................................................ 44

Ohio R.C. § 3409.4......................................................................................................... 12

1 Bl.Comm.......................................................................................................................... 30

16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 543........................................................ 51

3 Blackstone, 350........................................................................................................... 50

Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments §11 1785............................... 25

The Judicial Process, Text, Materials and Cases, Second Edition, by Ruggero J. Aldisert, ã 1976; West Publishing Co., 610 Opperman Drive, P.O. Box 64526, St. Paul, MN 55164-0526, 1-800-328-9352; ISBN 0-314-06776-0, p.10....................................................................................................................................... 48

THE STATUTORY TERM ANALYSIS (STA) METHOD , by Vincent P. Tassinari................................... 42

The Theory of Common Law, by James M. Walker Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852, p. 22 48

Article IV, Section 4 Constitution for the United States (1787-1791)....................... 51

Ohio, Constitution of 1802.............................................................................................. 23

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1, § 7(a)............................................................. 59

“He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden.”.......................................................... 11

A traditional legal principle that has been frozen into a concise expression............................. 35

Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium. “Every man's house is his castle.” 5 Rep. 92.. 49

Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. Co. Litt. 379a. “It is perilous to introduce new and untried things........................................................................................................................................ 35

Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. "It is dangerous to introduce new and dangerous things." Co.Litt. 379....................................................................................................................................... 35

Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque recta videntur. “What is done contrary to the custom of our ancestors, neither pleases nor appears right.” 4 Co. 78................... 35

Quea contra ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam. “Things introduced contrary to the reason of law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.” 12 Co. 75................................... 35

Radio est radius divini luminis. "Reason is a ray of divine light." Co. Littl. 232..................... 33

Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatuer et lex. "Reason is the soul of the law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed.".................................................................................... 33

Se a jure discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia omnibus incerta. "If you depart from the law, you will wander without a guide, and everything will be a state of uncertainty to every one." Co. Litt. 227b............... 34

Section 152b. [Maxim’s of Lord Coke]........................................................................ 59

When the common law and the statute concur, the common law is to be preferred." 4 Co. 71. 34

Where two rights concur, the more ancient shall be preferred................................................ 34

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., (hereinafter ‘Legends,’ is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization based in Stateline, Nevada. We have offices also in New York, New Jersey, California as well as Massachusetts and Michigan. We are an organization solely dedicated to the rights of Fatherhood which have been openly denied to men and fathers on the order of a half-century now. Legends represents men, with the knowledge that in doing so, you in fact, help women and children—as fatherhood; and not motherhood is in fact, the basic fulcrum of the family in all advanced Western Civilized Societies.

Legends, represents men and Father’s, and is an organization aggressively protecting their rights from outright intrusion, oppression and maladministration by the state, as well as other entities.

We are not a gender neutral nor feminized organization. We believe in the home, and family, which is the basic building block of all free societies. Fatherhood is a factual requisite of both those institutions. It is a fact, that you cannot have a family without a father, and conversely, you cannot have a free society without free sovereign families. Therefore, the state is legally bound to support fatherhood, as that in fact, (as this brief shall prove) supports the institution of marriage of which the state is legally bound to support.

Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., has not joined in any of the prior proceedings, but was asked to by its members who drew attention to this case and its’ national implications. Mr. Galluzzo has kindly consented to our Amicus filing in his matter. We have reviewed all the prior proceedings and enter this case in good faith, with no bad faith against any party. We stand ready to submit this brief and proffer it in the true light of settled law, and we present this document, ready to defend and we throw ourselves upon the country seeking relief for the real party of interest: Michael A. Galluzzo, the father embroiled within this controversy, and all father’s similarly situated thereto.

This case is of interest for us, as it concerns “Father’s Rights” and therefore comes under an original question of law, under organic judicial powers authority. As this court is well aware, by statutory practice and procedure, that there is a modern Apartheid going on against men and fathers whom dare to stand up and defend their rights to home and family, against the awesome powers of the state. The courts within the State of Ohio, as well as of the Federal venue and jurisdiction, have overtly and implicitly denied men’s and Fathers’ Rights in order to deny them their substantive rights to Due Process of Law and their rights to “Life, Liberty, and Property.”

There is in fact, no “Equal Protection of the Laws,” in this matter, as it is a fact, that the institution of marriage and the home and family, are legally established as an ‘unequal’ institution.[1] This “unequal” institution, that is the most successful human invention ever designed; serves the basis for all successful institutions which have followed this model established by the home and family. Banks, Governments, Sports Teams, Military Organizations, and other’s are all inculcated under the Patriarchal structure provided by the home and family: One Head leader or manager, leading other subordinates, who all owe allegiance to the basic organization. This model has been successfully implemented throughout ALL free Western Civilized societies for the past 6,000 years—until the advent of the radical feminized Family Court theology now implemented by respondent’s NON-Constitutional Marxist Jurisprudence and Feminist Jurisprudence within the “Family Court” systems.

We have deconstructed this fraud placed for the greatest part, against men, whom are denied basic constitutional rights through the advocacy of Feminism as inflected by Legislative promulgation of “Code” and “Revised Statute” as seen within Ohio R.C. § 3409.4 TA \l "Ohio R.C. § 3409.4" \s "Ohio R.C. § 3409.4" \c 4 .

Along with this document, we are submitting the 2005 Father’s Rights Fact Sheet, which documents the abject failure of the ‘Codes’ and ‘Revised Codes’, and the draconian application of “Family Courts” etc., as well as other Legislative implemented ‘social engineering schemes.’ These are not law,[2] and have no lawful valid governmental objective, as they are in fact, purely social engineering and a massive failure and cancer upon this society.

These failures stem and gestate from Federal impetus and payment schemes implemented by and through United States Code Title 42 U.S.C., §§ 651-666 “Welfare” scams and/or schemes. There is massive money attached to destroying fatherhood—and that payment scheme is undermining the very basis and substrate of the home and family: which is the active implementation and disenfranchisement of the American male and father.

Legends’ wants it judicially noted and on the record that all other Amicus Brief’s, and documentations within this case, are all premised off the errant feminist mythology of “shared” or “equal” parenting. Let it be known that there are approximately 22 states which have ‘codified’ “shared” or “equal” parenting plans within the Family Court systems of their respective states: and these states embody virtually the same rates of Family Court petitioners, Fatherhood “Failure to Pay” incarceration rates, and “Child Support” rates as other states without that “equality” embedded within their systems. In other words, these ‘shared’ or ‘equal’ parenting schemes, which are outside the concise rule of law, and opprobrious to Father’s Rights, do not in fact work…and if they do work—their success is negligible, at best.

Further, it should be noted, that a concomitant “Separate but Equal” Doctrine was miserably applied to the Black race in this nation, and failed as a legal institution and has notably understood as a failed historical premise. That failure cannot be survived by and through its application against Fathers such as Mr. Galluzzo by Ohio R.C. § 3109.4.

Let it be also be judicially noted and placed on the record, that this brief is in fact, ground zero of this case. This brief is about the law: well-established and well-settled fundamental law. This brief is not fashionable, nor is it ‘politically correct.’ But it is the law, and it is in fact true and correct for both the Union of Several States, as well as of the United States.

Let it be known, that what we are hereby going to factually establish in this brief, is not a throwback, but an advancement in human civilization.[3] It is the recognized and irrefutable basis for all free and advanced Western Civilized societies. It is a fact, that feminism and Marxism, is in fact, the older and more bases social environments, and as humankind and history show us, these are, as our founding father’s iterated: “the lowest and rudest state’s of mankind.”

This is irrefutable. One only has to glance at the advocacy within the already submitted Amicus Brief’s in this matter, as well as perusing the Father’s Rights Fact Sheet (FRFS). This eight-hundred (800) page FRFS is but a small preview into the uncontested fact, of what these courts, as well as State Legislatures have done to this society by and through implementation of such errant and unlawful codes such as RC § 3109.4, has done to this nation. It has in fact, irrefutably created a more-than-a-half-century of unbridled social destruction within this nation. It has destroyed the institution of the family, which now rages at a 63% (or higher) divorce rate process.[4]

It is also irrefutable, that each and every year, that these socialists, promulgating such bad and unconstitutional laws of which Mr. Galluzzo points out to us here, walk up to the State Legislatures, and Federal Congress, year-in and year-out, with hat in hand, and a plethora of social statistics showing how bad the situation is and begging those institutions for more and more public fundings to “administer” the problem, they themselves created but can never fix.

Legend’s hereby throws itself upon the country and is willing to defend this brief at length, as we can fix this problem. Fatherhood, is in fact, the greatest national resource this nation has to date, yet, it is unwilling to implement it. And the laws we establish here within this case, are in fact, the solution to this conundrum, and not proffered to delay or confuse this question—but rather; we submit this brief coldly, factually and with great aspirations that the law contained herein is reviewed empirically and without prejudice nor bias.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

LEGAL POINT 1: It is a fact, that the Constitution for the State of Ohio, dated November 29^th 1802, does in fact, contain the following unalienable right(s) for Michael A. Galluzzo (hereinafter Mr. Galluzzo).

ARTICLE VIII.

BILL OF RIGHTS.

That the general, great and essential principles of liberty and free government may be recognized and forever unalterably established, we declare:

section 1. That all men born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights; amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety; and every free republican government, being founded on their sole authority, and organized for the great purpose of protecting their rights and liberties, and securing their independence; to effect these ends, they have at all times a complete power to alter, reform or abolish their government, whenever they may deem it necessary.

1.01 – It is a fact, that Mr. Michael A. Galluzzo’s legal status is that of a white Christian male adult, of the age of majority, a competent sui juris Ohio state Citizen with full vested rights and privileges and not legally embarrassed by Amendment the Fourteenth to the Constitution for the United States, 1787-1791. He is in fact, a father,[5] with full vested rights and privileges, one of the organic posterity of this nation, a human being and man-about-the-land freeborn, who is of a status to legally question the debt and any and all other acts and/or omissions of his government(s).

1.02 –Stephen J. Walker, et als, of Families in Transition, (hereinafter FIT), makes a fundamental error in constitutional construction as it relates to Mr. Galluzzo’s unalienable rights supported by the constitution. Mr. Walker, et als states: “Yes, even the most fundamental rights are subject to alteration and indeed absolute loss.” He continues quoting: “Whether for good or ill, it is still the law in the United States that a state may take one’s life itself if one has been convicted of murder under certain circumstances. Liberty, which Jefferson also ranked as fundamental, is [also] subject to very severe restrictions upon the conviction of a crime. And the rights of a parent to custody of his children, are subject to limitation when he is divorced from their mother.”[6] This is gross scholarship without lawful authority and is eminently in error to the present case, and is an opprobrium to a free peoples..

1.03 –It is a fact, that Mr. Galluzzo has unqualified rights to life, liberty and property,[7] in that of his family, and his children. Divorce, does not change the status of these rights under law. Divorce, also does not enlarge the state authority of any judge or judicial officer, or branch of state or federal governments.

1.04 –It is a fact, that Fatherhood means something other than being a cash cow to the state. Divorce has become a ‘transfer of wealth scheme”[8] for the state by and through invocation of Rule 75(N) and RC § 3109.4, and other Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-666 Welfare scams and/or schemes.

1.05 –Firstly, it is a fact, that the family is a legal social unit, that is not equal under law. It does not come under “equal protection” clause and/or intrusion of the state. Quoting legal authority, it is well-settled and recognized that the home and family are a viable social unit, run under one legal head and under one authoritative family leader:

FAMILY. A collective body of persons who live in one house or within the same curtaliage and under one head or management (thereby including domestic servants, lodgers, boarders, guests, etc.) Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162 TA \l "Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162" \s "Jarboe v. Jarboe, 106 Mo. App. 459, 79 S.W. 1162" \c 1 ; Dodge v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A. 318 TA \l "Dodge v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A. 318" \s "Dodge v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 154 Mass. 299, 28 N.E. 243, 13 L.R.A. 318" \c 1 ; Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469 TA \l "Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469" \s "Tyson v. Reynolds, 52 Iowa 431, 3 N.W. 469" \c 1 ; Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37 TA \l "Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37" \s "Wilson v. Else, 204 Iowa 857, 216 N.W. 33, 37" \c 1 ; Klienberg v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981, 983 TA \l "Klienberg v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981, 983" \s "Klienberg v. Kinealy, (Mo. App.) 193 S.W. 981, 983" \c 1 ; City of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709 TA \l "City of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709" \s "City of Mexico v. Grey, 203 Mo.App. 547, 219 S.W. 707, 709" \c 1 ; Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825, 828 TA \l "Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825, 828" \s "Mullins v. Nordlow, 170 Ky. 169, 185 S.W. 825, 828" \c 1 ; May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S. 113, 115 TA \l "May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S. 113, 115" \s "May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 186 N.Y.S. 113, 115" \c 1 ; Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553 TA \l "Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553" \s "Wilson v. Cochran, 31 Tex. 680, 98 Am.Dec. 553" \c 1 . The immediate members of one’s household, as wife, children, brothers and sisters or father and mother. Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503 TA \l "Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503" \s "Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E. 503" \c 1 , 506. Those members of the household who are dependent on the householder to whom he owes some duty. Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394 TA \l "Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394" \s "Brokaw v. Ogle, 170 Ill. 115, 48 N.E. 394" \c 1 ; Cheshire v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326 TA \l "Cheshire v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326" \s "Cheshire v. Burlington, 31 Conn. 326" \c 1 , see also, Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121 TA \l "Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121" \s "Gamble v. Leva, 212 Ala. 155, 102 So. 120, 121" \c 1 ; Hall v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161 TA \l "Hall v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161" \s "Hall v. Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 103 Conn. 226, 130 A. 157, 161" \c 1 ; Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796 TA \l "Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796" \s "Scott’s Case, 117 Me. 436, 104 A. 794, 796" \c 1 . Those whom it is the natural or moral duty of one to support, Finn. v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350 TA \l "Finn. v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350" \s "Finn. v. Eminent Household of Columbia Woodmen, 163 Ky. 187, 173 S.W. 349, 350" \c 1 .

In a narrower sense, a father, mother, and children, whether living together or not. Higgins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323 TA \l "Higgins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323" \s "Higgins v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 127 Md. 171, 96 A. 322, 323" \c 1 .

In a broader sense, a group of blood-relatives; all the relations who descended from, a common ancestor, or who spring from a common root. See Civil Code La. Art. 3556, no. 12; 9 Ves. 323. The genealogical stock from a man and those related to him by blood have sprung. Albright v. Albright, 116 Ohio St. 668, 157 N.E. 760, 764..[9]

1.06 –Secondly, within the Family relation man and woman are legally joined as one, with the husband as that one. “Husband and wife by the common law[10] are treated as one for the most purposes, and the husband as being that one.” Mackinley v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt 3 Wharton 369 TA \l "Mackinley v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt 3 Wharton 369" \s "Mackinley v. McGregor, Mackinley v. Hewitt 3 Wharton 369" \c 1 .

1.07 –Thirdly, this clearly established line of descent and Patriarchal lineage, is the marriage archetype of which the state is bound to support.[11]

"...As guardian[s] of the interests of the public and persons not parties to the record, it is our imperative duty to prevent dissolution of the marriage relation[12] by means which the law condemns and expressly forbids.

An infant child is the issue of this marriage, and we cannot tolerate that its character shall be sullied and its career clouded by a Judicial conviction of the Father on such evidence of infidelity to the most sacred obligations. Since the "common-law marriages," so called-another name for concubinage-is so obtrusively prevalent in the community, and our calendars are crowded with applications for divorce, it behooves us not to relax the stringency of the rules which, in the interests of good morals and social security, have been prescribed by law for the safeguard of the sanctity and stability of the marriage relation. Daly Ch. J., and Bischoff, J. Concur.[13]

California public policy is to foster and promote institution of marriage. In re: Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4^th Dist. 1995) TA \l "In re: Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4^th Dist. 1995)" \s "In re: Marriage of Haines, 39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 673 (Cal.App. 4th Dist. 1995)" \c 1 [14]

"Because it is the policy of our law to preserve the marriage relation XE "policy of our law to preserve the marriage relation" .” Phillips v. Phillips, supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596 TA \l "Phillips v. Phillips, supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596" \s "Phillips v. Phillips, supra (R.I.) 97 A. 593, 596" \c 1 .

1.08 –Fourthly, that it is a fact, that Michael A. Galluzzo, is in fact, a father, (and not a parent) the recognized Head of His Family with full vested rights and privileges, and absolute and perfect rights thereto, which are in fact, constitutionally protected.

"The only ground upon which a court of law can interpose [against a father], is [by] some personal outrage.[15] But your Lordship exercises the jurisdiction, belonging to the Sovereign, as Parens Patriae XE "Parens Patriae" , delegated to the person holding the Great Seal. A court of law can only control abuse of power[16]; but cannot appoint any other person in the place of the parent as guardian to exercise power. The leading circumstances, influencing your Lordships discretion are the ability of the Father to maintain his child, and his disposition to make right use of his authority." [pg. 55]

"…If he maintains the child, and does not neglect it, your Lordship cannot deprive him of custody; nor interfere with a Father, teaching that mode of religion which he thinks best. A husband also has the right to the society of his wife, and if she deserts him, no one is justified in harboring her or supplying her with necessities.

"…the Father; under whose protection the law places [the child], will full powers; provided they are used for proper purposes.

"But there is no instance, either that court or this, of taking the child from the Father, willing to receive [it]; not under articles of peace an in no suit in Ecclesiastical, or any other court." DeManneville v. DeManneville XE "DeManneville v. DeManneville" (1804) TA \l "DeManneville v. DeManneville (1804)" \s "DeManneville v. DeManneville (1804)" \c 1 ; please also see Starr v. Gorman discussed in the footnote.[17]

"The father being domiciled and resident within the dominions of her Britannic Majesty, such is also the proper and rightful domicil of his wife and child, and he has a legal right to remove them thither. The child being detained from the father, its natural guardian and protector, without authority of law, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is his appropriate legal remedy for its restoration to him from its present illegal detention and restraint; Constitution United States, art. 3, 2; Judiciary Act, 1789, 11; Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21 TA \l "Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21" \s "Inglis v. Trustees Sail. Snug Harb., 3 Pet., 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. 3, cap. 21" \c 1 ; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F., 523 TA \l "Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F., 523" \s "Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F., 523" \c 1 ; Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160 TA \l "Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160" \s "Story Confl. L., 30, 36, 43, 74, 160" \c 1 ; Shelf. Marriage, Ferg., 397, 398 TA \l "Shelf. Marriage, Ferg., 397, 398" \s "Shelf. Marriage, Ferg., 397, 398" \c 1 ." U.S. Supreme Court--Barry v. Mercein XE "Barry v. Mercein" , 46 U.S. 103 (How.) (1847)

1.09 --Fifthly, it is an unquestioned and absolute premise at law, that the father owns the children in this nation and in all free Western Civilized societies.

1.10 --Biblical Law is concise and clear upon this subject. They are an identity and definitive: The husband is to rule over his wife or wives and the righteous wife is to submit to and serve her husband (Genesis 3:16; I Timothy 2:11-12; I Corinthians 11:3,9).

a.) “Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply they sorrow and thy conception, in sorrow, they shall bring forth children, and thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.” [Gen. 3:16 TA \l "Gen. 3:16" \s "Gen. 3:16" \c 2 ].

b.) This is a true saying, If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.

A bishop then must be blameless, the husband of one wife, vigilant, sober, of good behaviour, given to hospitality, apt to teach;

Not given to wine, no striker, not greedy of filthy lucre; but patient, not a brawler, not covetous;

One that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection with all gravity;

(For if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he take care of the church of God?) [1 Tim. 3.1-5 TA \l "1 Tim. 3.1-5" \s "1 Tim. 3.1-5" \c 2 ]

c.) But I would have you know, that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the woman is the man; and the head of Christ is God.

Every man praying or prophesying, having his head covered, dishonoureth his head.

But every woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered dishonoureth her head: for that is even all one as if she were shaven.

For if the woman be not covered, let her also be shorn: but if it be a shame for a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be covered.

For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man.

Nevertheless neither is the man without the woman, neither the woman without the man, in the Lord.

For as the woman is of the man, even so is the man also by the woman; but all things of God.

Judge in yourselves: is it comely that a woman pray unto God uncovered? [1 Cor 11:3-13 TA \l "1 Cor 11:3-13" \s "1 Cor 11:3-13" \c 2 ]

1.11 –It is a fact, and incontrovertible, that this is a Christian nation, with Christian laws.

a.) That we want it Judicially noted and on the record, that the State of Ohio, Constitution of 1802 TA \l "Ohio, Constitution of 1802" \s "Ohio, Constitution of 1802" \c 7 , does in fact, invoke, Almighty God:

b.) Citing Locke again, that it is a fact, that the State of Ohio was established upon the common law Lockean principles of Civil Society, which was that society established under God::

“It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must also do it with a reservation of his duty to the general authority, must every man who becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.”[20]

ITEM: The common law is the underlying law within all 50 states as well as the United States which mandates the acknowledgement of God and the Christian religion as the predominant religion recognized under the law as the foundation of our organic law:

See 10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4 TA \l "10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4" \s "10 Cent. Dig. Com. Law § 4" \c 3 .

If a custom has been recognized by a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, it will thereby receive vitality, and the right claimed under it may be asserted as conferred by the statute. – Delaplane v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat. 457 TA \l "Delaplane v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat. 457" \s "Delaplane v. Crenshaaw, 15 Grat. 457" \c 1 .[21]

the common law of Pennsylvania;[22] 11 Serg. & Rawle, 394; 5 Binn. R.555; of New York, 8 Johns. R. 291; of Connecticut, 2 Swift's System, 321; of Massachusetts, Dane's Ab. vol. 7, c. 219, a. 2, 19. To write or speak contemptuously and maliciously against it, is an indictable offence. Vide Cooper on the Law of Libel, 59 and 114, et seq.; and generally, 1 Russ. on Cr. 217; 1 Hawk, c. 5; 1 Vent. 293; 3 Keb. 607; 1 Barn. & Cress. 26. S. C. 8 Eng. Com. Law R. 14; Barnard. 162; Fitzgib. 66; Roscoe, Cr. Ev. 524; 2 Str. 834; 3 Barn. & Ald. 161; S. C. 5 Eng. Com. Law R. 249 Jeff. Rep. Appx. See 1 Cro. Jac. 421 Vent. 293; 3 Keb. 607; Cooke on Def. 74; 2 How. S. C. 11-ep. 127, 197 to 201.[23]

Sec. 200. The Common Law is a term which has, with us, a double significance. In the United States, when we speak of he common law, the mind of the lawyer naturedly refers to the system of English jurisprudence, and indefinite and undescribed portion of which was said to be the birthright[24] of the colonists, and has been adopted in most of the states as a portion of our jurisprudence. By the common law a great many of our most important transactions are governed.

In view of the common law every statute enacted by a state legislature is construed, and in every statues is said to be in derogation of the common law, or declaratory of it, unless the subject is one that was uncertain at common law. P. 242.

[fn 1 ] Custom: a species of legislation by the people themselves, which in this county and England is the foundation of the common law itself, or, in other words, general customs obtaining by common consent.” Gibson, U., in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &. R. 323-329 TA \l "Gibson, U., in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &. R. 323-329" \s "Gibson, U., in Lyle v. Richards, 9 S. &. R. 323-329" \c 1 [25]

3.1.0 Blackstone’s in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, discussed the concomitant obligations of Nations within the Law of Nations to recognize the law of God and to subordinate themselves thereto and not to violate those Christian precepts clearly espoused within the Decalogue of the Holy Bible:

With regard to the first of these, the declaratory part of the municipal law, this depends not so much upon the law of revelation or of nature as upon the wisdom and will of the legislator. This doctrine, which before was slightly touched, deserves a more particular explication. Those rights then which God and nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are; neither do they receive any additional strength when declared by the municipal laws to be inviolable. On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them, unless the owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture. Neither do divine or natural duties (such as, for instance, the worship of God, the maintenance of children, and the like) receive any stronger sanction from being also declared to be duties by the law of the land. The case is the same as to crimes and misdemesnors, that are forbidden by the superior laws, and therefore stiled mala in se, such as murder, theft, and perjury; which contract no additional turpitude from being declared unlawful by the inferior legislature. For that legislature in all these cases acts only, as was before observed, in subordination to the great lawgiver, transcribing and publishing his precepts. So that, upon the whole, the declaratory part of the municipal law has no force or operation at all, with regard to actions that are naturally and intrinsically right or wrong.

… This will of his maker is called the law of nature. For as God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws.

Considering the creator only as a being of infinite power, he was able unquestionably to have prescribed whatever laws he pleased to his creature, man, however unjust or severe. But as be is also a being of infinite wisdom, he has laid down only such laws as were founded in those relations of justice, that existed in the nature of things antecedent to any positive precept. These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the creator himself in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover, so far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions. Such among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three general precepts Justinian[1] has reduced the whole doctrine of law.

… This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other-It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.

… This has given manifold occasion for the benign interposition of divine providence; which, in compassion to the frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason, hath been pleased, at sundry times and in divers manners, to discover and enforce it's laws by an immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found only in the holy scriptures. These precepts, when revealed, are found upon comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature, as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these truths was attainable by reason, in it's present corrupted state; since we find that, until they were revealed, they were hid from the wisdom of ages. As then the moral precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those of the law of nature, so their Intrinsic obligation is of equal strength and perpetuity. Yet undoubtedly the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than that moral system, which is framed by ethical writers, and denominated the natural law. Because one is the law of nature, expressly declared so to be by God himself; the other is only what, by the assistance of human reason, we imagine to be that law. If we could be as certain of the latter as we are of the former, both would have an equal authority; but, till then, they can never be put in any competition together.

Upon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these. There are, it is true a great number of indifferent points, in which both the divine law and the natural leave a man at his own liberty; but which are found necessary for the benefit of society to be restrained within certain limits. And herein it is that human laws have their greatest force and efficacy; for, with regard to such points as are not indifferent, human laws are only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former.

But man was formed for society; and, as is demonstrated by the writers on this subject, is neither capable of living alone, nor indeed has the courage to do it. However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in one great society, they must necessarily divide into many; and form separate states, commonwealths and nations, entirely independent of each other, and yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law, to regulate this mutual intercourse, called "the law of nations:" which, as none of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be dictated by any; but depends entirely upon the rules of natural law, or upon mutual compacts, treaties, leagues, and agreements between these several communities: in the construction also of which compacts we have no other rule to resort to, but the law of nature; being the only one to which all the communities are equally subject: and therefore the civil law very justly observes, that quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, vocatur jus gentium.[26]

d.) Whereas, the Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 are in fact, null and void—and opprobrious and in direct contradistinction to the concise rule of law, as laid down and protected and secured by the Constitution for Ohio 1802, as well as the Constitution for the United States 1787-1791; these facts are irreversible:

"All acts of the legislature apparently contrary to natural rights and justice are, in our law and must be in the nature of things, considered as void. The laws of nature are the laws of God, whose authority can[not] be superseded by no power on earth. A legislature must not obstruct our obedience to him from whose punishments they cannot protect us. All human constitutions which contradict his [God's] laws, we are in conscience bound to disobey." Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109. (1772) TA \l "Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109. (1772)" \s "Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jefferson 109. (1772)" \c 1

1.12 –This well-settled law, solemnly protecting and securing Mr. Galluzzo’s right to be a father, gestating from natural law, declared within the common law, and protected by Constitutional right, has led to the formation of well-settled law which has not been superceded, nor can be overturned by the Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4:

a.) ITEM: Lex de responses prudentum. ORGANIC LAW: “The fundamental law, or constitution, of a state or nation, written or unwritten; that law or system of laws or principles which defines and establishes the organization of its government. St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575 TA \l "St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575" \s "St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 46 S.W. 976, 42 L.R.A. 686, 68 Am.St.Rep. 575" \c 1 .[27]

Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391 TA \l "Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391" \s "Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 338, 390, 391" \c 1 . Doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same. Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410 TA \l "Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410" \s "Moore v. City of Albany, 98 N.Y. 396, 410" \c 1 ; Regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. Horne v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510 TA \l "Horne v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510" \s "Horne v. Moody, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510" \c 1 …

Federal courts should in all instances follow the law of the state with respect to the construction of state statutes, and where that law has been determined by the courts of last resort their decisions are “stare decisis” and must be followed, irrespective of federal courts’ opinions concerning what the law ought to be, but with respect to the pronouncement of other state courts, federal courts are not so bound and may conclude that the decision does not truly express state law. Keharya v. Axton, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268 TA \l "Keharya v. Axton, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268" \s "Keharya v. Axton, D.C.N.Y., 32 F.Supp. 266, 268" \c 1 .[28]

Stare decisis et non quieta movere. “To adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.” 87 Pa. 286; Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773 TA \l "Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773" \s "Ballard County v. Kentucky County Debt Commission, 290 Ky. 770, 162 S.W.2d 771, 773" \c 1 .

TA \l "Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963)." \s "Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963)." \c 1

c.) It is a fact, that the opposing side makes the following specious argument: That the country has now changed, and the “new law”[29] and the “new understanding” thusly established and evolved cannot allow the Father’s Rights or any part of the Christian religion to be recognized by the secular government and therefore the “compelling state interests” reigns supreme in this legal argument.[30]

The original intent of the framers of the United States Constitution should not be discounted. However, the society for which it was written and the society of today differ greatly. For this reason we must make every effort not to rely too heavily on the "advice of the Founding Fathers" because historical messages often tend to be "ambiguous" and not relevant to a society far more heterogeneous than that of the framers. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963). TA \l "Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963)." \s "Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1579, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963)." \c 1

· "If the Constitution is to be construed to mean what the majority at any given period in history wish the Constitution to mean, [then] why a written Constitution?"[31]

· "That for the Constitution to declare a right inalienable, and at the same time leave the Legislature unlimited power over it, would be a contradiction in terms, an idle provision, proving that a Constitution was mere parchment barrier, insufficient to protect the citizen, delusive and visionary, and the practical result of which would be to destroy, not conserve, the rights it vainly presumed to protect." Billings v. Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17 TA \l "Billings v. Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17" \s "Billings v. Hall, 71 Cal.App. 15-17" \c 1 .

· "In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief with the chains of the Constitution." Thomas Jefferson.[32]

· "The Constitution which at any time exists, 'till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole People, is sacredly obligatory upon all." --George Washington

· The necessities which gave birth to the constitution, the controversies which precede its formation and the conflicts of opinion which were settled by its adoption, may properly be taken into view for the purposes of tracing to its source, any particular provision of the constitution, in order thereby, to be enabled to correctly interpret its meaning. — Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558 TA \l "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558" \s "Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558" \c 1 .

· The values of the Framers of the Constitution must be applied in any case construing the Constitution. Inferences from the text and history of the Constitution should be given great weight in discerning the original understanding and in determining the intentions of those who ratified the constitution. The precedential value of cases and commentators tends to increase, therefore, in proportion to their proximity to the adoption of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or any other amendments. — Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969). TA \l "Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)." \s "Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969)." \c 1

· "It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the citizens; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day." South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) TA \l "South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)" \s "South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905)" \c 1

e.) Whereas, Constitutional construction and understanding, is clear, and well-settled on this issue.

· Where the words of a constitution are unambiguous and in their commonly received sense lead to a reasonable conclusion, it should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the framers, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of limiting or extending its operation. A State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190 TA \l "State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190" \s "State Ex Rel. Torryson v. Grey, 21 Nev. 378, 32 P. 190" \c 1 .

· If the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional provision, the frequent repetition of the wrong will not create a right. Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619 TA \l "Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \s "Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \c 1 .

· Disobedience or evasion of a constitutional mandate may not be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public. State v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660 TA \l "State v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660" \s "State v. Board of Examiners, 274 N.Y. 367; 9 NE 2d 12; 112 ALR 660" \c 1 .

· Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatuer et lex. "Reason is the soul of the law;[33] the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed." TA \l "Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatuer et lex. \"Reason is the soul of the law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed.\"" \s "Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatuer et lex. \"Reason is the soul of the law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed.\"" \c 8

f.) That the settled law of “Father’s Rights’ has been erroneously marketed, both by feminists, socialists, and the mainstream media, as “old” and “outdated” and/or “abusive” and “discriminatory.” Because of this, they have “changed the reason of the law,” in not supporting “Father’s Rights.” In fact, ‘Father’s Rights’ (Patriarchy), is a very, very recent, and advanced social human invention—and is the cornerstone of all free Capitialist “Western” Civilizations. It is ingrained in all Western Civilized societies laws and cultures, and is declared throughout the natural law, and common law, and factually protected and a secured liberty under the Union of Several State’s Constitutional Laws as well as the Federal Constitution. It is in fact, Matriarchy (feminism, Socialism, and Communism) which come under the penumbra of ancient “tribal” social doctrines, those of which our founding fathers openly declared and understood to be failed:[34] “Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we find it [is] among the native tribes of North America, everyman is a warrior as well as hunter...”[35]

· When the common law and the statute concur, the common law is to be preferred." 4 Co. 71. TA \l "When the common law and the statute concur, the common law is to be preferred.\" 4 Co. 71." \s "When the common law and the statute concur, the common law is to be preferred.\" 4 Co. 71." \c 8

· Where two rights concur, the more ancient shall be preferred TA \l "Where two rights concur, the more ancient shall be preferred" \s "Where two rights concur, the more ancient shall be preferred" \c 8 ."

· Se a jure discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia omnibus incerta. "If you depart from the law, you will wander without a guide, and everything will be a state of uncertainty to every one." Co. Litt. 227b TA \l "Se a jure discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia omnibus incerta. \"If you depart from the law, you will wander without a guide, and everything will be a state of uncertainty to every one.\" Co. Litt. 227b" \s "Se a jure discedas vagus eris, et erunt ominia omnibus incerta. \"If you depart from the law, you will wander without a guide, and everything will be a state of uncertainty to every one.\" Co. Litt. 227b" \c 8 .[36]

· A traditional legal principle that has been frozen into a concise expression TA \l "A traditional legal principle that has been frozen into a concise expression" \s "A traditional legal principle that has been frozen into a concise expression" \c 8 .[37]

· Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. "It is dangerous to introduce new and dangerous things." Co.Litt. 379 TA \l "Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. \"It is dangerous to introduce new and dangerous things.\" Co.Litt. 379" \s "Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. \"It is dangerous to introduce new and dangerous things.\" Co.Litt. 379" \c 8

· Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. Co. Litt. 379a. “It is perilous to introduce new and untried things. TA \l "Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. Co. Litt. 379a. \“It is perilous to introduce new and untried things." \s "Periculosum est res novas et inusitatas inducere. Co. Litt. 379a. \"It is perilous to introduce new and untried things." \c 8 ”[38]

· Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque recta videntur. “What is done contrary to the custom of our ancestors, neither pleases nor appears right.” 4 Co. 78 TA \l "Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque recta videntur. \“What is done contrary to the custom of our ancestors, neither pleases nor appears right.\” 4 Co. 78" \s "Quae praeter consuetudinem et morem majorum fiunt, neque placent, necque recta videntur. \"What is done contrary to the custom of our ancestors, neither pleases nor appears right.\" 4 Co. 78" \c 8

· Quea contra ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam. “Things introduced contrary to the reason of law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.” 12 Co. 75 TA \l "Quea contra ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam. \“Things introduced contrary to the reason of law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.\” 12 Co. 75" \s "Quea contra ratioonem juris introducta sunt, non debent trahi in consequentiam. \"Things introduced contrary to the reason of law, ought not to be drawn into precedents.\" 12 Co. 75" \c 8

1.13 Whereas, it is well-settled and understood, and a natural law, common law and Civil Right of Michael A. Galluzzo, that by his status, and his status as a father, give him substantive rights, perfect rights and Constitutional Rights to life, liberty and property, understood and protected at law. Whereas, “Fatherhood mean’s something,” other than having a judge seize his rights in overt violation to the Constitution of Ohio 1802.

[a] The father is the natural guardian of his child, and [the father] will be awarded possession of his person, unless he is unworthy, and incompetent to discharge the trust imposed upon him.

(Ohio—C.C. 1899) In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208 TA \l "In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208" \s "In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208" \c 1 ;

(Tex. Civ. App. 1905) Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786 TA \l "Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786" \s "Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786" \c 1

(W.Va. 1891) Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843 TA \l "Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843" \s "Green v. Campbell, 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843" \c 1

The father is entitled to the custody of his child during minority, unless such right has been relinquished or forfeited. – Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553 TA \l "Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553" \s "Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553" \c 1 .

On the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the custody of a minor child, it is an improper exercise of discretion to render Judgment depriving on of the custody and awarding it to another, where there is undisputed evidence of the right and fitness of the [father] to have such custody, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114 TA \l "Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114" \s "Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114" \c 1 .

In general, as the Father is by law clearly entitled to the custody of his child, the court will so far interfere as to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus and inquire into the circumstances of the case, in order to prevent a party entitled to the custody of a child from seeking it by force or stratagem.[39] And the court will feel bound to restore the custody to the father, where the law has placed it, unless in a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody. -- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203 TA \l "Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203" \s "Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203" \c 1

Upon a petition for habeas Corpus, the court has authority to relieve an infant from restraint; but it has no power to determine matters of guardianship, appointment of trustees, disposition of the property, or moneys of the parties, or the making of provision for the child placed in the custody of the Father. Ibid.

Other things being equal, the claims of the Father to the custody and control of his children are superior to those of the mother, but it is discretionary with the court to which one of the parents children shall be committed, and, where they are under the age of choice, the court will exercise that discretion, looking solely to the welfare and happiness of the children. Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604 TA \l "Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604" \s "Ex. Parte Reed, 19 S.C. 604" \c 1 .[40]

2.01 –The State of Ohio, is in fact, a common law state of decision. The courts are bound as to the common law rule of decision in all the courts of its state.

2.02 –The Ohio Revised Codes, are in fact, not law, nor are binding on Michael L. Galluzzo. Judicially note and place on the record the legal term “law.”

2.03 –The Constitution of the State of Ohio, nor of the United States; is not a grant of state (or Federal) power, but a complete restriction upon the awesome powers of the state and especially the Legislature, as well as all branches of government:

"The constitution of this state is not to be considered as a grant of power, but rather as a restriction upon the powers of the legislature, and it is competent for the legislature to exercise all powers not forbidden by the constitution of this state, or delegated to the general government, or prohibited by the constitution of the United States." People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46 TA \l "People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46" \s "People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46" \c 1 ; People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23 TA \l "People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23" \s "People v Bigler, 5 Cal. 23" \c 1 ; Williams v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856 TA \l "Williams v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856" \s "Williams v. Thompson, Jan T. 1856" \c 1 .

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions." Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language." Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882 TA \l "Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882" \s "Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882" \c 1

"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..." Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31 TA \l "Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31" \s "Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31" \c 1 ; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356 TA \l "Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356" \s "Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356" \c 1

2.05 –That in any legal construction of law, the Legislature is to first hold the proposed Revised Statute up to the Constitution and see if the law squares with the common law and the Constitution. Reference: Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584) TA \l "Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \s "Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \c 1 Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 TA \l "Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288" \s "Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288" \c 1 .

2.06 That the Legislature is then to hold the proposed Revised Statute up to common law construction, to see if it squares with the law of highest reason.

2.07 –It is a fact, that Mr. Galluzzo, as a Ohio state Citizen’s, rights do not diminish, nor is the state to diminish his rights as vested in him by right and status under the Constitution for Ohio 1820.

“Glanville XE "Glanville:Father can punish those who take children" XE "Glanville" maintained a contrary doctrine, and insisted that the action lay. ‘For,’ said he, ‘the father hath an interest in every of his children XE "father hath an interest in every of his children:He can punish: Vaughn v. Rhodes" , to educate them and to provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonable that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury, but that he should have his remedy to punish it.”[41] Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord 227

We begin with In re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.), in which we held a trial court erred in terminating a natural father's parental rights based on a best-interest-of-the-child standard without first determining whether granting custody to the natural father would be detrimental to the child.

"'. . . the state may not deny biological parents the opportunity to establish a protected custodial relationship.'" (37 Cal.3d at p. 74 (italics added), quoting Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson (1984) 45 Ohio State L.J. 313, 351.) This observation, although perhaps unnecessary, tends to support petitioner's position. (Cited From: Adoption of KELSEY S. (Citations Omitted). TA \l "Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord 227" \s "Vaughan v. Rhodes, 2 McCord 227" \c 1

2.08 The Doctrine of Parens Patriae, allegedly invoked by Respondent’s state powers under and by Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4, are in fact, a SUBORDINATE LEGAL DOCTRINE to the individual rights of the Father.

The state XE "state, as Parents Patriae:INTEREST IS SECONDARY" , as parens patriæ, has an interest in the welfare of its children. The state’s interest, however, is secondary XE "state’s interest, however, is secondary:Santosky v.Kramer" to the parents’ interest XE "state’s interest, however, is secondary to the parents’ interest:Santosky v. Kramer" . The state may intervene only if the parents fail in their responsibility to care for their children.”30 (Fiore, 1982, pp. 141-42, citations omitted.) Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388 TA \l "Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388" \s "Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (Santosky, 102 S. Ct. 1388" \c 1 .)

2.09 –That it is fact, that Mr. Galluzzo’s rights and privileges as a father do in fact, supercede any “Judge” or “Family Court’ attempting to invoke Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4:

"The statist notion XE "statist notion:that state is superior to parent, repugnant to law" that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions.[42] Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests." Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990) TA \l "Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990)" \s "Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. 1990)" \c 1 , citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982) TA \l "Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982)" \s "Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93, 77 L.Ed. 2d 614, 623-29 (1982)" \c 1 .

“The institution of marriage has played a critical role both in defining the legal entitlements of family members and in developing the decentralized XE "decentralized:family" structure of our democratic society.[43]

2.10 That it is a fact, that the father’s rights cannot be superceded by the state for altruistic, or state social engineering purposes, that the right of the father to the child is unlimited, and unqualified under law:

"The discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one, but, in the absence of any positive disqualification of the father for the proper discharge of his parental duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount right to the custody of his infant child, which no court is at liberty to disregard. And, while we are bound also to regard the permanent interests and welfare of the child, it is to be presumed that its interests and welfare will be best promoted by continuing that guardianship which the law has provided, until it is made plainly to appear that the father is no longer worthy of the trust. The breaking of the ties which bind the father and the child can never be justified without the most solid and substantial reasons. Upon the father the child must mainly depend for support, education, and advancement in life; and as security for this he has the obligation of law, as well as the promptings of that parental affection which rarely fails to bring into the service of the child the best energies and the most thoughtful care of the father. In any form of proceeding, the sundering of these ties will always be approached by the courts with great caution, and with a deep sense of responsibility." Moran, et al. v. Liano, et ux., No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App TA \l "Moran, et al. v. Liano, et ux., No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App" \s "Moran, et al. v. Liano, et ux., No. 13429, (1959 TX. 313) TX. Ct.Civ.App" \c 1 .

2.11 –It is a fact, that Michael A. Galluzzo, in fact, has no positive disqualification of being a father whose rights can be taken away or subrogated by the state, therefore, at law, he is vested with full and substantive rights legally as a father.

"It is true that the child's welfare is the superior and comprehensive test of custody. Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58 TA \l "Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58" \s "Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58" \c 1 ; Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281 TA \l "Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281" \s "Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281" \c 1 ; State v. Deaton, supra; Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525 TA \l "Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525" \s "Castro v. Castellanos (Tex.Com.App.), 294 S.W. 525" \c 1 ; Edwards v. Edwards (Tex.Com.App.), 295 S.W. 581; Cecacci v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951 TA \l "Cecacci v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951" \s "Cecacci v. Martelli (Tex.Civ.App.), 235 S.W. 951" \c 1 ; Davis v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099 TA \l "Davis v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099" \s "Davis v. Elkins (Tex.Civ.App.), 249 S.W. 1099" \c 1 . But the presumptions noticed mean that in general the child's welfare and the parent's fitness commonly rest in the natural relation [of the father] which may not be disturbed save by that rebuttal which exhibits positive disqualification of the parent. State v. Deaton, supra; Legate v. Legate, supra; Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A. 672 TA \l "Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A. 672" \s "Weir v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 12 S.W. 798, 6 L.R.A. 672" \c 1 ; State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275 TA \l "State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275" \s "State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275" \c 1 ."

"In DeWitt v. Brooks, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S.W.2d 687, 694, our Supreme Court held as follows: 'The plaintiffs contend that since they were admittedly the natural parents of the child, and since the trial court found that they were suitable persons to have the custody of the child, they were, as a matter of law, entitled to its custody. The holding of this Court in the case of State ex rel. Wood v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901, seems to justify that contention."

In the case of State ex rel. Wood v. Deaton, 93 Tex. 243, 54 S.W. 901, 903, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment of a lower court and directed that the child be delivered to its mother, quoting with approval from the case of State ex rel. Herrick v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 275, as follows: 'The discretion to be exercised is not an arbitrary one, but, in the absence of any positive disqualification of the father for the proper discharge of his parental duties, he has, as it seems to us, a paramount right to the custody of his infant child, which no court is at liberty to disregard.'"

We are not unmindful of Chief Justice Calvert's opinion in Mumma v. Aguirre, Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220 TA \l "Mumma v. Aguirre, Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220" \s "Mumma v. Aguirre, Tex., 364 S.W.2d 220" \c 1 , in which he stated, ". . . our courts do not normally concern themselves with the righteousness of claims to custody of children; their paramount concern is with the best interests of the children." In Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966) TA \l "In Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966)" \s "In Re: Johnny Herrera, a minor, 409 S.W.2d 395 (1966)" \c 1

2.12 --Whereas, it is the courts whose rights are expanded under Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4, that is subrogating and abrogating Mr. Galluzzo’s rights under color of law and under color of authority.[44] The judiciary is only to state and declare what the law is: and do nothing more:

Although constitutional term analysis is an enormous task, a judge is bound by oath[45] XE "judge is bound by oath:Marbury v. Madison" as well as the Marbury v. Madison XE "Marbury v. Madison" [46] duty to say what the law is. [47]

“Justice Ormond, claimed that by this language (9th Amendment) the courts were authorized to declare void any act which was repugnant to natural justice and equity.[48] Hence, "any act of the legislature which violates any of these asserted rights of which entrenches on any of these great principles of civil liberty, or inherent rights of man shall be void." Re Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883). TA \l "Re Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883)." \s "Re Dorsey, 7 Porter (ALA) 293, 377-378 (1883)." \c 1

“Federal Court Judge Robert Bork XE "Bork" said: "America is in decline XE "America is in decline:Bork, Robert" and the rot is spreading. It is the courts that threaten our liberty - the liberty that govern ourselves -- more profoundly than does any legislature". (New Jersey Herald & News, Sept. 17, 1996) Because, ". . . If a State may compel the surrender of one's constitutional rights as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence." Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357 TA \l "Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357" \s "Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 181, 19 L.Ed. 357" \c 1 .

“Between 1975 and 1979, there were 24 references to "judicial activism" XE "\judicial activism\" or "judicial activist," with an average of 5 references per year. Between 1980 and 1984, there were 305 references, with an average of 24 references per year. For 1985 to 1989, the amount of references tripled to 993, averaging 200 references per year. The years 1990 to 1994 saw 1,560 references and an average of 312 references per year. In 1995, there were 372 references; 1996 had 578 references; and 1997 had 1,349 references, almost quadrupling 1995's record. Search of LEXIS, News Library, Curnws & Arcnws Files (Jan. 4, 1998).[49]

2.13 --Whereas, the state has the substantive burden of showing a “positive disqualification” of unfitness of Mr. Galluzzo before it divests any father of his children or rights, nor can legally bestow upon themselves the doctrine of parens patriae:

“More important, the court seemed to indicate that a father's parental rights could not be terminated absent a showing of his unfitness, and that a showing of the child's best interest would be an insufficient basis for termination of the father's rights. "What is the state interest in separating children from fathers without a hearing designed to determine whether the father is unfit XE "unfit" in a particular disputed case? We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals [of protecting the child's best interest] when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his family." (Id., at pp. 652-653, italics added.) The court has characterized Stanley as holding that the father's constitutional rights were violated "absent a hearing and a particularized finding that the father was an unfit parent."[50] (Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248 TA \l "Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248" \s "Quilloin v. Walcott (1978) 434 U.S. 246, 247-248" \c 1 , italics added.)” Adoption of Kelsey S., (1992) TA \l "Adoption of Kelsey S., (1992)" \s "Adoption of Kelsey S., (1992)" \c 1

"But before the court can deprive the [father[51] of his] right to the minor's custody and give her into the charge of strangers, there must be a finding that the [father] is an unfit XE "unfit" person to have the custody of [his] child." Eddlemon v. Eddlemon, 27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009] TA \l "Eddlemon v. Eddlemon, 27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]" \s "Eddlemon v. Eddlemon, 27 Cal. App. 2d 343 [80 P.2d 1009]" \c 1 ; In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706] TA \l "In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]" \s "In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637 [129 P.2d 706]" \c 1 ; Guardianship of De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521] TA \l "Guardianship of De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521]" \s "Guardianship of De Ruff, 38 Cal. App. 2d 529 [101 P.2d 521]" \c 1 ; and Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]

TA \l "Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]" \s "Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141 [152 P.2d 999]" \c 1

“We recognize that, as a matter of substantive due process, the parental rights of a Kelsey S. father cannot be terminated without a finding that he is unfit XE "unfit" .” (Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 830-834, 849.) Robert D. v. Jamie T., 87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001) TA \l "Robert D. v. Jamie T., 87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001)" \s "Robert D. v. Jamie T., 87 Cal.App.4th 1392, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 341 (Cal.App. Dist.4 03/27/2001)" \c 1

We begin with In re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.), TA \l "In re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.)," \s "In re Baby Girl M. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 65 (Baby Girl M.)," \c 1 in which we held a trial court erred in terminating a natural father's parental rights based on a best-interest-of-the-child standard XE "terminating a natural father's parental rights based on a best-interest-of-the-child standard:In re Baby Girl M." without first determining whether granting custody to the natural father would be detrimental to the child.

2.14 --Whereas, it is a fact, and uncontroverted that Michael A. Galluzzo is seeking redress of grievances from this court[52] to sustain and affirm his fundamental rights at law in the light of the offending Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 which disenfranchises him of his rights.[53] This review made by this court must be unbiased, fair, and embodied with substantive justice in the light most favorable towards Mr. Galluzzo.:

In a case where it is asserted that a person has been deprived by a State court of a fundamental right secured by the Constitution, an independent examination of the facts by this Court is often required to be made. See Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580 TA \l "Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580" \s "Norris v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 , 580" \c 1 ; Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539 TA \l "Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539" \s "Pierre v. State of Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 358 , 538, 539" \c 1 ; Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227 , 228, 229, 473, 474; Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367 , 374] TA \l "Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367 , 374]" \s "Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219 , 237, 238, 290, 291; [331 U.S. 367 , 374]" \c 1 Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923. TA \l "Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923." \s "Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 , 147, 148, 923." \c 1

"When no facts are present, or only such facts as have neither legal value nor color of legal value in the affair, then, in that event, for the magistrate to take jurisdiction is not, in any manner, the performance of a judicial act, but simply the commission of an unofficial wrong. This criterion seems a reasonable one it leaves him answerable for the commission of a wrong that is practically willful . . . such responsibility is imperative to guard the citizen against official oppression". Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654 1882) TA \l "Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654 1882)" \s "Grove v. Van Duyn, 44 N.J.L. 654, 660-61, 42 Am. Rep. 648, 654 1882)" \c 1 .

2.15 –It is also a fact, that Mr. Galluzzo’s substantive natural born, common law and constitutional rights, to not diminish, whatsoever, nor can they be taken away for “state” purposes:

"The State cannot diminish rights of the people XE "State cannot diminish rights of the people:Hurtado v. California" ." Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516 TA \l "Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516" \s "Hurtado v. California,110 U.S. 516" \c 1 .

Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458 TA \l "Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458" \s "Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. 458" \c 1 , sets the standard: "It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'" (304 U.S. at p. 464 [82 L.Ed. at p. 1466] (fn. citations omitted).)

2.16 --That it is a fact, and well-settled law and established, that Mr. Galluzzo’s rights to his children, are primary and a fundamental property right at law:

"The United States Supreme Court noted that a parent's right to "the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an interest "far more precious" than any property right XE "property right" ." May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952) TA \l "May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952)" \s "May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533; 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, (1952)" \c 1

Please note, that California, establishes this fact, and drives this point home even further:

“Under the general law, and independently of the provisions of the codes, the father has a natural right to the care and custody of the child…The father’s right…though not commonly spoken of as such, is of essentially the same nature as the right of property XE "right of property:Parents to children" . The right must therefore be regarded as coming within the reason, if not within the strict letter, of the constitutional provisions for the protection of property…” In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900) TA \l "In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)" \s "In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)" \c 1

See also: TA \l "In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)" \s "In re Campbell, 130 C. 380, 382, 62 P. 613 (1900)" \c 1

“The right of a fit and proper parent to his child's custody is somewhat in the nature of a property right XE "CHILD is property right:Turner and Petrosky cases" \t "See Best Interest of the Child \"test\"" , and is paramount, in a sense, to the child's theoretical welfare and best interests.” Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636 TA \l "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \s "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \c 1 .

2.17 --Whereas, it is a fact, that under the Campbell [Id.] test. noted above, Mr. Galluzzo has a fundamental “unlawful taking’s of property” conflict which in fact, arises out of Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 statutory conflict, with which he has no substantive due process rights to defend, nor any constitutionally protected redress of grievances to assert his substantive rights at law.

2.18 It is self-evident and declaratory, that the State of Ohio, does in fact, view Mr. Galluzzo’s children as their property, and controls, owns, and assigns them thereto, by and through their authority under the doctrine of parens patriae implemented under color of law and color of authority of Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4.. If the state is not allowing Mr. Galluzzo his rights to property, it is most assuredly enforcing it’s rights to property by unlawfully superceding and abrogating his common law rights to his own children.

2.19 --It is therefore an identity, that Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 are in conflict with the rights established under Constitution of Ohio, Article VIII, section 1 (noted above) and this courts Constitution for the United States, Amendment the Fifth, which makes said Revised Code § 3109.4 patently unconstitutional. No judge can assume power over a father by either Legislative fiat or judicial edict. No branch of government may supercede a true and proper fathers’ rights vested at law:

[O]ur fathers were not absurd enough to put unlimited power in the hands of the ruler and take away the protection of law from the rights of individuals. [That course would not] 'secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.' (Preamble, US Constitution) They determined that not one drop of the blood which had been shed on the other side of the Atlantic, during seven centuries of contest with arbitrary power, should sink into the ground; but the fruits of every popular victory should be garnered up in this new government. Of all the great rights already won they threw not an atom away. They went over Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the [English] Bill of Rights, and the rules of the common law, and whatever was found there to favor individual liberty they carefully inserted in their own system, improved by clearer expression, strengthened by heavier sanctions, and extended by a more universal application. They put all those provisions into the organic law, so that neither tyranny in the executive [or judiciary], nor ... in the legislature, could change them without destroying the government itself. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2 (1866). TA \l "Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2 (1866)." \s "Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281, 4 Wall. 2 (1866)." \c 1

“Compelling State interest” while applying “strict scrutiny” requires a vague statute, or a statute that infringes upon fundamental rights to fail. “It is well settled that, quite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution, it is presumptively unconstitutional.” Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980). TA \l "Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)." \s "Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980)." \c 1

2.20 --Under our form of government, we do not transfer our rights to be Lorded over by government ministers, as that is in direct violation of the construct of our free form of government which is to be Republican in Form:

“John Locke agreed with Hobbes XE "Hobbes:Agrees with Locke re: personal liberty" on the existence of a social contract but to the contrary contended that humankind is naturally sociable and endowed with the right to personal liberty, the right to work and consequently the right to property, and that the State is formed for the sole purpose of guaranteeing these rights.[54] Locke said that the State was formed because in nature there was no guarantee to secure these rights. Similarly, Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that humankind was born good and was born happy. He taught that the social contract was "a postulate of reason" and not an historical fact and explained how it came about: For an instant, the individuals confer all their rights (natural ones) to the State which thereafter gives them all back (civil rights) with the name changed; by this novation or transformation, the individuals have been assured by the State of those rights by which they already possessed by nature.”[55]

2.21 --Our form of government, comes under the construct of Lockean “Social Compact Theory.” It is a fact, that neither Mr. Galluzzo, nor we the people yield our sovereignty nor rights to those whom rule over us, in any branch of government; in any way, shape or form.

California also enjoins with this theory of government backed by Locke XE "Locke and Hobbes:GC 11120 and 54950" . “There was a great political division between two major philosophers, Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes was on the side of government. He believed that sovereignty was vested in the state. Locke was on the side of the People. He believed that the fountain of sovereignty was the People of the state. Statist’s prefer Hobbes. Populists choose Locke. In California, the California Government Code TA \l "California, the Government Code 11120" \s "California, the Government Code" \c 4 XE "Government Code:Section 11120 and 54950 agree with Locke and" sides with Locke. Sections 11120 and 54950 both say, "The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. " The preambles of both the U.S. and California Constitutions also affirm the choice of Locke by invoking: We the People.”[56]

2.22 –That these predicate rights[57] are fundamental in the light most favorable to Mr. Galluzzo, are unqualified and unalienable by and through the concise rule of well-settled and established law (of which Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4, by Legislative design; abrogates). This is overt violation of Mr. Galluzzo’s substantive rights, as well as settled foundational laws and birthrights of men and father’s everywhere:

"That no man, from henceforth, shall be attached by any accusation, nor forejudged of life or limb, nor his land, tenements, goods, nor chattels, seized into the kind's hands against the form of the Great Charter, and the law of the land." --St. 5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331) TA \l "St. 5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331)" \s "St. 5 Edward III., Cp. 9 (1331)" \c 2

"Whereas it is contained in the Great Chapter of the franchises of England, that none shall be imprisoned, nor put out of his freehold, nor of his franchises, nor free customs, unless it be by the law of the land; it is accorded, assented, and established, that from henceforth none shall be taken by petition, or suggestion made to our lord the king or to his council, unless it be by indictment or presentment of good and lawful people of the same neighborhood where such deeds be done in due manner, or by process made by original writ at the common law; nor that none be put out of his franchises, nor of his freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer, and forejudged of the same by the course of the law; and if anything be done against the same, it shall be redress and holden for none." St. 25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350) TA \l "St. 25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)" \s "St. 25 Edward III., Ch4 (1350)" \c 2

"That no man, of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer to due process of law." St. 28 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1354)

"That no man be put to answer without presentment before justices, or matter of record, or by due process and writ original, according to the old law of the land. And if anything from henceforth be done to the contrary, it shall be void in law, and holden for error." St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368) TA \l "St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368)" \s "St. 42 Edward III., Ch. 3 (1368)" \c 2

The foregoing interpretation of the words nisi per legem terrae--that is, but due process of law--including indictment, &c., has been adopted as the true one by modern writers and courts; as, for example, by Kent, (2 Comm. 13,) Story, (3 Comm. 661) and the Supreme Court of New York, (19 Wendell, 676; 4 Hill, 146)

"A privilege which is couched in almost the same words with that of the Emperor Conrad two hundred years before: 'nemo beneficium suum perdat, nis secundum consuetudinem antecssorum nostrorum, et judicium parium suorum." (“No one shall lose his estate unless according to he custom of our ancestors, and the judgments of his peers.”) --3 Blackstone, 350 TA \l "3 Blackstone, 350" \s "3 Blackstone, 350" \c 5

“It has even been said that the principle was known before Magna [Charta] and that it was originally designated to secure the subject against arbitrary action of the crown, and to place [the citizen] under the protection of the law. It is settled beyond question that this principle came from England to America as part of the common law and has been a fundamental rule in common law. When first adopted in the Magna [Charta], the phrase, “law of the land” had referenced to the common and statute law then existing in England; and when embodied in constitutions in this country, it referred to the same common law as previously modified, and as far as suited to the wants and conditions of the people.” 16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 543 TA \l "16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 543" \s "16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, Section 543" \c 5 .

2.23 –Please also judicially note and place on the record, that by identity, Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 are both unconstitutional, because it does not allow the people to control it’s own government, (by individual self-determination and self-government) thereby, that is a violation of the Constitution for the United States, Article IV, Section 4:

“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government XE "Republican Form of Government:guaranteed" , and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.” Article IV, Section 4 Constitution for the United States (1787-1791) TA \l "Article IV, Section 4 Constitution for the United States (1787-1791)" \s "Article IV, Section 4 Constitution for the United States (1787-1791)" \c 7

“…which would trigger the best interest of the children test. XE "trigger the best interest of the children test." ”[58] Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris XE "Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris" , 153 N.Y.2d 204; 207 TA \l "Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 153 N.Y.2d 204; 207" \s "Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 153 N.Y.2d 204; 207" \c 1 ; Op. Judge Cooke.

"Best interests of child is [a] test in custody cases XE "Best interests of child is test in custody cases" ..” See Scott v. Singleton, 378 So.2d 885 TA \l "Scott v. Singleton, 378 So.2d 885" \s "Scott v. Singleton, 378 So.2d 885" \c 1 .

3.02 –It is a fact, that the State of Ohio, has in fact, never undertaken this test, nor applied it to Mr. Galluzzo, in accordance with the concise rule of law.

3.03 --This BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD “test” is well-settled and established at law and is in consonance with Michael A. Galluzzo’s substantive rights as a father. This is in fact, the declension of the Best Interests of the Child test which is mandated at law. This, in fact, is the Best Interests of the Child “test”:

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD “TEST”[59] DECLINATION CHART XE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD \“TEST\” DECLINATION CHART" XE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD \“TEST\” DECLINATION CHART:Declination of persons who have primary rights over state as parens patriae"

3.04 –It is in fact, not in the Child’s Best Interests, to place the State of Ohio’s statutory authority, over the rights of the Father. (See the attached 2005 FRFS, in total). See: “In the end, any determination of child custody must be based upon what is in the best interest of the child and what will best promote his or her welfare and happiness.” In the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999) TA \l "In the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999)" \s "In the Matter of Ronald F. v. Lawrence G., 694 N.Y.S.2d 622, 624, 181 Misc.2d 760 (Fam.Ct., Kings County 1999)" \c 1 (Jeffrey S. Sunshine, J.). This is the real constitutional perversion of Ohio R.C. § 3109.4, is in that it places the judge over the father, and is a malicious instrument to overturn settled natural, and common law rights of Michael A. Galluzzo, as well as his children’s rights.

4.01 –As we have already proven, that it is a legal fact, that Parens Patriae is a subordinate doctrine to the legal rights of the father, Michael A. Galluzzo.

4.02 --That without a “positive disqualification” from the Father, Michael A. Galluzzo; the state, in fact, must subordinate itself to the “Best Interest of the Child Test” and under Petrosky, (Id.), that once the father is found, or found to be fit, the Best Interest of the Child test stops right then and there. The law in fact, supports fatherhood—and that is the settled law on this matter, and no other.

4.03 –Whereas, the State of Ohio, in invoking Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4, is operating under a theory of Legislative law, or of agency, unknown to our form of government, as positively declared under the Constitution of Ohio, 1802. That it is a fact, that Michael A. Galluzzo, has no comprehension of the existence of a trust, nor the nature and cause of any judicial discretion used to overturn his rights and privileges as a father, that supercedes his natural born and common law rights as a father. Whereas, if in fact, there is no meeting of the minds between Michael A. Galluzzo, and the State of Ohio, then; any “trust” or “public trust” or “parens patriae” trust, is immediately dissolved by the interests of that trust being divergent and not settled. Whereas, any establishment of any existence of a public trust being invoked by the State of Ohio, under Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4; is at the instant of separate, or incompatible interests—that trust is dissolved.

4.04 –That there is in fact, a theology promulgated by Feminists, Socialists, and the courts, that there is a basic flaw in American Capitalism, and that FDR’s “New Deal” was a emergency condition, to rectify that failure through the advent of absolutist Administrative Procedures, which in fact under this political theory, due to the ‘emergency’, allows the panoply of state agency Administrative Decisions to overcome Constitutional analysis itself:

[T]he Constitution itself imposes a requirement that the person challenging agency action have “standing.” In short, this means that the person has suffered (or is about to suffer) injury as a result of the government action and that a favorable court decision can redress (or prevent) the injury. The [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] imposes an additional statutory requirement on the general requirement when a person is challenging agency action under the APA. The APA creates a legal right to review for persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,” id. § 702. Thus, the person suing must either be suffering a “legal wrong” or be adversely affected “within the meaning of a relevant statute.” Chapter 5 discusses in detail the doctrines that restrict access to he courts to obtain judicial review of agency action.

If a court undertakes judicial review, it must determine what scope of review to apply. The APA contains three standards of review of agency action that establish a continuum raging from no deference to almost complete deference. The “de novo” standard instructs a court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Under this test, the court must agree with the agency decision in order to uphold it. The “substantial evidence” standard instructs a court to uphold a decision if it is “reasonable.” Under this test, the court need not agree with the agency’s conclusion to affirm it; it only needs to find that the agency’s conclusions are reasonable ones. Finally, the “arbitrary and capricious” or “abuse of discretion” standards instruct a court to affirm a decision unless the judges can say that the decision is “arbitrary.” The last standard historically has been considered the most deferential, although most courts no longer find any practical difference between the last two standards in light of intervening judicial decisions.

1. Passage of the APA was the result of a decade long political battle between the friends and foes fo the New Deal. From the perspective of today’s highly regulated society, it is difficult to understand the threat that the Roosevelt administration posed for the business and legal communities. Because the New Deal was extraordinary for its time in the degree of intrusion on private autonomy and in its promise that the capitalistic market system was fundamentally flawed, many business and legal leaders were extremely hostile.[67] Their criticism made little impression on a public still reeling from the worst depression in the history of the country, but as economic conditions slowly improved, the momentum for procedural reform picked up steam. In 1939 , Congress passed the Walter Logan Bill, which was based on an American Bar Association proposal.[68] Denounced as “so rigid, as needlessly interfering as to bring about a crippling of the administrative process,” id. At 272, the bill was vetoed by President Roosevelt. The political tide was turned by an influential report issued by the Attorney General which endorsed a more flexible administrative procedure set.[69] After war induced delay, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act [APA] in 1946.

2. “Professor Martin Shapiro argues that the APA was a compromise between supporters and opponents of the New Deal. He explains that the adjudicatory procedures where “weighted heavily” in favor of the opponents, but rulemaking “constituted an almost total victory for the liberal New Deal forces.”[70]

3. …Congress has required some agencies to engaged in “hybrid” rulemaking, which obligates an agency to comply with procedures in addition to those required for informal rulemaking. Such additional procedures have been criticized as unnecessary and too slow. See, e.g. Barry Boyer, Trade Regulation Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission, in 1980 Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendations and Reports 33, 124-127.[71]

Whereas, the result of this new “Village” Feminist Jurisprudence and Marxist Jurisprudence inflected by the courts are currently being implementing against Mr. Galluzzo by Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 has been well-documented and understood by this court:

"The idea prevails with some -- indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar -- that we have in this country substantially and practically two national governments; one, to be maintained under the Constitution, with all of its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise.

"I take leave to say that if the principles thus announced should ever receive the sanction of a majority of this court, a radical and mischievous change in our system of government will be the result. We will, in that event, pass from the era of constitutional liberty guarded and protected by a written constitution into an era of legislative absolutism.

"It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution." See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) TA \l "Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)" \s "Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)" \c 1 , Harlan dissenting.

4.05 –There is also a “Village” theology rampant which declares that the Father no longer “own’s” his own children—that in fact, the “state” now owns the children, and that the state ‘bestows’ a “temporary trust” within the parents, which can be abrogated at any time. We have already settled law which declares this idea repugnant to American ideals and traditions.

4.06 –The law is clear: the judge cannot split the children. This is well-settled law and established precedent understood from the time of Christianity, onwards:

Here be two maximes of the common law. First, that no man can hold one and the same land immediately of two severall lords. Secondly, that one man cannot of the same land be both lord and tenant. And it is to be observed, that it is holden for an inconvenience, that any of the maximes of the law should be broken, though a private man suffer losse; for that by infringing of a maxime, not onely a generall prejudice to many, but in the end a publike incertainty and confusion to all would follow. Section 152b. [Maxim’s of Lord Coke] TA \l "Section 152b. [Maxim’s of Lord Coke]" \s "Section 152b. [Maxim’s of Lord Coke]" \c 8

That either the Father owns the child, and has the qualified common law right to determine where his children will be domiciled:

Cal. 1977. “Parents have powers greater than state XE "Parents have powers greater than state" to curtail child's exercise of constitutional rights, for parents own constitutionally protected "liberty" includes right to direct upbringing and education[72] of their children. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; West's Ann.Const. Art. 1 § 7(a)”--In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298. TA \l "In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298." \s "In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298." \c 1 [73]

4.07 –The Ohio Courts, under R.C. § 3109.4, believe in the feminist doctrine, that parents do not own their children, and the courts are inflecting Feminist Jurisprudence to effect that oppressive and failed political theology:

“Parents do not own their children. They merely care for them in trust for the rest of society. To maximize healthy growth and development, all children should grow up surrounded by social relationships that are close, personal, and enduring.[74]

4.08 –Legends joins with Michael A. Galluzzo, and states that there is no such “emergency” exists in this nation, and that in fact, FDR’s “New Deal” and those agencies which serve us, do not have delegation of authority to supercede settled constitutional mandate nor the individual rights of a father. They factually act as an overt fraud, under color of law and under color of authority to overthrow settled Constitutional law. We also rebuke, by point and authority, the idea that Capitalism failed in this nation, and that there is an “emergency” or “exigency” of some national scale which allows the aegis of Administrative practice, policy or procedure to overthrow Constitutional law.

One man who tried to warn the people back in the 1930's not to allow the federal government to expand its powers without constitutional amendment was Herbert Hoover, the 31st President of the United States. He openly stated that the New Deal was a philosophy of government that would end up destroying liberty. He stated that if the socialist policies of the New Deal were implemented that "this will not be the America which we have known in the past."[75] Mr. Hoover also pointed out that all the alternative philosophies of government such as socialism, fascism, naziism, communism, etc, had one thing in common. He stated that: "They all have in common the idea of the servitude of the individual to the state, and the denial of liberties unassailable by the state."[76]

Fatherhood, that Mr. Galluzzo is attempting to invoke over Ohio R.C. § 3109.4, is one of those unassailable foundational liberties being overthrown by the state by said revised code. As Mr. Hoover and others have correctly warned and adumbrated, “rule making” by the offending Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4, places states interests above that of the individual father.

4.09 –Legends, stands ready to defend what is erroneously referred to as “old law” – and state factually—that under law, Mr. Michael A. Galluzzo, does in fact, own and control his children; further, we exclaim that the settled legal concept that the state cannot intrude a foreign political theology and failed political “social engineering scheme”[77] upon Mr. Galluzzo, which factually: destroys families and children, is alien to the State of Ohio as well as the Union of Several State’s settled laws.

4.010 –Further, Legends factually states with authority, that when courts support feminism and women in their efforts to create a socialist state, that they are neither helping society, nor are they helping children. They are in fact, only destroying father’s for profit and reward and creating a Welfare state by an every increasing artificial creation of the Single Female Headed Household (SFHH) home. Conversely, however; supporting Fatherhood, does not create Single Father Headed Households (SFtHH); conversely, when courts support fatherhood, all any society obtains is strong families, strong children, and a growing capitalist society, with concomitant low social pathology rates. The following Maxim of Law is controlling: Partus sequitur ventrem.”“The offspring follow the condition of the mother. This is the law in the case of slaves and animals; 1 Bouviers Institutes n. 167, 502; but with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father.”

4.011 –It is a fact, and Legends defends and asserts and declares with authority, the fact that every time a judge uses “discretion” and awards a mother a child against its father—that judge is in fact, unconstitutionally “creating the condition of slaves and animals,” and enlarging his Welfare state. It is incontrovertible, that those children whom he places within the SFHH, chances of entering the myriad of social pathology facts and figures go up exponentially.[78] Whereas, all father’s are being asked by a judge invoking “discretion” over his foundational rights as a father, is to enjoin with that judge in his, and his children’s own destruction. This violates the controlling Maxim of Law; “No man is required to participate in his own destruction.”

Mr. Galluzzo is eminently correct in that Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 design and effect is to undermine and subrogate his natural born and common law rights as a father. As denoted earlier, this is an identity that the offending code is in fact, unconstitutional and outside the concise rule of law, thereby, null and void, in ab initio, and therefore, it must be summarily overturned and found to be unconstitutional and not in consonance to the Constitution of Ohio, 1802; nor the Constitution for the United States,1787-1791.

"So the legislature may from time to time, alter or change the remedy, this may do, provided they do not materially affect the right. But whenever the Legislature so far alter the remedy as to impede, destroy, change, or render the right scarcely worth pursuing, They necessarily impair the obligation of the contract upon which such right is founded and the act is unconstitutional and void XE "act is unconstitutional and void:Legislature cannot affect right: Smith v. Morse" ." Smith v. Morse 2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924) TA \l "Smith v. Morse 2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924)" \s "Smith v. Morse 2 Cal. 524 (1852) (1924)" \c 1

Whereas, the applied statute, read in the light of Mr. Galluzzo’s rights as a father, fails miserably. In fact, the statute only “controlling state interest” is designed to subrogate and diminish the rights of fatherhood:

"That if a statute[79] is part of an unlawful scheme XE "statute is part of an unlawful scheme:must fail; McCallen v. Massachusetts" to reach a prohibited result...the statute must fail..." McCallen v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630 TA \l "McCallen v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630" \s "McCallen v. Massachusetts, 27 U.S. 620, 630" \c 1

"If a law has no other purpose than to chill assertion of constitutional rights XE "law has no other purpose than to chill assertion of constitutional rights:void, Shapiro v. Thompson" by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, it is patently unconstitutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). TA \l "Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)." \s "Shapiro v. Thompson, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969)." \c 1

“No state shall convert a liberty into a privilege, license it XE "convert a liberty into a privilege, license it:Murdock v. Penn." , and attach a fee to it. “ Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105 TA \l "Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105" \s "Murdock v. Penn., 319 U.S. 105" \c 1

Note the reiteration of law that addresses this here: TA \l "Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516" \s "Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516" \c 1

"The Court has held that the deprivation of fundamental liberty rights XE "deprivation of fundamental liberty rights:Elrod v. Burns" "for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976). TA \l "Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)." \s "Elrod v. Burns, 96 S.Ct. 2673; 427 U.S. 347, (1976)." \c 1

"If the legislature clearly misinterprets a constitutional provision, the frequent repetition of the wrong will not create a right XE "wrong will not create a right:Amos v. Mosley" ." Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619 TA \l "Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \s "Amos v. Mosley, 74 Fla. 555; 77 So. 619" \c 1 .

It is a fact, that the state vests its authority to take away and diminish the rights of property against Mr. Galluzzo, by and through Ohio R.C. § 3109.4. Yet, the state never considers the unlawful takings of property against Mr. Galluzzo’s children, who, by law, are to receive a natural guardian at law vested in their father. He is not only the natural guardian, but he is also the child’s mentor; he is the child’s Master, there to give it a trade if need be; he is the child’s legal consultant; he is in fact, the moral and religious teacher of the child;

[The] Third Amendment prohibition against unconsented peacetime quartering of soldiers protects one aspect of privacy from governmental intrusion…The protection of a person’s general right to privacy, that is, his right to be let alone by other people, is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual states. Katz v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967) TA \l "Katz v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967)" \s "Katz v. U.S., 88 S.Ct. 507, 387 U.S. 347 (1967)" \c 1 . TA \l "Degregory v. Attorney General of State of N.H, 86 S.Ct. 1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d 202." \s "Degregory v. Attorney General of State of N.H, 86 S.Ct. 1148, 383 U.S. 825, 16 L.Ed.2d 202." \c 1

"Congress of course acts in the context of existing common-law rules XE "Congress of course acts in the context of existing common-law rules:Heydon's Case" , and in construing a statute a court considers the "common law before the making of the Act." Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584) TA \l "Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \s "Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637(Ex. 1584)" \c 1 Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288 TA \l "Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288" \s "Pierson, Et al. v. Ray Et al. (1967) 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288" \c 1

"It is said that these constitutional provisions do not mean the general body of the law as it was at the time the constitution took effect; but they refer to certain fundamental rights which the system of jurisprudence of which ours is derivative has always been recognized; if any of these are disregarded in the processing by which a person is condemned to the loss of property, etc., then the deprivation has not been by due process of law. And it has been held that the state cannot deprive a person of his property without due process of law through a constitution convention anymore than it can through an act of the legislature." In Brown v. Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss 479 TA \l "In Brown v. Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss 479" \s "In Brown v. Leveee com'rs, 50 Miss 479" \c 1 ,

It is a fact, that the Respondent’s, and their surrogate courts; by and through their premeditated, willful and overt acts and/or omissions implemented by and through Ohio R.C. § 3109.4, as well as United States Code, Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-666 and other “Welfare” transfer of wealth, scams and/or schemes, that they are directly responsible for this societies massive divorce rates; as well as explosive creation of Single Female Headed Household’s; as well as its attendant social pathologies that largely effect children; which all tend to increase respondent’s and their surrogate courts and governments, respective empires, by and through the needless disenfranchisement of Father’s Rights.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

1.) Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., comes before this solemn judicial powers court in good faith with no bad faith against any party.

2.) That Legends Legal Aid Society, Inc., comes before this court and Almighty God seeking substantive justice by Amicus Curiae relief for Michael A. Galluzzo and similarly situated fathers, everywhere.

3.) That Legends joins with Mr. Galluzzo, in stating the law contained herein; and declares that Michael A. Galluzzo is in fact, an Ohio State Citizen, a Father w ith substantive rights under the law; and, that Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 are in fact, unconstitutionally removing and impeding those rights, privileges and secured liberties from Mr. Galluzzo by and through placing the state, over him invoking some ‘superior’ Parens Patriae authority which is in fact, outside the rule of law, and invoked under color of law and under color of authority.

4.) Legends demands that this court, find for Mr. Galluzzo in his entirety, and further,

5.) That Legends demands that this court find that Mr. Galluzzo, does in fact, own his own children, in accordance with law.

6.) Legends requests that the offending Ohio Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 be struck down and publicly excoriated and declared as being UNCONSTITUTIONAL by this court and so publicly proclaimed.

7.) That Legends also request this court find that the State of Ohio, by and through implementing Rule 75(N) and R.C. § 3109.4 against Mr. Galluzzo and his family, that it find that an “unlawful takings” of property has in fact, occurred against Mr. Galluzzo and his family.

8.) That if this court does not find for Mr. Galluzzo, that it remit a written FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, and a written STATEMENT OF DECISION, showing the concise rule of law decided by this court, which is in consonance with the Constitution for the United States 1787-1791 within fifteen (15) days of its judicial determination.

9.) That Legends request that this court remit to Mr. Galluzzo, any other further remedy, justice, or relief, or redress of grievances, that it deems fair, just and proper.

I, Robert Lindsay Cheney Jr., being the undersigned, declare under penalty of perjury as follows:

That the afore-going Amicus Curiae Brief, including referenced and/or attached documents, and/or duplicates of such documents are exacting copies of the originals in my/or my counsel’s (specifically not American Bar Association, or professional “Attorney’s”) possession. That I have read the foregoing document(s) and attachments, and know and understand their contents, and having personal knowledge of them, know them to be true. As to those matters submitted therein upon information and/or belief, as to those matters, I also believe them true.

Executed this August 25, 2005, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior Jesus the Christ Two-Thousand-Five.

SUBSCRIPTION

Subscribed this 25^th day of August, under exigent circumstances, before Almighty God, in the Year of Our Lord and Savior, Jesus the Christ, Two-Thousand-Five.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

I, the undersigned server, hereby certify and declare that I am over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within entitled cause of action; and, Further, hereby deposes and says: that on the date signed below, I did serve UNDER AUTHORITY OF APPELLANT/PETITIONER the attached document named:

Further, I declare under penalty of perjury knowing the laws thereof within the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that these documents were served by me personally as stated above and/or mailed and sealed as stated above within the California Republic.

[1] To escape this tyranny, Patriarchy created the Feme Sole woman, who had legal rights exactly conditioned upon any individual man’s rights. It was only in the institution of marriage, where women came under “coverture”—e.g. “legal protection of the husband” (see legal definition of “Family” denoted below)--which is still in existence today, under the Doctrines of Child Support and Alimony, which are Patriarchal institutions (not state nor Matriarchal ones). These two items of Child Support and Alimony allow coverture after marriage. They are in direct opposition to Feminism, which claims that women are just as good as men, (feme sole), are sexually and contractually unregulated; and can do without men and “make it anywhere.” Yet, both the state, and feminists, cling to the Patriarchal Institutions of Child Support and Alimony with a vengeance. These two institutions of Child Support and Alimony, created by Patriarchy admit, women and children are incompetent, and cannot take care of themselves after marriage, and that they need taking care of. They are established off of the benevolent Patriarchal premise that a man accrues the benefit of being Head of Household, and the leader of his family, and because of that recognized privilege, that the father is then obligated to Child Support and Alimony. However; Ohio R.C. § 3109.4 factually removes any and all privileges from the Father, therefore, under law, he does not, nor legally cannot assume the burden of Child Support or Alimony because of this. Oddly, marriage, (which is a voluntary institution) was not in fact, an abusive institution as the feminist would have us believe—in fact, women for millennium have chosen that institution over that of being feme sole. Either we live in a society that agrees with Patriarchy, and forces those men whom accrue the benefit of being Head of Family with the burden of taking care of that women and child after divorce (under coverture); or we live in a Feminized society, where women are in fact, EQUAL and FREE and can dissolve the marriage at will—and therefore, they assume the burden of maintaining their and their children’s own lives after divorce, and do not get Child Support nor Alimony. The controlling maxim of law here is: “He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden.” TA \l "\“He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden.\”" \s "\"He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden.\"" \c 8 We either live in a structured Patriarchal society, or a free and sexually unregulated Feminized society—but we cannot live in both.

See:

“But he is not bound, without some agreement, to pay another for maintaining them; 9 C. & P. 497; nor is he bound to pay their debts, unless he has authorized them to be contracted.” 38 E. C. L. R. 195, n. See 8 Watts, R. 366 1 Craig. & Phil. 317; Bind; Nother; Parent. This obligation ceases as soon as the child becomes of age, unless he becomes chargeable to the public. 1 Ld. Ray. 699 TA \l "Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1856; 1 Ld. Ray. 699" \s "1 Ld. Ray. 699" \c 3 .—BOUVIERS LAW DICTIONARY 1856 [FATHER]

[2] "Codes of this state were intended to establish law of state respecting subjects to which they relate, so that it is only when code and other statutes are silent that common law governs, under Pol. C. §4468."  Burlingame v. Traeger (1929), 101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051 TA \l "Burlingame v. Traeger (1929), 101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051" \s "Burlingame v. Traeger (1929), 101 C.A. 365, 281 P. 1051" \c 1 .

[3] It is in fact, Feminism, which Dr. Daniel Amneus, in his “The Case for Father Custody,” and his earlier work, “The Garbage Generation TA \l "The Garbage Generation, Dr. Daniel Amneus" \s "The Garbage Generation" \c 3 ”, correctly denoted feminism and Matriarchy (of which these family courts uphold) which is the older, more backwards of the two models. Other scholarship, ranging from Anthropology to Social Science, is replete with this understanding.

[4] "In 1988 divorces filed involving families with children 64.9% were filed by women, which is down from 71.4^ filed by women in 1975; 28.8% were filed by men, which is up from 25.6% in 1975; and 6.3% were filed jointly, which is up from 2.6% in 1975." Address to the Commonwealth Club of California, 1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992 TA \l "Address to the Commonwealth Club of California, 1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992" \s "Address to the Commonwealth Club of California, 1992, Quoted in FACE, August 1992" \c 3 .

“Further evidence of the impact of these two major societal revolutions on the family, marriage and fatherhood comes from the records of divorce rates in America in the 130-year span between 1870 and 1998. In the late nineteenth century (1870), the divorce rate was 3% — in other words, virtually non-existent. As the Industrial Revolution took hold, by 1930 the divorce rate had steadily escalated to a peak of 17% — a nearly 600% increase. At the end of the second socio-revolutionary event, World War II, the divorce rate spiked to 30% and then leveled off to an average of 25% between 1950 and 1965, just long enough for the Baby boomers to become young adults and late teens. It was at this point — between 1965 and 1975 that the divorce rate doubled, and has remained fairly constant at about 50% up until the end of the twentieth century.

The centerpiece of this latter day program was an expansion of welfare benefits, as long as recipients obeyed the "no man in the house" rule. Consequently, the black family that had been stronger up to that point than the white family, began to be destroyed. Bill Johnson, recently writing in the Detroit News, had this to say: "[There has been a] dramatic increase in the number of children living in father-absent families. According to federal government figures, driven by the growing number of unmarried women of childbearing age (15-44 years), the number of births to unmarried women rose to 1,293,567 in 1998, continuing an upward surge. The National Center for Health Statistics pegged out-of-wedlock births among blacks in 1997 at 69.2 percent, up from 23 percent in 1960." The Evolved Matriarchal American Family & Fatherhood, by Gerald L. Rowles, Ph.D TA \l "The Evolved Matriarchal American Family & Fatherhood, by Gerald L. Rowles, Ph.D" \s "The Evolved Matriarchal American Family & Fatherhood, by Gerald L. Rowles, Ph.D" \c 3 ., Monday, Jan. 29, 2001

[5] Reference: In re Jamie T.

[6] Cited from:

[7] “The right of a fit and proper parent to his child's custody is somewhat in the nature of a property right XE "CHILD is property right:Turner and Petrosky cases" \t "See Best Interest of the Child \"test\"" , and is paramount, in a sense, to the child's theoretical welfare and best interests.” Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636 TA \l "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \s "Turner v. Turner (1959) 334 P.2d 1011, 167 C.A.2d 636" \c 1 .

[8] As openly admitted by U.S. v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

[9] From: Black’s Law Dictionary, Third Ed., ã 1933, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. P. 753. [Pertinent parts quoted.]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LEGENDS LEGAL AID SOCIETY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ARTICLE VIII.

BILL OF RIGHTS.

OH

OHIO

OH

OHIO

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD “TEST”[59] DECLINATION CHART XE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD \“TEST\” DECLINATION CHART" XE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD \“TEST\” DECLINATION CHART:Declination of persons who have primary rights over state as parens patriae"

“Positive Disqualification”

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

SUBSCRIPTION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT